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Organizations that aim at delivering essential goods and services to low-income populations at 
the base of the pyramid increasingly blend the social welfare and the commercial logics in an 
effort to create financially sustainable solutions to social problems. Scholars have portrayed these 
cross-sectoral hybrid organizations as particularly agentic and resilient in institutionally complex 
settings, highlighting their ability to turn institutional voids into opportunity spaces. At the same, 
the reconciliation of two antagonistic goals, namely poverty alleviation and financial value 
creation, as well as the multiple institutional voids that hybrid organizations face at the base of the 
pyramid (BoP) expose them to severe tensions. By investigating eight hybrid organizations in four 
countries, namely Colombia, Mexico, Kenya and Colombia, the present study contributes to a 
better understanding of cross-sectoral hybrid organizations in BoP settings in two ways.  
First, it shows that hybrid organizations not only face tensions between sector logics, but also 
between formal and informal, as well as between “Western-style” and “local style” strategic action 
fields. In settings which do not effectively provide guidance on the prioritization of social vs. 
financial objectives, these institutional voids manifest as tensions over goals and tensions over 
means in hybrid organizations.  
Second, the study sheds light on how field-level dynamics influence the ability of hybrid 
organizations to strategically employ factors that spur legitimacy advantages in an effort to turn 
institutional voids into opportunity spaces. Two different scenarios have been identified.  
One scenario refers to Colombia, Mexico and Kenya, which have been classified as fields that 
don’t effectively enforce a dominant sector logic concerning the legitimate way that health 
services should be provided to low-income populations. The present study has shown that in 
such fields, an organization’s logic of origin as well as the personal background of founders are 
factors that may spur legitimacy advantages in hybrid organizations. In effect, organizations 
which strategically employ these factors can select more freely from competing logics and 
ultimately overcome the prevailing tensions. This resonates with previous research, which has 
suggested that in fields with a dominant logic, hybrid organizations may take advantage of 
legitimacy advantages if their logic of origin corresponds to the dominant logic at the field level 
(Pache and Santos, 2012). However, the present study suggests that the factors leading to 
legitimacy advantages are more complex in fields with no effective dominant logic regarding 
social service provision. Here, the dominant logics among funding organizations, possible 
legitimacy spill-over effects from other market players, as well as the specifications of the 
commercial and the social welfare logics become important sources of possible legitimacy 
advantages. However, the study suggests that an organization’s ability to employ them 




In addition to these findings, the study also provides insights on cross-sectoral hybridization in 
fields with a weakly enforced dominant logic, which is the second scenario that has been 
identified in South Africa. In particular, the study suggests that in such settings, hybrid 
organizations are more restricted to freely draw from competing logics, given that they face 
effective, normative imperatives about the goals they should pursue. However, the empirical 
investigation also indicates that an organization’s resource dependence structure is more 
influential than the encountered normative claims of audiences in health fields at the BoP. Further 
research is needed to refine these insights and explore cross-sectoral hybridization in social 
service provision fields in contexts of a weakly enforced dominant logic. 
Based on these findings, the author derives a range of practical recommendations that may 
themselves be interpreted as paradoxical. As the empirical study suggests, blended value 
creating hybrid organizations in Colombia, Mexico and Kenya currently face legitimacy 
advantages when originating from a commercial origin. The researcher is thus, on the one hand, 
inclined to recommend them to position themselves as commercially oriented organizations as to 
take advantage of the legitimacy advantages that the commercial logic currently entails. On the 
other hand, she cautions actors in the field of blended value creation, particularly funding entities, 
not to neglect the actual role of nonprofit organizations. The establishment of (health) markets 
that provide low-income populations in developing and emerging economies with affordable, 
high-quality products and services is likely to require significant unprofitable efforts. Finally, hybrid 
organizations in South Africa need to be more careful when adopting structures or practices from 
the commercial logic given the low legitimacy that this logic has in the health market at the BoP. 
There, organizations need to thoroughly analyze the institutional claims in the specific context of 
post-Apartheid South Africa. 
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1.1 Background and Problem Statement 
Innovative organizational models that solve societal issues with business means and concurrently 
create social and economic, that is, blended value (Emerson, 2003), have raised significant 
attention, both in theory and practice. This trend, which blurs traditional boundaries between the 
public, private and third sectors (Nicholls & Murdock, 2012), is particularly prominent in 
developing and emerging economies. 1 On the one hand, their economic growth often leads to a 
flourishing private sector that attracts foreign and domestic investors. On the other hand, many 
social issues such as access to health and education remain pressing challenges that still require 
support from development organizations and donors, as governments often lack the necessary 
resources and institutional strength to ensure a full supply of basic goods and services. Their 
provision is thus typically organized in mixed markets, meaning that various players from diverse 
sector backgrounds collaborate and/or compete with each other (Marwell & McInerney, 2005, 
p. 7). Given this pluralistic environment, various players have called for collaborations, as well as 
solutions that overcome sectoral barriers and create blended value in an effort to become self-
sustainable and provide lasting solutions to societal needs (see e.g. United Nations Development 
Programme, 2008, p. 21).  
The base of the pyramid (BoP) proposition, introduced by Prahalad and Hart (2002), is one of the 
blended value creating approaches that has spurred enthusiasm mainly among business 
practitioners and scholars. By stressing the existence of an untapped “fortune” at the BoP, that is, 
the market of low-income people, 2  Prahalad and Hart expressed a pivotal claim: poverty 
reduction does not necessarily have to happen at the expense of profit generation (p. 2). If 
innovative business models are applied at a large scale, the authors argue, the BoP yields a 
huge market potential, where both social and economic value can be created in a mutually 
beneficial way.  
                                                   
1 The term “public sector” is used to refer to the sphere of the economy owned and run by governmental entities 
both at the national and municipal level. “Private sector” refers to the sphere that is run by commercially driven 
organizations and primarily seeks profit making. It is mainly populated by for-profit organizations, such as private 
companies and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), as well as banks, investment funds and individual 
investors. Finally, the “third sector” designates the sphere between community, market and state, in which 
particularly nonprofit or civil society organizations emerge in order to promote certain social objectives. These 
organizations include, for instance, foundations and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Third sector 
(organization) is often used interchangeably with “nonprofit sector/organization” or “civil society (organization)” – 
although each term implies a different emphasis. However, they generally refer to the same phenomenon, namely 
organizations that operate between the public and the private sector. In this study, the terms will be used 
interchangeably, depending on the context and the references from which they are drawn.  
2 In accordance with extant literature, the term BoP is used in this study to refer to the approximately four billion  
people  around  the  world  that  live  in  considerable  poverty  and  face  substantial  socioeconomic  challenges. 
Although a small share of these people live in the Global North, the term is furthermore used with a focus on 
developing and emerging economies, that is low- and middle income economies with rapid growth rates and a 




However, there are so far only relatively few examples of BoP approaches that are financially and 
socially successful on a larger scale (Simanis, 2012). Evidence from microfinance, the best-
known example of large-scale blended value creating approaches at the BoP, has triggered 
controversial discussions about its actual social impact and thus the legitimacy of “doing business 
with the poor” (see e.g. Khavul, 2010). Examples include the Mexican bank Compartamos, as 
well as the Indian microfinance institution SKS, which sparked a global wave of indignation by 
going public and attracting large private investments. Critics argued that in order to fulfill their 
shareholders’ profit expectations both organizations putatively turned their socially oriented 
initiatives into companies that generated profit out of the poor (The New York Times, 2012). In 
addition, the wide range of challenges that prevail in BoP markets make profitability, or even 
financial sustainability, difficult to achieve. The BoP proposition has therefore been criticized for 
being overly optimistic concerning the compatibility of social and financial value creation (see e.g. 
Karnani, 2006, p. 91f.). 
Hence, it isn’t surprising that Multinational Corporations (MNCs), which were Prahalad and Hart’s 
main target group due to their ability to achieve economies of scale, have remained hesitant in 
approaching the BoP. Instead, new types of organizations have taken up the challenge of 
creating blended value through business models that serve the poor – particularly hybrid 
organizations that embrace the institutional logics3 of the private and the third sector, that is, the 
commercial logic and the social welfare logic (Pache & Santos, 2012, p. 972). Social enterprises, 
inclusive businesses and other types of social innovations, combine structures and practices 
traditionally belonging to separate sectors in order to make sense of complex environments and 
to gain the legitimacy and resources needed to achieve their hybrid goals of social and economic 
value creation (ibid). This capacity has been put forth as particularly important in a world that 
becomes more global, fast paced, and competitive, and thus depicts a higher level of institutional 
complexity, where multiple institutional logics co-exist, compete with each other, and create 
contradictory prescriptions for organizations (Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta, & 
Lounsbury, 2011). 
Still, despite their potential innovativeness and flexibility to adapt to institutional complexity, 
organizational scholars have also pointed to the tensions that hybrid organizations have to 
manage. Being exposed to conflicting institutional demands can cause tensions that jeopardize 
the achievement of aspired goals, or even organizational survival, as complying with one set of 
demands may require neglecting another set of demands (see e.g. Battilana & Dorado, 2010; 
Besharov & Smith, 2013; Pache & Santos, 2012; Smith & Lewis, 2011). 
Besides microfinance or telecommunications, for instance, health care is one of the fields in 
which hybrid organizations currently work towards developing and delivering solutions with a 
                                                   
3 Institutional logics are defined as “the socially constructed, historical patterns of material practices, assumptions, 
values, beliefs, and rules by which individuals produce and reproduce their material subsistence, organize time 
and space, and provide meaning to their social reality” (Thornton und Ocasio 1999, p. 804). 
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blended value creation approach. As a central human need, health is not only a human right, but 
also a huge market that attracts both philanthropic and commercial actors (see e.g. International 
Finance Corporation, 2007; Kapoor & Goyal, 2013; Paul, 2005). Especially in emerging 
economies, health sectors are characterized by high degrees of institutional complexity. 
Generally, various subsystems of health financing and provision co-exist with different, but also 
overlapping target segments of the population, thereby creating an inefficient and often ineffective 
health system that leaves certain parts of the population un- or poorly attended (Pan American 
Health Organization (PAHO) 2008, p. 35). Partly as a consequence of the resource scarcity and 
the administrative fragility that are typical for public health systems in emerging markets (Gerald 
Bloom, 2004, p. 7), the public, private and third sectors all interact within these mixed health 
markets (see e.g. Evers, 2005; Marwell & McInerney, 2005). Therefore health financing is 
typically a mixed and largely “unorganized market” (Standing & Bloom, 2002), where significant 
shares of health expenditures are unpooled out-of-pocket payments (Kutzin, 2001, p.1), that is 
direct payments from people – including low-income people – who increasingly favor private 
providers to the generally affordable, but often low-quality, public health service provision (see 
e.g. G. Bloom, Champion, Standing, Lucas, & Peters, 2009).  
Given this background, a growing number of health care organizations have emerged and started 
to attract considerable interest among private investors, international development agencies and 
philanthropic organizations (see e.g. Glaxosmithkline 2014; International Finance Corporation 
2007; PharmAccess Foundation 2014). They aim at hybrid goals in the sense that they seek to 
provide high-quality health care that is affordable for the poor in a financially sustainable manner. 
Due to the above-mentioned diversity and scarcity of resources available for these goals, these 
health care organizations experiment with new hybrid organizational models that combine 
elements of the commercial and the social welfare logics in order to allocate the best of two 
worlds that are traditionally in antagonistic positions (see e.g. Pache & Santos, 2012). However, it 
remains poorly investigated how they deal with tensions. For example, at first sight, the core of 
the BoP proposition remains a trade-off: Deciding to set a profitable price adversely affects the 
objective of reaching very poor customers, as they are by definition completely or partially unable 
to pay. If, on the one hand, hybrid organizations decide to charge profitable prices, they risk 
earning substantial criticism and jeopardizing their organizational legitimacy. If, on the other hand, 
they opt to offer products or services for free or sell them below the profitability threshold, it 
negatively affects their goal to reach financial sustainability. In order to cope with such trade-offs, 
new strategies such as the cross-subsidization between high or middle-income and low-income 
people have started to spread among organizations that operate at the BoP.  
In recent years, hybrid organizations have increasingly attracted the attention of management 
scholars, including institutional theorists and paradox researchers (see e.g. Battilana & Dorado, 
2010; Ebrahim, Battilana, & Mair, 2014; Jay, 2013). The number of publications about hybrid 




that integrates the diversity of those organizations. While institutional researchers put a stronger 
focus on the deterministic power of contradictory pressures to which hybrid organizations have to 
react, for example, through balancing or compromising, paradox researchers generally adopt a 
more optimistic view on tensions and argue that they may stimulate organizations to develop 
innovative solutions. One of the main interests of analyzing hybrid organizations therefore lies in 
shedding light on hybridization as a particularly resilient strategy to deal with complex institutional 
environments that impose conflicting demands on organizations. 
However, theory about hybrid organizations is still in its infancy. Many questions remain to be 
answered. For instance: Why do organizations combine logics of different sectors in a certain 
way? Or in other words: why do they hybridize the way they do? And why are certain 
organizations better able to manage tensions than others? The hybridization movement includes 
organizations with origins in the private sector as well as organizations with origins in the third 
sector, and thus legally encompasses both for-profit companies and nonprofit organizations 
(Battilana, 2012, p. 52). As recent research has shown, hybrid organizations’ logic of origin 
provides them with legitimacy advantages or disadvantages, and thus has influence over their 
ability to hybridize. For instance, in their study on social enterprises in the field of work integration 
in France, Pache and Santos (2012) show that social enterprises with a social welfare origin have 
a legitimacy advantage when compared to their peers with a commercial origin. This legitimacy 
advantage enabled them to draw more freely from structures and practices of competing logics. 
Yet, the source of this legitimacy advantage, as the authors explain, lies in public institutions’ 
effective enforcement of a field-level consensus concerning the way social services should be 
provided through. As the authors argue, in the field of work integration in France, there was a 
strong field-level consensus that social enterprises should pursue a social mission. Tensions over 
the appropriate goals of social enterprises were thus effectively resolved at the field level, thereby 
providing clear guidance for social enterprises about their appropriate behavior. The emerging 
theory of hybrid organizations so far lacks insights on cross-sectoral hybridization in settings 
where such a field-level consensus doesn’t exist or is not effectively enforced, thereby exposing 
hybrid organizations to tensions over goals. 
The present study shares the argument of scholars who emphasize that developing and 
emerging economies provide an interesting setting to investigate the influence of institutional 
environments on organizations (Peng, 2003, p. 276), and more specifically, on hybrid 
organizations. Besides the above-mentioned institutional complexity that may challenge 
organizations, BoP settings pose further obstacles that may cause different types of tensions for 
organizations. For instance, institutions developing and emerging economimes have generally 
been argued to be weak or absent. Governmental enforcing mechanisms of formal institutions 
such as laws, for instance, are often weak, thereby inhibiting the establishment of well-functioning 
(Western-style) markets (Mair, Martí, and Ventresca, 2012, p. 832) and consequently, social and 
economic development (see e.g. World Bank, 2002). However, scholars – mainly paradox 
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researchers and some institutional scholars (see e.g. Desa & Basu, 2013; Estrin, Korosteleva, & 
Mickiewicz, 2013; Estrin, Mickiewicz, & Stephan, 2013; McMullen, 2011) – have more recently 
started to argue that uncertain institutional conditions, or institutional voids, can also be seen as 
opportunity spaces. In particular, Mair, Martí and Ventresca (2012) argue that organizations may 
interpret institutional voids not as empty spaces, but rather as “intermediate outcome of conflict 
and contradiction” (p. 842) between several institutional spheres and thus as “problem-sensing 
tools (…) to diagnose conditions that need to be addressed for inclusive market initiatives to 
develop” (p. 843). This reasoning resembles arguments from scholarly investigations that 
portrayed hybrid organizations, particularly social enterprises, as particularly effective and flexible 
players that succeed in turning institutional voids into opportunity spaces (see e.g. Desa, 2011; 
Mair & Martí, 2009). Yet, little is known about cross-sectoral hybridization as a strategy to make 
sense of institutional voids. For instance: to which logics do hybrid organizations at the BoP refer 
to in order to overcome the challenges that institutional voids pose? How do field-level factors,4 
such as the prevalence of institutional voids, enable and/or constrain hybrid organizational 
models? 
In order to contribute to the emerging theory of hybrid organizations, and more concretely, to BoP 
and development literature, the present study seeks to approach two specific research questions: 
1. What tensions do hybrid organizations targeting the BoP experience, and why?  
2. What hybridization strategies do they apply to manage these tensions, and why? 
In approaching those research questions, the study will concentrate on the logic of origin and on 
institutional voids as two focal concepts that influence the tensions (constraints) and the strategic 
leeway (agency) in hybrid organizations at the BoP. It is believed that the research setting of the 
present study – four different BoP markets (Colombia, Mexico, Kenya and South Africa) – is 
particularly well suited to investigate the relationship between those concepts due to the high 
prevalence of institutional voids in their health systems, and thus to provide important 
contributions for theory and practice. 
  
                                                   
4 In this study the term ‘field’ refers to both the field of health care and the field of blended value creating 
organizations, depending on the context in which it is used. In accordance with institutional theorists, it will be 
used to emphasize the relational and network features of the space in which organizations operate (Scott, 2008, 
p. 430) and relate “to the totality of relevant actors“ in “a recognized area of institutional life” (see DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983, p. 148). Interactions among actors within an organizational field are frequent and routinized, and 
thus provide stability and meaning (Scott, 1995, p. 56). Field-level analysis thus emphasizes factors that relate to 
the interconnectedness of organizations and their embeddedness in an institutional environment that guides their 
behavior (Wooten & Hoffman, 2008, p. 131f.). While earlier conceptions of fields emphasized the rigidity of 
institutional environments and predicted organizational inertia, more recent scholarly work has adopted a dynamic 





1.2 Purpose and Significance of the Study 
The present study is based on the belief that a better understanding of hybrid organizations in 
BoP settings is important for practical as well as theoretical reasons. From a practice point of 
view, it can be observed that BoP approaches are currently being promoted from several ends, 
though with little coordination and little understanding of their actual potential to contribute to 
poverty alleviation in developing and emerging markets. Stemming from strategy research, BoP 
literature is very practice oriented, providing a range of tools and recommendations for 
businesses that seek to tap into low-income markets. Yet, these recommendations largely 
neglect field-level dynamics as well as other types of actors that are currently actively 
experimenting with the BoP propositions, including social enterprises and other types of hybrid 
organizations. Altogether these approaches – be it in health care or in other areas – form an 
eclectic organizational field at the BoP, which keeps growing and continues to raise interest 
among investors, donors, policy makers and other related actors (Kolk, Rivera-Santos, & Rufín, 
2013, p. 16). Yet, despite its increasing relevance in practice, the body of scholarly work about 
these organizational models in emerging markets remains relatively small, largely anecdotal, and 
scattered across different disciplines. A focus on hybrid organizations is thus believed to add to 
BoP literature by describing innovative ways of managing institutional complexity. With the focus 
on potential capacities to flexibly adapt to institutional complexity and mobilize resources in an 
innovative way (Desa & Basu, 2013), the emerging theory of hybrid organizations is a useful, 
though rarely applied, lens to learn about innovative ways to organize and foster social and 
economic development at the BoP. In addition, it remains largely unknown how field-level, and 
particularly cross-sector dynamics, constrain and/or enable BoP approaches in creating blended 
value. Leaning on institutional theory as a lens to investigate hybrid organizations will therefore 
account for the role of field-level factors and their influence on organizational level tensions and 
strategies at the BoP.   
From a theoretical point of view, cross-sector hybridity at the BoP provides a particularly fruitful 
research setting. Developing and emerging economies are typically not only characterized by 
institutional complexity, but also by institutional voids, which may challenge organizations and/or 
trigger innovative and strategic organizational behavior – for instance, with regard to hybridization 
strategies at the interstices of sector logics. The study will thus link organizational-level 
phenomena (tensions and hybridization strategies) to field-level factors (institutional complexity 
and institutional voids), and contribute to the emergent theory on hybrid organizations by 
shedding light on the process of turning institutional voids into opportunity spaces as well as 




1.3 Structure of the Study 
The present study will begin by providing a bigger picture of the configuration of social service 
provision in developing and emerging economies. Chapter 2 will outline the major historical 
factors that have led to the increasing market orientation in the development regime over the last 
decades. The rise of market-oriented development approaches will be further illustrated with the 
example of cross-sector hybridity in health care and a stronger focus on the BoP approach as an 
own body of literature originating from business literature. Chapter 3 will subsequently provide the 
theoretical background for the investigation of hybrid organizations in BoP settings. A review of 
key concepts from institutional theory, particularly institutional complexity and conflicting 
institutional logics will be presented. In addition, the chapter will outline the main arguments from 
paradox research, as the second most important research stream to investigate hybrid 
organizations. Based on these theoretical elaborations, chapter 4 will present the conceptual 
framework, that is, the assumed relationship of concepts on which the study focuses in order to 
approach the research questions. Chapter 5 will explain the methodology, which is rooted in 
critical realism, meaning that reality is understood as socially constructed, while also possessing 
a certain degree of objectivity. The study’s qualitative approach to data collection and analysis 
will furthermore be described in this chapter. Chapter 6 displays the empirical analysis of eight 
case studies of blended value creating health care providers in BoP settings. All cases will be 
presented through narratives that trace the trajectory of tensions and hybridization strategies 
throughout organizations’ existence. Furthermore, the findings of the empirical analysis will be 
summarized and embedded in extant literature. Finally, chapter 7 wraps up the study, presents 





2 CHANGES IN THE HISTORICAL CONFIGURATION OF 
SOIAL SERVICE PROVISION IN DEVELOPING AND 
EMERGING ECONOMIES 
In order to gain a better understanding of the complex institutional settings in which hybrid 
organizations that serve the BoP operate, it is necessary to consider some key dynamics that 
have shaped the way social services are provided in the Global South. 5 Although countries 
indisputably differ with regard to their institutional arrangements, the majority has been affected 
by an increasing market-orientation of the international development regime over the last 
decades. While development aid has traditionally flown to developing and emerging economies 
through channels of the public and third sector, the last years have increasingly positioned the 
private sector as a legitimate recipient of financial and technical support (Hanley, Wachner, & 
Weiss, 2015, p. 23). This trend will be further described in the following sections with a focus on 
the increasing importance of concepts such as social investment and the Base of the Pyramid 
(BoP) approach. In addition, the increasing market-orientation will be illustrated with the example 
of the health care sector, which is also the sector in which the case study of the empirical 
analysis operate.  
2.1 Market Liberalization, Third Sector Organizations and the Changing 
Role of Governments  
The beginnings of modern international development aid, as opposed to development aid in the 
colonial era, are often associated with events in the post World-War II period. In particular, the 
establishment of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) by the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1960 can be understood as the natal hour of 
official development aid (ODA). Since then, the development agenda, that is, the common 
understanding of key development actors over development goals and means, has experienced 
several shifts.  
After World War II, when the institutionalization of modern international development aid began to 
take off, “the prevailing view was that government intervention, public provision, inward 
orientation and economic planning could all enhance a country's development” (Greenaway & 
                                                   
5 The terms Global North and Global South refer to the disparities of resources and income between the Northern 
and Southern hemisphere. The terms have been popularized by the so-called Brandt Report (officially entitled 
“North-South: A Program for Survival”), which was published by the Independent Commission on International 
Development Issues” chaired by the former Chancellor of West Germany. The report broadly distinguishes 
between “developing countries as those which occupy the southern hemisphere and developed countries as 
those which occupy the northern hemisphere, while acknowledging exceptions to this generalization and 
emphasizing the common global economy that all countries function within. A distinction is drawn between the 
comparatively large human population that lives in relative poverty in the South, compared to the smaller and 
more affluent population of the North. The determining factor here being economic power, with the North’s 
domination of “the international economic system, its rules and regulations, and its international institutions of 
trade money and finance”. See more at http://www.sharing.org/information-centre/reports/brandt-report-summary   
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Morrissey, 1993, p. 241). The two major development theories, namely, modernization theory and 
dependency theory, differed with regards to their core argument,6 however, both embraced the 
importance of strong government involvement (Babb, 2005, p. 199f.). Countries in Latin America, 
Asia and Africa, which were lagging behind in terms of social and economic development, had 
high hopes for rapid growth and development. Programs that promoted state-driven development 
through import-substitution industrialization were implemented in various countries with the 
purpose to rapidly catch up with countries in the Global North (see e.g. Heidhues & Obare, 2011). 
However, as the aspired progress in development failed to materialize, the perception about 
governments’ role changed significantly from the early 1980’s onward. Concurrent to the “anti-
Keneysian wave that swept through the West”, a “neoliberal “counterrevolution” in development 
theory” emerged (Brohman, 1995, p. 134). As Evers (2005) describes with reference to the 
European context, “welfare systems increasingly define themselves as purchasers and regulators 
of services provided by private and non-profit businesses” (p. 741). A similar trend can be 
observed in the majority of developing and emerging economies, where governments have 
increasingly “hollowed out” (Rhodes, 1994) over the last decades; meaning that they have 
privatized state-owned firms, deregulated the provision of goods and services that was previously 
in the hands of public entities and opened it to multiple providers that compete in retail markets in 
the name of “efficiency, competitiveness, innovation, individual freedom, deficit reduction, 
revenue generation, and so on” (Haque, 1999, p. 204).  
Particularly, as a consequence of structural adjustment policies that were tied as conditions to 
financial assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB), 
various countries have been incentivized to implement extensive liberalization reforms, which 
promote market principles, the reduction of state interventions, the establishment of comparative 
advantages, and the importance of economic growth (Manor, 1993, p. 306). Hence, the 
measures included “the privatization of state enterprises, deregulation of state controls, 
liberalization of trade, elimination of import restrictions, encouragement of foreign investment, 
withdrawal of subsidies, and reduction of welfare programs” (Haque, 1999, p. 204).  
These changes in the development regimes of the last decades have resulted in a penetration of 
market mechanisms in various aspects of life in developing and emerging economies. In sectors 
that relate to basic needs,7 structural adjustment policies and the resulting market liberalization 
has spurred significant criticism. Homedes and Ugalde (2005, p. 83), for instance, argue that the 
                                                   
6 Modernization theory emphasized the need for policies that foster rationalization and industrialization – or as 
Pieterse (2001) argues, an „adoption of „Western“ political institutions“ (p. 22). Dependency theory criticized 
modernization theory as they argue that it is precisely modernization that has led to the exploitation of 
underdeveloped nations. Dependency theorists therefore advocated for alternative development strategies that 
states could apply, including the facilitation of world market access for underdeveloped countries (p. 24f.) 
7 In this study, basic needs will be defined according to the International Labour Organization (ILO) as the 
minimum consumption needs of a family, including adequate food, shelter and clothing, as well as essential 
goods and services like safe water, sanitation, public transport, health care and education. The ILO definition also 
encompasses access to employment as a means to an end in meeting basic needs, as well as participation in 
decision-making. (International Labour Office, 1976) 
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beneficiaries of neoliberal health reforms in Latin America aren’t the populations of the countries, 
but rather Western companies as well as employees and members of development organizations 
and associations. More specifically, liberal reforms in developing and emerging economies have 
been argued to have negative effects on human rights (Abouharb & Cingranelli, 2007), poverty 
(Killick, 1995), inequality (Babb, 2005, p. 209), environmental sustainability (Haque, 1999) and 
access to basic goods and services such as food (Walton & Seddon, 1994). Overall, even the 
most ardent supporters of liberalization reforms today concede that structural adjustment 
programs have not yielded the expected results (Rodrik, 2006, p. 973).  
As a reaction to this evidence, some scholars have expressed the radical recommendation to 
stop aid entirely, as it reflects the hegemony of the Global North over the rest of the world, and 
promoted the idea of inaugurating a post-development era (see e.g. Escobar, 1992; Sachs, 
1992). However, these claims haven’t materialized. Instead, the 1990’s brought about significant 
changes in development programs, among others, by emphasizing the role of the third sector. 
Nonprofit organizations were argued to be ideally suited for filling the gaps of markets and state 
provision due to their “small scale, flexibility and capacity to engage grass-roots energies” 
(Salamon, 1994, p. 110). Various development policy directives and agreements, including those 
from the DAC, explicitly stressed the importance of the third sector for development (see e.g. 
Bernard, Helmich, & Lehning, 1998). As a result, third sector organizations increasingly became 
the preferred recipients of development aid, and the emergence of nonprofit organizations 
proliferated – resembling an “associational revolution” (Salamon, 1994, p. 109) – both in 
developed, as well as in developing and emerging economies.  
As these changes in the landscape of welfare delivering organizations show, the role of the 
government has changed over time. As Salamon (2000, p.1611f.) explains, governments all over 
the world are today rather expected to build conducive conditions for private and third sector 
provision of essential goods and services instead of acting as providers themselves. However, as 
the next sections will explain, neither the criticism against market liberalization in developing and 
emerging economies, nor the emergence of the third sector have perturbed the hegemony of the 
liberal mindset in development thinking. Alternatives to privatization largely remain off the agenda 
in many developing and emerging economies (McDonald & Ruiters, 2012). Instead, 
internationally accepted guidelines and directives have further emphasized the need to build 
(Western-style) markets (Mair, Martí, & Ventresca, 2012, p. 821) and that well-functioning 
institutions are a prerequisite for that purpose (see e.g. World Bank, 2002). 
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2.1.1 The Commercialization of the Third Sector 
Given the persisting belief in the establishment of Western-style markets as being key to 
development, many nonprofit organizations have also started to dedicate their work to market 
development. Nonprofit organizations ideal-typically pursue social objectives – meaning that they 
don’t allow for profit distribution to shareholders or directors, and pursue public purposes that 
benefit socially underpriviledged populations or public purposes (Salamon, 1994, p. 109). To 
achieve this, they rely on non-repayable sources of funding, mainly grants and donations as well 
as voluntary workforce. However, not only has market development become a social purpose in 
itself, over the last decades, scholars have repeatedly described “marketization” (Eikenberry & 
Kluver, 2004) and “commercialization” (Cooney, 2006) trends in third sectors all over the world, 
as well as a shift of nonprofit organizations towards becoming more “business-like” (Dart, 2004a) 
or “market-oriented” (Liao, Foreman, & Sargeant, 2001). Eikenberry and Kluver (2004, p. 132), 
for instance, investigate major marketization trends in the nonprofit sector, namely revenue 
generating activities, contract competition between nonprofits, the rise of a new culture of 
donating (e.g. philanthrocapitalism, which refers to the adoption of methods and values from the 
market to transform philanthropy and foreign aid (Bishop & Green, 2008), as well as social 
enterprise.  
However, despite the common perception that nonprofit organizations have shifted towards 
increased market-orientation, scholars largely remain vague about their concept of market-
orientation. Originating from marketing literature, the term already causes confusion in the for-
profit context, as it touches on issues ranging from prioritizing customer concerns over production 
concerns to generally increasing marketing activities or the influence of marketing executives in 
strategic decision-making (Liao, Foreman, and Sargeant, 2001, p. 256). In order to apply it to the 
nonprofit sector, Liao et al argue that significant changes would have to be made. When referring 
to “markets” in the nonprofit sector, scholars need to define the markets in which nonprofits 
operate, and embrace their complexity. Nonprofits generally rely on several markets such as the 
one for resource acquisition and the one for resource allocation. Yet, these are often 
dysfunctional markets, and nonprofits frequently emerge in these precise situations of market 
failures (p. 258). The notion of markets furthermore implies an exchange relationship between 
market actors, which again may not exist particularly in the case of nonprofits that provide goods 
or services free of charge. In addition, the need to compete with other organizations differs in the 
case of nonprofits. Although it is widely known that nonprofits do compete with each other and 
with other types of organizations for funding and customers, many nonprofit organizations also 
collaborate with the very same organizations. Finally, the authors emphasize that the number of 
relevant stakeholders is much higher for nonprofits than for for-profits, making it necessary to 
account for the multiplicity of stakeholder and markets on which nonprofit organizations have to 
focus.  
CHANGES IN THE HISTORICAL CONFIGURATION OF SOCIAL SERVICE PROVISION 13 
 
Most scholarly work, including the present study, however, refer to the growing resemblance of 
nonprofit and for-profit organizations when describing a growing market-orientation in the third 
sector – that is, the trend of nonprofits to become more business-like in the way they operate. 
According to Dart (2004a, p. 290), this can happen in four different ways; first, with regards to the 
goals of their programs that emphasize the importance of markets or the generation of revenues; 
second, as being organizations of program service delivery with more narrowly focused services 
and more specific client groups; third, in their organizational management that stresses efficiency 
enhacing measures; and fourth, with regard to their organizational rhetoric. In addition, the way 
nonprofits are financed should also be added as donors equally move towards a market logic in 
their financing instruments and accountability mechanisms. 
The reasons for the increasing commercialization, marketization or market-orientation in the third 
sector are manifold. Lasprogata and Cotton (2003, p. 68) explain that nonprofits in the US have 
increasingly moved towards “enterprise” as they face increased competition for revenue sources 
and financial support with other nonprofits and for-profit entities, heightened pressure for 
accountability, as well as calls to continuously develop new programs and improve their 
efficiency. Similar trends can be found in developing and emerging economies. On the one hand, 
financial and technical support for developing and emerging economies has increased 
significantly in the last decades – particularly from private sources to nonprofit organizations 
(Hudson Institute - Center for Global Prosperity, 2013, p. 4f.). 8 
As Smith (2014) explains, the reason for this increase has, among others, been the reputation of 
nonprofit organizations for being more efficient and effective in delivering aid than the public 
sector or large development organizations (p. 3). Paradoxically, this trend didn’t lead to an 
improved situation for nonprofits with regard to their access to funding. Instead, increasing donor 
volatility and a lack of coordination in the fragmented and vast donor landscape intensified 
unpredictability for nonprofit organizations in developing and emerging economies. Donor 
volatility, mainly referring to the incontinuous donor preferences (Arellano, Bulíř, Lane, & 
Lipschitz, 2009, p. 88) has repeatedly been criticized by development experts in the last decades, 
as it doesn’t allow for continuity in development programs (Sindzingre, 2012, p. 25). In addition, 
the landscape of development actors today is more complex than ever before, as not only more 
countries become official donors, but also new types of actors and cooperation emerge (Gore, 
2013, p. 769). Nonprofit organizations have therefore sought ways to react to this increased 
                                                   
8 The Hudson Institute’s Center for Global Prosperity, for instance, publishes an Index of Global Philanthropy and 
Remittances every year. Its latest report – published in 2013 and based on data until 2011 – states that of the 
total financial flows from developed to developing countries, over 80% are private – including private capital 
investment, philanthropy and remittances. Government aid, at less than 20%, today represents a minority share of 
financial flows to developing economies, the opposite of 40 years ago  In absolute numbers, the Index shows that 
“private flows from the 23 developed donor countries who are members of the Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), amounted to $577 
billion, holding steady from 2010.” Of these private flows, capital investments account for the largest share with 
$322 billion, followed by total remittances ($196 billion) and philanthropy ($59 billion) (Hudson Institute - Center 
for Global Prosperity, 2013, p. 5). 
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unpredictability by diversifying their revenue streams and venturing into commercial activities 
(see e.g. Carroll & Stater, 2009). 
However, besides the resource-related trends, the increasing market-orientation of nonprofits can 
also be related to the difficulties that the world community has faced in reaching development 
goals. These difficulties have, among others, been described by a growing body of “Aid 
Effectiveness Literature” that has emerged in the last decades. Best-selling books like The White 
Men’s Burden (Easterly, 2006) or Dead Aid (Moyo, 2010) are just two examples of publications 
that explain why aid has failed, and suggest that market approaches are better suited to foster 
social and economic development. Since 2003, four High Level Forums on Aid Effectiveness 
were organized as governments and development agencies recognized the need to maximize the 
effectiveness with which aid is deployed. In several agreements, such as the Paris Declaration on 
Aid Effectiveness (OECD, 2005) increasing accountability was stressed as an essential measure 
to achieving development results. 9  
Criticism expressed in debates about aid effectiveness often referred to failures in channelling 
foreign aid through public entities, as these often face substantial problems such as corruption 
(see e.g. Calderisi, 2006). However, a large part of the literature also emphasizes the failures of 
nonprofit organizations to contribute to development progress. Similar to governments, non-profit 
organizations have been accused of fraud (see e.g. Platteau & Gaspart, 2003) and incentive 
structures that prioritize donor preferences (upward accountability) over the need of the social 
target group (downward accountability) (Agyemang, Awumbila, Unerman, & O’Dwyers, 2009, 
p. 10). Given that the nonprofit sector in general lacks a common higher authority, accountability 
mechanisms have mainly been defined and enforced by funders. The most common 
accountability mechanisms are therefore reports on nonprofits’ performance. This is particularly 
the case in the field of development aid, where geographical distance between foreign donors 
and implementing organizations results in large information asymmetries and principal-agent 
problems. 10  However, reporting and performance measurement not only causes significant 
administrative costs in an increasingly professionalized nonprofit sector (see e.g. Hwang & 
Powell, 2009), it also often fails to realistically reflect and improve the impact that organizations 
have on the communities that they target (see e.g. Brown & Troutt, 2007).  
Given this context, as well as the limits that international aid faces in reaching development 
goals, funders have increasingly asked for higher efficiency and effectiveness of nonprofit 
                                                   
9 The term accountability can be understood as “the means through which individuals and organizations are held 
externally to account for their actions and the means by which they take internal responsibility for continuously 
shaping and scrutinizing organizational mission, goals and performance” (Ebrahim, 2003, p. 194). Accountability 
is therefore closely linked to the existence of (formal or informal) higher authorities, judgment and sanction 
mechanisms as well as standards of performance (Kearns, 1994, p. 186). 
10  The principal-agent problem was first described by Jensen and Meckling (1976), who define an agency 
relationship as a “contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) 
to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent“. 
Consequently, the principals (e.g. foreign donors) have only limited possibilities to control how the agent (e.g. a 
local nonprofit organization) performs in reaching his goals. 
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organizations. Proponents of market approaches argued that a stronger market orientation – 
particularly a stronger emphasis on earned income strategies – would increase downward 
accountability. As resource-dependence theorists and institutional scholars have explained, the 
shift towards market-orientation can therefore be seen as a response from non-profit 
organizations that seek to overcome resource constraints through commercial revenue 
generation and conform with institutional prescriptions that legitimize the adoption of methods 
and values of the market (see e.g. Dart, 2004b; Eikenberry & Kluver, 2004). In other words, 
nonprofit organizations have increasingly adopted the market and the state logic in an attempt to 
secure their organizational survival and improve their financial stability. In doing so, they have 
departed from strictly adhering to the social welfare logic. As Knutsen (2012, p. 1007) argues, 
and as will be further elaborated in the present study, this adaptation of several logics in 
nonprofits may cause conflicts. Particularly, the logic of capitalism – equally called the 
commercial or market logic – that emphasizes efficiency stands in contrast with socially motivated 
claims such as to attend individual cases, which requires time, as opposed to efficiency.  
The concept of philanthrocapitalism, which emphasizes the need to adopt methods and values 
from the market to transform philanthropy and foreign aid (Bishop & Green, 2008), has therefore 
triggered controversial discussions. While proponents argue that a business mentality in 
philanthropy leads to stronger accountability and performance orientation, critics have accused it 
of being just another “naked emperor”, thereby alluding to the argument that philanthrocapitalism 
has been greatly oversold (Edwards, 2009). Seeing every person as a customer, as 
philanthrocapitalism proponents recommend (Novogratz, 2007, p. 20), may neglect important 
functions of the third sector. For instance, as Edwards (2008) argues, civil society focuses on 
human beings as citizens, engaging in “co-creation, shared responsibilities, and mobilizing 
people around a common cause“ (p. 62) – an attitude that is often too laborious for business. 
Similarly, Eikenberry and Kluver (2004) also point to the negative effects of the growing 
marketization of the third sector, as it tends to neglect the importance of adopting a holistic view. 
Alexander et al (1999) further posit that civil society organizations act “as value guardians, 
service providers and advocates, and builders of social capital” (p. 138). Such a holistic role, 
however, may be threatened through a market-oriented perspective, which emphasizes a focus 
on the most effective and efficient modes of service delivery (Eikenberry & Kluver, 2004). Hence, 
Weisbrod (2004) even argues that nonprofits should avoid any type of commercialization, in 
particular, substituting donations through earned-income strategies, as they run the risk of 
mission drift.  
As the next section will argue, the commercialization of the nonprofit sector in developing and 
emerging economies is just one manifestation of the increased legitimacy of the commercial logic 
in the delivery of social services. The “aid effectiveness” crisis has furthermore led to the 
legitimization of the private sector as a recipient of foreign aid. 
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2.1.2 The Rise of Endogenous, Market-Based Solutions and the Private Sector as a 
Legitimate Recipient of Foreign Aid   
Within aid effectiveness literature, a large number of different recommendations have been 
expressed in the last decades. While the most extreme recommendations continue to advocate 
for a radical stop of foreign aid (see e.g. Moyo, 2010), most arguments currently relate to radical 
reforms of international development aid. Banerjee and Duflo (2011, p. 3) highlight two competing 
streams that significantly shaped development discourses in the last years. The first 
recommendation, mainly expressed by Jeffrey Sachs, suggests drastically increasing aid flows in 
order to help developing countries overcome the “poverty trap”, which is a self-reinforcing 
mechanism keeping poor people in poverty because they don’t have the means to escape from 
their situation without external support (Sachs, 2006, p. 56). The second recommendation refers 
to the quasi-liberal, anti-colonial arguments pioneered by William Easterly to increase the 
accountability of development aid by actively scrutinizing its failures (Easterly, 2010, p. 1075). 
Easterly argues that in current development aid, particularly in bilateral and multilateral 
governmental aid, donors are not being held accountable for their decisions and activities. 
Consequently, recipients – above all, governments of developing countries – have no incentive to 
develop, as they do not experience any scrutiny when aid efforts fail. Easterly therefore 
advocates for home-grown, demand-driven solutions to local problems, best developed by so-
called “searchers” such as private firms or democratically accountable politicians – as opposed to 
“planners”, particularly governments and development organizations that implement programs 
based on decisions made in high-level forums. He states that poverty “is only ended by 
searchers, both economic and political, who explore solutions by trial and error, have a way to get 
feedback on the ones that work, and then expand the ones that work, all of this in an unplanned, 
spontaneous way” (p. 1f). For this reason, searchers do much better in free markets and 
democracies than aid agencies that are tied to autocratic planning and state interventionism 
(p. 13).  
Based on this, Banerjee and Duflo (2011) claim to provide a “radical rethinking of the way to fight 
global poverty” in their best-selling book Poor Economics. Instead of attempting to find the “big 
answer” for the “big question”, they direct their attention to, and try to learn from, the behaviour of 
poor people, more specifically their saving behaviour and their consumption behaviour, as well as 
their use and understanding of health care and family planning. The question of how radical this 
rethinking is, remains debatable, as micro-level or bottom-up approaches to development, for 
example through the collaboration with community-based or local civil society organizations, look 
back to several years of existence. However, Banerjee and Duflo’s approach, as well as 
Easterly’s call for more “searchers”, are examples of scholarly work that legitimized current 
market-oriented development approaches that are built from the bottom up.  
As the last sections have described, private sector development is nothing new in international 
development aid. Structural adjustment programs have promoted a liberalization of various 
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sectors in developing and emerging economies. However, since the 2000’s, the promotion of 
smaller-scale business activity has added a new notion to private sector development. All over 
the world, economists have repeatedly emphasized the importance of entrepreneurship and small 
and medium enterprises (SMEs) for economic development. Joseph Schumpeter’s Theory of 
Economic Development (Schumpeter, 1949) or Richard Swedberg’s more recent book 
Entrepreneurship: The Social Science View (Swedberg, 2000) are well-known elaborations on 
this topic. However, it is only recently that entrepreneurship in the Global South has received 
attention not only from development economists (McMullen, 2011, p. 186), but also from 
management and entrepreneurship scholars.  
Mair et al for instance, argue that institutional voids are generally interpreted as a major cause of 
the exclusion of poor people from Western-style markets (Mair, Martí, and Ventresca, 2012). 
Similarly, Bruton and colleagues (2013, p. 685) find that entrepreneurs in settings of poverty face 
severe penalties for failure, as the consequences may affect an entrepreneur’s family to access 
basic goods or services such as food and shelter. Scholars have therefore expressed a range of 
recommendations to improve the conditions for entrepreneurial activity in developing and 
emerging economies.  
However, McMullen (2011, p. 193) argues that commercial entrepreneurship alone is unlikely to 
instigate the development that developing and emerging countries need, and that policies that 
foster commercial entrepreneurship will therefore fall short of the expectation to have a positive 
impact on development. Although proponents of market-based development approaches 
recognize that markets in developing nations are dysfunctional, in that they fail to incentivize 
entrepreneurial action that serves the poor in a profitable way, few of them directly engage in 
improving the institutional environment. Business entrepreneurs have insufficient financial 
incentives to bare the efforts that proactive institutional change, that is, institutional 
entrepreneurship (see 3.1.2), engenders. This argument is further reinforced by the fact that 
entrepreneurship in developing and emerging countries often isn’t people’s first choice. Much 
entrepreneurship is not opportunity based, but rather necessity based, meaning that it is people’s 
only option, since they are excluded from labor markets (Reynolds, Camp, Bygrave, Autio, & Hay, 
2001, p. 8f.). These circumstances are likely to influence entrepreneurial decision-making as well 
as the effects of entrepreneurial activity on growth and development. Finally, Hall et al. (2012) 
also show that policies which seek to promote entrepreneurial activities in BoP markets may even 
lead to destructive outcomes such as social exclusion or crime. The authors therefore argue that 
policies need to be designed in a way that integrates social objectives, which may require a 
slower pace in economic development. 
However, in practice, the belief that fostering entrepreneurship in developing and emerging 
economies contributes to economic growth and thus to poverty reduction is widely accepted. 
McMullen (2011, p. 185) explains that although not all types of economic growth benefit the poor, 
growth still remains one of the major factors that alleviate poverty, and that entrepreneurship is 
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one of the major drivers of growth. Frustrated with government failure, new development theories 
therefore emphasize bottom-up, market-based strategies in order to foster endogenous 
transformation, particularly in Least Developed Countries (LDCs), in which the poorest people – 
“the bottom billion” – live without having experienced any growth (Collier, 2008, p. 185). For them 
to step out of poverty, economic growth is still believed to be crucial (ibid, p. 8ff.). 
Events such as the awarding of Muhammad Yunus with the Nobel Peace Prize in 2006 have 
further underlined this view. Yunus’ philosophy of microfinance is based on the view that every 
human being is an entrepreneur, able to lift himself out of poverty if provided with the adequate 
financial support (Yunus, 2006). Microcredits that need to be repaid, he further argues, is what 
poor people need to unleash their potential, as they incentivize them to become entrepreneurs 
and invest in their future. 
Today, thousands of microfinance institutions have adopted Yunus’ concept, leading to what 
some have described as a microfinance revolution (Robinson, 2001). Not only did microfinance 
convince many adopters from an ideological point of view, it also offered an entirely new 
opportunity in the fight against poverty, namely that of “doing well by doing good” (Khavul, 2010, 
p. 58). Microfinance did not only promise to deliver on development goals, it also created an 
entirely new market that soon attracted all kinds of funders, including development agencies, 
philanthropic organizations and individuals, as well as commercial investors. But as Salamon 
(2014, p. 7) describes, microfinance is just one example of how “the new frontiers of philanthropy” 
mobilize private resources to foster entrepreneurial solutions to social and environmental 
problems. Initiatives that seek to make markets more inclusive for the poor are surfacing in all 
kinds of sectors, as both scholars and practitioners increasingly believe that integrating the poor 
in markets will help them to escape poverty (Mendoza & Thelen, 2008, p. 427). As will be further 
elaborated later, today, hundreds of so-called social investment funds have surfaced, aiming at 
generating blended value returns through their investments. Organizations like the Aspen 
Network of Development Entrepreneurs (ANDE),11 in which such social investors are organized, 
exemplify the current institutionalization of the belief in small and growing business for 
development. In addition, development organizations and governments have also increasingly 
embraced the idea of fostering entrepreneurship and inclusive markets in developing and 
emerging economies. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), for instance, 
continuously promotes the idea of “doing business with the poor” (United Nations Development 
Programme, 2008) through their Growing Inclusive Markets (GIM) initiative.12 
                                                   
11 Fir further information see http://www.andeglobal.org/ 
12 For further information see http://www.growinginclusivemarkets.org/  
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2.1.3 Blended Value Creation in Developing and Emerging Economies 
The growing belief in entrepreneurship as a powerful means to alleviate poverty, is certainly one 
of the main drivers of the current rise of blended value creating (BVC) organizations. The concept 
of BVC has been introduced and promoted by Jed Emerson (2003), who repeatedly stressed that 
social and financial returns on investment can’t be seen separately. “True” value, he argues, 
integrates both aspects:  
“It is the social dynamics of financial capital markets that give numeric, financial 
returns ultimate value. It is the interplay of these complementary forces, the 
genomic embrace of interactive social capital with transactive social capital, which 
generates a dynamic tension that, in its totality, creates a “value vortex.” (p. 44) 
A number of concepts, as well as types of organizations, have embraced the idea of BVC, yet, 
with different emphases, objectives and various degrees to which the blending of social and 
financial value is central to the organization (Besharov & Smith, 2013, p. 9). The concept of 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) depicts a relatively low level of centrality, as it mainly 
refers to companies’ activities to conform with certain social and/or environmental norms, as well 
as to social initiatives that companies support besides their core business (for a review of CSR 
see Lindgreen & Swaen, 2010). Similarly, multinational companies implement inclusive business 
initiatives with the aim to integrate marginalized communities into their supply chains (see e.g. 
Halme, Lindeman, & Linna, 2012). However, inclusive practices remain a small component in 
multinationals’ procurement practices. As will be explained later, other concepts such as social 
enterprise, referring to organizational models that pursue social objectives in an entrepreneurial 
or business-like manner (see e.g. Alter, 2007), and BoP approaches that seek to combine 
poverty alleviation and new market exploitation (see e.g. Prahalad & Hart, 2002), depict higher 
levels of centrality.  
Likewise, the large number of social investors that have emerged over the last years have 
created a diverse spectrum of organizations that provide financial and technical support with 
social and – sometimes – financial return expectations. While the field of social investment is 
currently booming in practice, its definitional boundaries remain diffuse. Various types of 
organizations co-mingle in this space, allocating financial and technical support with means from 
philanthropic and/or commercial capital markets. Nicholls (2010a) therefore conceptualizes 
“social investment as a socially constructed space within which different investment logics and 
investor rationalities are currently in play” (p. 70).  
Overall, social investors often refer to innovative financing mechanisms that try to grasp the idea 
of blended value creation and/or to fit the financing needs of innovative business models such as 
social enterprises – or other types of hybrid organizations – in developing and emerging 
economies (Salamon, 2014). As figure 1 shows, social investing embraces two key subgenres – 
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venture philanthropy13 and impact investing14 – as well as a range of potential investors, including 
actors from philanthropic backgrounds and commercial investors such as J.P. Morgan, Deutsche 
Bank as well as smaller private equity or venture capital funds. Reflecting this diversity, social 
investment approaches, as well as social investors, have repeatedly been located on a spectrum 
from social to financial return expectations (so-called “impact only”, “impact first” or “finance first” 
investments), or from philanthropy to commercial capital institutions. 
 
Figure 1:  “The Social Investment Spectrum”  
  (Asian Venture Philanthropy Network, 2014, p. 18) 
In addition to this diverse spectrum of approaches, Salamon (2014) further describes that co-
investments between the different types of actors – what he calls “yin-yang deals” (p. 1) – 
become more and more common. It is no exception anymore to see the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) teaming up with various foundations – a major US investment 
firm and a private, India-based investment company – to invest in small-holder agricultural 
enterprises in Africa.15  
As such new types of investors and new forms of investments with both social and financial 
return expectations emerge, Emerson (2003, p. 39) predicts that, over time, the boundaries and 
trade-offs that we currently see in combining the social and financial will disappear. With 
instruments and measures as well as “breeding 21st Century Managers” that embrace the 
                                                   
13  Venture philanthropy is an important subgenre of social investing with philanthropic origins. Venture 
philanthropists apply private equity methods, particularly management consulting and access to networks, for 
precise outputs and outcomes (Nicholls, 2010a, p. 80). Venture philanthropy organizations don’t distribute returns 
to their funders but rather aim at reinvesting them in other ventures (Hehenberg, Boiardi, & Gianoncelli, 2014, 
p. 27). 
14 Impact investing is a rapidly growing type of investment where investors “[pursue] financial returns while also 
intentionally addressing social and environmental challenges” (Emerson & Bugg-Levine, 2011, p. 5). 
15 See for example The New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition https://new-alliance.org  
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concept of blended value, Emerson argues that organizations will be enabled to overcome the 
traditional emphasis on financial metrics and to create blended value within one entity. However, 
as recent research has revealed, the field of social investment in developing and emerging 
economies shows a strong emphasis on market-orientation. For instance, as Dichter, Katz, Koh, 
and Karamchandani (2013) state, impact investors tend towards minimizing financial risks by 
focusing on “easier, quicker, and more financially lucrative opportunities that target broader 
segments of society”, instead of targeting social issues in very-low or low-income settings. 
Further, Hanley, Wachner, and Weiss (2015, p. 23) find that social investors in developing and 
emerging economies increasingly target for-profit organizations with their support. 
The health sector, with a vast magnitude of unmet needs and a large number of people who are 
willing – or forced – to pay for higher quality health care, is one of the areas in which market-
based development approaches have proliferated. 
2.1.4 The Case of Health Care 
As the constitution of the World Health Organization (WHO) states: “The enjoyment of the highest 
attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental rights of every human being without 
distinction of race, religion, political belief, economic or social condition” (World Health 
Organization, 2013a). The objective of reaching “universal health coverage” (UHC) has therefore 
guided the majority of last decades’ policy recommendations and measures to improve people’s 
state of health globally (see e.g. World Health Organization, 2013b). The concept of UHC 
embodies the normative view that all people should obtain the health services they need without 
suffering financial hardship when paying for them. It usually aims at 1) enrolling people in publicly 
organized insurance schemes, 2) providing access to a comprehensive package of health 
services with financial protection for all, and 3) ensuring effective coverage guarantees, which 
means that an appropriate package of high-quality health services should yield the maximum 
attainable health results and thus reduce out-of-pocket payments for people seeking health 
services (Knaul et al, 2012, p. 1259).  
While all WHO member states have uniformly agreed on the common objective of reaching UHC, 
many developing and emerging economies struggle with the implementation (Travis et al, 2004, 
p. 900). Several studies show that access to health care – understood as the interplay of “quality, 
geographic accessibility, availability, financial accessibility, and accessibility of health services” 
(Peters et al, 2008, p. 161) – is comparably poorer in lower- and middle income countries 
(LMICs) than in wealthier countries. This is, however, quite opposed to the prevalence of health 
needs, which are often much more urgent and numerous in those countries (see e.g. Leon & 
Walt, 2000): According to Peters and colleagues (2008), “LMICs account for 90% of the global 
burden of disease but for only 12% of global spending on health” (p. 163) – an asymmetry that 
has been titled the inverse care law (Hart, 1971). And more importantly, the relationship between 
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poverty and health has often been described as a vicious circle: not only do the poor suffer from 
insufficient access to health services, the lack of appropriate treatment of diseases is also a 
frequent cause of poverty or a major hurdle to step out of poverty (see e.g. Peters et al, 2008, 
p. 161).  
The reasons for these dynamics are generally related to insufficient access to health care and 
dysfunctionalities in health systems of developing and emerging economies (see e.g. Leon & 
Walt, 2000) – in contrast to wealthier economies, where health disparities are rather considered 
to be a consequence of lifestyle and environmental exposures. However, there is little 
quantitative and reliable data providing deeper insights on health disparities in developing and 
emerging economies, even less with a comparative focus on different country settings (see e.g. 
Makinen et al, 2000). Not only is it difficult to collect appropriate data about the health status of an 
entire population, researchers and experts also agree on the need to view country settings 
separately and to account for differences caused by endogenous dynamics.  
A general proxy that is frequently used to measure inequity in health across countries is the 
percentage of out-of-pocket payments, that is, payments for health products and services that 
people place in cash. Out-of-pocket payments are often viewed as the most inequitable type of 
payment for health services, as they exclude low-income people from accessing high-cost 
treatments (Joumard, Andre, & Nicq, 2010, p. 27). At the same time, they are the most 
widespread type of financing in LMICs – around 60% of health spending in these countries 
comes from out-of-pocket payments (Peters et al, 2008, p. 163). Inequity in accessing health care 
is thus a highly relevant and widely discussed topic among scholars and practitioners. The study 
of Makinen and colleagues (2000), which analyzes the results of household surveys in eight 
developing countries and countries in transition, shows that richer groups generally have a higher 
probability of obtaining care when sick, of being seen by a doctor and of receiving medicines, 
than poorer groups. More surprisingly, comparing the studied countries furthermore revealed a 
correlation between income levels and the sectors in which health care is provided. For instance, 
in many countries, including South Africa, wealthier households tend to use private care. 
However, most hospitals belong to the public sector in South Africa. As a consequence, wealthier 
households are less likely to go to hospitals. In other countries, such as Zambia, for example, the 
authors find that government-subsidized health care is mainly consumed by richer groups. 
Analyzing the specific labor division between sectors in health care provision thus needs to be 
done on a country basis. 
However, it can be observed across most developing and emerging economies that public 
entities are generally overwhelmed by the health needs of their populations. Be it for resource 
constraints or institutional weaknesses, the provision of public health services is often deficient. 
Existing governmental or supra-governmental instruments, such as Policy Reduction Strategy 
Papers (PRSPs) or the Millenium Development Goals (MDGs), which cover health issues, have 
so far had limited success in improving the situation of the poor in many countries. Laterveer and 
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colleagues (2003, p. 138), for instance, assessed the “pro-poor focus” of 23 interim versions of 
PRSPs and provided evidence that little effort is made in including the interests of the poor in 
health policy designs and that the monitoring of health policies’ effects on poor populations is 
weak. Even in countries that have implemented public health insurances, the sheer magnitude of 
health issues often leads to overburdened public health systems and thus to high amounts of out-
of-pocket payments for alternative, that is, private health services (see e.g. De Groote, De Paepe, 
& Unger, 2005).  
Many of the recommendations that have been expressed by scholars and practitioners therefore 
emphasize the importance of involving the private and the third sector in order to leverage their 
strengths as well as resources and to improve the provision of health care in developing and 
emerging economies. Peters and colleagues (2008, p. 168), for instance, emphasize that 
innovations in health care, particularly in health care financing, such as health equity funds or 
conditional cash transfers, are needed. Cross-sector collaborations can be essential in this 
regard as shown by the Kenyan micro-health insurance program Changamka, which is supported 
and implemented by actors from the public, the private and the third sector.16 In fact, health 
innovations that operate at the interstices of the public, the private and the third sector, 
particularly market-oriented approaches, are currently having a strong momentum. 17  As 
mentioned before, market-orientation is frequently argued to increase the endogeneity of health 
care solutions – an attribute that health experts consider important in order to account for context 
specific circumstances and possible changes over time (see e.g. Gwatkin et al, 2005; Peters et 
al, 2008). In addition, the aspect of financial sustainability – as opposed to donor dependency – 
can be seen as a prerequisite for a health market that is able to serve its population continuously 
and durably. 
Given these dynamics, the health sector belongs to the most promising markets for market-based 
development approaches (see e.g. Berelowitz, Horn, Thornton, Leeds, & Wong, 2013; Kapoor & 
Goyal, 2013). Despite the wide consensus about the need to strengthen health systems and 
foster UHC (see e.g. World Health Organization, 2013b), governments of developing and 
emerging economies have struggled to implement effective measures that ensure access to 
healthcare for all income levels. Be it for resource constraints or institutional weakness, the 
provision of public health services is often deficient in developing and emerging economies. As 
will be explained later, this is even the case in countries like Colombia that have repeatedly been 
described as high achieving in the improvement of their health systems (see e.g. Mosquera, 
Zapata, Lee, Arango, & Varela, 2001). Consequently, access to health has remained a serious, 
life-threatening issue for many people living in developing and emerging economies (for the most 
recent figures see World Health Organization, 2013b). International development organizations 
                                                   
16  For further information see http://changamka.co.ke/ and/or http://healthmarketinnovations.org/ program/ 
changamka-microhealth-limited  
17 Another manifestation of this trend is the creation of the International Partnership for Innovative Healthcare 
Delivery (IPIHD) http://www.ipihd.org/  
24 CHANGES IN THE HISTORICAL CONFIGURATION OF SOCIAL SERVICE PROVISION 
 
 
and NGOs therefore continue to play a relatively important role in the financing and provision of 
health care in developing and emerging economies. At the same time, the majority of national 
health care sectors across the world have experienced an increasing marketization, manifesting 
in an increasing importance of private commercial players in the provision of health care, a rise in 
private sources of health financing, as well as an increasing influence of the commercial logic in 
health care (see e.g. Scott, Ruef, Mendel, & Caronna, 2000). This trend is particularly strong in 
emerging markets, where economic growth, the increasing role of the private sector in both 
health provision and financing, and the rise of a middle class in emerging markets have started to 
attract private investments. The International Finance Corporation, for instance, estimates that 
“over the next decade, $25–$30 billion in new investments will be needed in health care assets, 
including hospitals, clinics, and distribution warehouses, to meet the growing health care 
demands of Sub-Saharan Africa” (IFC, 2007, p. vii).  
Investing in health care in developing and emerging economies therefore yields the opportunities 
to not only improve the living standard of low-income people, but also to do it in a financially 
sustainable or profitable way. This blended value proposition as well as the growing legitimacy of 
market-based development approaches in health care and other sectors, has paved the ground 
for an increasing involvement of investors who seek to generate both social and financial return 
with their investments in developing and emerging economies. 
2.2 The Base of the Pyramid Proposition: New market opportunities for 
blended value creation in developing and emerging economies 
At the beginning of the 21st century, multinational corporations are exposed to complex 
challenges, including “mounting concerns over environmental degradation, labor exploitation, 
cultural hegemony, and loss of local autonomy, particularly in the Third World” (Hart, 2007, 
p. 111) and need to secure their long-term success. A growing amount of actors from the private 
sector are therefore seeking ways to overcome those challenges and have increasingly started to 
venture into spaces that were previously largely left to the third or public sector. Welfare delivery 
in developing and emerging economies is one of the spaces that have attracted the interest of the 
private sector in the last decade – because of the financial opportunities that they can gain from 
tapping into these new markets, but also because of the social value that they can possibly 
create.  
2.2.1 From an Untapped Customer Market to Mutual Co-Creation at the BoP 
Inspired by business models like microfinance, the two strategy scholars, C.K. Prahalad and 
Stuart Hart, brought a radically new perspective to poverty alleviation with their seminal article 
The Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid (Prahalad & Hart, 2002). Instead of viewing the billions 
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of people living on less than 2 USD a day as beneficiaries or victims, the authors argued that they 
should be seen as customers in need of affordable essential goods and services. While per 
capita profit margins may not be high when targeting poor customers, the aggregated amount of 
people living in poverty makes it a promising customer market of an estimated USD 5 trillion 
(Hammond, Kramer, Katz, Tran, & Walker, 2007, p. 3). Particularly multinational companies with 
their ability to achieve economies of scale have therefore initially been the key target group of 
BoP literature. In addition, reaching them with affordable essential goods and services, especially 
in the fields of health care, information technology, water, transportation, housing, energy, food 
and financial service (Hammond et al, 2007, p. 29), yields the potential of not only creating 
financial but also social value, as it contributes to raising people’s disposable income and thus to 
poverty eradication. In other words, the BoP proposition claims that fighting poverty does not 
necessarily need to happen at the expense of profitability.  
Early BoP publications mainly considered poor people as potential consumers who live in high-
cost micro economic systems due to unorganized and inefficient provision of goods, local 
monopolies, information asymmetry, and informality (Hammond et al, 2007, p. 5). Early 
publications therefore emphasized the need and the opportunity to find new and innovative 
opportunities to provide necessary goods and services at radically more affordable prices for poor 
customers. On the long run, this would contribute to the creation of an organized and profitable 
sector as well as increased competition, which again drives down cost and enhances quality.  
Despite the excitement that the BoP proposition caused, particularly among business scholars 
and practitioners, harsh criticism soon surfaced. Critics, such as Karnani (2006) and Jaiswal 
(2008), repeatedly argued that the estimation of the market size at the BoP has been widely 
overestimated and that the disproportionately high entry costs of tapping into these markets have 
been largely neglected. The generation of financial gains at the BoP has indeed proven to take 
very long time, requiring actors and investors to demonstrate patience in their endeavor to enter 
these untapped markets (Koh, Karamchandani, & Katz, 2012, p. 3f.). Another point of critique 
relates to ethical concerns, for example, with regard to businesses that raise a demand for non-
existential goods among highly vulnerable consumers who have only very limited resources. The 
research of Banerjee and Duflo (2011) underpins this concerns by showing that poor people tend 
to spend a relatively large amount of their budget on “unreasonable” goods like sweets, television 
and tobacco (p. 19f.). And finally, the contribution of BoP approaches to effectively fight poverty 
has been contested, as it neglects the multidimensionality of poverty. As Karnani (2011) as well 
as Arora and Romijn (2011) argue, particularly early BoP literature drew a simplified picture of 
poverty, understanding it as the situation of people living on less than 2 USD a day. However, 
income is only one of various factors that people need to lift themselves out of poverty. Studies 
on the social impact of microfinance, for instance, suggest that it has “little impact on health, 
education, average consumption, women’s decision making, or self-reported well-being (Ansari, 
Munir, & Gregg, 2012). BoP initiatives should therefore embrace social objectives that go beyond 
26 CHANGES IN THE HISTORICAL CONFIGURATION OF SOCIAL SERVICE PROVISION 
 
 
income generation. Viewing poverty as a lack of capabilities, Nobel Prize Laureate Amartya Sen 
(2001) provides a useful theory to adopt a more holistic perspective on poverty. Individuals, he 
argues, seek certain achievements with regard to their living standard. Sen calls these 
achievements functionings, reaching from elementary ones, such as being adequately nourished 
and being healthy, to more complex ones, such as being happy and having self-respect (p. 75ff.). 
However, in order to achieve this living standard, people also need capabilities, defined as 
“notions of freedom” in real opportunities to achieve the aspired living standard (Sen, 1988, 
p. 36). Fighting poverty should therefore focus on developing the capabilities of poor people. 
However, as Ansari, Munir, & Gregg, (2012) argue, the “means and ends” that Sen suggests for 
this capability development emphasize aspects such as “political freedom, transparency, and 
protective security” and may therefore exceed the possibilities of firms operating at the BoP 
(p. 820).  
Besides this criticism, experiences of the last decade such as the public scandals in microfinance 
have further nourished the controversial debate about the use of market principles in alleviating 
poverty. In particular, two events spurred global dismay, namely the microfinance crisis in India in 
2010 where the exposure of borrowers to insurmountable debts and aggressive collection tactics 
from microfinance institutions caused a number of suicides (Taylor, 2011, p. 484), as well as the 
initial public offering of the Mexican microfinance Bank Compartamos, which demanded interest 
rates of “90-plus” on average in order to meet its commercial investors’ return expectations (Cull, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, & Morduch, 2009, p. 182). 
As a result, the BoP proposition further developed and adopted the idea of “mutual value co-
creation” (Simanis, Hart, & Duke, 2008, p. 3), emphasizing the necessity to integrate low-income 
communities and entrepreneurs in the development, production and realization of BoP business 
models rather than seeing them as mere customers (Kolk, Rivera-Santos, & Rufín, 2013, p. 17). 
A new generation of BoP publications thus argued that benefits for the poor should not 
exclusively lie in the satisfaction of needs through consumption, but require an increase in 
productivity and income as well as empowerment in order to contribute to a holistic improvement 
of their situation.  
2.2.2 Benefits and Challenges to Operate at the BoP 
BoP literature generally emphasizes various arguments why companies should enter low-income 
markets. First, these largely untapped markets yield considerable financial opportunities on the 
long run. The sheer magnitude of unmet needs at the BoP represents a huge market, which 
needs to be served with approaches that allow for economies of scale (Prahalad & Hammond, 
2002, p. 50). It has to be noted, however, that Keating and Smith’s (2008) survey of 
multinationals with BoP initiatives finds that 70% of the business models were profit neutral; only 
11% were profitable and another 11% were cancelled due to various challenges of operating in 
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BoP settings (p. 389). The surveyed organizations though pointed to the positive social impact 
that the initiatives created. This leads to the second argument carved out in BoP literature, 
namely that multinational corporations can demonstrate their social responsibility by engaging in 
ethical BoP initiatives (see e.g. Arnold & Valentin, 2013) and/or strategic CSR, meaning that the 
social initiatives also foster the development of a competitive advantage in the long run 
(Kandachar & Halme, 2008, p. 10). Third, BoP initiatives have repeatedly been argued to trigger 
product, process and business model innovations as they require a radical rethinking – or even 
an entirely new philosophy – of how to approach end consumers (Prahalad, 2004, p. 24).  This is 
even more the case as customers at the BoP are not only very value conscious by necessity; 
they are also very brand conscious (ibid, p. 14f.). Fourth, venturing into BoP markets is argued to 
allow for an expansion of businesses’ labor pool which not only results in cost savings, but also in 
the acquisition of local knowledge (UNDP, 2008, p. 16). This is furthermore linked to the 
possibility of involving people living at the BoP as “producers, suppliers, distributors, retailers and 
franchisees”, thereby strengthening inclusive business value chains (p. 16). 
However, tapping into low-income markets in developing and emerging economies also comes 
along with significant challenges. Based on prior research, five major challenges can be 
highlighted:  
(1) Limited Access to Market Information Information about BoP markets are generally 
scarce or difficult to access. Little market research exists about demographical structures, 
willingness to pay for certain products or services as well as consumer behavior in low-
income settings (Gradl, Sobhani, Bootsman, & Gasnier, 2008, p. 30f.). Organizations that 
seek to serve the BoP therefore often have to invest significant resources in order to 
understand their target market.  
(2) Low levels of knowledge and skills The level of knowledge and skills of people living in 
poverty is often relatively low. This means that potential consumers may not know how to 
use a specific product and/or lack the knowledge to evaluate the benefits of certain goods or 
services. Providing health services, for instance, can be challenging as health care is in 
many instances a so-called merit good, meaning that the evaluation of a good needs to 
consider not only consumers’ perspective, but also additional factors such as the collective 
well-being of a society (Musgrave, 1987, p. 452). While consumers may lack the ability or 
willingness to purchase the good, other instances may judge that the consumption of this 
good is desirable for the individual or for society. In the case of healthcare, for example, a 
wide public consensus prevails in many countries about the benefits of certain products and 
services such as mandatory health insurance, although this doesn’t necessarily reflect the 
individual choices of end consumers. The theory of merit goods is therefore often used to 
justify government interventions and has subsequently led to debates about the “appropriate 
‘public/private mix’ for financing and delivering services/remedies” (Mendoza, 2011, p. 280). 
In developing and emerging economies, many governments face considerable challenges in 
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providing health services to their population. Large parts of health provision are thus left to 
private or third sector actors. However, their abilities and willingness to provide merit goods 
are limited and often insufficiently understood. Banerjee and Duflo’s (2011, p. 41ff.) research 
yields interesting results with regard to the health-seeking behavior of low-income people. 
According to the authors, poor people do indeed care about their health, but often spend 
their money for the wrong remedies. Tradition and faith in health related issues, they argue, 
becomes even more important when education is low. One illustrative example is the poor’s 
tendency to trust prescription happy doctors (p. 58f.). As a result, they rather spend more on 
expensive cures than on cheaper prevention and they also prefer private doctors who often 
lack an appropriate health education and tend to overmedicate.  
(3) Poor physical infrastructure Physical infrastructure including roads, water, electricity, 
sanitation and telecommunication is generally poor in developing and emerging markets. Not 
only the purchasing as well as the distribution of products and services, but also the general 
processes within organizations can be severally impeded (UNDP, 2008, p. 18). 
(4) Limited access to financial products and services Access to financial products and 
services is severally limited in markets at the BoP. Although Banerjee and Duflo (2011, 
p. 171) find that microfinance indeed increases the number of businesses being created, the 
idea of starting with a microcredit and growing businesses until they’re big enough to get a 
loan from a bank appears to be myth. As the nature of microfinance gives incentives to “play 
it safe”, risky ventures are not likely to be accepted by the social collateral networks that are 
formed by most microfinance institutions (p. 177). The authors therefore argue that finding 
ways to finance medium scale enterprises is the next big challenge for finance in developing 
countries. Banerjee and Duflo also provide important insights on the saving behavior of poor 
people. Due to the cost intensity of small saving accounts for banks and thus for low-income 
people, various alternative saving mechanisms have propagated in developing countries, 
ranging from saving clubs, to self-help groups, deposit collectors, cell phone based saving 
accounts or simply building a house. But, according to Banerjee and Duflo, it is not only the 
access to easy and safe saving instruments that matters. As the researchers argue, low-
income people tend to live in the present without expecting any improvement in the future. 
They therefore often don’t see the value of saving and/or don’t bring up the necessary 
discipline.  
(5) Weak and unknown institutional environments The institutional environment of BoP 
markets differs substantially from Western markets. Institutional weakness has repeatedly 
been described as a major barrier to development. As will be further explained later, Mair, 
Martí, and Ventresca (2012), for instance, emphasize that the absence of Western-style 
market institutions has been put forth as a major reason for the market exclusion of low-
income people. Kistruck et al (2011), further outline the institutional challenges that micro-
franchising models at the BoP face. Micro-franchising has been put forth as a promising way 
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to rapidly scale up BoP ventures (see e.g. Fairbourne, Gibson, & Dyer, 2007). However, their 
implementation is impeded in BoP markets, where formal institutions are typically poorly 
developed, where institutional contexts differ substantially from developed markets and also 
depict high variety across different regions (Kistruck et al, 2011, p. 510). This leads to major 
challenges in implementing the three core propositions of franchising models. First, 
franchising models seek to align franchisees’ incentives with those of the franchisor in order 
to reduce agency concerns.18 However, Kistruck and colleagues explain that the motivation 
of people living at the BoP to engage as micro-franchisees can’t be compared to that of 
franchisees in more developed markets. Similar to necessity entrepreneurs, micro-
franchisees may lack proactive, opportunity-seeking behavior that franchisors would expect, 
as they generally prefer to be employees rather than entrepreneurs (ibid, p. 510f.). The 
search for suitable candidates with the adequate mindset is likely to cause high monitoring 
costs, particularly in the context of weak technological infrastructure, difficult transportation 
conditions, and weak enforcement mechanisms (ibid, p. 513). Second, franchising models 
are based on the idea that start-up costs and operating costs can be shared between 
franchisors and franchisees, who ideally operate on a financially sustainable or profitable 
basis. This is arguably particularly advantageous for BoP initiatives that try to reach scale in 
resource scarce settings. However, micro-fanchisees rarely possess the financial means or 
access to affordable capital to allow for such a cost sharing. This leaves the largest share of 
capital requirements with the franchisor (ibid, p. 514). Poor formal educational institutions 
furthermore lead to low levels of business skills requiring significant efforts from franchisors 
to invest in capacity building and other costs when dealing with the low levels of human 
capital (ibid, p. 515). And for most products and services, low purchasing power and minimal 
profit margins usually also don’t suffice to overcome the resource scarcity that prevails at the 
BoP. Third, franchising models typically rest upon the idea of leveraging brand value – for 
instance based on the proposition of high quality – and benefitting of economies of scale 
through standardization and effective routines across geographies (ibid, p. 515). However, 
the lack of a communication infrastructure that reaches masses as well as the significant 
institutional differences within single regions or countries, including differences in norms, 
values and beliefs as well as language even between neighboring villages, undermine the 
possibilities to implement standardized processes and effective routines (ibid, p. 517).  
  
                                                   
18 Principal-agent relationships refer to situation in which an actor (the principal) delegates some decision making 
authority to another actor (the agent) to perform a task on his behalf. In order to avoid that the agent’s decisions 
deviate from the best interests of the principal, the latter can refer to measures such as incentive structures for the 
agent as well as monitoring mechanisms (Jensen & Meckling, 1976, p. 308) 
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2.2.3 Strategies for Businesses at the BoP 
In light of the diverse challenges that prevail in BoP settings, scholars and practitioners have 
expressed a range of strategic recommendations for companies to successfully tap into BoP 
markets. Radically rethinking the way to do business, investing in the BoP, gaining social 
embeddedness and entering cross-sector partnerships are the most important elements of 
recommended strategies in BoP literature.  
i. Radical rethinking In The Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid, Prahalad (2004, p. 25ff.) 
lists twelve principles of innovation for BoP markets; 1) radically rethinking price 
performance; 2) blending new technologies with existing and rapidly evolving infrastructures; 
3) developing solutions that are scalable across countries, culture and languages; 4) 
conserving natural resources; 5) focusing on functionality, not just form; 6) thinking of 
process innovations, not only product innovations; 7) deskilling work and products; 8) 
educating consumers about the benefits and the right use of products; 9) developing robust 
products that function in hostile environments; 10) developing interfaces that account for the 
languages, cultures and skill levels of BoP markets; 11) focusing of end consumers in both 
rural and urban areas; and 12) questioning entire architectures of systems – such as a grid-
based supply of electricity – and the possibility of rapid changes in BoP markets. More recent 
BoP publications embrace similar recommendations. Halme et al (2012), for instance, 
explain that multinationals short-term profit interests, as well as their incentive structures and 
risk aversion, usually curb the necessary mindset for innovativeness (p. 743). They therefore 
argue that multinationals need to promote intrapreneurial bricolage, that is, entrepreneurial 
action within the boundaries of their organizations and with the resources that are at hand 
(p. 747). 
ii. Investing in the BoP In accordance with the criticism that early BoP literature has drawn an 
overly simplistic picture of poverty as a mere lack of sufficient income, scholars have 
increasingly stressed the need to view poverty as a multidimensional issue. Referring to 
Sen’s definition of poverty as a lack of capabilities, Ansari and colleagues (2012) propose 
that actors venturing into the BoP should build capabilities by leveraging social capital mainly 
between communities and more resource rich networks, and by protecting already 
established social capital in communities. Similarly, scholars have repeatedly stressed the 
need to invest into BoP markets, for instance, by engaging in capacity building initiatives 
(London & Hart, 2004, p. 361). Training programs are often required in order to transfer 
knowledge and skills. These efforts can be seen as long-term investments that prepare 
markets for the provision of additional products and services and that provide a positive 
return for the investing companies in the form of brand image, employee morale, and 
corporate reputation among others (UNDP, 2008, p. 7).  
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iii. Gaining social embeddedness In order to gain a deep understanding of the people’s needs 
at the BoP and to achieve the social integration that is needed in order to operate at the BoP, 
Hart (2007) argues that companies will have to become indigenous, meaning that they 
should consider views and claims from audiences that have so far been disregarded, and 
show stronger respect of local culture as well as nature in order to develop solutions that fully 
fit the context (p. 21). This is even more important as BoP markets depict high levels of 
informality as well as structures and systems that are hardly accessible, including individual 
transactions, barter transactions, or subsistence farming - more than half of economic 
activities take place outside of the formal economy, resulting in the dominant importance of 
social contracts over formal contracts. Reaching BoP markets is therefore likely to require 
solutions that bridge the formal and the informal economy (London & Hart, 2004, p. 352). 
Hence, working with local partners has been emphasized as an important market entrance 
strategy particularly for foreign companies that seek to place their products and services in 
BoP markets. Combining principal-agent theory and identity theory, Kistruck and colleagues 
(2012) investigate how actors can establish successful partnerships with local agents in 
order to overcome marketing and distribution challenges at the BoP caused by “large cultural 
heterogeneity, language fragmentation, and a general distrust of “outsiders” by rural BOP 
communities” (p. 661). However, as mentioned earlier, such local partnerships also cause 
monitoring costs or incentive-based contracts in an effort to mitigate opportunistic behavior of 
the local agents. Kistruck and colleagues therefore propose another, arguably less cost-
intensive measure that turns agents into principals and fosters their ownership identity.  
iv. Entering cross-sector partnerships Finally, scholars and practitioners alike have called for 
cross-sector partnerships between the diverse actors that operate at the BoP, including 
nonprofit organizations, public entities and for-profit businesses. According to London and 
Hart (2004, p. 361), BoP initiatives that collaborated with “non-traditional” partners are more 
successful than those that don’t. The UNDP (2008) emphasizes that engaging in policy 
dialogue with governments is essential, as markets are often not prepared to adopt BoP 
innovations (p. 21). Kandachar and Halme (2008, p. 17) synthesize the idea of cross-sector 
collaborations in their multidisciplinary approach to BoP innovations, according to which the 
integration of various relevant actors and disciplines, but also hybrid business models that 
combine elements from the market, the public and philanthropy, is necessary to account for 
the heterogeneity of BoP markets and the information gaps that impede BoP initiatives.  
Given this background, it isn’t surprising that profit-maximizing multinational companies (MNCs) 
have remained hesitant to tap into BoP markets with their core business (Kolk, Rivera-Santos, & 
Rufin, 2013, p. 12). Instead, a wide range of other types of organizations and initiatives have 
started to adopt the BoP approach (ibid, p. 16). Among them are CSR projects or inclusive 
businesses initiated by multinational companies and smaller local enterprises, as well as NGOs 
and social enterprises that try to build up financially sustainable models that serve low-income 
32 CHANGES IN THE HISTORICAL CONFIGURATION OF SOCIAL SERVICE PROVISION 
 
 
people. Common to these approaches is that many of them embrace the idea of hybridity, not 
only in their goal setting, but also in the way they are organized and financed.  
For example, a well-known example of cross-sector BoP partnership in health is the WOW® 
Business Concept initiated by S.C. Johnson to prevent Malaria transmission. In collaboration with 
Cornell University and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, S.C. Johnson developed a business 
model that seeks to integrate mosquito control products into the daily routines of rural villagers in 
Ghana. Based on a membership model, the initiative aims to complement traditional philanthropic 
and aid-based efforts (Simanis, 2012). Although these types of cross-sector solutions are typical 
for BoP initiatives, little research has so far explored the concept of hybridity in BoP ventures. 
However, as Kolk, Rivera-Santos, and Rufin, (2013, p. 26) argue, drawing from research streams 
that have a stronger focus on hybridity may provide useful insights for BoP research. More 
generally, the authors posit that despite the increasing relevance of the BoP approach in practice, 
academic research remains underdeveloped. Most publications are targeted to practitioners and 
focus on the challenges that enterprises face when entering the BoP and/or propose a set of 
strategies in order to overcome these challenges and market to the poor (ibid, p. 8). In contrast, 
critical views or academic articles that contextualize the BoP approach in the larger field of 
international development or poverty alleviation are scarce (Ansari, Munir, & Gregg, 2012, 
p. 833). The reasons for this lack of contextualization are manifold. Kolk and colleagues (2013, 
p. 20) relate it, among others, to the difficulty of defining the BoP as well as to collecting 
information at the BoP, two obstacles that impede accurate academic research and theory 
building, particularly when it comes to the comparison of sectors or countries. 
The present study contributes to filling this gap by investigating health care providers that serve 
the BoP though the lens of hybrid organizations. The next chapter will provide the theoretical 




3 ORGANIZATIONAL HYBRIDITY IN THE CONTEXT OF 
INSTITUTIONAL COMPLEXITY 
As fields – such as the field of health care or the field of international development – become 
inhabited by increasingly divergent types of actors, environments become more complex for 
organizations. Institutional theorists argue that institutional environments provide organizations 
with guidance on norms, values, beliefs, modes of operating and structures that are considered to 
be appropriate in a society.19 Institutions within political and social environments, most generally 
understood as “rulelike” frameworks (Scott, 2008, p. 427), structure social behavior and thereby 
reduce uncertainty for organizations (North, 1990, p. 5f.). As institutional theory further argues, 
organizations have to comply with those institutional pressures in order to secure their legitimacy 
and thus their survival – with legitimacy being defined as “a generalized perception or assumption 
that the actions of an entity are socially desirable, proper or appropriate within some socially 
constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions” (Suchman, 1995, p. 574).  
In addition to those institutional prescriptions that institutional environments produce, 
organizations are also exposed to internal demands. Oliver (1997) comprehensively describes 
the interplay of forces to which organizations are exposed: “A firm’s institutional context includes 
its internal culture as well as broader influences from the state, society, and interfirm relations 
that define socially acceptable economic behavior“ (p. 697). Accordingly, institutional theory 
focuses on both the macro-level dynamics of the fields that surround organizations and the micro 
level of structures, practices and behavior within organizations.  
However, when organizational fields are characterized by heterogeneity or change (Wooten & 
Hoffman, 2008, p. 133ff.), scholars have argued that institutional complexity increases 
(Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta, & Lounsbury, 2011, p. 317ff.), and so-called 
institutional voids arise, thereby failing to provide clear guidelines for acceptable organizational 
behavior (Mair, Martí, & Ventresca, 2012, p. 819ff.).  
Institutional complexity and institutional voids – two concepts that will be further defined in this 
chapter – have traditionally been viewed as obstacles to organizational activity – and thus to the 
functioning of markets and to social and economic development. More recently, however, 
scholars have started to reinterpret those institutional challenges as opportunity spaces (see e.g. 
Desa, 2011; Greenwood et al, 2011; Mair & Marti, 2009; Mair et al, 2012). In contradictory or 
                                                   
19  The term institutional theory will be used to refer to a set of sociologically oriented organization and 
management theories that emerged in the late 1970’s and have altogether also frequently been labeled as “new 
organizational institutionalism” (e.g. Greenwood et al., 2008), “neo-institutional theory”, (e.g. DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1991, p. 12) or simply “institutional theory” (e.g. Scott, 1987, 2008). The institutional theory that build the 
basis of the present study is thus distinguished from, though related to, the new institutional economics, which 
focuses on the influence of institutions on transaction costs in economic processes and mainly goes back to 
Coase (Coase, 1937), and new institutionalism in political science, which emphasizes the need to analyze the 
behaviour of individual political actors within political institutions in order to understand political reality (March & 
Olsen, 1984). However, these three research streams share the fact that they explicitly seek to distinguish 
themselves from the older understanding of institutions as formal rules and structures. 
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ineffective institutional settings, the argument goes, organizations may also be able to find 
innovative solutions to achieve their goals. Hybrid organizations, which operate at the interstices 
of the public, the private and the third sector, for instance, have been claimed to be particularly 
resilient and innovative in such contexts (e.g. Jay, 2013). Although their emergence is not 
necessarily an innovation, it is only recently that they have caught the increased attention of 
scholars – mainly institutional theorists, but also representatives from the relatively new body of 
paradox research – and practitioners who seek to understand how organizations can successfully 
operate in complex institutional conditions. Hybrid organizations are defined as organizations that 
combine multiple institutional logics in unprecedented ways (Battilana & Dorado, 2010, p. 1419) – 
with institutional logics being defined as “the socially constructed, historical patterns of material 
practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by which individuals produce and reproduce 
their material subsistence, organize time and space, and provide meaning to their social reality” 
(Thornton & Ocasio, 1999, p. 804). In developing and emerging economies, for instance, hybrid 
organizations that seek to generate BVC and thus to combine the social welfare logic and the 
commercial logic, have raised significant hopes in the last decades. As described in the last 
chapter, concepts like base of the pyramid, social enterprise and social investing have been 
taken up by many actors who aim to develop innovative, financially sustainable or even profitable 
business models to serve the poor – among others in the field of health care. 
This chapter will outline the theoretical foundations of the emergent theory on hybrid 
organizations by reviewing literature from institutional theory and paradox research. Combining 
both literature streams is argued to be crucial as they bring different emphases on the 
investigation of hybrid organizations and thus ideally complement each other in light of this 
study’s research questions.  
It is believed that paradox research adds to institutional theory by providing a more agentic view 
on organizations, meaning one that accounts for organizations’ capacity to act independently and 
change its own situation (DiMaggio, 1988). Although there has been a shift towards integrating 
strategy arguments into institutional theory, institutional scholars generally focus on episodic 
organizational responses to institutional complexity and thus draw a rather passive picture of 
organizations. In addition, institutional theorists have generally predicted that in institutionally 
complex situations, organizations will sooner or later move toward one coherent logic (see e.g. 
Thornton & Ocasio, 1999). It is only recently that institutional scholars have started to explore 
hybridity as a sustainable characteristic of organizations (see e.g. Battilana & Dorado, 2010; 
Battilana & Lee, 2014; Jay, 2013; Pache & Santos, 2013). In contrast, paradox researchers view 
tensions as possible triggers for innovative strategic behavior that tries to move from “either/or 
decisions” to a “both/and perspective” (Lüscher & Lewis, 2008, p. 232) and allows organizations 
to manage these tensions sustainably through recursive or cyclical responses (see e.g. Jay, 
2013; Smith & Lewis, 2011). 
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Institutional theory is an important complement to paradox research, as it accounts for field-level 
dynamics by viewing institutions as societal phenomena that are reflected in organizations. Given 
this study’s interest in the reasons behind the tensions and strategies in hybrid organizations, this 
field-level perspective is essential. However, it is largely lacking in paradox research, which 
mainly focuses on strategies to manage tensions within organizations.  
This chapter will therefore be structured as follows: First, a brief introduction in institutional theory 
will present the key concepts and trace the main shifts of the theory over time, particularly the 
integration of strategic arguments into institutional theory. The second part will elaborate on 
existing research on institutional complexity with a focus on conflicting institutional logics. Finally, 
the third part will present the current state of research about the concept of hybrid organizations 
in institutional theory and introduce key insights from paradox research.  
3.1 Introducing Institutional Theory 
3.1.1 Key Concepts of Institutional Theory 
Early institutional literature emphasized the argument that organizations are exposed to 
institutional forces to which they have to comply in order to secure their organizational legitimacy 
and thus their survival (see e.g. Meyer et al. 1980; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Scott, 2008). Referring 
to Max Weber’s (Weber, 2012/1934) metaphor of organizations that are imprisoned in an “iron 
cage” of the “rationalist order”, 20 the seminal work of DiMaggio and Powell (1983) posited a bold 
hypothesis that sought to explain seemingly irrational organizational behavior (Scott, 2004, 
p. 462): Organizational structures, they argued, are a result of organizations’ responses to the 
“structuration of organizational fields” and not only pressures to reach higher levels of efficiency - 
with “structuration” referring to an entire set of institutions that shape social behavior (Giddens, 
1979).   
With this, organizational institutionalism has often been conceived as a counterpart to 
organization or management theories that hold a rational view on organizations being 
demarcated from their environment, or only exposed to resource dependencies (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978) and technological imperatives for efficiency and effectiveness. Inefficient 
organizational structures and practices may, for instance, emerge and endure due to power 
distribution, complex interdependencies, taken-for-granted assumptions or path dependencies 
                                                   
20 Weber’s metaphor of an iron cage represents one of the most widespread and powerful metaphors used by 
sociologists and organizational scholars (Tiryakian, 1981, p. 27). The original concept referred to an increased 
rationalization and efficiency-orientation that rooted in the protestant ethic and inescapably shaped the economy 
and thus social life, particularly in Western societies (Weber, 2012, p. 65). DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) seminal 
paper, which is one of the papers that marked the beginning of institutional theory, reinterpreted the figure of the 
iron cage by arguing that organizations, specifically, were not only forced to comply with technical demands for 
efficiency, as Weber suggested, but also with institutional pressures that conferred legitimacy, but didn’t 
necessarily lead to the most efficient outcomes. 
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(Oliver, 1997, p. 702). Early publications of institutional theorists have thus explicitly distinguished 
institutional pressures for legitimacy, and technical pressures for efficiency. 
By justifying the existence of inefficient structures and the importance of organizational 
legitimacy, institutional scholars expressed an argument which, at that time, was bold and 
seminal. A large number of scholars therefore felt incentivized to join this line of argumentation 
and to form an entire new research stream. However, early literature on organizational 
institutionalism remained highly theoretical and broad, as the most widespread definition of 
legitimacy exemplifies, describing it as a “generalized perception or assumption that the actions 
of an entity are socially desirable, proper or appropriate within some socially constructed systems 
of norms, values, beliefs and definitions” (Suchman, 1995, p. 574). In a similar vein, the concept 
of “institutional forces” was vaguely defined as “rulelike” frameworks or “rational myths” that 
shape organizational behavior and structures (Meyer & Rowan, 1977, p. 343). The mid 1990’s, 
however, can be seen as a tipping point in institutional theory, mainly due to the publications of 
Scott (1995) and Suchman (1995) who proposed concreatizations for the two interrelated 
concepts of organizational institutionalism, namely institutions and legitimacy – which are both 
central to institutional theory.  
Scott (1995) suggested that institutional material is composed of three ingredients, namely 
regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive elements. These institutional elements, he specified, 
differ with regard to the base of order, motives for compliance, logics of action, mechanisms, and 
indicators employed (p. 60):  
(1) Regulative elements entail rule setting and sanctioning and, as Scott (1995, p. 59f.) explains, 
generally correspond to economists’ – particularly North’s – understanding of institutions as 
coercive forces in the form of legal sanctions or other enforcing mechanisms, including 
“political (and judicial rules), economic rules, and contracts” (North, 1990, p. 47). However, in 
a larger sense, coercive pressures can be related to any pressures that are imposed on 
organizations by sources on which they depend. In market relationships, such coercive 
pressure is, for instance, exerted on organizations when exchange partners have a stronger 
bargaining power (McGregor, 1988, p. 25). Mizruchi and Fein (1999) thus argued that 
coercive forces are “at least in the first instance, (…) analogous to formulations of the 
resource dependence model, in which organizations are viewed as constrained by those on 
whom they depend for resources” (p. 657).21  
                                                   
21 The resource dependence theory mainly goes back to Pfeffer and Salancik’s influential book The External 
Control of Organizations: A Resource Dependence Perspective (1978) in which the authors suggested that an 
organization’s strategic leeway depends on its external resources. As these resources are often in the hands of 
other organizations, organizations highly depend upon each other. Resources can thus be interpreted as a basis 
of power that organizational leaders need to manage in order to ensure their survival (for a review, see Hillman, 
Withers, & Collins, 2009).  
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(2) Normative elements of institutions “introduce a prescriptive, evaluative, and obligatory 
dimension into social life” (Scott, 1995, p. 63). Their basis of compliance is social obligation, 
which rests on moral imperatives.  
(3) Finally, cultural-cognitive elements of institutions refer to taken-for-granted conceptions and 
frames (ibid, p. 68). These elements of institutional material are the most deeply 
institutionalized, as they occur in a taken-for-granted manner, meaning that cognitive 
pressures and cultural support occur unconsciously (Scott, 2008, p. 429). Together with 
normative institutional elements, cultural-cognitive institutions correspond to what North 
refers to with “informal constraints” (North, 1990, p. 36f.). 
Organizational legitimacy, Scott further elaborated, can be seen as the result of the interplay 
between regulative, normative and cultural/cognitive institutional forces surrounding an 
organization (Scott, 1995, p. 71). Legitimacy, he argued, is respectively claimed on the basis of 
being legally sanctioned, morally authorized, or culturally supported (ibid, p. 60). 
As Deephouse and Suchman (2008, p. 50) describe in their review of Legitimacy in 
Organizational Institutionalism, most institutional researchers credit Weber for the introduction of 
legitimacy in organizational theory. In his writings about legitimate forms of authority, namely 
charismatic, traditional and legal authority, he stressed that social practices follow ‘maxims’, or 
rules, and that this conformity can provide them with legitimacy (Weber, 1978, p. 212 ff.). 
However, as Deephouse and Suchman further describe, neither Weber nor early institutionalist 
publications provided a clear conceptualization of legitimacy (2008, p. 50). This mainly changed 
with Scott’s (1995) systematic approach to analyze the different rationales for the legitimacy 
claims that lie behind different institutional pressures.  
In addition, Suchman (1995) also provided an important contribution to institutional theory by 
proposing to distinguish three conceptual dimensions of organizational legitimacy: First, 
pragmatic legitimacy, he stated, is based on audience self-interest, meaning that an 
organization’s constituencies grant an organization legitimacy if it’s activities have positive 
practical consequences for them (p. 578). Second, moral legitimacy is granted by audiences 
when they consider that an organization does “the right thing” (p. 579). It reflects a positive 
normative evaluation and is independent of the benefits that an organization’s activities have on 
the evaluator. Third, cognitive legitimacy, Suchman explains, is based on comprehensibility and 
taken-for-grantedness. This type of legitimacy is the result of a more subtle process which 
doesn’t rely on any active evaluation, but rather occurs unconsciously. Organizations are granted 
cognitive legitimacy when they act in a plausible way or when audiences literally can’t think of any 
alternative behavior (p. 582f.). 
In contrast to Scott, Suchman extended the concept of legitimacy by an important aspect. He not 
only provided a framework to explain the differences in how societal beliefs become embedded in 
organizations, but also a strategic perspective on how legitimacy can be managed to help 
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achieve organizational goals (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008, p. 52). The concrete strategies will 
be further elaborated in the next section that summarizes the major scholarly efforts to integrate 
strategic arguments into institutional theory. 
Overall, early institutional theorists shared Weber’s argument that organizations are all subject to 
the above-mentioned institutional forces, and therefore predicted that organizations would, over 
time, move toward resembling one another. The drivers behind that increasing resemblance were 
argued to be so-called isomorphistic pressures, namely coercive, normative and mimetic forces, 
that drive homogenization processes as organizations strive for legitimacy. Boxenbaum and 
Jonsson (2008) explain: “organizations adapt not only to technical pressures but also to what 
they believe society expects from them” (p. 78). These dynamics create organizational structures 
that are similar and thus legitimate, but not necessarily the most efficient ones (Powell & 
DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 147).  
However, based on the observation that organizations are de facto neither totally determined by 
institutional pressures nor entirely free to act strategically, an increasing number of scholars 
started to emphasize the need to integrate arguments from strategic management into 
institutional theory in order to provide a more realistic view (see e.g Beckert, 1999, p. 778; W. 
Richard Scott, 1995, p. 170).22 Oliver’s (1991) seminal work on organizations’ strategic responses 
to institutional processes certainly prepared the ground for various efforts to reconcile the basic 
premises of both literature streams by acknowledging that organizations do have a certain 
flexibility to strategically respond to institutional forces. As mentioned earlier, Suchman 
furthermore proposed various strategies to manage legitimacy, and finally, concepts such as 
institutional capital and institutional entrepreneurship have provided complementary views, 
putting a stronger emphasis on agency in institutional theory. The following sections will briefly 
review the key arguments put forth in this regard. 
3.1.2 From Environmental Determinism to Organizational Agency 
Responses to Institutional Processes 
Oliver’s (1991) work on strategic responses to institutional processes triggered a reorientation of 
early institutional arguments. By incorporating arguments of the resource-based view into 
institutional theory, she provided the first attempt to simultaneously account for both 
                                                   
22 Strategic management literature mainly deals with the question of how companies can reach their objectives, 
particularly by acquiring a competitive advantage (for an historical overview on the beginnings of strategic 
management literature (see e.g. Bracker, 1980). In contrast to institutional theory, the focus therefore lies on 
firms’ heterogeneity, and strive to distinguish themselves particularly from competitors. Strategic management 
literature furthermore imples that firms have a strategic choice and the possibility to actively shape their 
environment, for example, by fostering the establishment of market entry barriers or resource mobility barriers 
(see e.g. Bresser & Millonig, 2004) 
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environmental determinism and strategic latitude.23 Responses to institutional processes, she 
argued, may differ depending on “the degree of choice, awareness, and self-interest that 
organizations possess for handling external constraints” (p. 148). Accordingly, she presented five 
general strategic responses to institutional processes, which can be located on the spectrum 
between high and low conformity with institutional pressures: acquiescence, compromise, 
avoidance, defiance and manipulation (see table 1).  
Table 1:  Strategic Responses to Institutional Processes  
  (adapted from Oliver, 1991, p. 152) 
Strategies Tactics Examples 
Acquiesce  Habit 
 Imitate 
 Comply 
 Following invisible, taken-for-granted norms 
 Mimicking institutional models 
 Obeying rules and accepting norms 
Compromise  Balance 
 Pacify 
 Bargain 
 Balancing the expectations of multiple constituents 
 Placating and accommodating institutional elements 
 Negotiating with institutional stakeholders 
Avoid  Conceal 
 Buffer 
 Escape 
 Disguising nonconformity 
 Loosening institutional attachments 
 Changing goals, activities or domains 
Defy  Dismiss 
 Challenge 
 Attack 
 Ignoring explicit norms and values 
 Contesting rules and requirements 
 Assaulting the sources of institutional pressures 
Manipulate  Co-opt 
 Influence 
 Control 
 Importing influential constituents 
 Shaping values and criteria 
 Dominating institutional constituents and processes 
 
Several studies built upon Oliver’s seminal work to further develop the integration of strategic and 
institutional arguments, including Suchman (1995), who proposed several strategies to manage 
pragmatic, moral and cognitive legitimacy. As he elaborated, pragmatic and moral legitimacy 
differ from cognitive legitimacy, as they rest on discursive evaluations, as opposed to cognitive 
legitimacy, which is based on unspoken assumptions (p. 585). Thus, he argued, the possibilities 
for organizations to gain, maintain and/or repair legitimacy differ. In order to gain legitimacy, 
Suchman argues that organizations can, for instance, conform to environments by meeting the 
substantive needs of audiences (for pragmatic legitimacy), conform to more abstract ideas (for 
moral legitimacy) or adopt established models or standards (for cognitive legitimacy). In order to 
maintain legitimacy, organizations may take measures that enable it to perceive audience 
reactions and possible emerging challenges. These measure include monitoring multiple interests 
around the organizations (for pragmatic legitimacy), incorporating multiple ethics (for moral 
                                                   
23 According to the resource-based view of the firm, organizations can achieve a competitive advantage by 
rationally identifying disposable resources that are valuable, rare, in-imitable, and non-substitutable (Barney, 
1991). 
40 ORGANIZATIONAL HYBRIDITY IN THE CONTEXT OF INSTITUTIONAL COMPLEXITY 
 
 
legitimacy), and establishing units that question each other’s taken-for-granted assumptions (for 
cognitive legitimacy). Finally, in order to repair legitimacy, Suchman explains that organizational 
managers can usually refer to three different strategies: offer normalizing accounts such as 
denying, presenting an excuse, justification or explanation; restructure the organization by 
creating monitoring instances and distance the organizations from bad influences; and avoid 
panic.  
In addition, Lawrence (1999), introduced the concept of institutional strategies, defined as 
“patterns of organizational action concerned with the transformation of institutions, fields and the 
rules and standards that control those structures” (p. 167). These strategies, he argued, are not 
so much concerned with the objective of gaining a competitive advantage, but rather with the 
managing of institutional structures in order to establish conditions that are favorable for the 
organization. Lawrence described two main strategies that organizations use to influence their 
environment, namely membership and standardization. Membership strategies attempt to define 
the rules that determine whether an organization belongs to an institutional community as well as 
the meaning that such membership has for organizations. Standardization strategies, in contrast, 
set the standard that is “normal” with regard to the technical, legal and market process behind the 
production of goods and services. In both cases, Lawrence suggests that the intensity of 
institutional pressures determines whether a strategy is to be successful or not.  
Building up Institutional Capital 
In line with her efforts to integrate institutional and resource-based views, Oliver (1997) extended 
her argumentation, positing that an organization needs to manage both institutional capital and 
resource capital to establish a sustainable competitive advantage – with resource capital being 
defined as “the value-enhancing assets and competencies of the firm” and institutional capital as 
“the firm's capability to support value-enhancing assets and competencies” (p. 709). Oliver 
proposed a conceptual framework that traces the process of decision-making that will ultimately 
create this competitive advantage. This process describes the conflicts that a firm is likely to 
experience between institutional pressures and resource-based demands – that is, technical 
pressures (p. 700 ff.). A firm’s ability to generate a competitive advantage, thus, according to 
Oliver, depends on its effectiveness in managing the social context of the resources and 
capabilities. 
Bresser and Millonig (2004) extended the concept of institutional capital by distinguishing three 
components of institutional capital, based on Scott’s (1995) conceptualization of institutions: 
cognitive capital resting on the interpretive schemes of decision makers in an organization; 
normative capital resulting from an organization’s institutionalized norms, values, structures and 
routines; and regulative capital based on the way organizations deal with formal and informal 
demands from external institutional actors. Particularly cognitive and normative capital, they 
argue, differ among organizations and may therefore lead to competitive advantages (p. 232). 
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Measures of organizational learning, for instance, can be actively taken to reduce cognitive sunk 
costs or challenge institutionalized – which in this context means “dysfunctional” – organizational 
behavior. At the interfirm level, Bresser and Millonig furthermore argue that the ability to establish 
a competitive advantage will depend on a firm’s success in managing essential relationships, and 
their ability to “gain support from relevant institutional actors” (p. 232). Finally, Bresser and 
Millonig also propose a further extension of manipulation strategies by introducing five more 
options to Oliver’s (1991) catalogue of strategic responses: (1) lobbying as the active formulation 
of a firm’s wishes and recommendations for policy-making, (2) co-optation defined as the 
acquisition of key oppositional actors for governance or advisory boards, (3) membership as a 
means to foster the institutionalization of new groupings that become a rule setter within an 
organizational field, (4) standardization defined as the process of setting the standard that is 
“normal” for a certain product, service or practice. By doing so, organizations create institutions 
that don’t necessarily focus on the most efficient solution but rather a favored solution. Finally, (5) 
influence refers to the strategies that aim at manipulating “values, belief systems, and acceptable 
practices (…) at the societal level”. 
Institutional Entrepreneurship 
In contrast to previously mentioned efforts to theoretically account for strategic latitude in 
organizations, despite their exposure to institutional pressures, research on institutional 
entrepreneurship depicts a much stronger emphasis on organizational agency (Battilana et al., 
2009, p. 68). While the term was first used by Eisenstadt (1980), it is Paul DiMaggio (1988, p. 14) 
who further introduced institutional entrepreneurship into institutional theory, thereby triggering 
the emergence of multiple studies on organizational efforts to shape institutional environments. 
Battilana and colleagues’ extensive review on institutional entrepreneurship summarizes this 
body of work and defines institutional entrepreneurs as “actors who leverage resources to create 
new or transform existing institutions” (Battilana et al., 2009, p. 68). These institutions particularly 
refer to formal or informal rules within a certain context or to concrete organizational practices or 
structures that institutional entrepreneurs consider as necessary for their purpose. Institutional 
entrepreneurs, however, are not exclusively individuals, as the term “entrepreneur” could 
suggest. They can also take the form of organizations or groups of actors that, as some scholars 
suggest, may act in a coordinated or uncoordinated way. 
Two main streams can be distinguished within institutional entrepreneurship research: one that 
deals with the concrete strategies that institutional entrepreneurs use to change or create 
institutions such as mobilizing resources through story telling (see e.g. Zilber, 2007), applying 
bricolage techniques (see e.g. Maguire et al., 2004),24 or building platforms that enable excluded 
groups to participate in markets and breaking relationships of dependence (see e.g. Mair & Marti, 
                                                   
24  The concept of bricolage was introduced by Lévi-Strauss (1966) without providing a clear definition. 
Subsequent studies often used the term with reference to Baker and Nelson’s (2005) definition of bricolage “as 
making do by applying combinations of the resources at hand to new problems and opportunities“ (p. 333) 
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2009); and a second body of work that analyzes the preconditions that are necessary for 
institutional entrepreneurs to achieve the change they seek (for an overview, see Battilana et al., 
2009).  
With regards to the strategies to implement institutional change, Battilana and colleagues (2009) 
emphasize that the process of institutional entrepreneurship often starts with the creation of a 
vision for divergent change on a discourse level. In concrete, institutional entrepreneurs often 
refer to the strategy of “framing”, which entails all discursive activities used to emphasize the 
importance of the aspired institutional change. This framing is said to be diagnostic when it aims 
at depicting the current failures, challenges and limits of institutionalized practices; prognostic 
when it stresses the superiority of the envisaged institutional change in comparison to the current 
situation, and motivational when it focuses on the reasons why one should support the new vision 
(p. 79 f.). Battilana and colleagues therefore specify that framing strategies often go hand in hand 
with the de-legitimization of current institutional arrangements and the legitimization of new actors 
and practices. As will be further elaborated at a later stage, these discursive strategies resemble 
the concept of sensemaking, which has been put forth as a central way how hybrid organizations, 
in particular, can overcome paradoxical situations that challenge their operations (see e.g. Jay, 
2013). In addition, it also recalls narrative strategies of social movements, which refer to similar 
strategies for collective mobilization in a society (for an overview, see Davis, McAdam, Scott, & 
Zald, 2005, or Davis, 2012). 
Tracey and colleagues (2011) draw a similar picture with regards to the importance of discursive 
strategies applied by institutional entrepreneurs. In order to create a new hybrid organizational 
form and gain the necessary legitimacy, the organization that they investigated referred to what 
Tracey et al call “bridging institutional entrepreneurship”, that is institutional work entailing 
discursive, operational and structural action at the micro, meso and macro level – with different 
purposes at each level (p. 69). While opportunity recognition was the main goal at the micro level, 
the design of the hybrid organizational form predominated the actions at the meso level, and the 
legitimation of the hybrid organizational form was the central aspiration of institutional work at the 
macro level. This reflects Battilana and colleagues (2009) who point to the mobilization of allies 
that support the vision and provide financial and social capital as the second step of their 
“process of institutional entrepreneurship” (p. 81f.). 
Conditions Influencing Variations in Strategic Behavior 
Institutional scholars have stressed, though, that agentic behavior does not occur in a vacuum. A 
range of factors have an influence on the strategies that organizations will apply and whether 
institutional entrepreneurship will occur and succeed. These factors can be divided in three 
categories: (1) factors relating to field-level dynamics, (2) specifications of the institutional 
prescriptions that surround organizations, and finally (3) organizational or individual 
characteristics and positions. 
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(1) In her early work on strategic responses to institutional processes, Oliver (1991) suggested 
that the “context” of an organization would influence the choice of a strategy (p. 146f.). 
Environmental uncertainty, that is, for instance, unpredictability of the state, as well as the 
interconnectedness of actors in an organizational field are, according to Oliver, significant 
determinants of organizational responses. The lower the uncertainty and the lower the 
interconnectedness, the more likely it is that organizations will resist to institutional 
pressures. Several scholars have picked up this argument.  
With regards to institutional entrepreneurship, Battilana and colleagues (2009) argue that 
field-level conditions differ in their conduciveness for institutional change and thus in their 
receptivity for institutional entrepreneurs’ efforts. The level of institutionalization, 25  the 
scarcity of resources, the need for new solutions, the prevalence of heterogeneity or 
uncertainty in the institutional environment, as well as the occurrence of “social upheaval, 
technological disruption, competitive discontinuity, and regulatory changes” (p. 74), all 
potentially facilitate the introduction of new ideas.  
Maguire, Hardy and Lawrence (2004) similarly shed light on the relationship between a 
field’s maturity – again referring to the field’s level of institutionalization – and successful 
strategies of institutional entrepreneurs. Their qualitative study of institutional 
entrepreneurship in the field of HIV/aids treatment advocacy in Canada describes how 
uncertainty and institutional ambiguity in an emerging field, defined as a field with little 
coordinated action among its members and a lack of dominant actors and institutions 
prescribing social order, open the spaces for new solutions and actions as cognitive, 
normative and regulative forces are not yet deeply institutionalized, and isomorphic 
pressures are therefore weak.  
Oliver (1991, p. 160ff.) furthermore suggested four additional factors that influence 
organizations’ choice for a strategy, which all relate to the specifications of the institutional 
forces: First, the author argued that the cause of why an organizations is being pressured 
generally refers to two main types of pressure, namely for social or economic fitness – or, in 
other words, for legitimacy or efficiency. Second, the constituents that exert institutional 
pressure, that is, an organization’s stakeholders, can furthermore be characterized by 
varying degrees of multiplicity, “defined as the degree of multiple, conflicting, constituent 
expectations exerted on an organization” (p. 162) and by the degree to which the 
organization depends on the constituents. The higher the inconsistency between the 
constituents and the lower the organization’s dependence on them, the more Oliver expected 
organizations to resist to institutional pressures. Third, the author posited that the content of 
                                                   
25 Institutionalization can be understood as a process and a property variable that has been central to institutional 
theory from early on. As Zucker posits (1977): “It is the process by which individual actors transmit what is socially 
defined as real and, at the same time, at any point in the process the meaning of an act can be defined as more 
or less a taken-for-granted part of this social reality (p. 728). 
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norms, claims and requirements to which an organizational is supposed to conform can differ 
with regards to its consistency with organizational goals and to the degree of discretion of the 
constraints imposed on an organization. The lower the consistency and the higher the 
discretionary constraints, the more organizations will tend to refer to resistance strategies. 
Finally, Oliver argues that the control that external constituents exert to impose their 
demands on an organization can take two forms, namely legal coercion by means of 
authority, or pressure for voluntary diffusion. The lower the degree of legal coercion and the 
lower the degree of voluntary diffusion, she argues, the more organizations are likely to resist 
to pressures. Oliver concludes that organizations are expected to estimate the potential gain 
that can be achieved through conformity with each of these pressures and choose their 
response strategy accordingly. 
(2) One aspect that hasn’t been considered by Oliver, but subsequently by many other 
institutional scholars, refers to organizational-level factors, including ownership structure (see 
e.g. Goodrick & Salancik, 1996), the distribution of power within organizations (e.g. Delmas 
& Toffel, 2007), organizational learning (see e.g. Westphal & Zajac, 2001) or identity (see 
e.g. Fox-Wolfgramm et al., 1998). All these aspects foster heterogeneity among 
organizations and therefore the available resource and capacities, as well as internal 
preferences to deal with institutional prescriptions. 
Institutional entrepreneurship scholars have expressed similar arguments. Maguire and 
colleagues (2004), for example, emphasize that institutional change is a “political process 
that reflects the power and interests of (…) actors” and that institutional entrepreneurs will 
only be able to achieve this change if they have “the "capital" or resources to exert power 
over the field at a particular time” (p. 658). Successful institutional entrepreneurs must be 
able to counter the efforts of opponents to the aspired institutional change and gain the 
support of legitimacy granting actors in the field – a process that is facilitated when 
institutional entrepreneurs hold “financial resources and resources related to social position” 
(Battilana et al., 2009, p. 83) as this in turn enables them to acquire more financial and social 
capital.  
Maguire and colleagues (2004) therefore concluded that the number of positions within a 
field that enable actors to instigate institutional change are limited (p. 658). This argument is 
further specified by Battilana and colleagues (2009) who state that the social position or 
status within an organizational field influences both “actors’ perception of a field (…) and 
their access to the resources needed to engage in institutional entrepreneurship” (p. 76).  
As these elaborations show, the nexus between institutional prescriptions and strategic behavior 
in organizations is highly complex. The range of field-level, prescription specific and 
organizational level factors at play make it difficult to predict (strategic) organizational behavior. In 
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addition, and as the next section will explicate, the reconciliation of strategic and institutional 
arguments is also difficult from a theoretical point of view. 
3.1.3 The “Paradox of Embedded Agency” and How Reflexivity Can Help 
The last sections have outlined the major scholarly attempts to integrate a more active 
understanding of organizations and strategic action in the further development of institutional 
theory. This body of work has significantly contributed to moderating the passive understanding 
that initially prevailed in institutional theory. Some scholars even went further and proposed that 
institutional theory provides an excellent basis for understanding more dynamic phenomena such 
as organizational change, as it outlines the contextual dynamics that bring about the need for 
organizational adoption (e.g. Greenwood & Hinings, 1993). However, several scholars keep 
emphasizing that the current attempts to reconcile strategic and institutional arguments remain 
insufficient when it comes to resolving a central discrepancy between the two lines of thought, 
namely the paradox of embedded agency – a notion that has first been introduced by Seo and 
Creed (2002, p. 226) – (for an overview, see Battilana & D’Aunno, 2009, or Garud, Hardy, & 
Maguire, 2007). Under this label, scholars have regularly pointed to the argument that actors’ 
behavior is – often unconsciously – influenced by institutional pressures, and that actors are 
therefore not able to change or actively make strategic decisions concerning these very same 
institutions. Particularly in the situation where institutional pressures remain unconscious, the 
meta-theoretical question remains: How can actors that are embedded in institutions disembed 
themselves from taken-for-granted prescriptions and act strategically towards confronting or even 
changing them? The concept of institutional entrepreneurship, which strongly presupposes 
actors’ general ability for strategic action, has consequently been criticized for holding an overly 
rational and heroic view on organizations or individuals (Garud et al., 2007, p. 961).  
Seo and Creed (2002) try to approach the paradox of embedded agency by using the concept of 
praxis. Introduced by Benson (1977), praxis is one of four basic principles of dialectal analysis,26 
and refers to the “free and creative reconstruction of social patterns on the basis of reasoned 
analysis of both the limits and the potential of present social forms” (p.5). For the paradox of 
embedded agency, Seo and Creed argue that actors are “partially autonomous in a contradictory 
social world” and can thus become “active exploiter[s] of social contradictions” (p. 230). In other 
words, the authors propose to view contradictions in the institutional environment as key sources 
for the reflexivity that actors need to spur institutional change. The next sections will further 
elaborate on the topic of institutional contradictions. 
                                                   
26 As Benson (1977) explains “the dialectical view is a general perspective on social life which can be extracted 
from the Marxist analysis of economic structure and its ramifications“ (p. 2) He further specifies: “a dialectical view 
is fundamentally commited to the concept of process“ (p. 2-3). Nothing is fixed but rather temporary and “arbitrary 
patterns and any observed social pattern are regarded as one among many possibilities“ (p. 3). He posits four 
basic principles of dialectical analysis: social construction, totality, contradiction and praxis. 
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In addition, scholars have proposed further variables that may enable actors to achieve the 
reflexivity that is needed to disembed themselves from institutional orders. Beckert (1999) posits 
that it is particularly in situations of uncertainty in which the interplay of institutionalized behavior 
and strategic agency unfolds (p. 782). Uncertainty, he argues, occurs in complex situations where 
actors are unable to predict the probable consequences of strategic choices (p. 782). Beckert 
argues that institutionalized behavior (embeddedness) and strategic agency (disembeddedness) 
of actors shouldn’t be seen as alternative but rather corresponding processes. He therefore 
points to the existence of agents with the capability to interpret constraints as possibilities to 
achieve more efficient outcomes. As he explains, “the violation of institutionalized structures, 
rules, and strategies might carry a profit premium” (p. 779).  
As Seo and Creed suggested, and as will be further explained in the next section, situations of 
uncertainty may emerge, for example, when institutional pressures are not coherent or even 
conflicting. Institutional contradictions – or more generally, institutional complexity – are an 
increasingly prevalent condition shaping organizational environments and strategies, and thus 
provide an interesting setting to gain new insights on the paradox of embedded agency. 
3.2 Institutional Complexity, Institutional Voids and their Influence on 
Organizations 
As mentioned earlier, the concept of conflicting demands – understood as “antagonisms in the 
organizational arrangements required by institutional referents” (Pache & Santos, 2010, p. 457) – 
already resonated in very early institutional theorizing that pointed to the incompatibility between 
the legitimacy claims and efficiency claims that organizations face (see e.g. DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983). However, as environments become more global, fast paced and competitive (Smith & 
Lewis, 2011, p. 381), researchers have started to work on a more differentiated understanding of 
contradictions in institutional environments, or, more generally, in institutional material.  
Seo and Creed (2002, p. 226f.), for instance, further concretized the concept of institutional 
contradictions by distinguishing four key contradictions that may occur in institutional 
arrangements. First, the dichotomy of institutional and technical pressures (legitimacy versus 
efficiency);27 second, the negative influence of adaptation on adaptability, as institutionalization 
processes usually come along with an increasing resistance to change; third, the contradictions 
accruing from incompatible institutional prescriptions; and fourth, the exposure to isomorphistic 
forces, which conflict with the existence of divergent interests.  
                                                   
27 It is worth highlighting that most institutional research today doesn’t distinguish anymore between institutional 
and technical demands, that is, competitive forces that drive organizations toward efficiency. Institutional 
researcher have increasingly argued that technical demands are themselves socially constructed and embedded 
in institutional logics that promote efficiency (Lounsbury, 2002) – mainly the commercial or market logic. More 
generally, recent institutional theory has come to the conclusion that all social systems, including economic 
systems like markets, are governed by rules, norms, and belief systems (Scott, 2008). 
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In addition, a larger body of research around the concepts of institutional complexity and 
institutional pluralism has emerged, seeking to shed light on the behavior of organizations that 
are exposed to multiple institutional demands. Whereas the term institutional pluralism simply 
points to the co-existence of multiple institutional orders – and thus institutional demands towards 
organizations (see e.g. Kraatz and Block, 2008) – institutional complexity furthermore stresses 
the difficulties that pluralism implies when institutional prescriptions contradict each other (e.g. 
Greenwood et al, 2011). In the latter case, recent scholars have argued that so-called institutional 
voids arise, that is, analytical spaces between conflicting institutional spheres (Mair, Martí, and 
Ventresca, 2012, p. 822) – and not empty spaces as suggested by other researchers (see e.g. 
Chakrabarty & Bass, 2013). As the next section will summarize, researchers have interpreted 
institutional voids as both challenges and opportunities for organizations. 
3.2.1 Institutional Voids – From Empty Spaces to Institutional Abundance 
Given that institutional scholars have repeatedly emphasized the role of institutions in giving 
stability and meaning to social reality, as described in the last sections, institutional voids have 
traditionally been interpreted as challenges for organizations, and thus for social and economic 
development in developing and emerging economies (see e.g. Chakrabarty, 2009; Chakrabarty & 
Bass, 2013; Webb, Tihanyi, Ireland, & Sirmon, 2009). However, institutional theory so far lacks a 
commonly accepted definition of institutional voids. At least two different perspectives on 
institutional voids can be distinguished in the literature. 
The first widely adopted interpretation of institutional voids comes from scholars with 
management and economics background mainly, who argue that institutional voids refer to 
situations in which institutions are weak or absent. This view has been coined by Khanna and 
Palepu (2006), who define institutional voids as “the absence of specialist intermediaries, 
regulatory systems, and contract-enforcing mechanisms” in an economy (p. 62). Chakrabarty 
(2009, p. 32) adopted a similar view, explaining that the lack of institutional norms and regulations 
needed for monitoring contracts is one type of institutional voids, and the lack of financial credit 
availability is another type. Chakrabarty and Bass (2014, p. 529), further expand the list of 
institutional voids and include ineffective governmental institutions, ineffective regulatory 
agencies, regressive laws and regulations, as well as weak policing. Similarly, Tracey and Phillips 
(2011, p. 31) view institutional voids as situations in which institutions that facilitate economic 
activity as well as their enforcing mechanisms are absent. In other words, the first interpretation 
of institutional voids emphasizes the lack or weakness of formal or regulative institutional 
elements. These institutional voids, the argument continues, incentivize organizations to refer to 
informal practices such as bricolage (see e.g. Desa, 2011), trust and reciprocity in social relations 
(see e.g. Puffer, McCarthy, & Boisot, 2010), or the affiliation to business groups (see e.g. 
Castellacci, 2015), thereby inhibiting the formation of efficient markets (see e.g. Kistruck, Webb, 
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Sutter, & Ireland, 2011). Developing and emerging economies are therefore often the setting of 
studies that theorize around institutional voids, as they are characterized by weak formal 
institutions as well as strong institutional transition and therefore rapidly changing prescriptions 
for organizations (see e.g. Peng, 2003).  
However, another interpretation of institutional voids rather adopts a sociologist or anthropologist 
perspective, stressing the abundance of institutions. Desa’s (2011) definition of institutional voids 
points to the cognitive frames that underlie an interpretation of institutional voids as a lack of 
formal institutions. By using the term institutional voids, Desa refers to “institutional arrangements 
that are absent, weak, or fail to accomplish the role expected of them” (p. 1) and thereby points to 
the fact that viewing institutional voids as empty spaces lies in the eye of the beholder who 
“expects” certain institutions to accomplish a function. Institutions, he explains, can enable and 
constrain entrepreneurial action. However, in the case of social entrepreneurship,28 he argues, 
this action by definition often takes place in the context of institutional voids. Social entrepreneurs 
thus seek to address social problems that remain unsolved by other institutions, innovatively 
using and combining resources for their social purpose. In the context of lacking institutional 
support, Desa argues that this resource mobilization may take the form of bricolage – more 
specifically “material bricolage, labor bricolage, and skill bricolage” (p. 4). The author explains 
that it is through these mechanisms that social enterprises gain access to resources in a wider 
sense, including normative and cognitive legitimacy for a specific social need. He furthermore 
expands on the reciprocal nature of bricolage in that not only do entrepreneurs gain access to 
resources but they also shape their institutional environment by creatively combining resources 
and are therefore instigating institutional change. Bricolage, he argues, is thus particularly 
prevalent in developing and emerging economies that depict restrictive cognitive, regulative, and 
normative institutions (p. 16). With these elaborations, Desa’s study certainly added important 
insights to the study of social entrepreneurship in the context of institutional voids. However, it 
unfortunately didn’t provide any further elaboration on the socially constructed character of 
institutional voids that he implied in his definition.  
                                                   
28 The definition of social entrepreneurship and social enterprise remains a central issue in this body of literature 
that has emerged out of business research. Accordingly, many publications have attempted to typologize and 
conceptualize the phenomenon (Dacin, Dacin, & Matear, 2010, p. 41). In general, two schools of thought can be 
distinguished within social entrepreneurship literature. The first stream emphasizes the characteristics of the 
social entrepreneur as an individual able to instigate systemic change in analogy to commercial entrepreneurs 
who cause creative destruction, meaning economic development through the repeated emergence of disruptive 
solutions that destroy old structures and create new ones (Schumpeter, 1943/2013, p. 81). Researchers involved 
in this debate largely draw from entrepreneurship literature and center on various characteristics of individuals 
that recognize entrepreneurial opportunities and succeed in exploiting them as to create social value (e.g. 
Palmås, 2012).  
The second body of work emphasizes the organizational aspect of social enterprises – or social businesses – as 
organizations that apply business mechanisms to reach their social objectives, or in other words, “as a 
businesslike contrast to the traditional nonprofit organization” (Dart, 2004b, p. 411). The differences between 
social enterprises and traditional nonprofit organizations relate to the strategy, structure, norms, and values of the 
organizations (ibid, p. 411). Social enterprise research therefore deals with questions of strategic management 
(Moizer & Tracey, 2010), financing (Sunley & Pinch, 2012), resource mobilization (Desa & Basu, 2013), 
organizational form (Townsend & Hart, 2008), organizational legitimacy (Nicholls, 2010c) and other organization 
centered topics.  
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Mair and colleagues (2012) further concretized this idea by treating institutional voids as 
“analytical spaces at the interface of several institutional spheres, each with its own animating 
logic of meanings and social practices” (p. 822). In a case study of the Bangladeshi NGO BRAC, 
the authors show how institutional voids result from conflict and contradiction between 
components of Western-style market institutions – namely property rights and autonomy – and 
local political, community, and religious spheres in rural Bangladesh. Their study further suggests 
that when such institutional voids arise, organizations can renegotiate existing institutional orders 
to overcome the contradictions. In concrete, they show how BRAC acted as an intermediary to 
build more inclusive markets, that is, markets that are also accessible for women who were 
formerly excluded from market activities. The organization referred to social narratives and 
negotiation activities surrounding existing institutional patterns in order to legitimate new actors 
and redefine markets (p. 833).  
With this study, Mair and colleagues presented an important contribution to the scholarly 
understanding of institutional voids, particularly in developing and emerging economies. In 
contrast to viewing institutional voids as empty spaces, they stress their situatedness at the 
interface of different institutional spheres and thereby deemphasize the belief in Western-style 
market institutions as the only means to establish well-functioning markets (p. 843). Instead, they 
echo Bourdieu’s (2005) and Fligstein’s (2002) social interpretation of markets and emphasize that 
markets result out of efforts to build on locally prevailing institutions through “social movement-
like struggles between incumbents and challengers” (p. 822). 29 
In addition, Mair and colleagues view corresponds to the argument of authors who have 
emphasized that institutional voids are not necessarily, or only, challenges for organizations. 
They can also be interpreted as opportunity spaces for more discretionary organizational 
strategies in the context of institutional complexity. This argument has been put forth in similar 
words, for instance, by Goodrick and Salancik (1996, p. 5) who argued that in situations of 
institutional uncertainty, organizations have more discretion to pursue their strategic interests. 
Institutional uncertainty, they explain, refers to situations in which institutions only specify goals, 
not means; when the knowledge base for practices is insufficient; or when multiple institutional 
                                                   
29 Bourdieu’s (2005) The Social Structure of The Economy appeared in 2005 as an English translation of the 
French original Les structures sociales de l'économie published in 2000. While most scholars cite Bourdieu with 
reference to his elaborations on cultural sociology (e.g. his extension of the concept of capital to include social 
capital, cultural capital, financial capital, and symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 1977)), Manning (2007) interpreted the 
book as a “call for socialogists to reengage with the study of economy“ (p. 443). Most sociologically oriented 
interpretations of markets insufficiently challenge rational neoclassical economic theories. Economie and markets, 
Bourdieu argues, must be viewed in the context of the historically constructed habitus of the actors that populate 
them. 
With The Architecture of Markets: An Economic Sociology of Twenty-First Century Capitalis Societies, Fligstein 
(2002) further provided one of the cornerstone works of modern economic sociology. In this book, Fligstein 
presents a rich analysis on the social construction of markets – an idea popularized by Granovetter (1985) – and 
introduces his political-cultural approach which emphasizes the political nature of markets. It stresses the 
interactions of various market players – including the state – and suggests various stages of market development 
in which actors introduce, defend and transform their positions (see also Fligstein (1996) for a further elaboration 
on the concept of markets as politics).  
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prescriptions contradict each other (ibid, p. 4f.). Viewing institutional voids as outcomes of 
contraditions between different institutional spheres thus directly links the concept to situations of 
high institutional complexity.  
3.2.2 Understanding Institutional Complexity at the Field Level 
Research on institutional complexity can be divided in two main areas: one focusing on the field 
level and one focusing on the organizational level. In studies that sought to shed light on higher-
level institutional orders, research on institutional complexity has mainly tried to trace back field-
level roots of conflicts between multiple institutional prescriptions. Greenwood and colleagues 
(2011, p. 334) explain that institutional complexity within organizations is directly linked to the 
structures of the organizational fields in which they operate. Research on institutional complexity 
has therefore often referred to the concept of institutional logics – more precisely to conflicting 
logics – as it allows a cross-level perspective on the influence of overarching sets of meaning and 
normative criteria on organizations. Institutional logics are defined as “the socially constructed, 
historical patterns of material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by which 
individuals produce and reproduce their material subsistence, organize time and space, and 
provide meaning to their social reality” (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999, p. 804). Friedland and Alford 
(1991) explain that “[t]he central institutions of the contemporary capitalist West – capitalist 
market, bureaucratic state, democracy, nuclear family, and Christian religion” (p. 232) each follow 
own logics. As will be explained later, these high-level orders may, however, be incompatible at 
an organizational level, as they expect organizations to conform to different demands. 
Initially, research on conflicting logics suggested that in situations where multiple logics co-exist, 
fields will ultimately move towards one dominant logic. Thornton and Ocasio (1999), for instance, 
described how a logic of markets dominated a logic of profession in the higher education 
publishing industry over time. In institutionally complex contexts, the importance of collective 
actors such as professional associations, public entities or the media to impose a dominant logic 
was frequently stressed (see e.g. Greenwood, Suddaby, & Hinings, 2002, p. 335; Hoffman & 
Ocasio, 2001, p. 420ff.). However, recent institutional work suggested that, in some fields, 
competing logics may co-exist over a longer period of time or even endure concurrently 
(Greenwood et al., 2011, p. 323). The co-existence of multiple logics becomes particularly salient 
in a world of increasing cross-sectoral collaboration and congruence (Townsend & Hart, 2008, 
p. 686), which poses new challenges above all for organizations that seek to comply with multiple 
institutional orders.  
Greenwood et al furthermore state that organizational fields have been compared in terms of their 
degree of “fragmentation,” “formal structuring / rationalization,” and “centralization / unification” 
(Greenwood et al., 2011, p. 337). These dimensions arguably influence the number and the 
nature of institutional demands imposed on organizations. Fragmentation refers to the “number of 
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uncoordinated constituents upon which an organization is dependent for legitimacy or material 
resources” (ibid, p. 337). The higher the fragmentation, Greenwood et al explain, the more 
complex is the environment. Formal structuring further “refers to whether institutional demands 
are formally or informally organized” (ibid, p. 337), where a high degree of formality leads to 
decreased complexity for organizations. Finally, high degrees of centralization – referring to “the 
hierarchical power structure of institutional constituents” (ibid, p. 337) – arguably reduce 
institutional complexity, as they may enforce standardized organizational forms.  
By acknowledging the prevalence of institutional complexity, institutional theorists have 
increasingly shifted away from predicting universal isomorphism. The homogenization of 
organizations was less and less expected in whole populations of organizations, but rather in 
delimited organizational fields or societal sectors with similar institutional demands (Scott, 2008, 
p. 430). Furthermore, with the increased integration of organizational agency into institutional 
theory, many scholars started to shift their focus of attention on the linkages between institutional 
complexity and organizational action.  
As mentioned earlier, the co-existence of multiple institutional orders often results in demands 
that compete or even conflict with each other at the organizational level. Pache and Santos 
(2010, p. 458f.), for instance, suggest that field-level dynamics manifest in institutional demands, 
which permeate organizational boundaries either through claims from external actors on which 
organizations depend for resources, including financial and human resources or a license to 
operate, or through “hiring and filtering practices” as organizational members are imprinted from 
past exposure to certain practices, norms, and values that they now consider as apprpriate.  
In order to investigate competing institutional orders at the organizational level, scholars have 
frequently referred to the analytical tool of ideal types.30 As Greenwood and colleagues argue, 
logics “manifest(…) in rituals, practices and day-to-day behavior” (Greenwood u. a., 2011), 
p. 334). Thornton and Ocasio (1999), for instance, outline the manifestation of two institutional 
logics – the editorial logic and the market logic by using ideal-typical characteristics of logics with 
regards to different categories such as authority structures, focus of attention or logics of 
investment in organizations (see table 2). 
  
                                                   
30 Ideal types are frequently used as an analytical tool to grasp organizational archetypes or institutional logics. As 
Thornton and Ocasio (2008) describe: “Ideal types are a method of interpretive analysis for understanding the 
meaning that actors invest their actions with. They were first developed by the classic theorists as a theoretical 
tool to facilitate intelligible comparisons (...). In theory building, ideal types require the development of formal 
typologies composed of two parts: (a) the description of ideal types and (b) the set of assertions that relate the 
ideal types to the dependent variable (...). They do not precisely conform to reality because of deliberate 
simplification to afford comparative analysis and multidimensional classification of phenomena not restricted by 
the events oft he selected cases.“ (p. 110)   
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Table 2:  “Two Ideal Types of Higher Education Publishing”  
  (adapted from Thornton and Ocasio, 1999, p. 809) 
 Editorial Logic Market Logic 
Characteristics...……………………. Personal Capitalism Market Capitalism 
Organizational identity…………….. Publishing as profession Publishing as business 
Legitimacy……………………………. Personal reputation 
Rank in hierarchy 
Market position 
Rank in performance 




Corporate parent firm 
Public ownership 
Mission………………………………… Build prestige of house 
Increase sales 
Build competitive position 
Increase profits 
Focus of attention…………………… Author-editor networks Resource competition 
Strategy……………………………….. Organic growth 
Build personal imprints 
Acquisition growth 
Build market channels 
Logics of investment……………….. Capital committed to firm Capital committed to market 
Rules of succession………………… Family estate plans Market for corporate control 
 
As mentioned earlier, most research on competing logics, including Thornton and Ocasio (1999), 
predicted that ultimately one logic would dominate at the field-level as certain players would use 
their power to institutionalize the preferred logic. However, in the last years, an increasing 
number of scholars have pointed to the possibility that under certain conditions field-level conflicts 
between logics may remain co-existent at the field-level and thus need to be resolved at the 
organizational level. Pache and Santos (2010, p. 457), for instance, suggest that when fields are 
fragmented and moderately centralized – that is when there is no clear dominant institutional 
constituent and yet several of them are powerful enough to constrain organizational agency in an 
uncoordinated way – conflicting institutional pressures are likely to be directly imposed on 
organizations instead of being resolved at the field level.  
Research using the concept of institutional logics, including research on conflicting logics, thus 
originates from observations on field-level dynamics, but at the same time often takes a cross-
level perspective that highlights the interplay between organizations, individuals and institutional 
forces. However, it has to be noted that scholars have recently criticized the widespread use of 
the concept of institutional logics in organizational research. Fligstein and McAdam (2011, p. 4) 
for instance, argued that institutional logics provide an overly broad perspective and furthermore 
suggest too much consensus among the actors embedded in those logics. Hence, they recently 
presented their theory of Strategic Action Fields (SAFs) in an effort to better account for collective 
strategic action (see Fligstein and McAdam, 2012, for their detailed elaborations). Drawing from 
institutional theory, Anthony Giddens’s theory of “structuration”, and, Bourdieu’s account for 
habitus, field, and capital in social and political life (Fligstein and McAdam, 2011, p.2), they define 
SAFs as “meso-level social order where actors (who can be individual or collective) interact with 
knowledge of one another under a set of common understandings about the purposes of the field, 
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the relationships in the field (including who has power and why), and the field’s rules” (ibid, p. 3). 
SAFs, they argue, constantly change and are constructed by (collective) actors on a situational 
basis, depending on what is at stake.  
With a similar purpose to provide a more holistic view on the meso-level orders that structure 
organizational behavior – though not explicitly as an extension of the concept of institutional 
logics – Beckert (2010) argued that previous research on the sociology of markets has 
emphasized one of three types of social structures to explain economic outcomes: social 
networks, institutions, or cognitive frames. However, in order understand the dynamics in 
markets, he advocates for an integration of the three structures, given that together they form 
“social grids within which the decisions of market actors take place” (p. 617). 
Both concepts promise to provide significant advancements in the reconciliation of environmental 
determinism and strategic latitude – or as Fligstein and McAdam more generally state, between 
“structure and agency” (ibid, p.1). However, they have so far merely been applied in research 
about organizational behavior in institutionally complex settings. As the next sections will outline, 
existing research about organizational responses as well as active strategies to deal with 
institutional complexity mainly draw on the concept of institutional logics. 
3.2.3 Organizational Responses to Institutional Complexity  
From Decoupling to Synthesis 
As mentioned earlier, the coexistence of multiple pressures in the form of claims for efficiency 
and legitimacy has been an essential observation in institutional theory since its beginnings. In 
this context, decoupling was the first strategy that scholars identified as a response to conflicting 
demands. Decoupling refers to situations in which organizations implement certain structures, 
programs or practices in order to conform to external societal expectation, but do not adopt this 
implementation in their actual operations, for example, for financial or efficiency related reasons 
(Meyer & Rowan, 1977, p. 341). In other words: they give only ceremonial and symbolic 
commitment to certain pressures while preserving their original behavior and identity (see e.g. 
Fiss & Zajac, 2006, on symbolic management).  
The exposure of organizations to such conflicting pressures has also been described by strategic 
management scholars such as Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) who observed that firms are often 
confronted with multiple pressures to which they can’t conform unilaterally. Satisfying one set of 
demands might often require ignoring or defying the demands of others. As a result, 
organizations experience institutional uncertainty, in particular when the demands can’t be clearly 
prioritized one over the other (Goodrick & Salancik, 1996, p. 4f.). Decoupling strategies 
supposedly enable organizations to overcome such situations by pretending conformity with 
institutional pressures while actually striving for efficiency (Meyer & Rowan, 1977, p. 340). 
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However, as MacLean and Behnam (2010) argue, decoupling strategies entail high risks for 
organizations. Internal constituents or insiders such as employees who experience the choice for 
a decoupling strategy are important sources of legitimacy for an organization as well. If a 
dissonance emerges between organizational members’ perceptions and external stakeholders’ 
perceptions, organizational behavior may be affected in several ways. It may, for instance, lead to 
reduced employee motivation, loyalty and commitment (see e.g. Foreman & Whetten, 2002) or 
even to legitimacy losses (see e.g. Maclean & Behnam, 2010).  
Organizational scholars have therefore analyzed the different possible organizational responses 
to institutional complexity, including the selective synthesis of competing logics, where certain 
organizational practices from one logic were selected and synthesized with existing practices 
(Chen & O’mahony, 2006, p. L1); or the selective collaborative understanding within groups 
carrying competing logics whenever this collaborative attitude is perceived as useful for achieving 
a common objective (Reay & Hinings, 2009). Overall, in their review of literature on institutional 
pluralism, Kraatz and Block (2008, p. 11ff.) suggest four different responses that scholars have 
described: (1) delete or marginalize one of the institutionally-derived identities, (2) 
compartmentalize identities and relate to the various institutional constituencies independently, 
(3) balance the various institutional demands actively through cooperations among identities, and 
(4) building an own identity and thereby forging a new institution in itself.  
Conditions Influencing the Choice of a Strategy 
Scholars have further analyzed the factors that influence to which strategy organizations will 
refer. These factors, again, relate to the field and organizational levels as well as to logic 
specifications. Some studies, for instance, suggest that organizations may experience 
institutional complexity differently depending on their position within a field (e.g. Galaskiewicz & 
Wasserman, 1989; Greve, 1998; Leblebic et al. 1991). However, these studies yield contradicting 
results. Greenwood and colleagues (2011, p. 340) explain that organizations at the periphery of a 
field may experience lower levels of complexity. Being less connected to other organizations 
which suggest what appropriate behaviors are, they may also be less exposed to, and thus, less 
aware of institutional claims. This difference in perception not only affects their sensitivity to 
institutional complexity but also their ability to conceive opportunities for action. In contrast, 
D’Aunno and colleagues (2000, p. 698) suggest that organizations located at the center of a field 
are likely to be less sensitive to complex situations as they are more deeply embedded in 
institutional arrangements and thus more resistant to alternative conceptions.  
As Greenwood et al (2011) outline, the characteristics of organizations, such as structure, 
ownership, governance and identity, are further factors that influence the way institutional 
complexity affects organizational behavior. The way they are organized and structured, 
particularly with regard to their members, affects how institutional pressures are “interpreted, 
given meaning, and “represented” by occupants of structural positions” (p. 342). The authors 
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summarize that the more complex an organizational structure, the more it is likely to be sensitive 
to institutional complexity as a higher number of actors and structures automatically leads to 
more intra-organizational communities and the representation of a higher number of institutional 
claims (ibid).  
Other researchers provide additional insights, suggesting that the specificity of what constitutes 
an adequate mean, or in general the specificity of logics, is a key factor influencing the discretion 
of organizations to act strategically. Goodrick and Salancik (1996, p. 4), for instance, argue that 
the more logics are unspecific and ambiguous concerning their institutional prescriptions, the 
greater the leeway that organizations have. This can occur as logics prescribe specific 
organizational goals, but leave more leeway in choosing the means to achieve those goals. 
Given that these factors occur at the field and the organizational level, institutional scholars have 
increasingly shifted towards a cross-level perspective when analyzing the factors that influence 
the strategic behavior of organizations. They provided several models that combine the different 
types of variables – field-level, organizational-level and prescription-specific variables. 
Pache and Santos (2010) propose a model to predict organizational responses to conflicting 
demands, which considers the influence of both logic specifications and organizational factors, 
namely the nature of the conflict and the intraorganizational representation of that conflict. In 
contrast to prior research on conflicting logics, Pache and Santos take a novel perspective by 
choosing the conflict itself as a point of departure. With regards to the nature of the conflict, 
Pache and Santos propose a distinction between conflicts over goals and conflicts over means. 
Goals refer to the ideological level of the appropriate objective to be pursued, while means point 
to the adequate way these goals should be pursued. The authors argue that whereas conflicts 
over goals are more difficult to resolve and generally require a field-level response, conflicts over 
means can be resolved at an organizational level. Pache and Santos, however, accentuate that 
means and goals can sometimes overlap, for example, when “technical prescriptions are so 
institutionalized that they become ends in themselves for the constituencies implementing them” 
(p. 460). In their model, they conceive of conflicts over such prescriptions as conflicts over goals. 
Concerning the internal constituencies within organizations, Pache and Santos build upon 
Greenwood and Hinings (1996), who suggest an understanding of organizations as complex 
“entities composed of various groups promoting different values, goals, and interests” (Pache & 
Santos, 2010, p. 459). They hence distinguish situations in which (1) the conflict is not 
represented, (2) one side of the conflict is represented and (3) multiple sides of the conflict are 
represented in the organizations. While prior institutional research would suggest that in cases of 
multiple representation, the power of the constituents that represent the controversial issues is of 
decisive importance, Pache and Santos point to the limit of this argument in the context of 
conflicting demands. First, full compliance with conflicting demands, they argue, is problematic, 
as one source of institutional pressure would then be neglected. Second, conflicting demands 
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often emerge in moderately centralized fields with a less marked distribution of power. Pache and 
Santos therefore suggest considering the costs and the risks that an organization attributes to a 
certain strategic response as determinants for their choice. Conflict over means, they argue, 
might often not be worth the “cost of an institutional battle” (p. 464). Particularly when the conflict 
is internally not represented, the organization will be more likely to resort to compromise or 
avoidance strategies. In contrast, when both sides of the conflict are represented, avoidance will 
be unlikely. Instead, the power of the respective groups will decide whether one side of the 
conflict will win or a compromise can be found.  
Pache and Santos further argue that conflicts over goals are more challenging for organizations 
as they touch on their core identity. The authors explain that, in these cases, negotiations and 
compromise will be difficult to achieve. Instead, strategies such as avoidance or defiance become 
more likely. Within the organization, manipulation of one internal representative might also take 
place in the case of multiple representation of the sides of the conflict. This, however, may 
strongly destabilize the organization from the inside ultimately may even lead to organizational 
paralysis or breakups.  
Greenwood and colleagues (2011) emphasize that the “thickness of the ties between 
organization members and field-level referent audiences” (p. 342) are significant factors that 
influence organizational behavior. The thicker the tie, the more external actors will be able to 
utilize these ties in order to make sure that their position or institutional pressure is being 
implemented by the organization. Furthermore, organizational responses to competing 
institutional pressures reflect the distribution of power in and around organizations. They add: 
“appreciation and recognition of logics, and the choice of which logic to prioritize and how to do 
so, will be dictated by those with power” (p. 344). In accordance with a resource-dependence 
perspective, Greenwood et al emphasize that this power mainly lies in the hands of those that 
control and allocate resources or confer the legitimacy that organizations need. 
Crilly et al. (2012) further observe that few research has attempted to analyze under which 
conditions organizations refer to decoupling strategies and which factors – both internal and 
external ones – cause variance in organizational responses. The depth of decoupling strategies, 
they argue, has to be conceived in a more elaborated way. Decoupling as a response to multiple 
institutional pressures, they suggest, depends on the consistency of stakeholders’ expectations 
about firms and the awareness of stakeholders about practices taking place inside the firm. In 
their study on the implementation of corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices, they find that 
decoupling might not always be a well-coordinated response when managers disagree with 
claims from external stakeholders. Decoupling may also happen as a consequence of low 
consensus among managers. This situation produces uncertainty both outside and within a firm, 
and may result in an uncoordinated “muddling through” strategy. In contrast, Crilly and colleagues 
also point to the possibility of applying strategies other than decoupling. Strategic implementation, 
they state, might occur when managers link CSR to potential business opportunities and when 
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closer relationships with stakeholders are needed, making decoupling strategies unfeasible. 
Finally, routine implementation describes the situation of managerial consensus about expected 
behavior, even if such expectations are contradictory or vaguely defined. Here, the impetus for 
implementation is internally driven, based on organizational values or identity.  
In sum, these elaborations reflect how recent institutional research insinuates that institutional 
complexity may enable or incentivize organizations to act strategically. Pache and Santos (2010, 
p. 461 f.) even go further and posit that choosing between antagonistic demands is not a choice, 
but rather a necessity in the context of institutional complexity. This view recalls Seo and Creed’s 
(2002) argumentation that identified institutional contradictions as a key trigger for strategic action 
and institutional change. Contradictions, tensions and conflicts arguably increase the 
consciousness and reflexivity of organizational actors and thereby enable them to take action in 
order to creatively approach conflicts. In addition, Chen and Mahony (2006, p. 46) posit 
considering multiple conflicting logics helps prevent a logic becoming an end in itself, rather than 
a means to reach an aim.  
Based on these scholarly reflections, it is believed that a better understanding of conflicts in 
organizations is of paramount importance for a better understanding of organizational behavior in 
the context of institutional complexity. As the last sections have shown, institutional theorists have 
largely treated organizational responses to institutional complexity as episodic necessities. 
However, in recent years, scholars have moved towards the investigation of persisting conflicts 
and viewing conflicts as constitutive elements of organizations – particularly in hybrid 
organizations. As will be explained in the next section, these organizations are by definition highly 
and endurably exposed to conflicting demands from outside and from within the organization. 
Organizational responses to institutional complexity are therefore inevitably to be seen as 
recursive elements of their strategies.  
3.3 Hybrid Organizations: The Internalization of Institutional 
Complexity 
As mentioned previously, some scholars have pointed to the challenge of a current increase in 
the multiplicity of demands that are imposed on organizations. Smith and Lewis (2011) observe 
that “organizational environments become more global, dynamic, and competitive“ (p. 381). 
Moreover, several studies outline an increasing congruence of sectors – for example, of the 
private and the third sector  (see e.g. Townsend & Hart, 2008, p. 686) or of the public and private 
sector  (see e.g. Meyer & Hammerschmid, 2006). As the last sections have outlined, institutional 
researchers, in particular, have investigated the various challenges as well as opportunities that 
institutional complexity implies. Research on hybrid organizations builds upon this body of 
literature by looking at the combination of institutional logics as a constitutive element of 
organizations.  
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Hybridity, in its original abstract meaning, “refers to the state of being composed through the 
mixture of disparate parts” (Battilana & Lee, 2014, p. 4) – a condition that refers to many 
phenomena, be it in organizations, biology or engineering. Further, this mixture needs to be 
“central and persistent within a given entity, rather than adaptive and transitory” (ibid, p. 4). To 
illustrate, Battilana and Lee argue that “a mule is a hybrid, but a chameleon, due to the contingent 
nature of its multiple forms, is not“ (ibid, p. 4). 
In organizational research, the concept of hybridity has been used to describe various 
organizational arrangements. While Powell (1987) already coined the term nearly two decades 
ago to describe a new type of organization that combines network and hierarchy, other scholars 
have used it to describe organizations that mix characteristics and practices that ideal-typically 
belong to different organizational fields or sectors – particularly the public, the private and the 
third sector (see e.g. Billis, 2010; Minkoff, 2002). Furthermore, strategy scholars have used the 
concept of hybridity to describe the strategic choice of organizations not to apply “pure” 
strategies, that is “the extent to which a business pursues one type of generic strategy over 
another” (Thornhill & White, 2007, p. 553), but rather to also consider the importance of being 
flexible and adaptive (see e.g. Gopal et al., 2013).  
The present study concentrates on the hybridity concept as used in institutional theory and 
paradox research. Almost two decades ago, Haveman and Rao (1997) already pointed to the 
possibility that hybrid forms of organizing (hybrid plans) may emerge in the presence of 
competing logics. However, it is only recently that efforts to further specify the concepts of 
hybridization (see e.g. Greenwood et al., 2011, p. 352), hybrid organizations (see e.g. Battilana & 
Dorado, 2010; Pache & Santos, 2012) or hybrid organizing (see e.g. Battilana & Lee, 2014) have 
increased significantly. Stated concretely, the hybridity lens in institutional theory has been 
applied to several areas of interest – to the blending of different institutional logics at the field 
level resulting in a new hybrid logic (see e.g. Glynn & Lounsbury, 2005), to the establishment of a 
hybrid identity within organizations (see e.g. Meyer & Hammerschmid, 2006), the creation of new 
hybrid organizational forms and structures (see e.g. Tracey et al., 2011), or to the synthesis of 
antagonistic behavior into new hybrid practices (see e.g. Pache & Santos, 2012). Most 
institutional studies on hybrid organizations, however, implicitly or explicitly follow a cross-level 
approach, which can be seen as a natural consequence of the cross-level nature of the concept 
of institutional logics that underlies many of these studies. As Battilana and Lee (2014) posit: “the 
combination of logics, of organizational forms, and of identities (…) co-occur” (p. 7). They 
therefore propose the concept of hybrid organizing, which embraces those interrelated levels and 
furthermore also combines an internal and external view on organizations. They define hybrid 
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organizing as “the activities, structures, processes and meanings by which organizations make 
sense of and combine multiple organizational forms“ (p. 7).31  
The main assumption behind the recent attention on hybrid organizations is, among others, 
based on the belief that hybridity as a structural or behavioral feature may enable organizations 
to reconcile or balance conflicting logics enduringly. This contrasts to prior institutional arguments 
for at least two reasons. First, it contradicts the widely spread understanding that in situations of 
institutional complexity, one logic will ultimately dominate, implying that hybridity is unstable 
(Battilana & Dorado, 2010, p. 1419). And second, it presents hybridity as a long-lasting feature 
and ongoing strategy of organizations that operate in the context of institutional complexity, rather 
than focusing on episodic responses to conflicting institutional pressures (Jay, 2013, p. 138). 
In practice, the increased interest in hybrid organizations reflects the rise of new organizational 
arrangements – in particular organizations that operate at the interstices of the public, the private 
and the third sector. In this context, hybrid organizations have formed, partly as a consequence of 
resource scarcity (see e.g. Desa & Basu, 2013, p. 27) and/or as a reflection of field-level shifts 
towards market-orientation (see e.g. Dart, 2004, p. 418f.). Pache and Santos (2010) explain: 
Hybridity “is particularly prevalent in fields where mission and resource dependence patterns 
require the interaction of a wide variety of stakeholders (hence inducing high levels of 
fragmentation) and where the fields are dependent on a few key resource providers (hence 
inducing moderate levels of centralization)“ (p. 471f.). 
As the next sections will show, social enterprises, especially, have repeatedly been interpreted as 
an ideal type of hybrid organizations (see e.g. Battilana & Lee, 2014, p. 2). As Doherty and 
colleagues (2014) argue, hybridity in social enterprises is given through the pursuit of a dual 
mission, namely financial sustainability and social purpose, which challenges traditional 
conceptions of private, public or non-profit organizations (p. 1). Social enterprises therefore blur 
the private, the public and the third sectors and allow values and artefacts from competing 
categories (sectoral paradigms, logics and value systems) to coexist (p. 2).  
Social enterprises have furthermore been portrayed as exceptionally agentic organizations, which 
creatively make sense of conflicting institutional logics or institutional prescriptions. Particularly in 
the context of resource scarcity, social enterprises have been claimed to be particularly good in 
                                                   
31 Battilana and Lee (2014) define organizational forms as “organizational templates that are socially legitimate, 
and therefore provide standard instructions for building organizations” (p. 3). In the context of social enterprise 
research, and more generally in research about hybrid organizations, the term organizational form has frequently 
been used synonymously with legal form. Most countries lack a legal entity that accounts for the hybrid nature of 
social enterprises – with few exceptions such as in the United Kongdowm where the Community Interest 
Company (CIC) has been introduced by the British Parlament in 2005 (for further elaborations on the CIC, see 
Nicholls, 2010). Social enterprises thus typically have to choose between incorporating as a for-profit or a 
nonprofit organization. Greenwood and Hinings (1993), however, state that the term organizational form is often 
imprecisely defined and used synonymously with the concept of “archetypes”. Archetypes, they argue, are 
patterns of organizing that are coherent in that the subcomponents of those patterns are systematically related to 
each other (p. 1054). Hence, the concept of archetypes resembles the one of ideal-types as it serves scholarly 
efforts to classify and typologize organizational behavior. 
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managing resource dependence (Desa & Basu, 2013, p. 27). Combining structures and practices 
from competing logics, in this context, has been put forth as a strategy to access various types of 
resources (see e.g. Teasdale, 2010) and avoid becoming too dependent on one powerful funding 
source (Desa & Basu, 2013, p. 29f.). From this perspective, hybridity is viewed as an outcome of 
dynamics in resource environments. As organizations face increasing resource constraints, they 
expand their scope of search to other sectors in which resources are less scarce and adopt 
structures and practices from these sector logics in order to gain the legitimacy of powerful 
resource providers. However, by doing so, scholars have argued that organizations expose 
themselves to competing institutional demands, which may cause tensions that can ultimately 
even threaten organizational survival (Smith, Gonin, & Besharov, 2013, p. 35). 
More generally, scholars have also emphasized that hybrid organizations may equally form in an 
effort to develop innovations that solve complex problems, that is, problems such as climate 
change or global poverty, that overwhelm organizations drawing on one single logic (Jay, 2013, 
p. 137). In his ethnographic case study of a public-private hybrid organization, Jay describes how 
an organization started with a combination of selected practices from a logic of public service and 
a logic of client service (p. 141) and iteratively moved towards the synthesis of logics through an 
iterative process of sensemaking. More precisely, the organization experienced conflicts between 
the logics not as a consequence of competing demands from external resource providers, but 
when it realized that organizational outcomes could simultaneously be interpreted as successes 
and failures. Organizational leaders reacted by making sense of those paradoxical outcomes, 
thereby fostering organizational change and innovation, as means and ends are combined in a 
new way, forming a new hybrid logic (p. 152). 
Similarly to many of the above-mentioned studies, the present study will focus on cross-sectoral 
hybrid organizations. Hybrid organizations have often been defined as organizations that are able 
to integrate multiple societal-level logics in unprecedented ways (see e.g. Battilana & Dorado, 
2010; Battilana & Lee, 2014; Pache & Santos, 2010, 2013). Accordingly, investigating the 
tensions as well as strategies, doesn’t neglect a field-level perspective. It rather views them as 
proxies for dynamics between the public, the private and the third sectors. The next section will 
further elaborate on cross-sector hybridity and scholarly reflections on the manifestation of sector 
congruence within organizations. 
3.3.1 Introduction in Cross-Sector Hybridity 
Economies are typically conceptualized as consisting of three sectors, the public, the private and 
the third sector, which all depict distinctive characteristics and are populated by different types of 
actors.32 The last decades, however, have seen a blurring of boundaries between these sectors 
and, consequently, also between the corresponding ideal-typical logics that prevail in those 
                                                   
32 See footnote nr. 1 for a definition of the terms public, private and third sectors. 
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sectors. With a focus on the United Kingdom, Billis (2010, p. 11) describes that hybridity – which 
he understands as a blurring of sector boundaries – has been a key characteristic of the third 
sector for many years. It is manifested, among others, in concepts such as “the mixed economy 
of welfare” (Powell, 2007), which denotes the pluralism in welfare delivery involving private, 
voluntary and informal sectors. However, Billis stresses that we are currently facing changes that 
go beyond the congruence of the private, the public and the third sector at the macro level. 
Fundamental changes are happening with regard to the financing, planning and delivering of 
welfare as organizations themselves become “mixed” or hybrid (Billis, 2010, p. 11f.), meaning 
that they increasingly posses core characteristics of more than one sector.  
In order to further elaborate organizational hybridity, Billis displays the core elements of non-
hybrid organizations in the private, the public and the third sector with regard to their ideal-typical 
ownership, governance, operational priorities, distinctive human resources, and distinctive other 
resources (see table 3). With this, Billis’ conceptualization yields several similarities with 
analytical tools developed by institutional scholars to describe the ideal-typical components of 
common institutional logics  – in this case, respectively, the market or commercial logic, which 
prevails in private sector or for-profit organizations that seek to maximize shareholder value 
(Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury, 2012, p. 56); the state logic, predominating in public, that is 
governmental entities (ibid); and the social welfare logic, which typically resides in organizations 
of the third sector, particularly in voluntary organizations with the single aim to create social 
impact (Pache & Santos, 2012, p. 977).  
Table 3:  “Principles underlying the private, the public and the third sector”  
  (adapted from Billis, 2010, p. 11) 
Core elements Private sector 
principles  
(or market logic) 
Public sector 
principles  
(or state logic) 
Third sector  
principles  
(or social welfare logic) 
1. Ownership………..................... Shareholders Citizens Members 
2. Governance……………………. Share ownership size Public elections Private elections 
3. Operational prioritie………….. Market forces and 
individual choice 













5. Distinctive other resources…. Sales, fees Taxes Dues, donations and 
legacies 
 
As Billis posits, private sector organizations are ideal-typically owned by shareholders, governed 
in accordance to owners’ share size, operated based on the principles of market forces and 
individual choice, consisting of paid employees who work in a managerially controlled firm, and 
primarily financed by sales and fees. In contrast, public sector organizations are owned by 
62 ORGANIZATIONAL HYBRIDITY IN THE CONTEXT OF INSTITUTIONAL COMPLEXITY 
 
 
citizens. Their governance is determined through public elections, as well as their operational 
priorities, which are driven by the principles of public service and collective choice. Human 
resources in public sector organizations are ideal-typically paid public servants, operating in a 
legally backed bureau; and taxes represent the main types of other resources. Finally, third 
sector organizations are ideal-typically owned by members. Private elections determine their 
governance, and the commitment to a specific mission mainly influences their operational 
priorities. While members and volunteers organized in associations are the typical human 
resources in third sector organizations, dues, donations and legacies represent other distinctive 
key resources.  
Building on these core elements of non-hybrid organizations in the three sectors, Billis then 
explores nine “hybrid zones”, that is nine variations of sector intersections (see figure 2). 
Furthermore, the author emphasizes that hybridity may take the form of entrenched vs. shallow 
hybridity, depending on the degree to which sector characteristics are mixed in core 
organizational elements, as well as organic or enacted hybridity, referring to the point of 
departure for hybridity. Whereas organic hybridity refers to the growing blurring of sector 
boundaries within an organization that has started closer to the ideal-type organizations, enacted 
hybrid organizations have been purposefully founded as hybrids from day one (p. 61). 
 
Figure 2: “The Three Sectors and their Hybrid Zones”  
  (Billis, 2010, p. 57) 
This recalls Battilana (2012) who describes in her popular article In Search of the Hybrid Ideal, 
how hybrid organizations combining aspects of nonprofits and for-profits are currently on the rise. 
This movement encompasses traditional nonprofits as well as traditional companies that 
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increasingly become more “integrated”, meaning that they increasingly adopt structures and 
practices from for-profit and nonprofit organizations, respectively. In addition, a range of new 
hybrid organizations have emerged, which seek a balanced combination of both worlds from the 
beginning (see figure 3).  
 
Figure 3:  “The Hybridization Movement”  
  (Battilana, 2012, p. 54) 
Although Billis doesn’t utilize the concept of institutional logics, his approach strongly resembles 
institutional scholars’ conceptualizations of hybrid organizations, where hybridity refers to the 
inner-organizational combination of competing logics.  
Recent studies have located social enterprises, for instance, at the interstices of economic 
sectors, and emphasized how they challenge traditional conceptions of labor division in welfare 
states (see e.g. Jansen, 2012). Similarly, researchers have repeatedly situated social enterprise 
at the interface of the commercial and the social welfare logic – as the ideal-typical logics of the 
private and the third sector (Smith, Gonin, and Besharov, 2013, p. 419). While the commercial 
logic emphasizes “profit, efficiency, and operational effectiveness”, a social welfare logic seeks to 
promote “the welfare of society” (ibid). Ideal-typically, different institutional structures and 
practices, including actors, legal forms, financing and governance mechanisms, as well as 
sources of professional legitimacy, embody and support the two logics. Pache and Santos (2012, 
p. 980) juxtapose some of these characteristics as outlined in table 4: 
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Table 4:  “Competing Belief Systems of the Social Welfare and Commercial Logics”  
  (adapted from Pache & Santos, 2012, p. 980) 
 Social Welfare Logic Commercial Logic 
Goal...……………..………... Make products and/or services 
available to address local social 
needs. 
Sell goods and/or services on the 
market to generate economic 
surplus that can be legitimately 
appropriated by owners. 
Organizational form……… The nonprofit form (association) is 
legitimate because of its ownership 
structure giving power to people 
who adhere to a social mission. 
The nonredistribution constraint 
ensures a real focus on the social 
goal. 
The for-profit form is legitimate 
because its ownership structure 
allows it to channel juman 
resources and capital to areas of 
higher economic return. 
Governance mechanism… Democratic control, which is, by 
law, constitutive of the association 
status, is the appropriate way to 
monitor strategy and operations, 
allowing organizations to take into 
account local social needs. 
Hierarchical control is the 
appropriate way to monitor 
strategy and operations in a way 
that ensures consistency of 
products and services and efficient 
allocation of resources. 
Professional legitimacy…. Professional legitimacy is driven by 
contribution to the social mission. 
Professional legitimacy is driven by 
technical and managerial 
expertise. 
 
Similarly, Jay (2013) also refers to ideal-typical conceptual categories of institutional logics in the 
state, the market and the civil society and displays the differences of these three logics with 
regard to their ideal-typical organizational form, their normativity/strategic imperatives, their 
constraints, the time and space dimension, as well as the ideal-typical artifacts (see table 5).33  
  
                                                   
33 These categories, Jay explains, are based on Ewick and Silbey (2002) as well as Scott (2003). 
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Table 5: “Institutional Logics in Cross-Sectoral Hybrid Organizations”  
  (adapted from Jay, 2013, p. 143) 





Business firm. Nonprofit organization. 
Normativity/strategic 
imperatives 




Client service. Revenue, 
profit, value creation. 
Public service. Mission, 
public service, solidarity, 
selflessness. 
Source of agency/ 
capacity to act 
Coordination of public 







Constraint/structures Law, procurement rules, 
transparency to public. 
Rules of the game, scarce 
client attention and 
resources, brokerage 
position, fiduciary 
responsibility to financiers. 
Normative expectations 
of stakeholders. 
Time Budget cycles, election 
cycles. 
Sales cycles, quaterly 
reporting. 
Campaign momentum, 








Artifacts (carriers) Climate action plan, 
budgets. 




As will be further elaborated in the next section, the prescriptions of the different sector logics 
yield incompatibilities that may challenge organizations. A major topic in research on hybrid 
organization is thus the tensions that the inner-organizational combination of competing 
institutional logics causes. 
3.3.2 Conflicts and Tensions in Hybrid Organizations 
In the last years, institutional theorists have dedicated increased attention to the further 
specification of conflicts between institutional forces, and to the ways hybrid organizations 
experience such conflicts. While most of this research focuses on the organizational level, very 
recent work has started to link the emergence and manifestation of inner-organizational conflicts 
to field-level dynamics. Much of these insights are again related to social enterprise research. 
Based on a review of social enterprise literature, Doherty, Haugh and Lyon (2014, p. 12) outline 
the various areas in which hybridity impacts social enterprises, and list concrete tensions and 
trade-offs that emerge. First, with regard to their mission, the authors argue that social 
enterprises need to constantly balance the goals of commercial opportunity exploitation and 
pursuit of social mission, depending on the degree to which these two areas are tied to one 
another. Second, hybridity affects social enterprises’ ability to access financial resources, as 
social enterprises may not fit recognized categories of financial institutions, and as commercial 
funders, in particular, may not understand the social value. Finally, Doherty and colleagues 
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describe the impact of hybridity on human resource management. Besides the financial 
constraints that social enterprises are likely to face, they argue that the pursuit of dual goals 
yields considerable challenges with regard to human resource management, as employees are 
likely to be imprinted by former professional experiences. 
Ebrahim, Battilana and Mair (2014) additionally point to the governance challenges of social 
enterprises that are “accountable for both a social mission and for making profits (or surplus)” and 
thus accountable to multiple stakeholders – including their beneficiaries and their funders or 
investors, which may have diverging interests (p. 82). Particularly when social enterprises are 
dependent on commercial revenue generation for their survival, Ebrahim and colleagues argue 
that they are constantly at risk of mission drift, given that they are likely to prioritize the demands 
of stakeholders on which they depend for resource acquisition, that is, funders and paying 
customers. In differentiated hybrids, where social and commercial activities are separated, 
management teams are at risk of prioritizing activities that generate revenue and neglect those 
that pursue the social mission. In integrated hybrids the risk lies in the temptation of “charging 
higher prices, offering additional products or services that are meant to generate profits rather 
than actually help beneficiaries, or by shifting to market segments that can afford to pay for their 
goods or services rather than those who most need them” (p. 84). With regard to the different 
constituents to which social enterprises are accountable, social enterprises are furthermore 
exposed to tensions between upward accountability requirements (generally from funders) and 
downward accountability requirements, which mainly relate to the voices of social enterprises’ 
social target group (p. 91).  
Similarly, Teasdale (2012a) also cautions social enterprises to carefully manage tensions in order 
to avoid mission drift. Investigating integrated social enterprises in the field of homelessness in 
the UK, the author finds that the costs relating to placing homeless people into employment differ 
according to people’s social and economic needs. He observes that “those with the highest 
support needs are harder to place into employment than those with lower support needs“ 
(p. 519). Accordingly, social enterprises may face the inherent trade-off between their social 
objective to support homeless people in need and the economic objective of reducing costs. This 
is why many of them ended up “creaming off” those homeless people that were easiest to 
integrate into the labor market (p. 525).  
In recent years, scholars have moved from the investigation of tensions in specific hybrid 
organizations – mainly social enterprises – to developing a theory of hybrid organizations. As part 
of that, the conceptualization of tensions has made some important progress. Besharov and 
Smith (2013), for instance, provide a framework that – although not explicitly referring to hybrid 
organizations – seeks to further the understanding of logic multiplicity in organizations. In this 
framework the conflicts between logics are central elements for a typology based on how 
compatible and how central the multiple logics are to an organization. The compatibility of logics 
refers to the extent to which concurrent logics offer compatible prescriptions to organizations 
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(p. 367 f.). In accordance with Pache and Santos (2010), Besharov and Smith (2013) stress that 
“compatibility is lower when there are inconsistencies regarding the goals of organizational action 
than when there are inconsistencies involving only the means by which goals are achieved” 
(p. 367). The centrality of multiple logics refers to the varying degrees of influence that logics 
have on the functioning of organizations (Besharov & Smith, 2013, p. 369 f.). According to the 
authors, centrality is high when both logics are essential to the core functioning of organizations. 
This is, for example, often the case in social enterprises that explicitly pursue a double-bottom-
line (e.g. Battilana & Dorado, 2010). In contrast, centrality is low when one of the logics, for 
instance, dominates the core of an organization while the other logic remains at the periphery of 
operations. In a multinational company that maintains a CSR project to help marginalized 
communities and to improve its reputation, the social logic largely remains at the periphery while 
the commercial logic is at the core.  
Compatibility and centrality, they further argue, are functions of field-level, organizational and 
individual factors (see table 6). The instantiation of incompatible logics in organizations depends 
on the number of professional institutions in a field as well the relationships between them. 
Furthermore, hiring and socialization practices influence how multiple logics are represented in 
an organization and thus determine the extent to which (in)compatibility will be experienced. 
Finally, incompatibility also depends on the ties that individuals within organizations have to field-
level referents as well as to the degree they are interdependent. As Besharov and Smith argue, 
“when members have close relationships to one another or are more interdependent, they are 
motivated to develop more compatible ways of enacting multiple logics“ (p. 368). Although not 
explicitly considered in their model, the authors further argue that compatibility is also a function 
of the elements of the logics themselves. Some logics are more compatible than others, 
depending on the prescriptions that they carry. Democratic participation, for instance, often put 
forth as a core element of a state logic, may inherently be difficult to combine with the commercial 
logic in which shareholders hold the major power in decision making (Thornton, Ocasio, and 
Lounsbury, 2012, p. 56). This recalls Goodrick and Salancik (1996, p. 4) who suggest that the 
specificity of what constitutes an adequate means in an institutional logic or, more generally, the 
specificity of logics itself is a key factor influencing the way how organizations experience 
conflicts.  
Similarly, Besharov and Smith (2013) posit that the centrality of multiple logics is determined by 
organizational factors, such as its mission and strategy, and its resource dependence structure. 
For example, if an organization depends on one source for resources, it will be forced to comply 
with the demands of that actor even if the logic underlying the demands conflicts with the 
organization’s core logic (p. 370). This argument has already been put forth by scholars that have 
combined institutional theory with resource dependence arguments, while Oliver (1991) has 
pioneered this integration (see 3.1.2), scholars have built upon her arguments to suggest that 
hybridization patterns are an outcome of resource-dependencies. For instance, Pache and 
68 ORGANIZATIONAL HYBRIDITY IN THE CONTEXT OF INSTITUTIONAL COMPLEXITY 
 
 
Santos (2010, p. 460f.) argue that organizational responses to institutional pressures are a 
function of how logics are given voice within an organization. Ebrahim, Battilana and Mair (2014) 
also point to the risk of mission drift for social enterprises if they give more importance to the 
claims of resource providers than to the voices of their social target group. As Greenwood et al 
(2011) caution, this is particularly delicate as “the ability of a voice to be heard is linked to the 
influence of that logic’s field-level proponents over resources—including legitimacy—that they 
control“ (p. 349). 
Table 6:  “Drivers of Variation in Compatibility and Centrality“  
  (Adapted from Besharov & Smith, 2013, p. 367) 
Level of Analysis Factors That Influence Compatibility Factors That Influence Centrality 
Institutional field Number of professional institutions and 
relationships between them 
Power and structure of field actors (i.e. 
fragmented centralization) 
Organization Hiring and socialization Mission and strategy 
Resource dependence 
Individual Ties to field-level referents 
Interdependence 
Adherence to logics 
Relative power 
 
Based on these two variables, compatibility and centrality, Besharov and Smith (2013, p. 370 ff.) 
present a typology of four different types of organizations. As figure 4 illustrates, the degrees of 
centrality and compatibility are presented as continuous spectrums on which organizations can 
be located (featured by the dashed lines between the different types). Accordingly, the types of 
organizations portrayed in the typology – the contested, estranged, aligned and dominant 
organization – have to be conceived as ideal-types: 
 
Figure 4:  “Types of Logic Multiplicity Within Organizations“  
  (Besharov and Smith, 2013, p. 371) 
ORGANIZATIONAL HYBRIDITY IN THE CONTEXT OF INSTITUTIONAL COMPLEXITY 69 
 
As the authors posit, logic multiplicity within organizations can cause both challenges and 
opportunities. However, in the case of high centrality and high incompatibility (contested 
organizations), they propose that challenges and opportunities are both the highest since the 
tensions have to cause either a creative or a destructive outcome. As they observe, this type of 
hybrids has received a disproportionate amount of attention, particularly in the field of social 
enterprise (p. 375).  
Besharov and Smith further provide several examples of how logic multiplicity manifests in 
different organizational areas. In contested organizations, they argue that the multiplicity of logics 
will be observable in central organizational features and practices such as “mission, strategy, 
structure, identity, and core work practices”, and will also “be represented among members, with 
no clear hierarchy between logics” (p. 371). The same counts for aligned organizations, where 
multiple logics are central to the functioning or organizing, with the only difference being that 
those logics are highly compatible and therefore do not pose big challenges to the organization. 
Estranged organizations, which confront inconsistent pressures that only affect peripheral 
practices, will only face inconsistency with regards to certain goals. Finally in the case of 
dominant organizations, one logic predominates at the core of the organizations and diverging 
logics only appear at the periphery, creating little room for conflict. 
Another scholarly body of work providing important contributions to a better understanding of 
hybrid organizations comes from paradox researchers. In contrast to institutional theorists who 
largely focused on the concepts of conflicting logics and organizational responsee to these 
conflicts, paradox researchers have adopted a more proactive understanding of organizations. In 
addition, they have dedicated more attention to specifying the types of tensions that emerge in 
organizations. Smith and Lewis’ (2011, p. 383) dynamic model of organizing provided an 
important contribution to this new research stream. Based on Lüscher and Lewis (Lewis, 2000; 
Lüscher & Lewis, 2008), the authors classify tensions in four pure categories: belonging, learning, 
organizing and performing tensions.  
Belonging paradoxes refer to tensions concerning an organization’s identity. Opposing “roles, 
memberships, and values” are instances of such belonging paradoxes (p. 383). Learning 
paradoxes emerge as side-effects of organizational change, renewal and innovation. Organizing 
paradoxes occur when “complex systems create competing designs and processes to achieve a 
desired outcome” (p. 383 f.). Hence, this type of tension evokes Pache and Santos’s (2010) 
definition of conflicts over means. Finally, performing paradoxes relate to divergent stakeholder 
expectations to which organizations are exposed and manifest in “competing strategies and 
goals” (Smith and Lewis, 2011, p. 384). In addition to those pure categories, tensions between 
them may equally emerge, for example, when organizations seek to promote both “the individual 
and the aggregate”, which results in a belonging / organizing tension.  
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This typology has also been used by Smith, Gonin and Besharov (2013) to classify the types of 
tensions put forth by social enterprise research (see table 7).  
Table 7:  “Social-Business Tensions within Social Enterprises”  
  (adapted from Smith, Gonin, & Besharov, 2013, p. 410) 
 Dimensions of Social 
Missions 
Dimensions of Business 
Ventures 
Emergent Tensions 
between Social Missions 
and Business Ventures 
Performing Tensions 
Tensions that emerge 
from divergent 
outcomes – i.e. goals, 
metrics, and 
stakeholders 
 Goals address 
concerns across a 
broad ecosystem of 
stakeholders 
 Metrics are more 
subjective, qualitative, 




 Goals address concerns 
of a narrow group of 
shareholders 
 Metrics are more 
objective, quantitative 




 How do organizations 
and leaders define 
success across divergent 
goals, particularly as the 
same event can 
simultaneously be a 
success in one domain 
and failure in the other? 
 How can organizations 
sustain support for both 
social and financial 
metrics? 
Organizing Tensions 
Tensions that emerge 
from divergent internal 
dynamics – i.e. 
structures, practices, 
and processes 
 Organizations hire for 
skills that enable the 
social mission, or hire 
disadvantaged 
employees as a 
means of achieving 
the social mission 
 Organizations usually 
adopt non-profit legal 
form 
 Organizations hire for 
skills that enable 
efficiency and 
profitability 
 Organizations usually 
adopt for-profit legal 
form 
 Who should 
organizations hire, and 
how can they socialize 
employees? 
 How much should 
organizations 
differentiate vs. integrate 
the social mission and 
the business venture? 









and the organization 
 Employees and 
stakeholders 
predominantly identify 
with the social 
mission 
 Employees and 
stakeholders 
predominantly identify 
with the business 
venture 
 How can organizations 
manage divergent 
identity expectations 
among subgroups of 
employees? 





 How can organizations 
present their hybrid 
social-business identity 
to external audiences? 
Learning Tensions 
Tensions that emerge 
from divergent time 
horizons and flexibility 
vs. stability and 
certainty 
 Social mission 
success requires a 
long time horizon 
 Growth can increase 
but also threaten 
social mission impact 
 Business venture 
success can come from 
short-term gains 
 Social mission can 
constrain growth 
 How can organizations 
attend to both the short 
term and long term? 
 How can organizations 
manage increased short-
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Performing tensions may, for instance, emerge as the general dominance of quantitative metrics 
over qualitative metrics, which are more difficult to compare, and thus may result in the 
dominance of commercial objectives over social objectives (p. 411). Controversies about human 
resource practices, the organizational model or the adequate legal form for a social enterprise, 
are furthermore examples of areas in which organizing tensions may emerge (p. 411f.). 
Belonging tensions can manifest in social enterprises’ difficulties concerning the identity that is 
presented to external audiences, or the identity expectations of internal constituencies, 
particularly employees. Finally, learning tensions may emerge as social outcomes are often only 
tangible at the long run, whereas commercial outcomes can often be measured in the short term. 
Yet, social objectives are as important or more important to social enterprises, leading to 
challenges in managing both at the same time.  
In addition, Smith and Lewis (2011) also discuss elaborations of previous researchers who have 
debated about whether tensions are material or socially embedded. Material tensions, they 
explain, are “inherent in the external world” and “embedded in complex human systems” (p. 385). 
In contrast, from a social construction perspective, tensions are created through the cognitive 
frames of actors and therefore “situated (…) within a particular time or space” (ibid). In contrast to 
making such a distinction, Smith and Lewis propose to view tensions as both material and 
socially constructed, arguing that they “are embedded in the process of organizing and are 
brought into juxtaposition via environmental conditions“ (p. 389). In other words, they remain 
latent, that is, “dormant, unperceived, or ignored” (p. 390), until environmental conditions, such as 
plurality, change or resource scarcity, make them salient. 
Although these elaborations touch upon the sources of tensions, field-level antecedents of 
tensions, however, received limited attention in paradox research. For instance, with regard to 
cross-sectoral hybridity, Smith, Besharov, Wessels and Chertok speak of “contradictory 
elements”, arguing that “commercial viability is based on economic values, whereas social 
missions are grounded in societal values” (2012, p. 465). With regard to social enterprises, the 
authors further specify two specific challenges that arise from dealing with competing demands. 
The first challenge refers to the risk of a mission shift, leaving the dual focus of social and 
economic value creation out of sight and shifting towards a single value creation process. The 
second challenge refers to internal conflicts between different groups of members advocating the 
need to either pursue social or economic value creation. As group membership also provides 
organizational members with a sense of continuity, Smith et al argue that individuals are likely to 
side with one of the groups, which may lead to polarization within an organization. Yet, like most 
paradox researchers, the authors do not further elaborate on the roots of these competing 
demands.  
As will be further explained in the next chapter, the present study argues that it is at this specific 
point where paradox research can benefit from institutional research which emphasizes the 
environmental factors that shape organizational behavior. The field-level antecedents of tensions 
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– or in Smith and Lewis’ words, the complex human systems in which tensions are embedded – 
are essential in order to understand hybridization patterns from a theoretical point of view, and 
derive appropriate recommendations for practitioners.  
On a final note, it also has to be noted that the terminology used to describe tensions in paradox 
research depicts significant inconsistency. Smith and Lewis (2011) explicitly point to this “lack of 
conceptual clarity” (p. 385) and propose to distinguish four types of tensions: (1) paradoxes, 
which refer to “contradictory yet interrelated elements (dualities) that exist simultaneously and 
persist over time”, (2) dilemmas as “competing choices, each with advantages and 
disadvantages”, and (3) dialectics, which relate to “contradictory elements (thesis and antithesis) 
resolved through integration (synthesis), which over time, will confront new opposition”. Although 
helpful in theory, the distinction between those types of tensions, however, sometimes proves to 
be difficult. As Smith and Lewis posit, dualities, dilemmas and dialectics can sometimes 
themselves be paradoxical, thereby resulting in an overlap of the four types of tensions. 
Furthermore, Smith and Lewis’ categorization of organizational tensions is itself confusing, as it 
uses both the term “tension” and “paradox” interchangeably. While the figure uses the term 
“tension”, the narrative description names those tensions “paradoxes”. This leads to the question 
of whether the categorization refers to all types of tensions, or only to paradoxes. The present 
study believes that Smith and Lewis’ model of dynamic organizing may be not only apply to 
paradoxes, but to all kinds of tensions.  
3.3.3 Strategic Behavior in Hybrid Organizations 
As mentioned above, institutional theorists have mainly applied the hybridity lens to investigate 
the combination of competing institutional prescriptions at different levels, ranging from the 
creation of a new hybrid logic at the field level to a new hybrid identity, hybrid structures or hybrid 
practices at the organizational level. In contrast to traditional institutional arguments, research on 
hybrid organizations has sought to explicate how competing institutional logics can endurably co-
exist. This research stream has thus drawn a particularly agentic picture of hybrid organizations 
as actors that are able to combine competing logics in unprecedented ways (see e.g. Battilana & 
Dorado, 2010; Jay, 2013). As mentioned previously, social enterprise research has been a major 
body of literature showcasing this trend. In this context, scholars have pointed to a series of 
strategies that social enterprises apply, including the creation of new hybrid practices and 
structures. Nicholls (2009), for instance, delineates the creative strategies that social enterprises 
use to report on their social and economic impact. Based on the concept of BVC (Emerson, 
2003), he proposes a spectrum of blended value accounting, encompassing all reporting 
practices that emphasize quantitative financial value creation on the one side, and more 
qualitative social value creation on the other (p. 764). In other words, Nicholls describes how 
social enterprises hybridize two different modes of control, namely a managerial and a 
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democratic mode of control, into a “new logic of governance” (Nicholls, 2009, p. 765). The 
creative interpretation of blended value accounting spectrum and the strategic combination of 
different reporting options within the limits of their regulatory context, he further argues, helps 
social enterprises to “enhance their performance, access resources, and build organizational 
legitimacy” (p. 766).  
However, as Pache and Santos (2012) posit, based on their study of French social enterprises in 
the field of work integration, “hybridization” mainly takes place as a combination of “intact” 
practices of the social welfare and the commercial logic, and less through the creation of new 
hybrid practices (p. 972). Instead of mixing certain traditional procedure of the commercial and 
the social welfare logics and creating new hybrid practices with regards to branding and 
monitoring, for example, social enterprises instead choose to implement the intact for-profit 
branding practice and the intact nonprofit monitoring practice. This strategy of “selective coupling” 
allows the social enterprises “to project legitimacy to external stakeholders without having to 
engage in costly deceptions or negotiations” (ibid). 
This finding is reflected in much of social enterprise research, which has described how 
organizations balance commercial and social activitites. One such strategy, for instance, is cross-
subsidization of various income streams, in which organizations complement earned-income with 
donations, grants and/or voluntary labor, or set higher profit margins when providing to customers 
with increased ability to pay (see e.g. Teasdale, 2012).  
Particular attention has also been dedicated to the study of hybrid organizational identities in the 
context of institutional complexity (Greenwood et al, 2011, p. 354).34 Battilana and Dorado (2010), 
for instance, investigated how hiring and socialization practices influenced hybrid organizations’ 
ability to establish a sustainable hybrid identitdy. They compared the hiring practices of two 
microfinance institutions embedded in two competing logics – the development logic which 
guided their activities to help the poor, and the banking logic, which prescribed the generation of 
sufficient profit to keep operations up and running, as well as to fulfill external financial 
expectations. Battilana and Dorado’s study shows that hiring employees that are not attached to 
one of both logics is a key success factor for the establishment of a common hybrid identity and 
thus for a sustainable hybrid organization. In contrast, employees that have experiences in one of 
both logics will be more difficult to convince of the new hybrid identity, as they are often carriers 
of archetypal logics. As a consequence, sub-group identities are likely to be formed within the 
organization, which hinders the formation of a common hybrid identity and puts the organization 
at risk of a mission shift, that is, in this particular case, a dominance of the banking logic, which 
prioritizes the financial objectives, over the development logic with a primacy of social objectives.  
                                                   
34 In accordance with the seminal definition of Albert and Whetten (1985, p. 263), organizational identity refers to 
the central and enduring characteristics that distinguish an organization. Hence, organizational identity research 
mainly deals with questions about how to manage the “perception shared by organizational members about “who 
we are” and “what we do” as an organization (Smith, Gonin, and Besharov, 2013, p. 19f.). 
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A study that rather reflects the findings of Pache and Santos and showcases an example of 
selective coupling in the management of organizational identity, has been provided by Teasdale 
(2010). The author has described social enterprises’ strategies to seek the legitimacy of 
stakeholders from diverse sectors and accessing financial resources ranging from philanthropic 
to commercial sources by displaying different aspects of their hybrid identity. The author posits 
that the innovative combination of different sources of funding is a key component of social 
enterprise (p. 274). Particularly in the very early stage of a social enterprise’s lifecycle, grant 
funding plays a crucial role. Yet, most social enterprises try to mitigate the risk of single source 
funding by diversifying their funding streams. As Teasdale demonstrates, one strategy to succeed 
in this regard relates to organizational impression management, where organizations intentionally 
manipulate the audience’s perceptions of the organization. As social enterprises are hybrid 
organizations operating between the market, the state and the non-profit sector, Teasdale argues 
that multiple stakeholders may take the role of resource providers. In order to access these 
resources and reduce ambiguity among stakeholders, social enterprises need to manage their 
image carefully. Teasdale’s in-depth case study of a theatre production initiated by refugee and 
asylum seekers reveals several findings in this regard. Social enterprises, he argues, have 
multifaceted identities, externally and internally, that they enact differently depending on which 
resource holder they are talking to in order to attract their sympathy and support. For example, 
when talking to funders that were supporting the theatre production to become a professional 
organization, the social entrepreneur presented himself from a professional side, wearing a suit 
and emphasizing the organization’s ability to systematically generate social impact. When 
interacting with another resource holder that sought to improve the situation of refugee and 
asylum seekers, he portrayed himself and his organization as a group of people in need. 
However, Teasdale emphasizes that resource holders are not passive recipients of this 
impression management. By explicitly or implicitly outlining their expectations towards social 
enterprises, they co-construct the impressions presented by the entrepreneur. This influence of 
resource holders depends on their respective strategic interests.   
Overall, in their review of research on social enterprises as ideal types of hybrid organizations, 
Battilana and Lee (2014) suggest that, on a more abstract level, the hybridization approaches put 
forth by this body of work can be regrouped in four key types: (1) dismissing at least one of the 
multiple institutional pressures; (2) separating the exposure to multiple prescriptions; (3) 
managing competing institutional forces in a cumulative and simultaneous way; and (4) creating 
new institutional orders. These four approaches, they argue, synthesize all major attempts to 
conceptualize hybridization approaches – an argument that they underpin by classifying existing 
typologies into their four categories (see table 8).  
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Table 8:  “Typologies of hybridization approaches“  
  (adapted from Battilana and Lee, 2014, p. 41) 
 
Oliver –  
“Strategic Responses to 
Institutional Processes”  
(1991) 
Pratt & Foreman – 
“Classifying Managerial 
Responses to Multiple 
Organizational Identities” 
(2000) 





Dismissing Defiance (“Explicit rejection 
of at least one of the 
institutional 
demands”)/Avoidance 
(“Attempt at precluding the 
necessity to conform to 
institutional demands”) 
Deletion (“managers 
actually rid the organization 
of one or more of its multiple 
identities”) 
Denial (“deny the validity of 
various external claims that 
are placed upon it, attack 
the legitimacy of the entities 
making the claims, attempt 
to co-opt or control these 
entities, and/or try to escape 
their jurisdiction or influence 
altogether”) 
Separating Compromise (“Attempt to 
achieve partial conformity in 
order to accommodate at 
least partly all institutional 
demands”) 
Compartmentalization 
(“organization and its 
members choose to 
preserve all current 
identities but do not seek to 
achieve any synergies 
among them... multiple 
identities are maintained but 
are separated from each 
other”) 
 Compartmentalize 
(“(separate) identities and 
try to relate independently to 
various institutional 
constituencies”) 
Cumulative Acquiescence (“adoption of 
demands”) 
Aggregation (“an 
organization attempts to 
retain all of its identities 
while forging links between 
them”) 
Rein in (“try to balance 
disparate demands, play 
constituencies against each 
other, and/or attempt to find 
more deeply cooperative 
solutions to the political and 
cultural tensions which 
pluralism creates”) 
Creative Manipulation (“Active 
attempt to alter the content 
of the institutional 
demands”) 
Integration (“managers 
attempt to fuse identities 
into a distinct new whole”) 
Forge durable identities of 
their own (“forge durable 
identities of their own and to 
emerge as institutions in 
their own right”) 
 
Battilana and Lee (2014, p. 13ff.) further suggest that tensions between co-existing institutional 
forces and thus dimensions of hybrid organizing will manifest both internally and externally (see 
figure 5). Within organizations, tensions may occur in five key areas of organizational life: in (1) 
the organizational culture, (2) the organizational design (including the organizational structure, 
incentive and control systems and governance mechanisms), (3) the workforce composition, as 
well as in (4) the organization’s core activities. External manifestations of tensions will be 
reflected in (5) the various inter-organizational relationships of organizations. The authors explain 
that in all of these areas, the activities of hybrid organizations are integrated to different degrees. 
Microfinance, they argue, is a highly integrated concept as the business activities (loan making) 
are inseperable from the social mission (providing access to finance as a means to poverty 
alleviation). In contrast, work integration social enterprises are less integrated as their social 
mission to reintegrate marginalized people in the labor market are conceptually and factually 
distinct from their production and sales activities (p. 16f.). 





Figure 5: “Dimensions of Hybrid Organizing”  
  (Battilana and Lee, 2014, p. 27) 
The study of paradoxes in organizations provides an alternative conception of possible strategies 
to deal with contradictions in organizations. In contrast to the body of work that originated from a 
conflicting logics perspective, which mainly focused on episodic responses to tensions, and 
implied that strategic decisions need to be made in an “either / or” fashion, paradox scholars 
emphasize the possibility and advantages of a “both/and” mind-set and point to the iterative or 
cyclical nature of hybridization strategies.  
Poole and Van de Ven’s (1989) typology represents one of the most used conceptualizations of 
strategies to deal with paradox until today. They distinguished four different strategies: “(1) accept 
the paradox and use it constructively; (2) clarify levels of analysis [spatial separation]; (3) 
temporally separate the two levels; and (4) introduce new terms to resolve the paradox.” (p. 562). 
These categories resemble Battilana and Lee’s typology of hybridization approaches. However, 
what becomes apparent in Poole and Van de Ven’s strategies is the different time perspective 
that paradox scholars apply to conceive of organizational tensions. Paradoxes, earlier defined as 
persiting contradictions between interrelated dualities are by definition durable. Hence, strategies 
to cope with paradoxes have to be seen in function of time.  
Smith and Lewis’ dynamic equilibrium model of organizing (2011, p. 389) illustrates this approach 
(see figure 6). It builds upon the argument that the possible responses to paradoxes depend on 
organizations’ ability to embrace them. If organizational forces or individual factors spur anxiety or 
inertia, paradoxes are likely to end up as vicious cycles. In contrast, if individual and 
organizational factors trigger the acceptance of paradoxes as opportunities to develop both/and 
solutions, virtuous cycles will result. According to Smith and Lewis these factors are mainly 
cognitive and behavioral complexity as well as emotional equanimity at the individual level, and 
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dynamic capabilities at the organizational level. Virtuous cycles, in turn, will ultimately contribute 
to organizational sustainability, defined as long-term success, fueled by organizational “learning 
and creativity”, “flexibility and resilience“ and the “unleashing [of] human potential” (p. 393). 
However, Smith and Lewis’ model neglects the role of field-level factors that influence 
organizations’ ability to embrace paradoxes – or tensions more generally. 
 
Figure 6:  “A Dynamic Equilibrium Model of Organizing“  
  (Smith & Lewis, 2011, p. 389)  
Jarzabkowski et al (2013) further elaborate on the notion of organizational cyclical processes by 
suggesting that the different types of tensions that Smith and Lewis proposed co-evolve over 
time. In a longitudinal study of an organization caught between market and regulatory demands, 
the authors describe how paradoxes evolved in cycles – from organizing paradoxes to performing 
paradoxes and ultimately to belonging paradoxes. Their study suggests that it is unlikely for 
theory to be able to predict certain strategies based on the types of tensions that unfold in 
organizations. Instead, the authors show how the type of response – defensive vs. active 
responses – determine how tensions further evolve in organizations. More specifically, 
Jarzabkowski et al show that organizational survival was only at threat when managers tried to 
avoid the paradoxes through defensive responses that sought short-term relief. If managers – at 
some point – referred to a more active response of embracing the paradox and embedding it 
within organizational procedures as an “organizing outcome” of paradox, they could spur virtuous 
cycles (p. 267).  
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Jay’s (2013) study on public-private hybrid organizations also builds upon Smith and Lewis 
conceptualization of paradoxes. His ethnographic study of a hybrid organization is one of the few 
studies so far that has combined institutional theory and paradox research to investigate hybrid 
organizations. By doing so, Jay shows how a latent paradox in a hybrid organization that 
combined a public service logic and a client service logic became salient as outcomes of a 
particular action could be interpreted in opposite ways – namely, as failures or successes, 
depending on the logic that was adopted to evaluate the outcome (p. 138). His observations 
show that hybrid organizations manage such performance paradoxes through a process of 
“iterative, continuous organizational change” (p. 138). When the paradox first became salient, the 
administrative leaders interpreted it from the perspective of a client service logic – which was the 
dominant logic at that time – and then reframed the paradox and shifted the organizational 
identity to the concurrent logic (the public service logic). Only after having further reflected upon 
the paradox and involved external constituencies, the organization “made sense” of the paradox 
by oscillating between logics and iteratively interpreting organizational outcomes as to generate 
stable meaning and organized action (p. 140) and thus ultimately synthesizing the logics into a 
new one. Jay argues that it is through this cyclical process that the synthesizing of logics takes 
place and new types of practices emerge.  
Although prior scholarly work on cross-sectoral hybrid organizations has stressed the importance 
of sensemaking in creating or changing institutions (see e.g. Tracey et al., 2011, p. 72), Jay 
observes that most studies do not further explain the outcomes of sensemaking. In order to fill 
this gap, Jay’s study describes how sensemaking leads to new organizational structures over 
time. In addition, the author emphasizes that his results provide a view that contrasts to prior 
institutional theory, which mainly described how external constituencies impose demands and 
claims upon organizations. He proposes that external constituencies may instead also be seen as 
sources of alternative interpretive schemes that allow an organization to make sense of 
paradoxes and hence to change. This argument leads to a further contribution of Jay’s work with 
regards to the nexus between hybridity and innovation. Whereas prior scholar work suggested 
that organizations’ exposure to competing institutional orders may foster innovation, little 
evidence existed to further concretize when this occurs. Jay’s work suggests that innovation 
occurs when organizations – particularly their leaders – embrace alternative interpretive 
schemes. Only after having involved external constituencies and their interpretive schemes, the 
organization that he studied was able to create a synthesized logic. Hence, Jay suggests that 
innovation may be tied to the organizational leaders’ capability to embrace “behavioral 
complexity” and to be “above the fray” of everyday decision making” (p. 154). This recalls 
ambidexterity literature, which highlighted the need of “ambidextrous leaders” who understand 
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the particular challenges that the concurrent pursuit of exploiting and exploring strategies pose for 
organizations (Greenwood et al, 2011, p. 356).35 
The importance of capable organizational leadership has also been emphasized by researchers 
who adopted a paradox lens to investigate social enterprises. In particular, Smith and colleagues 
(2012) suggest three strategies that social entrepreneurship leaders can adopt in order to 
maintain a hybrid focus and avoid or manage internal conflicts: accepting, differentiating, and 
integrating competing demands (p. 464). By accepting competing demands, social 
entrepreneurship leaders acknowledge the existence of competing demands as a constitutional 
characteristic of their organizations with which they have to live. By doing so, leaders encourage 
members to mindfully deal with both types of demands instead of viewing them as paralyzing 
conflicts. Differentiation emphasizes the value of each type of demand, aiming at avoiding the 
dominance of one logic over the other. Finally, organizational leaders can also integrate 
competing demands, trying to foster the use of synergies between them. Integration thus 
emphasizes a productive interpretation of competing demands. Smith and colleagues however 
argue that these strategies are interrelated: “Yet, paradoxically, integration depends on effective 
differentiation. Differentiation can help leaders identify novel features of each side of competing 
demands, which in turn enables them to develop more creative ways of integrating these 
demands” (p. 466)  
As these elaborations show, the emergent theory of hybrid organizations has in recent times 
strongly developed and provided insights particularly on the different hybridization strategies that 
allow organizations to endurably combine contradictory logics or claims at the organizational 
level. Although institutional theory often inherently takes on a cross-level approach by referring to 
the concept of institutional logics, theory on hybrid organizations has so far provided limited 
insights on field-level antecedents that explain why hybridization takes a certain form. One factor, 
however, that has received some attention is the origin of hybrid organizations. In the context of 
cross-sector hybridity, researchers have discussed the implications of commercial or social 
welfare origins in hybrid organizations. The next section will briefly summarize the main advances 
in this regard. 
  
                                                   
35  As proposed by O’Reilly and Tushman (2013), "organizational ambidexterity refers to the ability of an 
organization to both explore and exploit—to compete in mature technologies and markets where efficiency, 
control, and incremental improvement are prized and to also compete in new technologies and markets where 
flexibility, autonomy, and experimentation are needed“ (p. 324). Ambdexterity has thus been put forth as a 
paradox that organizations need to manage well in order to ensure their innovativeness and thus their long-term 
survival (see e.g. Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2009).  
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3.3.4 The Role of Organizational Origins  
As mentioned earlier, scholars have repeatedly described the multiple roots of the currently 
observable rise of hybrid organizations in both theory and practice. One of these roots refers to 
the increasing congruence of economic sectors, portraying hybrid organizations as organizations 
that have been initiated by private, public or third sector actors (see 3.3.1).  
Mainly motivated by the literature on imprinting, researchers have thus started to explore the 
influence of hybrid organizations’ origin on their further existence and behavior. As Stinchcombe 
(1965) suggests in his seminal paper Social Structure and Organizations, a firm’s initial structures 
are influenced by historical factors and persist in the long run (p. 153). Further, he hypothesized 
that these initial structures mainly persist as they continue to be efficient, as inertial forces come 
into play, or because of a lack of competition (p. 169). Although the author didn’t use the term 
imprinting, Marquis and Tilcsik (2013) explain that Stinchcombe’s elaborations have soon been 
interpreted as the beginning of imprinting literature in organizational research (p. 197). The 
authors thus define imprinting as: 
“a process whereby, during a brief period of susceptibility, a focal entity develops 
characteristics that reflect prominent features of the environment, and these 
characteristics continue to persist despite significant environmental changes in 
subsequent periods.” (p. 199) 
Based on their review of imprinting literature, Marquis and Tilcsik further state that while 
Stinchcombe has described similarities within entire organizational populations, imprinting 
literature usually focuses on the organizational level. Much research on imprinting seeks to shed 
light on the way organizations are affected by founding conditions – or as the authors put it, how 
organizations “carry the legacy of their founding environment” (p. 198). In addition, Marquis and 
Tilcsik observe that scholars have also recently started to examine imprinting effects at the level 
of organizational building blocks (e.g. jobs and occupations, see Cohen, 2012) and at the 
individual level (e.g. career paths, see Higgins, 2005). 
Similarly, organizational researchers have started to apply the concept of “origins” to the 
investigation of hybrid organizations (Pache & Santos, 2012) as well as of individuals within 
hybrid organizations (Lee & Battilana, 2013). In light of the present study’s focus, it is particularly 
the influence that hybrid organizations’ origins have on the tensions that they face, as well as on 
their ability to manage these tensions, that is of superior interest. 
Pache and Santos’ (2012) investigation of French social enterprises compares the conflicting 
institutional demands that hybrid organizations with commercial and hybrid organizations with 
social welfare origins face, as well as the hybridization strategies that these organzations apply. 
With “origins”, the authors refer to the question of whether the social enterprise has been founded 
by a social organization or by a commercial organization (p. 978). This founding condition, their 
study further shows, equips social enterprises with an a priori legitimacy advantage or 
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disadvantage, which influences their ability to draw freely from practices of competing logics. 
More precisely, Pache and Santos describe how social enterprises with a commercial origin 
entered the field of work integration with a legitimacy disadvantage and were thus forced to prove 
the sincerity of their social intentions by enacting more practices from the social welfare logic than 
their peers with social welfare origins. The latter could select more practices from the commercial 
logic as their founding origin equipped them with an a priori legitimacy advantage. Building on 
these findings, Pache and Santos introduce a hybridization strategy that they labelled “Trojan 
Horse”, whereby “organizations that entered the field with low legitimacy due to their 
embeddedness in a contested logic strategically incorporated a majority of elements from the 
predominant logic to gain legitimacy and acceptance” (p. 973). Interestingly, these findings 
contradict the basic assumption of imprinting literature, which would suggest that organizations 
with a commercial origin primarily enact practices from the commercial logic. The hybridization 
strategy described by Pache and Santos can thus be interpreted as a way to “manipulate the 
templates provided by the competing logics” (p. 972). 
Similar strategies had already been described by social enterprise researchers such as Wilson 
and Post (2013), who outline how social businesses deliberately choose to incorporate as for-
profit legal entities, although they do not seek profit maximization. In their study, social 
enterprises considered the for-profit legal to be advantageous with regard to access to growth 
capital – mainly equity investments – and also for the enactment of the market-orientation 
rationales (p. 726). Kistruck and Beamish’s (2010) study yields similar results. The authors 
investigate the influence of cognitive, network and cultural embeddedness on the organizational 
form and structure of social intrapreneurship – a term that the authors chose in order to 
emphasize the frequent phenomenon of social entrepreneurial venture creation out of already 
existing nonprofit or for-profit organizations.36 As such, the authors argue, social intrapreneurship 
depicts higher levels of embeddedness, path dependency and complexity (p. 736). 37  By 
comparing social intrapreneurship case studies in seven developing countries, Kistruck and 
Beamish propose that ventures originating from the for-profit context face less constraints in 
pursuing social and financial goals than ventures originating from the nonprofit context. They then 
investigated the advantages and disadvantages that social intrapreneurship ventures with 
nonprofit and for-profit origins faced in establishing an organization with a dual mission. With 
regard to cognitive embeddedness, the authors explain that members of organizations with 
nonprofit roots reported to feel constantly conflicted in their new market orientation. Members of 
                                                   
36 Organizational form, Kistruck and Beamish specify, “refers to the legal characterization of an organization as 
belonging to either the for-profit or the nonprofit sector” (p. 735). See footnote 32 for a reflection on the use of the 
term organizational form. 
37 It has to be noted that the concept of path-dependency has often been used interchangeably with the one of 
imprinting. Sydow et al (2009), however, provide an important contribution to organizational theory by clarifying 
the difference between the two concepts. As the authors argue, there are certainly striking similarities between 
the two concepts. However, path dependency is different in that its pattern is not determined since the beginning. 
The process of path dependency is an „unforeseeable product of later processes, which are initially unknown“ 
(p. 696). Therefore, research on path dependency has to consider more than reproduction of initial structures. 
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organizations with for-profit roots felt that the social and financial goals were much more 
congruent and faced less difficulties in justifying any decisions that were made for business 
reasons. Similar results emerged regarding network embeddedness. Local actors, with whom 
many nonprofit organizations had engaged, sometimes even for decades, decided to search for 
better collaboration partners when organizations with nonprofit roots started to transform their 
relationships from being “unidirectional and donative to [becoming] bidirectional and 
transactional” (p. 743). Also donors didn’t feel comfortable with the notion of “making money off 
the back of the poor” (p. 744). Hence, social intrapreneurship ventures with nonprofit origins had 
to establish new networks for their increasingly commercial activities. For-profits, in contrast, 
were able to leverage their relational ties. Finally, similar dynamics occurred when looking at the 
cultural embeddedness of the social intrapreneuship ventures. As Kistruck and Beamish argue, 
people in developing countries “have come to rely upon nonprofit forms for charitable assistance” 
(746). The transformation of such practices into more transactional activities therefore faces 
cognitive barriers. Furthermore, the authors found that nonprofit organizations in developing 
countries do not benefit from the same trustworthiness as their counterparts in developed 
nations. Employments in nonprofit organizations, for instance, are much better paid than most 
other job positions, as financing from nonprofit organizations largely comes from foreign sources. 
This raises skepticism and distrust among local communities with regard to the intrinsic 
motivation of nonprofits’ employees (p. 746).  
Overall, Kistruck and Beamish suggest that the for-profit form was more conducive to the 
implementation of social intrapreneurship then the nonprofit form. However, the authors also 
show that alternative organizational structures provided advantages for both organizations that 
originated from the nonprofit sector and those that originated from the for-profit sector. As 
mentioned previously, social enterprises frequently refer to strategies such as structural 
separation – or structural decoupling, in the words of Kistruck and Beamish – in order to 
accommodate social and commercial activities. Kistruck and Beamish’s investigation shows that 
higher levels of structural decoupling come along with higher rates of success in engaging in 
social intrapreneurship. The separation helped organizations to avoid confusion and overcome 
constraints that emerged through cognitive, network and cultural embeddedness. This effect was 
even more pronounced for organizations with a nonprofit origin. 
In sum, these findings confirm Pache and Santos (2012) in that the founding origin of hybrid 
organizations appears to have an important influence on hybridization patterns and strategies. 
However, they suggest that the commercial origin may be advantageous in the context of 
developing economies – as opposed to Pache and Santos’ study on social enterprises in France. 
The role of the institutional setting on hybridization patterns and strategies thus seems to play an 




4 HYBRIDIZATION AS A STRATEGY TO TURN 
INSTITUTIONAL VOIDS INTO OPPORTUNITY SPACES – 
THE STUDY’S CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
4.1 Problem Statement, Focal Concepts and Research Questions 
The present study seeks to contribute to a better understanding of hybrid organizations that 
pursue blended value creating objectives in BoP settings. As the last chapters have outlined, the 
shifts in the international development regime over the last decades have manifested in an 
increasing institutional complexity, where multiple conflicting logics co-exist. In developing and 
emerging economies, where social service delivery today is typically organized in mixed markets 
and where financial resources are scarce, cross-sector hybridity falls on fertile grounds. For 
instance, organizations that aim at delivering essential goods and services to low-income people 
increasingly blend sector logics in an effort to access resources from the public, the private and 
the third sector and to create financially sustainable and thus more durable organizations.  
In such contexts, concepts such as the BoP or BVC propositions have raised considerable 
interest. Organizations originating from different sector backgrounds – including for-profits and 
nonprofits – have adopted these concepts and started to experiment with innovative business 
models that blur sector boundaries. These organizations are hybrids in the sense that they 
combine practices and structures of competing logics – particularly the social welfare and the 
commercial logic – assuming that cross-sector hybridity is necessary, or at least useful, in 
developing innovative solutions that promote long-lasting social and economic development. 
Scholars have portrayed such hybrid organizations as particularly agentic and resilient in the 
context of institutional complexity, highlighting their ability to turn institutional voids into 
opportunity spaces (Mair & Marti, 2009, p. 420). At the same, the last chapters have also 
elaborated on the challenges that hybrid organizations face when operating at the BoP. 
Particularly, the challenge of balancing multiple logics under one organizational umbrella has 
been put forth as a potential threat for organizational success or even survival. Both institutional 
and paradox researchers have thus started to dedicate their attention to a better understanding of 
tensions and response strategies in hybrid organizations. In addition, BoP and social enterprise 
research have also pointed to a range of other challenges and tensions that hybrid organizations 
at the BoP have to overcome.  
Building on these observations, two main research gaps are believed to curb the understanding 
of hybrid organizations in developing and emerging economies. First, the process of turning 
institutional voids into opportunity spaces has been interpreted in a narrow way, leaving 
many questions unanswered concerning the role of hybrid organizations in that process. How 
does hybridity enable organizations to turn institutional voids into opportunity spaces? Why do 
hybrid organizations draw on a particular logic to overcome the institutional voids that they face? 
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So far, hybridization has mainly been interpreted as a function of tensions – or institutional voids 
– at the interface of economic sectors. However, studies and field observations suggest that 
organizations also refer to hybridization as a strategy to overcome other types of institutional 
voids. Yet, the relationship between organizational hybridity and strategies to turn institutional 
voids into opportunity spaces remains a black box. Secondly, prior research has started to shed 
light on organizations’ ability to hybridize. Why are certain organizations better able to hybridize 
than others? How does the institutional environment influence hybrid organizations’ ability to 
freely draw from competing logics? The current understanding of field-level factors that enable or 
constrain hybridization is mainly based on evidence from Western settings where tensions over 
the appropriate goals of cross-sectoral hybrid organizations are often resolved at the field-level 
through effective legal regulations. However, the present study is based on the belief that the 
ability to hybridize, and thus hybridization strategies, are different in settings that don’t effectively 
resolve tensions over goals. In particular, it is argued that the institutional context of developing 
and emerging economies or BoP settings, in which institutional voids prevail, presents a 
promising opportunity to extend the knowledge about factors that enable and constrain hybrid 
organizations. 
In order to contribute to a better understanding of hybrid organizations in BoP settings, the focus 
will thus lie on two concepts that are believed to be of influence on hybrid organizations’ ability to 
hybridize and on their hybridization patterns, namely organizations’ logic of origin and their 
exposure to institutional voids. The next sections will elaborate on the relationships that are 
assumed to be relevant. 
4.1.1 Turning Institutional Voids into Opportunity Spaces 
As outlined in 3.3, scholars have interpreted cross-sectoral hybridity as a consequence of field-
level dynamics, including resource scarcity (see e.g. Desa & Basu, 2013), the globally increasing 
legitimacy of market-oriented political and ideological values (see e.g. Dart, 2004), or, more 
generally, an increasing congruence of economic sectors (see e.g. Billis, 2010). From this 
perspective, organizational hybridity is interpreted as a consequence of field-level dynamics, thus 
drawing a rather passive picture of organizations that refer to hybridization as a reaction to 
external factors. In contrast, some researchers have recently started to suggest a more agentic 
view on hybridization. Jay (2013), for instance, suggests that hybridity can also be seen as a 
result of organizational attempts to develop innovative solutions to complex problems that require 
more than a single logic focus.  
The present study builds upon the assumption that organizations are both constrained and 
enabled through environmental factors and proposes to investigate the scope for agency in the 
context of developing and emerging economies. As posited by institutional theorists, a central 
role of institutions is to reduce uncertainty by prescribing appropriate rules for action (see e.g. 
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DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Hence, prior studies have suggested that organizations are 
challenged in their operations in contexts where institutions are weak or absent (see e.g. Desa, 
2011), ambiguous (see e.g. Townsend & Hart, 2008), unknown or unpredictable (see e.g. 
Kistruck, Webb, Sutter, & Ireland, 2011). This has particularly been described in the context of 
developing and emerging economies, where institutions that support market-oriented operations 
exist, but are often weakly enforced (see e.g. Chakrabarty, 2009). However, Mair, Marti and 
Ventresca (2012, p. 819) have suggested a broader perspective on institutional voids, defining 
them as analytical spaces between different institutional spheres – as opposed to viewing them 
as empty spaces that occur when institutions are weak or absent. Institutional voids, in this 
sense, occur, for instance, as a result of the contradiction between Western interpretations of 
markets and institutional bits and pieces of local political, community, and religious spheres (ibid, 
p. 820). Interpreting institutional voids as such, Marti et al further argue, allows organizations to 
identify institutional contradictions and develop solutions that build on institutional interfaces – or 
in the words of Mair et al, solutions that “work institutional voids” (p. 819) – instead of feeling 
inhibited by the lack of Western-style institutions. 
Building on Mair et al’s definition, the present study views institutional voids as institutional 
interfaces, and thereby directly links them to the concept of institutional complexity. As mentioned 
in chapter 3, scholarly reflections on institutional complexity have predominantly elaborated on 
the implications that cross-sectoral configurations have on organizations. These studies have 
mainly drawn from the large body of research on conflicting logics, arguing that institutional 
complexity manifests in organizational tensions between competing demands of internal and 
external referent audiences of competing sector logics. Further, institutional scholars have 
posited that the corresponding institutional demands may either create conflicts over appropriate 
organizational goals or over the adequate means to achieve set goals (Pache & Santos, 2010).  
However, building upon paradox research, the present study further assumes that tensions may 
not only occur as a consequence of conflicting institutional demands from referent audiences, but 
also be inherently embedded in complex institutional arrangements. In other words, it adopts the 
view that tensions are both material and socially constructed (see e.g. Jay, 2013 or Smith & 
Lewis, 2011). It is believed that the manifestation of contradictions between elements can 
ultimately always be referred to a social construction – be it different views about what is 
legitimate behavior in an organization or dynamics in markets, which are socially constructed 
systems as well. However, tensions related to conflicting demands from multiple institutional 
logics are not necessarily the only type of tension that organizations may face. Tensions may 
also originate from effective trade-offs between multiple organizational goals that are all 
legitimate within the same logic or from developments over time – for instance when 
organizations innovate and disrupt markets in which they also generate profit as suggested by 
ambidexterity literature. Social enterprise and BoP research, for instance, suggest that hybrid 
organizations face different types of institutional voids, which may cause inner-organizational 
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tensions. Kistruck and Beamish (2010), for instance, show how three types of institutional 
challenges – “(1) poorly developed or undeveloped formal institutions, (2) significant formal and 
informal institutional differences between developed and BOP markets, and (3) significant 
institutional differences within and among BOP markets “ (p. 510) – inhibit the success of BoP 
ventures.  
In sum, with regards to the challenges that institutional voids pose for organizations, the present 
study adopts a distinctive view by integrating institutional and paradox theory in an effort to 
account for antecedents of tensions in hybrid organizations that go beyond contradictions 
between sector logics. This is also argued to be crucial in understanding how hybridity is applied 
as a strategy to turn institutional voids into opportunity spaces.  
Besides viewing institutional voids and institutional complexity as challenges that create different 
types of tensions in organizations, both concepts have also been interpreted as opportunity 
spaces for organizations. This study seeks to further develop this argument, arguing that 
hybridization strategies may be another way how organizations can turn institutional voids into 
opportunity spaces. In fact, many of the organizations that have been studied as particularly 
agentic organizations that succeed in turning institutional voids into opportunity spaces are hybrid 
organizations – or, more specifically, social enterprises. The Bangladeshi organization BRAC, 
which has been the object of study in Mair, Marti and Ventresca’s (2012) elaborations on 
institutional voids, is a social enterprise in the sense that it combines the social welfare and the 
commercial logic. Similarly, Desa (2011) describes how social enterprises refer to bricolage 
techniques in order to reconfigure existing resources at hand in the context of instutional voids. 
Yet, the process of how hybridization is used as a strategy to turn institutional voids into 
opportunity spaces remains to be explored, as well as the question how institutional voids 
influence hybridization patterns. To which logics, for instance, do hybrid organizations at the BoP 
refer in order to turn institutional voids into opportunity spaces? 
As Battilana and Lee (2014, p. 41) describe in their review of literature on hybrid organizations, 
institutional theory has brought forth four different types of hybridization approaches: separating, 
dismissing, cumulative and creative responses. Most research on cross-sector hybridity, 
particularly social enterprise literature, describes how organizations refer to one of these 
response strategies to deal with conflicts between the social welfare and the commercial logic 
(see 3.3.3). In particular, by studying work integration social enterprises in France, Pache and 
Santos (2012) find that hybrid organizations are more likely to combine intact practices from the 
social welfare and the commercial logics – which would refer to cumulative strategies in the 
words of Battilana and Lee – rather than to create new and creative hybrid practices. For 
instance, they simulatenously refer to a social welfare logic at the level of volunteer mobilization 
and to a commercial logic at the level of legal status, but they rarely create new hybrid practices 
that blend both logics at the very same level.  
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In addition, paradox theorists have recently emphasized that strategies to deal with tensions 
should be investigated over time, allowing to observe organizational change as an “interpretative, 
iterative, and emergent mechanism” (Jay, 2013, p. 153). This approach contrasts with most 
institutional research, which has focused on episodic responses to organizational tensions. Jay 
delineates that, over time, organizations may either oscillate between logics or synthesize them in 
order to navigate through organizational paradox. Furthermore, he extends the interpretation of 
tensions by arguing that they may not only emerge as a consequences of conflicting demands 
from internal or external audiences, but may also be latently embedded in organizational designs 
until they become salient, for instance when organizational outcomes can be interpreted as both 
success and failure. The author therefore emphasizes that sensemaking, which can be 
interpreted as a more creative response to organizational tensions, is an important strategy to 
manage paradoxical outcomes, as it allows transforming the organizational logic over time.  
Taking the time dimension into account when looking at hybridization strategies is believed to be 
important for further theory development about hybrid organizations at the interstices of sector 
logics, as it departs from the necessity to find solutions that resolve tensions once and for all. 
Instead, it points to the fact that tensions may be a constitutive element in hybrid organizations 
and that organizational leaders should accept and embrace tensions in order to turn them into 
opportunity spaces. Similar reasoning has been expressed by Jarzabkowski, Lê, and Van de Ven 
(2010) who state the defensive strategies, which try to avoid oppositions – including separating, 
dismissing and cumulative strategies in Battilana and Lee’s typology – are likely to spur vicious 
cycles. In contrast, active strategies that accept tensions are likely to spur virtuous cycles in 
organizations. 
However, concerning the present study’s research questions, it is argued that both extent 
research on tensions and hybridization strategies is limited in that it neglects the question in 
which way hybridization is a reaction to other types of tensions that do not emerge from conflicts 
between sector logics. Further, as the next section will explain, the researcher stresses the need 
to view hybrid organizations as actors that are embedded in institutional fields that influence their 
scope for agency. 
4.1.2 The Ability to Hybridize 
In the present study, the ability to hybridize will refer to hybrid organizations’ leeway to 
strategically combine structures and practices from competing logics in an effort to overcome 
tensions and create a sustainable new hybrid arrangement. While only a few studies explicitly 
elaborate on the ability to hybridize, analogies can be drawn from the larger body of literature 
from institutional and paradox research. From an institutional perspective, the ability to hybridize 
can be interpreted as organizations’ ability to enact strategies that help them overcome tensions 
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emerging through their exposure to conflicting logics. As elaborated in the previous chapter, 
factors that influence this ability include field-level, logic specific, and organization-level factors.  
Besharov and Smith (2013, p. 367) suggest that at the field-level, the number of professional 
institutions and the relationship between them influences whether an organization will be exposed 
to tensions emerging from conflicting institutional demands. The higher the amount of 
professional institutions, and the more competitive the relationship between them, the more 
institutional referent audiences will claim that their own logic is unique and superior to the logics 
of other professional groups. 
Besides the institutional context, Besharov and Smith argue, it is also the degree to which a logic 
is ambiguous or specific, as well as the compatibility of institutional logics that is critical (ibid). 
This perspective has interesting implications, as it suggests that the nature of specific claims in 
logics is of relevance when looking at tensions in organizations and that certain combinations of 
logics may be more feasible than others – a view that has been largely neglected in research 
about hybrid organizations so far. Besharov and Smith therefore stress that it is important to draw 
attention to the content of incompatibilities. Similar to Pache and Santos (2010), they posit that 
for logics to be compatible, it is more important that they are compatible concerning their goals, 
than with regard to the means they prescribe to achieve set goals. They explain that “goals reflect 
core values and beliefs and are evaluated based on a logic of appropriateness, making them 
hard to challenge or modify. In contrast, means are evaluated based on a logic of consequence 
and are therefore more malleable” (p. 367). 
In addition, organizational characteristics such as field positions, structure, ownership, 
governance and identity (Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta, & Lounsbury, 2011, p. 339ff.) 
or the internal representation of multiple logics within an organization (Pache & Santos, 2010, 
p. 460), have been identified as important influencing factors when looking at tensions in 
organizations and their possible response strategies. Other factors, including the distribution of 
power (Greenwood et al, 2011, p. 344), the resource dependence structure (Maguire et al, 2004, 
p. 668f.), as well as the costs and risks that organizations perceive when considering different 
types of strategies (Pache & Santos, 2010, p. 464), are furthermore likely to influence the 
strategies that organizations will apply to manage tensions.  
From a paradox research perspective, researchers further suggested that dynamic capabilities of 
organizations, leadership skills such as cognitive and behavioral complexity and emotional 
equanimity (Smith & Lewis, 2011), as well as the interaction of organizations with external 
constituencies carrying alternative institutional prescriptions (Jay, 2013) influence the success 
that organizations will have in managing tensions. However, Jarzabkowski, Lê and Ven (2013) 
implicitly point to the role of field-level dynamics by suggesting that strategies depend on the 
context in which organizations are embedded. Accordinlgy, they argue, it is unlikely to see a one 
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to one link between different types of tension and strategies, but rather combinations of different 
responses over time (p. 249). 
As outlined in chapter 3, institutional scholars have recently started to look at field-level 
influences on organizational hybridization patterns, defined as the specific way how competing 
logics are combined across organizational functions or areas. Particularly, the influence of 
organizational origins has been analyzed at the organizational and individual level (see 3.3.4). At 
the organizational level, Pache and Santos (2012) suggest that hybrid organizations that enter a 
field with an a priori legitimacy advantage are freer in drawing from competing logics. They show 
that, in the field of work integration social enterprises in France, hybrid organizations with a social 
welfare origin benefitted from such a legitimacy advantage in contrast to their peers with a 
commercial origin who had to prove the sincerity of their social objectives by applying more 
practices from the social welfare logic.  
However, as the present study argues, Pache and Santos’ findings are limited in the sense that 
they build on a research setting in which conflicts over goals are effectively resolved at the field 
level. As their empirical investigation suggests, there is a strong field-level consensus in France 
concerning the appropriate goals of work integration social enterprises, namely to “serve a clear 
social need: reintegrating long-unemployed people into the job market“ (p. 982). The pursuit of 
this goal is furthermore protected by the state, who acts as a gate-keeper by “granting [work 
integration social enterprises] the right to operate, by monitoring the accomplishment of their 
social mission, and by expelling contravening organizations from the field” (ibid). The social 
welfare logic, they argue, is thus the dominant logic in the field of work integration, providing 
hybrid organizations with social welfare origins with a legitimacy advantage. Pache and Santos, 
however, themselves point to the need of investigating hybridization strategies and patterns in 
contexts where conflicts over goals are not resolved at the field level (p. 995).  
The present study seeks to respond to this call by assuming that fields with institutional voids that 
inhibit public authorities or other institutions to enforce a dominant logic may provide less 
guidance for organizations on how to resolve conflicts over goals. It is argued that this may 
particularly be the case in developing and emerging economies. As elaborated in the previous 
chapters, BoP ventures strategically combine structures and practices from the social welfare and 
the commercial logic in an effort to develop business models that try to reconciliate two goals that 
have traditionally been interpreted as antagonistic, namely poverty alleviation and profit 
generation. They operate in fields of social service provision, such as health care, where conflicts 
over goals are part of their daily routine – providing affordable health care to poor populations vs. 
generating financial surpluses. These conflicts may, in theory, be resolved at the field level, for 
instance, if governments provide health insurance for poor populations and set effective 
guidelines for health providers to become and stay eligible for these funds. However, BoP 
settings have repeatedly been argued to be characterized by weak enforcement of formal 
institutions, or, in other words, by prevailing institutional voids. Hence, even if conflicts over goals 
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are in theory resolved at the field level, they may, in fact, remain unresolved in practice and put 
hybrid organizations in a far more difficult situation as they have to deal with those conflicts over 
goals at the organizational level. It remains to be researched whether logics of origin remain a 
source of legitimacy advantages or disadvantages in such settings and how organizations refer to 
hybridization strategies to deal with institutional voids. 
Interesting insights touching upon this topic have been provided by Kistruck and Beamish (2010), 
who suggest that in the context of seven developing and emerging economies, social 
intrapreneurship initiatives with for-profit origins were more successful in overcoming constraints 
stemming from their cognitive embeddedness (i.e. restrictive mindsets within the organizations), 
network embeddedness (i.e. constraints stemming from interdependencies between the ventures 
and external audiences) and cultural embeddedness (i.e. restrictive macro-level norms and 
expectations in countries, regions or populations). The reasons for this legitimacy advantage, 
however, do not relate to state intervention. Instead, Kistruck and Beamish explain that the 
cognitive embeddedness of for-profits was advantageous as the combination of social and 
financial objectives was less seen as a contradiction as in nonprofit social intrapreneurship 
initiatives. With regard to network embeddedness, the authors find that for-profits had established 
a network based on exchange mechanisms and thus bidirectional ties. This was an advantage in 
establishing social intrapreneurship when compared to nonprofits whose networks were mainly 
based on unidirectional ties and thus had to be reorganized for the new social intrapreneurship 
venture. Finally, with regard to cultural embeddedness, Kistruck and Beamish also find that 
nonprofits were disadvantaged because they were considered to keep alive the dependency in 
which developing and emerging economies were trapped after centuries of colonialism. In 
addition, and in contrast to Western settings, nonprofit organizations were not attributed with the 
characteristic of being altruistic. Working in a nonprofit belongs to the most attractive employment 
opportunties. Jobs are typically well paid and nonprofit organizations are typically well equipped. 
People working in nonprofit organizations are thus rather believed to be driven by self-interest 
rather than altruism.  
Overall, Kistruck and Beamish thus conclude that the for-profit origin was more advantageous for 
venturing into social intrapreneurship as its cognitive, network and cultural embeddedness is less 
restrictive than for nonprofits. Their findings thus support Pache and Santos’ (2012) conclusion 
that “the institutional freedom that hybrids gain from their exposure to institutional contradictions 
can only be leveraged by those whose legitimacy is secure in the first place” (p. 995). However, 
in contrast to Pache and Santos’ study, the findings of Kistruck and Beamish suggest that the 
reasons why they benefitted from this legitimacy advantage is not determined by a central field-
level player with gate-keeping power such as the state. Instead, it is a result of differences in the 
cognitive, network and cultural embeddedness of the commercial and the social welfare logics. 
Building on these elaborations, the present study assumes that the logic of origin is a central 
factor that determines hybrid organizations’ ability to hybridize. However, in addition, it seeks to 
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investigate how organizations manage tensions through hybridization strategies in the context of 
institutional voids. As mentioned previously, institutional voids have traditionally been argued to 
be challenges for organizations operating at the BoP. However, institutional researchers have 
currently suggested that institutional voids may also incentivize organizations to become 
particularly agentic. Building on this argument, the present study thus proposes to investigate 
hybridity as one manifestation of agentic behavior of organizations that seek to deal with tensions 
that reflect higher order institutional voids. 
The Study’s Focus 
In light of these elaborations, it can be summarized that, so far, it remains largely unknown how 
field-level, and particularly, cross-sector dynamics constrain and/or enable BoP approaches in 
creating blended value. Further research is needed to explore how hybridization at the interstices 
of sector logics can allow organizations to pursue their blended value creating objectives at the 
BoP. The aim of this research is to contribute to filling these research gaps.  
In an effort to operationalize the above-mentioned research gaps, the study will investigate 
organizational level phenomena that reflect field-level dynamics. In particular, tensions in hybrid 
organizations will be seen as proxies for institutional contradictions at the field level, and 
hybridization strategies will be investigated to infer field level dynamics that constrain or enable 
organizations to overcome those tensions. Hence, the present study will investigate the following 
research questions: 
3. What tensions do hybrid organizations targeting the BoP experience, and why?  
4. What hybridization strategies do they apply to manage these tensions, and why? 
Given the above mentioned observations, the study will concentrate on two focal concepts in 
approaching these research questions, namely the logic of origin and institutional voids. Both are 
believed to influence the tensions (constraints) and the hybridization strategies (agency) in hybrid 
organizations at the BoP (see figure 7).  




Figure 7: Relationships Between Focal Concepts for Empirical Analysis 
The empirical part of this research aims to refine the understanding of the above-mentioned 
relationships and thus to further develop the emerging theory of hybrid organizations. As will be 
further elaborated in the next chapter, theory and empirical findings have thus been treated in a 
reciprocal relationship over the entire research in order to complement and further elaborate the 
conceptual framework presented above.  
4.2 Research Objectives 
A better understanding of factors that constrain and enable agency in hybrid organizations is 
argued to be important for practical as well as theoretical reasons. From a practical point of view, 
organizational models that are able to cope with institutional complexity and to shape institutional 
environments are of paramount importance. In developing and emerging economies, it can be 
observed that BoP approaches are currently being promoted from several ends, however, with 
little coordination and understanding of their actual potential to alleviate poverty. A focus on 
cross-sector hybridity is believed to shed light on key constraints and opportunities to perform this 
task. Given that institutional settings at the BoP are challenging, organizations are needed that 
are able to deal with those conditions in an effort to provide essential social goods and services 
to low-income people. Particularly, in countries that are trying to exit donor dependency, the 
establishment of financially independent markets for the provision of social critical goods is 
critical. In these countries, policies generally promote economic liberalization, thereby triggering 
the proliferation of private companies that engage in welfare related sectors such as education or 
health. However, the public and the third sector also play an important role in these sectors – 
either because they are necessary players in creating a monetizable demand for the provision of 
these goods, and/or because they act as providers themselves. As a result, sectors relating to 
social service provision are highly fragmented and thus complex. 
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A focus on hybrid organizations is furthermore believed to add to BoP literature by describing 
innovative ways of managing institutional complexity for organizations with different sector 
backgrounds. Stemming from strategy research, BoP literature is very practice oriented, providing 
a range of tools and recommendations for businesses that seek to tap into low-income markets. 
Yet, these recommendations largely neglect other types of actors that are currently experimenting 
with the BoP propositions, including social enterprises and other types of hybrid organizations. 
Altogether these approaches – be it in health care or in other areas – form an eclectic 
organizational field at the BoP, which keeps growing and continues to raise interest among 
investors, donors, policy makers and other related actors (Kolk, Rivera-Santos, & Rufín, 2013, 
p. 16). With focus on the potential capacity to flexibly adapt to institutional complexity and 
mobilize resources innovatively (Desa & Basu, 2013), the emerging theory of hybrid 
organizations is a useful and yet rarely applied lense to learn about innovative ways to organize 
and foster social and economic development at the BoP. In addition, it remains largely unknown 
how field-level and particularly cross-sector dynamics constrain and/or enable BoP approaches in 
creating blended value. Leaning on institutional theory as a lense to investigate hybrid 
organizations will therefore account for the role of field-level factors and their influence on 
organizational level tensions and strategies at the BoP.   
From a theoretical point of view, cross-sector hybridity at the BoP provides a particularly fruitful 
research setting. Developing and emerging economies are typically not only characterized by 
institutional complexity, but also by institutional voids, defined as contradictions at the interface of 
different institutional spheres. By investigating the influence of logics of origin and institutional 
voids on organizations’ ability to hybridize, as well as on the process of turning institutional voids 
into opportunity spaces, the present study seeks to contribute to the emergent theory on hybrid 
organizations. In particular, it seeks to contribute to a better understanding on hybridization in 
settings that don’t resolve tensions over goals at the field level. 
More generally, the present study is based on the belief that organizations are constrained and 
enabled by these conditions. Hence, it draws a picture of organizations that are both pressed to 
comply with institutional prescriptions and free to act strategically. This belief relies on a 
conception of human beings who have the ability to reflect and act in their own interest, while at 
the same time being restricted by institutional forces. This reflexivity, as elaborated in 3.1.3, is of 
particular importance to shed light on the paradox of embedded agency. It helps actors to 
disembed themselves from the institutions that shape their behavior. In the context of the present 
study, institutional voids are assumed to be key triggers for reflexivity. They permit actors to 
perceive alternative ways of interpreting and legitimizing social or organizational behavior. The 
researcher thus shares Peng’s (2003) argument that “institutional transitions throughout emerging 
economies present a fascinating opportunity to integrate institutional and strategic choice 




5 RESEARCH SETTING AND METHODOLOGY  
This chapter outlines the ontological and epistemological foundation of this study as well as the 
research design and process through which data was collected and analyzed. It further 
introduces the research setting, that is, the context in which the study was conducted. 
5.1 Research Paradigm 
The research paradigm of a study refers to its philosophical underpinning with regard to the way 
insights are generated and interpreted. In other words, it refers to the “ideas of reality (ontology) 
and how we can gain knowledge of it (epistemology)” (Maxwell, 2012, p. 42). Generally, at the 
most abstract level, researchers often differentiate between a quantitative and a qualitative 
research paradigm. While quantitative research mainly seeks to empirically test theories in large-
scale samples, qualitative research is frequently dedicated to investigating less researched areas 
by focusing on fewer units of analysis and seeking to understand these more in depth. 
The theoretical aim of this research is twofold. First, it seeks to further develop the emerging 
theory on hybrid organizations, which is mainly rooted in institutional theory and paradox 
research. Second, it aims at adding to literature on blended value creating organizations, in 
particular, social enterprises and BoP ventures. While those literature streams have so far largely 
been treated separately, it is believed that linking them is fruitful for both. Research on hybrid 
organizations remains rather conceptual at this stage, and has so far largely neglected the 
context of developing and emerging economies, which differs substantially from Western 
economies and may thus challenge some of the prevailing assumptions. At the same time, the 
theoretical underpinning of BVC approaches remains to be further developed, particularly with 
regard to the influence of field-level dynamics. A focus on the concept of hybridity is believed to 
add significantly in this regard, as it allows investigating how organizations that seek to create 
blended value at the BoP deal with tensions that reflect higher order institutional voids.  
The present study is thus exploratory and explanatory. The exploratory part of the research seeks 
to investigate what type of tensions hybrid organizations at the BoP experience and what 
hybridization strategies they apply to overcome the tensions. The explanatory part seeks to 
contextualize the findings – in particular, to understand the field-level reasons that lie behind 
those tensions and strategies. As proposed by Smith and Lewis (2011, p. 388f.), tensions can 
remain latent and unperceived, but still existent, until external events or internal organizational 
dynamics make them salient. This view is consistent with the philosophical position of critical 
realism (Lawson, Collier, Bhaskar, Archer, & Norrie, 1998), which combines two perspectives that 
are usually conceived as antagonistic. On the one hand, critical realism is based on the 
ontological belief that there is a reality that exists independently from human perceptions and 
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thinking. On the other hand, it embraces epistemological constructivism, which claims that the 
way we gain knowledge and perceive reality – or experience tensions – is inevitably linked to our 
perceptions and thus socially constructed (Maxwell, 2012, p. 43). The study is thus based on the 
belief that individuals’ experience of reality, or more precisely, that the phenomena of interest – 
tensions in hybrid organizations and hybridization strategies – are socially constructed, as they 
are experienced through cognitive frames of individuals (Smith & Lewis, 2011, p. 388), which are 
in turn influenced by field-level logics. At the same time, the study doesn’t “reject outright some 
notion of objectivity” (Baxter & Jack, 2008, p. 545). Although actors may not perceive 
contradictions between institutional claims, they may still exist (for a more detailed elaboration on 
a critical realist approach to institutional theory, see Leca & Naccache, 2006). 
A qualitative research paradigm was chosen to investigate the research questions, as its 
descriptive nature allows for deeper insights into social constructions by focusing on the way 
social experience occurs and is given meaning (Gephart Jr., 2004, p. 455). Furthermore, a 
qualitative paradigm allowed the researcher to adopt an epistemologically pragmatic approach 
and a problem-solving focus in her investigation of complex societal challenges (Eisenhardt & 
Graebner, 2007, p. 26). For data analysis, different literature streams and methods have been 
mixed and applied according to their contribution to answer the research questions. For instance, 
as will be further described later, data analysis has been performed inductively and deductively, 
given that some findings could be subsumed into existing theory, while others couldn’t. This 
doesn’t mean that the researcher adopted an “anything goes” principle (Feyerabend, 1993, 
p. 14f.) but rather that she followed a pragmatist way of doing science. Methods were evaluated 
in terms of their potential to generate the necessary insights. For instance, and as will be further 
explained later, theory and empirical results have been treated iteratively along the course of the 
study in order to constantly contextualize the findings and reflect upon them from different points 
of views. This iteration motivated the researcher to reach out for additional theoretical input and 
to adapt her research focus when needed. Furthermore, various measures – including exchange 
with experts from the field and theory as well as transparent documentation of the research 
process – were taken to ensure rigor and reliability in data collection and data analysis. 
5.2 Research Design and Setting: Comparative Case Studies of Health 
Care BoP Approaches 
Exploratory and explanatory studies often dive deep into social phenomena and seek to 
understand all related aspects of one or few cases. This is particularly important in research 
endeavors that seek to investigate under-researched topics by gaining an in-depth understanding 
on complex social phenomena (Yin, 2008, p. 4). However, instead of focusing on one case study 
and gaining a deep understanding of one specific context, a comparative approach of multiple 
case studies was chosen for this study. Using case studies as a research instrument allowed the 
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researcher to gain information about contemporary real-life events, work closely to the study 
participants who could share their views of reality, and contextualize the observations through 
additional insights such as historical explanations. At the same time, choosing a comparative 
research design also allowed for a replication logic by focusing on four variables (hybrid 
organizations logic of origin, the exposure to institutional voids, the types of tensions that hybrid 
organizations experience and the hybridization strategies that they apply) and enable a useful 
consideration of similarities and differences. In general, replication can occur through literal 
replication, that is, when the use of multiple case studies is expected to yield similar results, or 
theoretical replication, when the research design predicts contrasting results, but for anticipated 
reasons (Yin, 2008, p. 54).  
Both types of replication were applied in the sampling approach of this study. Sampling in case 
study research differs from sampling in quantitative research. Instead of seeking statistical 
representation, for example through random sampling, cases are rather chosen intentionally 
based on their appropriateness to answer the research question (Boeije, 2009, p. 35). In order to 
shed light on the two variables (logic of origin and institutional voids) that are believed to 
influence the types of tensions that hybrid organizations face and the hybridization behavior of 
those organizations, the cases – that is, the hybrid organizations – have been selected in 
different developing and emerging economies. Furthermore, within each country, one for-profit 
and one nonprofit organization have been selected. The sampling procedure will be further 
explained in the next sections. 
In order to isolate the concepts of interest, the researcher furthermore chose to focus on the 
health care sector, which is not only one of the sectors in which BoP initiatives have sprouted in 
the last years, but also a sector that typically depicts characteristics that are conducive for the 
purpose of this study. First, as repeatedly suggested by prior research conducted in Western 
economies, health care organizations depict a high centrality concering the multiplicity of logics, 
as they seek to provide care and to operate in a financially sustainable way (see e.g. Besharov & 
Smith, 2013; Scott, 1983). In developing and emerging markets, financial sustainability has been 
less emphasized in the past, as many health sectors used to rely on external financial support 
like foreign aid. However, with the rise of market-orientation and blended value creating 
approaches such as BoP initiatives in developing and emerging economies in recent years (see 
chapter 2), health care organizations increasingly accommodate multiple logics. Providing 
affordable high-quality care (a goal that will be attributed to the social welfare logic) and operating 
in a financially sustainable way (a goal that will be attributed to the commercial logic, see 
appendix 4) are both central objectives of health care BoP approaches. Tensions between those 
logics are thus likely to manifest in their core activities (Besharov & Smith, 2013, p. 369). Second, 
as health care is not only a huge market, but also a human right, it attracts and involves actors as 
well as resources from the public, the private and the third sector. Health sectors in developing 
and emerging economies are thus often highly fragmented and characterized by high levels of 
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institutional complexity, as multiple logics co-exist at the field-level and prescribe competing 
institutional demands at the organizational level. Third, developing and emerging economies are 
generally subject to comparably strong institutional change, since players from the public, the 
private and the third sector continuously seek to improve existing institutions that are related to 
social welfare delivery. It can thus be inferred that organizations operating in health sectors in 
developing and emerging markets are strongly exposed to institutional voids, which are one of 
the focal conditions that are to be investigated in this study. As further elaborated in the section 
on limitations of the present study, the findings that will be presented are believed to apply to 
other sectors of social service provision as well. However, in education and housing, for instance, 
the findings may be less pronounced given that the incompatibility of logics might be less central 
to organizations. Further, given that the health sectors globally experience a shift towards market-
orientation, one could question whether marketized health care can still be classified as a “hybrid 
field” or rather as a newly institutionalized institutional field. However, as further elaborated later, 
the researcher argues that providing care and generating revenues remain antagonistic enough 
in the context of the sample countries where public institutions, for instance, fail to enforce legal 
norms concerning the appropriate behavior of market-oriented health providers (see p. 7.2). 
5.2.1 Country Selection 
The present study focuses on the investigation of the tensions that hybrid organizations at the 
BoP face and the hybridization strategies that they apply. More concretely, the study aims to 
shed light on the influence that hybrid organization’s logic of origin (social welfare or commercial 
logic) and their exposure to institutional voids have in this regard. In order to provide more 
generalizable insights about these relationships, the study sought to compare the institutional 
context of health markets in different developing and emerging countries. Although health 
markets vary substantially from one country to another, developing and emerging economies 
generally depict certain features in common. In particular, they typically cause considerable 
uncertainty for organizations, given that they often lack functioning formal institutions, are subject 
to fast institutional change, and generally depict high levels of fragmentation and thus institutional 
complexity. In other words, they are likely to engender multiple institutional voids. Furthermore, 
the focus of the study was on economies in which market-oriented development approaches are 
generally in line with the regime. This is particularly the case in countries that use economic 
liberalization as a primary engine of growth and delivery of social welfare delivery. In sum, the 
following characteristics were considered in the search for sample countries: 
 Representative for developing or emerging economies that promote economic liberalization 
in health care 
 Adoption of the principle of universal access to health care 
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 Prevalence of institutional challenges that inhibit the effective implementation of the principle 
of universal access to health care 
 Pluralistic health sector that involve actors from the public, the private and the third sector 
 Existence of hybrid organizations with commercial and social welfare origin providing health 
care at the BoP 
 Access to one hybrid organization with commercial origin and one with social welfare origin 
willing to participate in the study per country 
Given these parameters, a convenience sampling approach was chosen in order to overcome the 
challenge of accessing study objects located in distant places. Being a member of the 
International Research Network on Social Economic Empowerment (IRENE|SEE) initiated by 
Zeppelin University and Siemens Stiftung, the researcher benefitted from improved access to four 
countries: Colombia, Mexico, Kenya and South Africa. These countries provided an interesting 
sample composition as they can all be classified as developing and emerging economies, albeit 
with different levels of development when looking at economic and social indicators and important 
differences in their health markets.  
In the first exploratory phase of the research, contrasting features between these countries have 
been analyzed in order to explore their appropriateness for answering the research questions. 
This first exploratory phase included desktop research, expert interviews and attempts to contact 
potential study participants. Desktop research sought to provide a better understanding of the 
attractiveness of health sectors for the private sector and thus, the extent to which economic 
liberalization was promoted. Further, it sought to give a first impression of the legitimacy of sector 
logics in the four sample countries.  
Table 9 summarizes some key social and economic indicators on the four sample countries:  
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Table 9:  Key Social and Economic Indicators of Colombia, Mexico, Kenya and South Africa 
 Colombia Mexico Kenya South Africa 
GDP (2013)38 378.4 billion US$ 1.261 trillion US$ 55.24 billion US$ 366.1 billion US$ 
Country classification 






Low income Upper middle 
income 
GINI Index (income 
distribution) (different 
years of reference)40 
53,5 48,1 47,7 65 
Human Development 
Index (2013)41  
0.711 0.756 0.535 0.658 
Country classification 
according to UNDP42 
High human 
development 







Index (MPI) (2013)43 
0,032 0,024 0,226 0,041 
Contribution of 
deprivations in health to 
overall poverty (2013)44 
24.7% 25.6% 32.4% 61.4% 
Multidimensional poverty 
headcount (2013)45  
7.6% 6.0% 48.2% 10.3% 
Share of population near 
poverty (2013)46 
10.2% 10.1% 29.1% 39.6% 
Share of population in 
severe poverty (in%)47 
1.8% 1.1% 15.7% 1.3% 
Share of population 
living under poverty line 
of 0.125 USD (2013)48 
8.2% 0.7% 43.4% 13.8% 
 
                                                   
38 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD  
39 http://data.worldbank.org/country 
40  “Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of income or consumption expenditure among 
individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Lorenz curve plots the 
cumulative percentages of total income received against the cumulative number of recipients, starting with the 
poorest individual or household. The Gini index measures the area between the Lorenz curve and a hypothetical 
line of absolute equality, expressed as a percentage of the maximum area under the line. Thus a Gini index of 0 
represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect inequality” http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/2.9  
41 “The Human Development Index (HDI) is a summary measure of average achievement in key dimensions of 
human development: a long and healthy life, being knowledgeable and having a decent standard of living. The 
HDI is the geometric mean of normalized indices for each of the three dimensions“ 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi   Measures have been drawn from the UNDP (2014) 
42 Ibid 
43 The multidimensional poverty index (MPI) identifies multiple deprivations in the same households in education, 
health and living standards. All of the indicators needed to construct the MPI for a household are taken from the 
same household survey. The indicators are weighted to create a deprivation score, and the deprivation scores are 
computed for each household in the survey. A deprivation score of 33.3 percent (one-third of the weighted 
indicators), is used to distinguish between the poor and nonpoor. If the household deprivation score is 33.3 
percent or greater, the household (and everyone in it) is classed as multidimensionally poor. Households with a 
deprivation score greater than or equal to 20 percent but less than 33.3 percent are near multidimensional 
poverty. http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/multidimensional-poverty-index-mpi Definitions of deprivations in each 
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The analysis of health sectors in Colombia, Mexico, Kenya and South Africa furthermore revealed 
interesting contrasting features. When looking at health financing, two types of health systems 
can be distinguished in developing and emerging economies at the most abstract level. First, an 
increasing number of countries, including Colombia and Mexico, tries to cover their population 
with health insurance schemes in an effort to reach UHC. In these countries, health care 
financing is set up as a subsidy of the demand for health care (Ellis & McGuire, 1993, p. 135). 
Health providers can generally affiliate to the national health insurance system, which then covers 
the expenses of treating the insured population. Hence, in such health systems, the 
establishment of organizations that provide health care to low-income people in a financially 
sustainable way is, in theory, facilitated.  
The second type of health system, which encompasses most developing and emerging 
economies including Kenya and South Africa, lacks any public health insurance scheme for the 
largest share of its population. In these countries, funds that aim at supporting poor people’s 
access to health care mainly take the form of a subsidization of the supply (ibid). This means that 
funds are channeled to health providers from the public, the private and/or the third sector in 
order to allow them to offer their services at affordable prices, or for free. These systems are 
likely to pose more challenging conditions for health care organizations that seek to establish 
financially sustainable, and thus durable business models. Funds generally remain subject to 
donor volatility and budgetary shortages of public bodies.  
While the next sections will introduce the main specificities of the health sectors in Colombia, 
Mexico, Kenya and South Africa and contextualize them with other macroeconomic indicators, 
Table 10 summarizes some key indicators on the health systems: 
Table 10:  Breakdown of Health Expenditures in Colombia, Mexico, Kenya and South Africa  
  (World Health Organization, 2013) 
 Colombia Mexico Kenya South Africa 
Total expenditure on health as % of gross 
domestic product  
6.5 6.3 4.4 8.7 
 General government expenditure on health 
as % of total expenditure on health  
74.6 49.0 40.2 46.6 
o Social security expenditure on health as 
% of general government expenditure on 
health 
82.9 55.4 13.0 2.9 
 Private expenditure on health as % of total 
expenditure on health  
25.4 51.0 59.8 53.4 
o Out-of-pocket expenditure as % of 
private expenditure on health 
67.7 92.2 76.6 13.9 
o Private prepaid plans as % of private 
expenditure on health 
32.3 7.8 9.3 80.3 
 External resources for health as % of total 
expenditure on health 
0.1 0 37.9 2.2 
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(1) Colombia: Colombia is Latin America’s fourth largest economy, with a GDP of 378.4 billion 
USD. Since 1990, the Colombian government has actively promoted economic liberalization, 
thereby increasing the attractiveness of the country for the private sector. Several globally 
active social investment funds, such as Bamboo Finance and Acumen Fund, have opened 
regional offices in the country’s capital, Bogotá, in recent years, which suggests an 
increasing attractiveness and prevalence of blended value creating initiatives in Colombia 
(Hanley, Wachner, & Weiss, 2015, p. 12).  
As can be seen in table 10, the World Bank classifies Colombia as an upper middle-income 
country, and the UNDP categorizes Colombia as a country of high human development (with 
a HDI of 0.711). However, with a GINI coefficient of 53,5, inequality in income distribution is 
among the highest in the world. The newly developed Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) 
furthermore reveals that 7,6% of the Colombian population is multidimensionally poor, of 
which 1.8 percentage points refer to severe poverty. Another 10,2% of the population lives 
near multidimensional poverty. Multidimensional poverty is a measure that allows measuring 
multiple deprivations in health, education and living standards within the same households. 
Deprivations in health contribute to 24.7% to overall poverty in Colombia. This is the lowest 
value when compared to the other three sample countries. In addition, multidimensional 
poverty is lower than income poverty in Colombia (8,2%). This suggests that people living 
below the income poverty line of 1.25 USD per day may still have access to non-income 
resources. These resources can include public services or other types of social security 
systems in order to meet their needs in health, education and living standards.49  
Access to public services is particularly salient in the Colombian health sector. Since 1993, 
the country has progressively put into place a mandatory National Health Insurance scheme 
with the aim to reach universal coverage for all Colombians. Through annual household 
surveys, the Colombian government classifies its population in six different income levels 
(estratos). This system called SISBEN (Sistema de Identificación y Clasificación de 
Potenciales Beneficiarios para Programas Sociales) forms the basis of the health insurance 
scheme that cross-subsidizes between the different income levels, with “estrato 1” being the 
poorest segment of the population, and “estrato 6” being the richest.  
While the provision of health services and the management of health financing are 
privatized, funds for the health system originate from publicly collected sources. More 
specifically, private health care providers – both nonprofit and for-profit – can qualify as 
Service Provider Institutions (IPS) and affiliate to the public health system. IPS thus become 
eligible for treating patients from all income levels and getting reimbursed by the Health 
                                                   
49  More research about the relationship between MPI and monetary poverty measures is needed to better 
understand the specific reasons for discrepancies between those measures. For further information see materials 
from the Oxford Poverty & Human Development Initiative’s workshop ‘Dynamic Comparison between 
Multidimensional Poverty and Monetary Poverty‘: http://www.ophi.org.uk/workshop-on-monetary-and-
multidimensional-poverty-measures/ 
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Promotion Entities (EPS), which mobilize financial resources and act as insurers (Bossert et 
al, 2000, p. 17).  
As shown in Table 11, the governmental expenditures on health accounted for 74.6% of the 
total health expenditures in Colombia in 2010. Of these, 82,9% were attributable to social 
security expenditures. This well developed social security system and the composition of 
health financing resembles security levels of social welfare systems of Western economies 
such as Germany, where affiliation to a health insurance is legally required for every person 
(Glassman, Escobar, Giuffrida, & Giedion, 2009, p. 12). Covering around 96% of the entire 
population, and 98% of the poor (Montenegro Torres & Bernal Acevedo, 2013, p. 9), 
Colombia’s health systems has often been described as a best practice example for other 
developing and emerging economies (De Groote, De Paepe, & Unger, 2005, p. 126f.).  
However, as will be further explained later, the Colombian health sector has faced severe 
problems in the last years. Due to a corruption scandal at the EPS level that surfaced in 
2012 (El Tiempo, 2012), a large number of IPS remained unreimbursed for health services 
that they had already provided, and so fell into a severe financial crisis. Access to health 
care thus theoretically remains free of charge in Colombia. However, the low quality of these 
health services and the long waiting times often force people to seek health services that are 
independent from the public health system, and thus need to be paid out-of-pocket. As 
reflected in table 11, in 2010, 25% of the health expenses in Colombia were private, of which 
67,7% could be referred to out-of-pocket payments. 
(2) Mexico: With a GDP of 1,261 trillion USD, Mexico is Latin America’s second largest 
economy. The country has been promoting economic liberalization in most economic sectors 
for many years, making it one of the largest recipients of Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) 
among emerging economies. The ecosystem of blended value creating initiatives in Mexico 
has been strengthened recently through the joint efforts of various actors, including domestic 
foundations, the Inter-American Development Bank and the social enterprise incubator, New 
Ventures (Hanley, Wachner, and Weiss, 2015, p. 12).  
The World Bank classifies Mexico as an upper middle income country and, based on a HDI 
of 0.756, the UNDP categorizes Mexico as a very high human development country (see 
table 10). However, similar to Colombia, inequality in income is very high with a GINI 
coefficient of 48.1. A look at the MPI reveals that 6% of the population is multidimensionally 
poor, of which 1.1 percentage points refer to severe poverty. Furthermore, an additional 10% 
of the population lives in conditions that are near multidimensional poverty. Similar to 
Colombia, deprivations in health contribute to poverty in Mexico to 25.6% - the rest refers to 
deprivations in education and living standards. In contrast to Colombia, however, Mexico’s 
MPI exceeds the income poverty level by 5 percentage points. This means that individuals 
living above the income poverty line of 1.25 USD per day may still suffer deprivations in 
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education, health, and other living conditions, suggesting that either public services have 
less positive impact on the reduction of deprivations in health, education and living 
standards, or that the possibility of transforming input (mainly financial resources) in outputs 
that reduce deprivations in those areas are limited.50  
The Mexican health system is highly fragmented and segmented (OECD, 2005, p. 29ff.), with 
different financing systems for different target groups. Formal salaried workers are covered 
by an insurance scheme called IMSS, and public sector workers are covered by a scheme 
called ISSTE. This fragmentation not only reinforces the above-mentioned underfinancing, it 
also engenders major inefficiencies in the health system (Bonilla-Chacín & Aguilera, 2011, 
p. 14). While the majority of the Mexican population, namely those living in the so-called 
informal sector,51 have long been excluded from any public financing scheme, the national 
health insurance “Seguro Popular” was introduced in 2004 with the aim to cover exactly that 
share of the population (Gomez-Dantes, Frenk, & Knaul, 2009). Although official 
unemployment rates are very low, experts estimate that up to 50% of the population work in 
the informal sector (Coronado, Krettecos, & Lu, 2007, p. 6). After its introduction, the Seguro 
Popular expanded rapidly, particularly after 2010. In that year, 49% of the total health 
expenditures in Mexico came from governmental sources, of which 55,4% originated from 
the social security system (see table 10). As a result, the government stated in February 
2012 that the target population, about 52 million previously uninsured people, had 
successfully been enrolled in the program. However, with 51%, private expenditures, mainly 
out-of-pocket payments (92,2%), still account for the largest share of health expenditures in 
Mexico, suggesting that enrolment in the health insurance schemes doesn’t sufficiently 
protect the population from out-of-pocket health expenditures. This can be related to the way 
the Seguro Popular is financed, as it draws from premiums paid by insured families and from 
government revenues. Premiums, however, are paid progressively, meaning that they are 
determined in accordance to the income levels of families. The bottom 20% of the population 
is exempted from paying the premiums. However, given that 96% of the people enrolled in 
the Seguro Popular belong to the bottom 20%, their premiums only cover about 0,4% of the 
costs. Underfinancing of the health system is thus a constant issue, as it strongly depends 
                                                   
50  More research about the relationship between MPI and monetary poverty measures is needed to better 
understand the specific reasons for discrepancies between those measures. For further information, see materials 
from the Oxford Poverty & Human Development Initiative’s workshop ‘Dynamic Comparison between 
Multidimensional Poverty and Monetary Poverty‘: http://www.ophi.org.uk/workshop-on-monetary-and-
multidimensional-poverty-measures/    
51  “The informal economy comprises half to three-quarters of all non-agricultural employment in developing 
countries. Although it is hard to generalize concerning the quality of informal employment, it most often means 
poor employment conditions and is associated with increasing poverty. Some of the characteristic features of 
informal employment are lack of protection in the event of non-payment of wages, compulsory overtime or extra 
shifts, lay-offs without notice or compensation, unsafe working conditions and the absence of social benefits such 
as pensions, sick pay and health insurance. Women, migrants and other vulnerable groups of workers who are 
excluded from other opportunities have little choice but to take informal low-quality jobs.“ 
http://www.ilo.org/global/topics/employment-promotion/informal-economy/lang--en/index.htm  
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on governmental revenues generated in other areas (Hamermesh, García-Cuéllar, & 
Margulies, 2011, p. 14). 
(3) Kenya: With a GDP of 55.24 billion USD, Kenya is the study’s smallest economy. However, 
Kenya looks back on a long history of economic leadership in the East African region. For 
companies as well as investors interested in the East African region, Kenya is the main entry 
point (U.S. Department Of State, 2013). The Kenyan government tries to promote this 
situation through the facilitation of investment opportunities and economic liberalization – the 
third privatization round since independence in 1963 took place at the end of 2013. Kenya, 
particularly Nairobi, is also a hub for blended value creating initiatives such as social 
investing and social enterprises in the East African Community (Hanley, Wachner, & Weiss, 
2015, p. 13). This can, among other factors, be related to the country’s innovative capacity, 
which ranks 53rd worldwide and is thus comparably high (Schwab & Sala-i-Martín, 2014, 
p. 14). Innovative businesses and services, in particular, the mobile money transfer system 
m-pesaTM,52 have received global recognition and created a fundament upon which further 
socially impactful business models can build (Hanley, Wachner, & Weiss, 2015, p. 13).  
The world bank ranks Kenya as a low-income country and according to the UNDP, Kenya is 
a country with low human development, with a HDI of 0.535 (see table 9). Furthermore, 
48,2% of the Kenyan population is multidimensionally poor, of which 16 percentage points 
live in severe poverty, with an additional 29,1% of the population living near multidimensional 
poverty. With this, Kenya is the country with the most severe manifestation of poverty. 
Similar to Mexico, MPI is 5 percentage points higher than income poverty, implying that 
individuals living above the poverty line of 1.25 USD may still suffer deprivations in 
education, health and other living conditions. 53  With a contribution of 32.4% to overall 
poverty, health is furthermore a stronger contributor to poverty in Kenya when compared to 
Colombia and Mexico.  
In 1966, Kenya’s government introduced a national hospital insurance fund (NHIF), partly 
tax-paid and partly supported by international development agencies, which is compulsory 
for employees of the formal sector and voluntary for people working in the informal sector. 
However, today, due to the large informal sector in Kenya, the NHIF only reaches 
approximately 20% of the Kenyan population. Furthermore, it only covers inpatient care 
(Carrin, 2007, p. 130). The plans to roll-out the financing scheme in order to provide for all 
                                                   
52 m-pesaTM is an electronic money transfer, financing and microfinancing service, allowing for comparably faster, 
cheaper and more secure financial transactions. It was launched in 2007 by Vodafone for Safaricom and 
Vodacom, the largest mobile network operators in Kenya and Tanzania, with financial support from the British 
development bank DFID (for further information on m-pesa’s impact on Kenya’s economic and political 
development, see (Jacob, 2016)).  
53  More research about the relationship between MPI and monetary poverty measures is needed to better 
understand the specific reasons for discrepancies between those measures. For further information see materials 
from the Oxford Poverty & Human Development Initiative’s workshop ‘Dynamic Comparison between 
Multidimensional Poverty and Monetary Poverty‘: http://www.ophi.org.uk/workshop-on-monetary-and-
multidimensional-poverty-measures/    
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Kenyans and include outpatient care through the NHIF remain challenging (ibid). As 
displayed in table 10, health financing thus largely stems from private sources (59,8%), of 
which out-of-pocket payments form the most significant share (76,6%). In 2010, 40.2% of the 
total health expenditures in Kenya originated from the public sector, mainly being used to 
fund public health facilities that provide free health care services to the Kenyan population. In 
contrast to the other three sample countries, total health expenditures in Kenya originate to 
37.9% from external resources, mainly official development aid, which flows toward public 
and private health financing and provision. Low-income people thus theoretically have 
access to free health facilities. Yet, health provision depicts significant deficiencies mainly 
concerning NHIF’s coverage and the public health system’s infrastructure (Open Capital, 
2012, p. 2). 
(4) South Africa: With a GDP of 366.1 billion USD, South Africa is the second largest economy 
of the African continent and the third largest economy of this study. Since 1994, the post-
apartheid regime has liberalized trade and enhanced international competitiveness, among 
others, through privatization measures and reforms of the regulatory environment. A unique 
policy directive in South Africa’s regulatory framework called BBBEE – standing for ‘broad-
based black economic empowerment’ – aims to improve the conditions of historically 
disadvantaged South Africans by fostering their participation in the economy (Tangri & 
Southall, 2008). A so-called “BBBEE scorecard” rates organizations’ commitment to 
economic transformation using seven different dimensions – ownership, management, skills 
development, employment equity, preferential procurement, enterprise development and 
socioeconomic development.54 Gathering points on the BBBEE scorecard not only allows 
organizations to visibly improve their social responsibility, it also enable them to participate in 
public tenders and licensing processes. The existence of the BBBEE scorecard thus has far-
reaching implications for the ecosystem of blended value generating organizations in South 
Africa. In comparison to other countries, private companies are more involved in the support 
of enterprises owned by marginalized populations. This may partly explain the comparably 
small amount of social investment funds in South Africa, which contrasts with the well-
developed private equity market in the country.  
The World Bank classifies South Africa as an upper middle income country, and according to 
the UNDP, South Africa is a country with medium human development, with an HDI of 0,658 
(see table 9). With a GINI coefficient of 65, the country ranks second place in the list of the 
most unequal countries in the world. 55  10,3% of the South African population is 
multidimensionally poor, of which 1,3 percentage points live in severe poverty. In addition, 
39,6% of the population lives near multi-dimensional poverty. Multidimensional poverty is 
lower than income poverty (4 percentage points), suggesting that people that live below the 
                                                   
54 For more information, see https://www.thedti.gov.za/economic_empowerment/bee.jsp  
55 For an overview of GINI coefficients in all countries see http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI  
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income poverty line have access to non-income resources, including public services or 
different abilities to convert income into outcomes that reduce deprivations in health, 
education or living standards. When compared to the other sample countries, South Africa 
depicts the most alarming health conditions, as health appears to contribute to overall 
poverty deprivation by 61,4%. As Coovadia and colleagues (Coovadia, Jewkes, Barron, 
Sanders, & McIntyre, 2009) state: “Poverty-related illnesses (…), such as infectious 
diseases, maternal death, and malnutrition, remain widespread, and there is a growing 
burden of non-communicable diseases. (…) Although South Africa is considered a middle-
income country in terms of its economy, it has health outcomes that are worse than those in 
many lower income countries” (p. 1). 
South Africa is also the country with the highest share of health expenditures as percent of 
GDP (8,7%) when compared to the other three sample countries (see table 10). However, 
the country currently lacks any public financing scheme subsidizing the demand for health 
care among low-income people (Ataguba & McIntyre, 2012, p. i36). This is reflected in the 
fact that only 2,9% of governmental health expenditures originate from a social security 
scheme. Instead, low-income people can refer to public clinics and hospitals, where health 
services are provided for free based on the principle of universal free access to health care. 
Similar to the Kenyan context, the South African health system faces considerable 
challenges to meet the vast health needs of its population. However, despite the severity of 
health issues in South Africa and the high income inequality, external resources for health 
account for only 2,2%. Further, in contrast to Kenya, South Africa has a well-established 
landscape of private prepaid plans, accounting for 80.3% of private health expenditures. 
Hence, out of pocket payments are much lower (13,9%) in South Africa than in all other 
sample countries. 
In sum, it can be observed that the sample countries are at different stages in their efforts to 
reach universal health coverage, with Kenya and South Africa being further away from reaching 
this goal, and Mexico and Colombia being more advanced. However, the first analysis of the 
health sectors also revealed that institutional challenges prevail in all countries and are thus likely 
to expose organizations operating in health sectors to significant institutional voids.  
As mentioned earlier, the country selection was realized with the aim to have a representative 
sample of developing and emerging countries, thus allowing for theoretical replication. This 
means that in the four countries, different results regarding the ability of hybrid organizations to 
turn institutional voids into opportunity spaces were expected, but for anticipated reasons. More 
specifically, based on the previously mentioned dynamics within the institutional context of 
Colombia, Mexico, Kenya and South Africa, hybrid organizations’ logics of origin as well as their 
exposure to institutional voids are likely to have different influences on tensions and hybridization 
strategies in hybrid organizations providing health care at the BoP. Exploring these influences on 
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organizations more in depth is one of the objectives of the empirical investigation in the next 
chapter.  
Finally, as further explained in the section on the limitations of the study, the findings derived from 
the empirical analysis in these four countries are believed to be valid for many other developing 
and emerging economies that don’t resolve tensions over goals at the field level. In developing 
and emerging countries that do effectively resolve tensions over goals at the field level, tensions 
and hybridization strategies may look different. However, further research is needed to test, refine 
and generalize the propositions generated in this study and explore developing and emerging 
markets with diverging characteristics. 
5.2.2 Case Selection 
The organizations studied in this research have been identified through desktop research and 
snowball sampling (Given, 2008, p. 815f.), where an initial number of pertinent players in the field 
of blended value creation (e.g. social investment funds or incubators) were are asked for the 
names of blended value creating organizations in the field of health care at the BoP. Snowball 
sampling is particularly useful when studying sensitive or taboo topics, or when target groups are 
difficult to reach. For this study, the sampling approach has been chosen due to the lack of a 
countrywide register for blended value creating organizations in all research countries.  
Potential participant organizations were subsequently approached and checked against the 
study’s definition of hybrid organizations as organizations that internalize multiple societal-level 
logics within one organizational construct. More precisely, the process focused on organizations 
that explicitly pursued the blended value creating aim of providing affordable high-quality health 
care to low-income people in a financially sustainable or profitable way. Although health markets 
in the four sample countries had all shifted towards increased market-orientation in the last 
decades, the combination of the social welfare logic and the commercial logic were still to be 
seen as competing logics – in particular, as tensions over goals were not resolved at the field 
level as just described. 
The researcher followed the strategy of purposive sampling, meaning that cases have been 
selected according to the needs of the study (Boeije, 2009, p. 35f.). In each country, one hybrid 
organization with commercial origins and one organization with a social welfare origin have been 
sought in order to allow for a systematic comparison. As mentioned in the conceptual framework, 
the logic of origin of hybrid organizations is believed to be a major influencing factor concerning 
the tensions that hybrid organizations face and the hybridization strategies that they apply. In the 
present study, the logic of origin will be understood as the predominant logic that has influenced 
hybridization patterns at time of founding. In particular, the legal form, the explicit prioritization of 
social or financial objectives as well as the individual imprinting of founders will be used as 
RESEARCH SETTING AND METHODOLOGY 109 
 
criteria to determine the logic of origin. It is argued that these factors have a particularly important 
signaling function towards internal and external audiences and thus essentially influence the 
relationships that are of interest in the present study. However, with regard to the explicit 
prioritization of objectives, it has to be noted that the distinction wasn’t made between 
organizations that prioritized social objectives or financial objectives, but rather between 
organizations that prioritized social objective or didn’t prioritize any of both objectives. This is due 
to the fact that the study sought to investigate organizations whose central goal is the creation of 
blended value. As explained in chapter 2, such organizations either adopt an impact first 
approach (prioritization of social objectives) or a financial first approach (prioritization of financial 
objectives). While impact first organizations are likely to explicitly communicate the priority of 
social goals, the researcher argues based on own observations that financial first organizations 
are unlikely to communicate a priority of financial goals. Instead, they often refer to the argument 
that they seek financial returns in order to establish organizations that are more durable, more 
scalable and thus more able to generate social value. Hence, in the selection of cases, hybrid 
organizations with commercial origins mainly refer to organizations that use such an 
argumentation. 
In the following, the eight hybrid organizations that have been part of this study will be briefly 
introduced. Their names have been anonymized, as some organizations expressed concerns to 
openly discuss the tensions that they face, particularly when related to the claims of influential 
stakeholders such as funders and public authorities. Any information that would allow readers to 
trace back the names of study participants have been neutralized in order to protect anonymity. 
In direct quotes, such changes will be marked with square brackets. At the same time, the 
researcher always attempted to minimize these changes as well as possible influences that they 
might have on the interpretation of results. For an overview of the cases, see table 11. 
(1) COL-NP (social welfare origin, Colombia): COL-NP is a nonprofit hybrid organization 
providing medical services and education to the Colombian population. Founded in 1965 by 
a medical specialist, COL-NP was structured in a twofold manner at the time of data 
collection: COL-NP IPS was the health care providing arm affiliated to the national health 
insurance scheme. It targets a broad range of the Colombian population, from low-income to 
middle income levels. COL-NP Social, the second arm of the organization, acquired 
donations mainly from foreign aid agencies and used the surpluses of COL-NP IPS to 
finance health care delivery programs for the most vulnerable. Both, COL-NP IPS and COL-
NP Social were incorporated as nonprofit organizations, sharing the same infrastructure 
across all sites. The organization’s sites were located across Colombia, both in urban and 
rural areas. For the study, data collection has taken place at the main site in Bogotá where 
the central functions of the organization were located. COL-NP was furthermore clearly 
founded with a priority on social objectives. It thus fulfilled all three requirements mentioned 
above to qualify as a hybrid organization with social welfare origins. 
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(2) COL-FP (commercial origin, Colombia): COL-FP is a for-profit hybrid organization that 
provides access to a network of high-quality private health providers, mainly general 
practitioners and small clinics, which are willing to offer their services at significantly 
discounted rates (up to 60%) for low-income people and guarantee them maximum wait 
times of less than 10 days. People and their families can access the network by acquiring a 
COL-FP membership card. This membership furthermore entails access to a social 
assistance service which helps in scheduling appointments at health providers and provides 
advisory services for medical or health sector related issues. With this approach, COL-FP, at 
the time of data collection, mainly targeted people from the “estratos 2-4”, which are the low 
to middle-income segments. In the long run, COL-FP sought to also target the poorest 
income segments (“estrato 1”) with its health services. A business administration student and 
a general practitioner founded COL-FP in 2010 and received support from an incubator 
specialized on blended value creation in Colombia since the beginning of operations. The 
official incorporation of the for-profit legal entity, however, only took place in 2012. COL-FP 
has furthermore received a social investment from a large Colombian company. Revenues 
were solely generated through direct sales of membership cards to the target population who 
pays out-of-pocket. COL-FP has started its operations in a Colombian city with almost 
400,000 inhabitants, located in one of the poorest departments of the country. This is also 
where data collection for this study has taken place. Given the legal structure of COL-FP, the 
initial emphasis on low- to middle-income segments – as opposed to very low-income 
segments – as well as the business background of one of the founders, COL-FP has been 
classified as hybrid organization with commercial origin. 
(3) MEX-NP (social welfare origin, Mexico): MEX-NP is a nonprofit hybrid organization 
founded in 2005 by a Mexican philanthropist and managed by two managers with 
professional background in nonprofit management. The organization focuses on providing 
comprehensive high-quality health services, which include not only the traditional care of the 
acutely or chronically ill patient, but also the prevention and early detection of disease and 
the rehabilitation of the disabled. With its focus on rural and marginalized populations, MEX-
NP operated three hospitals at the time of data collection, all located in small towns or rural 
areas in Mexico. Data collection for this study took place at the main site from which key 
functions were effectuated. MEX-NP was financed through private and institutional donations 
as well as an investment from a Mexican social investment fund. At the time of the study, 
revenues were entirely generated through direct sales of health services to the target 
population, who paid for the services in cash. However, MEX-NP was also in the process of 
seeking accreditation to the Seguro Popular. MEX-NP was qualified as a hybrid organization 
with social welfare origin, as it depicts all three criteria mentioned above complied with the 
social welfare logic at the time of founding. 
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(4) MEX-FP (commercial origin, Mexico): MEX-FP is a for-profit hybrid organization providing 
affordable and high-quality health care services as well as products, with a focus on very low 
to middle income segments of the Mexican population. Two entrepreneurs with business 
background founded the company in 2010. Having started with a site in Mexico City, the goal 
of the company was to expand across the entire country, and in the long run, even to other 
Latin American countries. In order to do so, the organization pursued an approach that 
focused on fast scaling and efficiency maximization. Data collection for this study took place 
at the main site in Mexico City as this is where the core functions of the organization are 
located. MEX-FP was financed through a loan from a development bank and an equity 
investment from a Mexican social investment fund. Revenues were initially generated 
through direct sales of services to the target population, a contract with a large Mexican 
foundation, which covered a predefined amount of health services per month, and the 
affiliation to the Seguro Popular. However, during the time of data collection, the affiliation to 
the Seguro Popular ended, as the government decided to take out the health services 
provided by MEX-FP from the list of services covered by the Seguro Popular. Given its legal 
form, the emphasis on scale as well as the imprinting of founders, MEX-FP has been 
classified as hybrid organization with commercial origin. 
(5) KEN-NP (social welfare origin, Kenya): KEN-NP is a nonprofit hybrid organization 
incorporated in Kenya and founded by a US American foundation in 1997. It has the 
objective to improve access to medicine and basic healthcare services for low-income 
people in Kenya. The organization has adapted the commercial franchising model to the 
problem of distributing essential medicines in remote communities and established a 
franchise network of for-profit clinics and drug shops. The Kenya-based foundation fulfills 
various typical franchisor functions of recruiting, training, monitoring, and supporting 
franchisees. At the time of data collection, KEN-NP outlets were located in three main areas 
of Kenya: Central Kenya, Western Kenya, and the outskirts of Nairobi. For data collection, 
the researcher was mainly in touch with representatives of the Nairobi based nonprofit 
franchisor and a representative clinic in the peri-urban area of Nairobi. KEN-NP was mainly 
financed through donations. At the franchisee level, revenues were generated through the 
direct sales of health services to the target population who paid cash. Despite the for-profit 
legal form of the franchisees, KEN-NP has been classified as an organization with social 
welfare origins, given that the franchisor, which is the organizational part with the 
outweighing decision making power, has been founded as a nonprofit organizations by a 
foundation and had a clear emphasis on social goals over financial goals,. 
(6) KEN-FP (commercial origin, Kenya): KEN-FP is a for-profit hybrid organization based in 
the surroundings of Nairobi and founded in 2011 by three entrepreneurs with a professional 
background in development aid. The company seeks to provide high-quality primary 
healthcare services for every Kenyan, independently from their income level. It is the 
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organization’s goal to make access to health care as easy as possible through a fast scaling 
approach. At the time of the study, patients in need of treatment could just walk into the 
clinics, which were open 12 hours a day. While KEN-FP generated its revenues mainly 
through the direct sales of services to its target population, the organization was in the 
process of entering collaborations with select private health insurance providers. The 
company has launched a social crowdfunding campaign, which has provided KEN-FP with 
seed funding. Furthermore it received convertible debt from a global social investment fund. 
During the period of data collection, KEN-FP has opened its second clinic, however, data 
collection only focused on the first clinic, as this was more established and thus yielded more 
insights on the topics of interest for this study. Despite the social welfare background of the 
founders, and despite their social motivation, KEN-FP has been classified as a hybrid 
organization with commercial origin, as it was founded as a for-profit and clearly followed a 
fast scaling approach. 
(7) SA-NP (social welfare origin, South Africa): SA-NP is a nonprofit hybrid organization 
based in a larger South African city, seeking to improve access to affordable health care. 
Founded in 1976/2005 by a medical specialist,56 SA-NP provides health services to low-
income people and trains people from low-income communities to become health workers. It 
furthermore supplies the public and third sector with affordable health products. At the time 
of data collection, the organization operated in several countries including South Africa. 
When possible, health services were provided through existing community health care 
facilities, creating links to other health services and ensuring sustainable health systems. In 
South Africa, SA-NP operated across several provinces and strongly collaborated with public 
health entities. Most activities in South Africa took place in the province in which the South 
African headquarter was located. Data collection therefore mainly took place in the 
administrative headquarter of the organization and a clinic close to the headquarter from 
which the organization provided services. In South Africa, SA-NP was financed through 
donations and revenues through the sales of health products. Given the nonprofit legal form, 
the clear dominance of social goals and the individual imprinting of the founder, SA-NP was 
classified as a hybrid organization with social welfare origin. 
(8) SA-FP (commercial origin, South Africa): SA-FP is a for-profit hybrid organization, 
initiated by a South African company (hereafter the “mother company”) in 2011. It is 
designed to provide health care services at an affordable price to under-served communities 
in South Africa. However, at the same time, it was also launched with the aim to establish a 
network of clinics that could be used as a distribution channel for goods and services for low-
income populations. The fee-based service model enables sustainability and the 
                                                   
56 SA-NP looks back on a long history of work in health care. Since 1976 different organizations have been 
founded, merged and re-divided, each with different emphasis. The organization, as it stands today, has been 
established in 2005. 
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empowerment of black women through the use of a franchised business model. The 
franchisor, which was still the mother company at the time of data collection, supported 
franchisees for a period of 5 years by providing initial and growth capital, establishing 
infrastructure with all medical equipment and other furnishings required to operate, and 
providing business skills training (specifically in financial management and marketing). SA-
FP clinics were strongly standardized in an effort to allow for high efficiency and economies 
of scale. At the time of data collection, SA-FP was financed through an internal budget of the 
mother company and revenues were generated through the direct sales of health services 
who paid cash at the health facilities. At the beginning of data collection, SA-FP was not yet 
incorporated as its own legal entity. However, given that the mother company was a large 
multinational corporation, that the venture followed a fast scaling approach and was founded 
by a well established business men, SA-FP has been classified as an organization with 
commercial origin.  
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Table 11:  Key Features of Cases 
Country Organization Legal Form Declared target group Founding 
Year 
Financing Revenue streams 
Colombia 
COL-NP Nonprofit 
 Low- to middle income 
segments 
 Marginalized populations in 
urban and rural areas 
1965  No external financing 
 National health insurance 




 Low- to middle income 
segments, urban and peri-
urban settings 
 Long-term: very low-income 
segments 
2010  No external financing  Membership fees 
Mexico 
MEX-NP Nonprofit  Low-income segments (rural and marginalized communities) 2005 
 Non-repayable investment from 
Mexican social investment fund 




 Very low to middle income 
segments, urban and rural 
areas 
2010 
 Grant and loan from development 
bank and Mexican foundation 
 Equity investment Mexican social 
investment fund 
 Out-of-pocket payments for health 
services 
 Donations 
 (National health insurance) 
Kenya 
KEN-NP Nonprofit 
 Very low- to low-income 
segments, urban and rural 
areas 
1997  Donations from foreign and domestic donors 
 Franchisor: Donations 
 Franchisees: out-of-pocket 
payments for health services 
KEN-FP For-profit  All income levels, peri-urban areas 2011 
 Equity investment from global social 
investment fund 
 Social crowdfunding 
 Out-of-pocket payments for health 
services 
 Private health insurances 




 Very low- to low-income 




 No external financing 





at beginning of 
data collection 
 Low- to middle income 
segments, peri-urban areas 
  
2011  Internal budget of South African company 
 Out-of-pocket payments for health 
services 
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In sum, the sampling strategy thus involved (1) theoretical replication, that is contrast across 
cases that vary on two dimensions of theoretical interest (logic of origin and institutional 
context/countries) and (2) literal replication across organizations from the same industry (health 
care) to increase the generalizability of theory development.  
As can be seen in table 11, the organizations also differ with regard to other factors. For instance, 
the age of organizations, the type of financing as well as the business models differ substantially 
across the cases. The influence of these factors will be considered when interpreting the results 
of this study and discussing counterfactual explanations and limitations of the findings. 
5.3 Data Collection 
The researcher conducted three distinct data collection phases. During an exploratory stage from 
January 2012 to April 2012, she conducted desktop research and correspondede with potential 
study participants, first, to gain a general understanding of the functioning of the field in each 
country, second, to identify the above-mentioned participant organizations, and, third, to verify 
whether the selected organizations met the necessary requirements to investigate the research 
questions.  
During the second stage (May 2012 to December 2012), the researcher visited the participant 
organizations for a period of approximately two weeks each to collect archival data, interview 
data and field observations. These visits allowed the researcher to gain a deeper understanding 
of the field as well as of the participant organizations through physical presence. It furthermore 
established the social capital that was necessary for the third phase of data collection (January 
2013 to December 2013), during which already gathered information and first interpretations of 
the evidence was confirmed or adapted, and complementing information was collected via e-mail. 
For each of the cases, the researcher gathered available annual reports, press articles, and 
internal documents, including general presentations, accountability reports, and, if possible, 
business plans. The researcher conducted semi-structured interviews with internal informants 
(founders, members of management teams, key employees) as well as external informants (e.g. 
partners and patients) in each organization. Semi-structured interviews were chosen as the main 
data collection method, as they allowed following up on interesting cues brought up during the 
interviews. This flexibility was considered necessary to account for the exploratory nature of this 
research. At the same time, the rough structure of semi-structured interviews ensured that all 
relevant topics were covered in the data collection process, and that rigor and reliability were 
ensured across cases (Yin, 2008, p. 79ff.). 
Depending on the internal structure of the organization, 4 to 9 interviews, lasting between 30 and 
90 minutes, were conducted for each case. Almost all interviews took place in meeting rooms of 
the participant organizations. A few interviews took place in restaurants or public areas when no 
116 RESEARCH SETTING AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 
other option was available. In addition, shorter interviews (approximately 2 to 10 minutes each) 
were conducted with patients sitting in waiting areas for three cases. Some organizations didn’t 
feel comfortable with the idea of interviewing patients, and in other cases, the interviews didn’t 
yield meaningful insights, as people seemed uncomfortable to openly discuss their perception of 
health systems or other related topics. This was particularly noticeable in Kenya and South 
Africa. 
Through the multiple sources of evidence, data could be triangulated, thereby enhancing the 
validity of the data basis. The data collection procedure was standardized through the use of a 
case study protocol (Yin, 2008, p. 79ff), which contained all the questions that needed to be 
answered (see appendix 1). In total five different categories of questions were covered in each 
case study, based on the research questions and the focus of the conceptual framework:  
(1) Founding circumstances, justification for legal form and normative position of organization 
(Legal structure; understanding of blended value creation; mission and vision; approach to 
health care provision) 
(2) Market environment and health system (Competition and collaborations; access to financial 
and human resources, institutional uncertainties in health system and market environment) 
(3) Business and financing model (Key activities; definition of customer groups; revenue model; 
price setting mechanisms; external financing) 
(4) Perceived tensions between social and financial value creation (sources and nature of 
tensions) 
(5) Past, present and future strategies to create blended value (social and financial objectives; 
reactions to tensions; changes in hybridization patterns) 
In order to avoid implicitly directing the respondents into a certain direction, the researcher chose 
to state the initial assumptions of the study’s conceptual framework prior to conducting the 
interviews. In particular, the assumption that the logic of origin had an influence on organizations’ 
ability to manage tensions was presented as one of the central assumptions underlying the study. 
During the second and third data collection phase, additional data about the field of health care 
and blended value creation at the BoP in the four sample countries was collected to complement 
the open interviews that were conducted in phase 1. This included archival data such as journal 
articles, books and professional documents produced by pertinent associations The researcher 
also participated in various events that related to blended value creation in the sample countries 
and conducted open interviews with experts in the field of blended value creation as well as 
health in the four countries. This allowed for a better understanding of the culture and debates in 
the field, particularly with regard to the prevailing labor division between the public, the private 
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and the third sector in providing health care to low-income populations. The researcher 
documented the open interviews with experts by taking field notes. 
In sum, a total of 59 interviews were conducted, audio-recorded and transcribed. Interviews were 
generally conducted in the official country languages, as the researcher fluently speaks Spanish 
and English. Although English was not necessarily the native language of all Kenyan and South 
African interviewees, it is the common language in the work context for both countries. Hence, no 
effect upon the responses could be made out. Two interviews were conducted in German as the 
participants were German natives and so is the researcher. For interviews that were conducted in 
Spanish or German, relevant text passages were translated into English by the researcher. 
As mentioned previously, the quotations in this document have been anonymized as to comply 
with the confidentiality agreements made with the organizations. The original, non-anonymized, 
data as well as the entire archival data is added to this dissertation on a separate drive. The 
anonymized text passages in this study are provided with informations in square brackets that 
indicate to which source on the external drive they refer. An anonymized list of interviews is 
furthermore displayed in appendix 2. 
5.4 Data Analysis 
The conceptual framework presented in the last chapter has mainly been developed on the basis 
of a thorough literature review and a focus on certain concepts that are believed to be of 
relevance for a better understanding of the way hybrid organizations at the BoP experience and 
manage tensions. However, in the course of the study, the conceptual framework has been 
further developed as the researcher iterated between theory (see chapter 2, 3 and 4), experiential 
knowledge and empirical findings. In contrast to viewing the researcher’s identity and experience 
as bias that needs to be avoided as much as possible, the practice of explicitly incorporating the 
experiential knowledge of the researcher has gained wide theoretical and philosophical support 
over the last decades (Maxwell, 2012, p. 44). Given the focus of the study, it is believed that the 
background and the embeddedness of the researcher has helped to identify tensions in hybrid 
organizations. Being part of the International Research Network on Social and Economic 
Empowerment (IRENE | SEE) initiated by Zeppelin University and Siemens Stiftung, the 
researcher is embedded in a research network with four partner universities in Africa and Latin 
America: EGADE Business School in Monterrey, Mexico, Universidad de los Andes, in Bogotá, 
Colombia, Stellenbosch University in Cape Town, South Africa and Adama University in Adama, 
Ethiopia. This network has not only allowed for an easier access to empirically relevant 
organizations, people and data, but also for regular discussions about the research progress, and 
reflections upon research findings and conclusion that were drawn. Alternative cognitive scripts 
were regularly brought in and complemented interpretations of research findings. Being a 
member of the IRENE SEE network therefore increased the internal validity of the study, that is 
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the “establishment of a causal relationship, whereby certain conditions are believed to lead to 
other conditions, as distinguished from spurious relationships” (Yin, 2008, p. 40). In addition, the 
former professional experience and the educational background of the researcher have 
contributed to a better understanding of tensions and strategies at the BoP. Having worked for 
the Grameen Creative Lab57 in the field of social business for nearly two years, the researcher 
has gained a deep understanding of management in hybrid organizational models. More 
specifically, the researcher was directly in charge of public relations in Germany and member of a 
so-called crisis communication task force during the legitimacy crisis of microfinance and 
Muhammad Yunus. Accordingly, the researcher witnessed the crisis from within and gained first-
hand insights on legitimacy issues relating to tensions in hybrid organizations. Prior to this, the 
researcher studied International Culture and Business Studies at the University of Passau. This 
interdisciplinary program has trained her in analyzing dynamics at the interstices of the public, the 
private and the third sector. 
In an initial phase of the study, experiential knowledge and insights from literature with regard to 
the research questions and the conceptual framework have furthermore been checked against 
the views held by people who are embedded in the field of health care and hybrid organizations 
in the four sample countries. As already mentioned, an exploratory phase of data collection and 
analysis was conducted to refine the conceptual framework. This was particularly important, first, 
because only little scholarly attention has so far been dedicated to investigate hybrid 
organizations in low-income settings, and second, because practitioners do not necessarily 
understand a research proposal that is only derived from theory and thus framed accordingly. 
Initially, the study aimed at investigating the accountability mechanisms of social enterprises and 
the tensions that these accountability mechanisms caused. Accountability mechanisms were thus 
put forth as proxies for institutional demands that create tensions in organizations. However, the 
notion of accountability was repeatedly misunderstood by potential study participants, who often 
confounded the term with reporting mechanisms, which are only one form of accountability 
mechanisms (Brown & Troutt, 2007). Despite various attempts to explain the broader concept of 
accountability as the entirety of mechanisms by which organizations are held accountable for 
their behavior (Ebrahim, Battilana, & Mair, 2014), potential study participants didn’t embrace the 
concept and were thus less interested in participating. Similarly, the use of the term social 
enterprise – although used by the research in a broad sense, namely referring to organizations 
that aim at creating blended value – impeded the research progress. Discussions with both 
scholars and practitioners regularly led to disproportionate attention on defining social enterprises 
instead of focusing on the blended value creating aspect of these organizations. While some 
potential study participants explicitly defined themselves as social enterprises, others refused to 
adopt the term. However, in fact, the organizations depicted strong similarities. Reasons for the 
                                                   
57 The Grameen Creative Lab is an organization founded by a German entrepreneur and Peace Nobel Prize 
Laureate Muhammad Yunus, which seeks to promote the concept of social business. Further information can be 
accessed here: http://www.grameencreativelab.com/  
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different viewpoints were thus not comprehensible from an external point of view. For instance, 
most organizations that were approached for the study acknowledged being part of the same 
ecosystem and were repeatedly encountered at pertinent events about blended value creation, 
BoP approaches, social enterprises, or social investment. These experiences led the researcher 
to reframe the research questions and adopt a broader focus on blended value creation at the 
BoP, which allowed including various types of hybrid organizations into the study. 
As mentioned previously, cross-case synthesis was realized in order to analyze the data, link it to 
the focal concepts presented in the conceptual framework and increase the external validity of 
this study, defined as the domain to which a study’s findings can be generalized (Yin, 2009, 
p. 40). A mixed-methods approach in which data analysis was conducted deductively and 
inductively was chosen in order to allow theoretical arguments to emerge. In total, six analytical 
steps can be distinguished in this study (see table 12): 
Table 12:  Steps of Data Analysis and Relationship to Conceptual Framework 
Analytical Step Concept of Interest Concerned 
Research Questions 
1. Validation and refinement of assumption 
concerning field-level dynamics 
Field-level factors enabling and 
constraining hybrid organizations 
RQ1 + 2 
2. Inductive coding of tensions in empirical 
material based on their sources 
Type of tensions in hybrid 
organizations as proxies for higher 
order institutional voids 
RQ1 
3. Deductive coding of hybridization 
strategies  
Type of hybridization strategies  RQ2 
4. Inductive coding of factors that enable 
and constrain hybrid organizations to turn 
institutional voids into opportunity spaces 
Organizational and field-level factors 
enabling and constraining hybrid 
organizations 
RQ1 + 2 
5. Creation of narrative accounts tracing 
chronological trajectory of Critical Tension 
Points (CTPs) and Response Cycles 
(RCs)  
Link hybridization strategies to 
tensions in hybrid organizations 
RQ1 + 2 
6. Cross case comparison between  
 virtuous cycle, fragile equilibrium and 
vicious cycle cases 
 hybrid organizations with commercial 
origins and those with social welfare 
origins 
 hybrid organizations in all four countries 
Link ability to hybridize to 
organizational and field-level factors 
RQ1 + 2 
 
First, the researcher sought to validate and refine insights about the institutional contexts, in 
particular the legitimate labor division between the public, the private and the third sectors in the 
four sample countries concerning health care provision to low-income populations. Based on the 
empirical data, inferences could be made concerning the legitimacy of for-profit and nonprofit 
hybrid organizations in providing health care to people living at the base of the pyramid. Archival 
data, field notes and case data were analyzed to accomplish this task, confirming that in all four 
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countries, hybrid organizations providing health care at the BoP operate in fields that are 
characterized by persisting institutional complexity and institutional voids. As will be further 
elaborate in the empirical chapter, interviews and field observations suggested that the hybrid 
organizations in all four countries faced tensions over goals at the organizational level and had to 
find strategies to deal with them. However, the reasons why they faced these tensions over goals 
differed. In three sample countries, namely Colombia, Mexico and South Africa, health fields 
didn’t effectively enforce a field-level consensus about how health care should be provided to 
low-income populations. In South Africa, there was a strong field-level consensus that hybrid 
organizations should provide health care according to a social welfare logic, however, this field-
level consensus was weakly enforced.  
Second, with the first research question as a lens, the researcher inductively identified tensions in 
hybrid organizations by focusing on contradictory elements that were documented in archival 
data or reportedly experienced by organizational members, forcing or incentivizing them to refer 
to hybridization strategies. These tensions were classified as tensions over means or tensions 
over goals, depending on the content of the tension (Pache & Santos, 2010). Furthermore, the 
researcher identified the audience that imposed demands on the organization. However, as will 
be explained in the empirical chapter. Based on this, the researcher allocated the tensions to 
three different sources: institutional voids between the social welfare and the commercial logic, 
institutional voids between formal and informal strategic action fields and institutional voids 
between Western and local strategic action fields. The term logic, in this context, has been 
chosen in reference to research on hybrid value creating organizations, in particular social 
enterprises, that have repeatedly been described as hybrid organizations that operate at the 
interstices of the commercial and the social welfare logic. The elements of these two logics have 
thus been worked out by prior research (see 3.3.1), providing guidance for the researcher during 
the analytical process of allocating contradictory elements to those logics. In particular, the 
framework proposed by Pache and Santos (2012, p. 984-986) was used as a basis. However, the 
organizational elements on which logics prescribe conflicting demands were modified and 
extended to fit the empirical data of the present study. For instance, as just mentioned, given the 
“publicness” of health care, hybrid organizations repeatedly reported facing institutional claims 
that could be allocated to a state logic, such as that audiences expected them not to exclude any 
target populations, but rather to provide affordable high-quality health care to the entire 
population. However, further exploring the sector logics in the context of the study revealed that 
acting as a complement to and supporting the government to establish a functioning health 
system was integrated in the social welfare logic. It thus didn’t require an own account of the 
state logic for the analysis of tensions between sector logics in the hybrid organizations of this 
study.  
As the investigation further revealed, Pache and Santos’ framework needed to be adapted, as 
tensions didn’t reflect questions of ownership, site form, site governance, brand, professional 
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affiliation and profit destination. These categories which had been elements of Pache and Santos’ 
framework were thus removed. Instead, new organizational elements needed to be added to the 
framework as hybrid organizations either experienced tensions or applied hybridization strategies 
at that level. Leaning on Jay (2013, p. 143), the category of “normativity / strategic imperatives”, 
which includes the organizational elements “mission and vision” as well as “source of agency”, 
was added. In addition, induction from the empirical data revealed that, among others, the 
category of “financing”, including the organizational elements “external financing” and “revenue 
model” needed to be added. An overview of the categories and organizational elements that 
appeared to be relevant in this study can be found in appendix 4.  
For the second and third sources of tensions, the concept of strategic action field was chosen, as 
the researcher considered the term to be more appropriate. As posited by Fligstein and 
McAdams (2011), the term logics implies “too much consensus in the field about what is going on 
and why” and underestimates dynamic changes in the behavior of actors geared towards 
improving their situation in a field (p. 4). The concept of strategic action fields, in contrast, 
encompasses actors’ constant adjustment to field conditions and leaves more flexibility 
concerning shared beliefs and perceptions in a field. Instead, the researcher considered strategic 
action fields to be a better term to grasp the contradictions between behavior that followed formal 
institutions and behavior that followed informal institutions, as well as between behavior that 
followed a Western culture and behavior that followed local cultures. It is argued that referring to 
illegal practices of price fixing agreements or selling substandard drugs can’t be interpreted as 
pertaining to a logic of the informal market given that informal markets are not necessarily the 
result of a shared higher belief in the appropriateness of informal markets, but rather on the 
aggregate individual decisions of market participants geared towards improving their situations. 
Nevertheless, informal markets do have established rules of the game and can thus be seen as 
distinct institutional meso-level orders in the sense of strategic action fields. Similarly, the 
behavior of participants in BoP markets can’t be traced back to a homogeneous set of beliefs or 
meanings as suggested by the concept of institutional logics. As argued by Banerjee and Duflo 
(2011), the economics of the poor is a result of a complex set of decisions that people have to 
make with restricted resources, knowledge and possibilities. Normative or cultural foundations of 
these decisions differ across regions and even more across countries. Thus, it can’t be referred 
to as a logic of poor economics or a logic of BoP markets.  Nevertheless, for the purpose of the 
study, namely to identify sources of tensions, the local rationale of BoP market participants can 
be seen as a distinct strategic action field, as it builds upon shared rules and patterns of collective 
action. As discussed in the section on the limitations of the present study, the researcher is aware 
of the simplification that this approach entails. However, it is believed that this simplified approach 
is sufficient for the purpose of the study, which is to generally investigate the types of tensions 
that hybrid organizations face when operating in low-income settings in developing and emerging 
economies. 
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Third, the researcher screened the empirical data and identified hybridization strategies as 
deviations from ideal-typical organizational behavior in the sense of the commercial and the 
social welfare logic. Juxtaposing these strategies to Battilana and Lee’s (2014, p. 41) typology of 
hybridization approaches revealed that all identified strategic actions could be classified into one 
of the four categories, namely dismissing, separating, cumulative and creative hybridization 
strategies. Furthermore, relying on Jarzabkowski, Lê, and Van de Ven (2013, p. 255), the 
researcher tried to classify these strategies as defensive vs. active type of strategy. Defensive 
strategies, as the authors define them, refer to strategies that try to avoid contradictions – for 
instance, through splitting, surpressing or opposing (ibid), or, with regard to Battilana and Lee’s 
typology, to dismissing, separating, and cumulative hybridization approaches. Active strategies, 
in contrast, try to accept contradictions and embrace them in the long run through adjusting 
measures such as confrontation, that is, directly addressing and working through the sources of 
tensions, or transcendence, meaning moving to a higher plane of understanding in which 
paradoxical elements are understood as complex interdependencies rather than competing 
interests (ibid, p. 249). In Battilana and Lee’s typology, this active type of strategy corresponds to 
creative hybridization approaches. 
Fourth, in light of the second research interest about the factors that enable and constrain hybrid 
organizations to turn institutional voids into opportunity spaces, the researcher conducted an 
inductive analysis of the empirical material. First inductive codes and categories were given 
descriptive labels based on the wording used by interviewees (Miles, Huberman, & Saldana, 
2013, p. 71ff.). Subsequently, codes and categories were regrouped and relabeled to allow for a 
sound clustering into second-order constructs. The fit of these new labels with the coded text 
passages was checked thoroughly. The process of coding and creation of second-order 
constructs was accomplished with the software HyperResearch, which helped to keep track of 
emerging categories and to manage the large amount of data. The codes created based on the 
inductive analysis were, however, also checked against concepts from prior literature (see 
appendix 3). If necessary and sensible, codes and categories were adapted to fit existing 
theories.  
Fifth, narrative accounts of each hybrid organization were created. These accounts were 
designed to trace the chronological trajectories of how tensions surfaced in the sample 
organizations, and link them to corresponding response patterns. For this purpose, the tensions 
were clustered in CTPs, defined as points in time in which tensions reached a magnitude that 
threatened progress and thus required comprehensive organizational measures (Jarzabkowski, 
Lê, and Van de Ven, 2013, p. 253) in the form of hybridization strategies. Hybridization strategies 
were clustered in response cycles (RCs), defined as the set of measures combining multiple 
logics as an answer to the CTPs. As the next chapter shows, the narrative account comprise 
quotes from interviews and excerpts from archival documents. This analytical step revealed how 
the logic of origin and institutional voids influence the types of tensions that hybrid organizations 
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face and the hybridization strategies that they apply. One of the central findings of this study 
emerged at this stage, revealing that hybridization patterns are not only an answer to conflicting 
demands between conflicting logics, but also a strategy to prevent or respond to such conflicts, 
as well as other tensions that do not necessarily relate to conflicting institutional demands 
between sector logics. 
Sixth, cross-case comparison was performed in three steps, reflecting the focus of the study as 
described in the conceptual framework. In the first step, the cases were classified in virtuous, 
fragile and vicious cases. Virtuous cases refer to cases that are successful in turning institutional 
voids into opportunity spaces through hybridization strategies. This means that they are able to 
freely select from competing logics in an effort to achieve a lasting resolution or acceptance of 
tensions and establish and maintain a new hybrid logic at the core of the organization. Fragile 
cases are defined as cases that are restricted in their ability to hybridize and thus apply strategies 
that provide short-term relief. However, they remain likely to face the same or related tensions 
soon again. Vicious cases refer to organizations that are paralyzed in selecting from competing 
logics and thus unable to resolve the tensions. They face a substantially threatening situation, in 
which the survival of the organization was at risk. It has to be noted that the classification of 
cases into virtuous, fragile and vicious cases is based on the specific time at which data 
collection ended. It is absolutely possible that the ability to turn tensions into opportunity spaces 
changed afterwards. However, as will be further elaborated in the conclusion, this is not 
considered to be a limit in the validity of the current study, but rather a fact that underlines the 
argument that the ability to turn institutional voids into opportunity spaces is dependent on field-
level changes. 
In the second step, virtuous, fragile and vicious cases were compared along the focal concepts 
presented in the conceptual framework. It was analyzed in which way the logic of origin, as well 
as the different institutional contexts, were determinant with regard to hybrid organizations’ ability 
to turn institutional voids into opportunity spaces. In order to do so, the type of tensions (nature 
and sources), the hybridization strategies (dismissing, separating, cumulative, creative), the 





6 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
The aim of this study is to develop a better understanding of hybrid organizations in BoP settings. 
More specifically, it seeks to analyze the behavior of these actors that combine multiple 
institutional logics – the social welfare and the commercial logic – to make sense of the complex 
and challenging environments in developing and emerging economies. Based on the conceptual 
framework presented in chapter 4, the next sections will outline the findings of the empirical 
analysis, showing how institutional voids that prevail at the field level trigger tensions in hybrid 
organizations, and how the logic of origin – the social welfare or the commercial logic – influences 
how organizations experience and manage tensions. Further, other factors that enable and/or 
constrain hybrid organizations to turn institutional voids into opportunity spaces will be presented 
and discussed. In the following, the case narratives of each organization will be presented, 
tracing the trajectories of tensions (Critical Tension Points – CTPs) and subsequent hybridization 
strategies (Response Cycles – RCs). Organizations with a commercial origin will be presented 
first, followed by the analysis of organizations with a social welfare origin. Within those sections, 
the order of hybrid organizations that will be presented corresponds to their success in turning 
institutional voids into opportunity spaces. Virtuous cases will be presented first, followed by 
fragile and finally, vicious cases. 
6.1 Hybrid Organizations with Commercial Origins 
6.1.1 MEX-FP: Defying the Mexican Health Sector 
MEX-FP is a for-profit hybrid organization providing affordable and high-quality health care 
services and products, with a focus on the eradication of a specific disease among very low to 
middle income segments of the Mexican population. Two entrepreneurs with international 
business background (in the following “founder 1” and “founder 2”) founded the company in 2010. 
Having started to operate with personal investments of the founders, MEX-FP later received a 
loan from a development bank and an equity investment from a Mexican social investment fund.  
Being inspired by Prahalad’s book “The Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid”, MEX-FP’s long-
term plan was to establish a business model that disrupted the inequitable Mexican health sector, 
and that achieved the economies of scale that were necessary to drive down costs. In addition, 
the business model was based on the idea of cross-subsidization between different income 
segments. Prices were to be adapted to patients’ ability to pay, and profits made through the 
sales of services to middle-income people were to be used for the subsidization of service 
provision for people that couldn’t afford to pay. Having opened its first sites in Mexico City, the 
goal of the company was to expand across the entire country, and in the long run even in other 
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Latin American countries, in order to bring about a systemic change in the way health care is 
provided to low-income people.  
Data collection for this study took place at the main site in Mexico City, as this is where the core 
functions of the organization were located. In sum, the case of MEX-FP shows how a hybrid 
organization with a commercial origin faced two CTPs over a period of three years, and reacted 
in two RCs (see table 13). 
Starting Point 
Before incorporating a formal organization, the founders of MEX-FP agreed that they needed to 
spend a considerable amount of time on getting prepared. They were aware of the fact that their 
ambitious plan of launching a company that should disrupt the Mexican health market, and that 
would be based on an innovative social business model, needed to be well prepared – 
especially as both founders lacked professional experience in the health sector. Over a period of 
four years, the founders – who were still involved in their former business jobs – spent their 
weekends and vacations developing their business plan. At some point, however, one of the 
founders quit his job as an investment banker to complete a master’s degree in public health in 
order to deepen his knowledge about health sectors.  
As part of this process, the founders proactively reflected upon potential tensions that they 
expected to experience in their BoP venture. Pursuing the goal of providing health care to very 
low-income people while also establishing a profitable organization could clearly represent a 
central conflict if MEX-FP didn’t succeed in reaching the economies of scale that would be 
necessary to make a systemic change in a financially sustainable way. Founder 2 explained: “We 
knew very clearly that the poor would only be able to afford low-priced products because they 
have very little purchasing power and many competing demands on disposable income.” [MEX-
FP-3.2] 
In addition, having learnt from other social enterprises that ended up shifting their mission due to 
the pressure of investors, they knew that the right type of funding was key. Founder 1 explained: 
“We are planning to seek social investment, but the limit that we face is that we 
want to make sure that the model is being safeguarded. We don’t want to grow in 
whatever way just to grow it. We want it to grow in the way we want it, in the 
sense that values are protected and the ethics are maintained, safeguarding the 
model we are interested in. Honestly, we are not doing this just for money. So it is 
important to find… If you let other investors come in, they have to be investors 
who share the vision. This I think is not so easy. There are many people with 
money. There will be many that want to invest. But people with money who want 
to protect this, there won’t be many.” [MEX-FP-3.1] 
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MEX-FP was aware of its innovativeness and thus of the difficulty to find funders that shared a 
similar philosophy. Finally, through their thorough preparations and their education in health 
studies, the founders became aware of the many perverse incentives that prevailed in health 
markets: 
“Many clinics perform surgeries although they are not needed. Surgeries are 
made to earn money. There is no quality control with regard to the need of the 
patient. (…) If we start operating people for economic reasons we move away 
from being… we loose the respect that we are trying to gain.” [MEX-FP-3.2] 
Having thoroughly discussed the varous risks and tensions that they expected to face, the 
founders took a series of measures to set up the hybrid business model. One of these measures 
was the decision to incorporate as a for-profit organization, which reflected the clear emphasis 
on efficiency as a major ingredient of the commercial logic. Processes were designed in the most 
efficient way in order to drive down costs and enable the organization to provide their products 
and services at affordable prices. For instance, the patient journey was systematized in a way 
that allowed for standardization, and thus, for maximum efficiency.  
However, the decision to incorporate as a for-profit was also based on the conviction of the 
founders that they would access the right type of resources more easily, as if they were a 
nonprofit: 
“We are convinced that for Mexico, the for-profit form is not only better from an 
economical point of view, but also from an impact point of view. A for-profit can 
grow much faster because there are these incentives that require the organization 
to focus on fostering its product and service delivery. (…) And there are enough 
people in Mexico with some disposable income for health services, so we can 
draw from these earnings to cross-subsidize service provision for people that can’t 
pay anything. And then investors can invest and we can use their money to create 
more clinics. (…) What we are doing right now is still a pilot. Once we have proven 
the concept and its scalability, we want to replicate this pilot in a different location. 
And that’s where investors might enter. Private investors, or if we don’t find private 
investors, it could also be an Initial Private Offering.” [MEX-FP-3.2] 
And also with regard to human resources, they were convinced that being a for-profit carried 
more advantages. [Founder 2] furthermore explained: 
“I think as a for-profit you can also attract higher quality staff. If someone invested 
all his money to go to a good university, he will search to get a return on his 
investment, be it financially or in a different way like personal development and 
social impact. As a for-profit, you can offer this return much easier than a nonprofit 
because resources are much more scarce and they come from donations. Donors 
don’t want you to spend all your money on salaries. But as a for-profit it is easier 
to attract talent.” [MEX-FP-3.2] 
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In other words, MEX-FP’s decision to incorporate as a for-profit was also based on the conviction 
that the accountability requirements of funding mechanisms that were typical in the social welfare 
logic were restricting the establishment of a sustainable organization.  
In order to attract talent, MEX-FP emphasized the innovativeness of its business model and 
the higher goal of “doing something good”. With this approach, MEX-FP represented an 
attractive opportunity, particularly for young professionals who gave strong importance to 
personal development opportunities, intellectual challenge and a noble task. Hence, MEX-FP 
particularly attracted students from renowned business schools who wanted to contribute to 
proving the innovative model. The organization was thus able to hire them as employees or 
even volunteers for its business adminitstration department. With regard to health 
personnel, MEX-FP also tried to recruit young employees who sought the same personal 
development opportunities. However, the organization clearly also needed medical specialists 
with enough experience to perform the surgeries and lead the medical department – 
particularly as both founders had no medical background. 
Despite the emphasis on the commercial logic from a structural point of view, the founders of 
MEX-FP were also aware that they would need third sector resources, particularly in the early 
stages of the venture during which the scalability of the business model was not yet proven. 
MEX-FP thus sought collaborations with, and support from, third sector actors. Through an 
agreement with a foundation that committed to cover the expenses of a certain amount of health 
services per month, MEX-FP succeeded in establishing a steady revenue stream since the 
beginning of operations. In addition, a grant provided by an international development bank could 
explicitly be used to develop the business model until it had reached investment readiness. 
Collaborations with third sector organizations were furthermore crucial for MEX-FP to organize 
so-called outreach campaigns in which they educated people about the benefits to seek their 
health care services. Finally, MEX-FP also reached out to collaborate with the public sector. Soon 
after its incorporation, the organization had successfully acquired the accreditation from the 
Seguro Popular, which secured profitable revenue streams for serving poor people. It was 
important for the founders not to become too dependent on one source of revenue and 
funding in order to increase the resilience of the organization if one of the sources dried 
up.  
In sum, it can be observed that MEX-FP had succeeded in establishing itself as a hybrid 
organization with stronger influence of commercial origins, as the founders had commercial 
backgrounds, and as the for-profit form was chosen at the structural level. However, with regard 
to resources, MEX-FP was drawing from sources of the third and public sector mainly.  
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CTP1: Experiencing Denial from Internal and External Stakeholders 
Despite the thorough analysis that the founders of MEX-FP had conducted concerning potential 
risks and tensions, some unexpected challenges emerged after several months of operation. 
Within the organization, MEX-FP experienced a high fluctuation, particularly among health 
personnel, as the job profiles that they had designed in an efficiency-maximizing way deviated 
from typical jobs in the Mexican health sector. Particularly, some employees with a nonprofit or a 
health care background didn’t accept the efficiency-driven, market-oriented model that MEX-FP 
was implementing. An internal document provided by the organization described the challenge: 
“The majority of [health personnel] was trained in nonprofit clinics and brought 
preconceptions of their roles and responsibilities to [MEX-FP]. The discrepancy 
between clinical staff expectations and the initial [MEX-FP] experience led to 
higher than expected turnover in the first year of operation.” [MEX-FP-3.12] 
In other words, the job profiles that MEX-FP offered, as well as the organizational culture 
and procedures that the organization cultivated, conflicted with the imprinting of some 
employees. Although, at first sight, manifesting as a tension over means – namely the 
appropriate way of designing job profiles – the tension can be classified as a tension over 
goals, given that the job profiles reflected the goals that health personnel sought to 
pursue with their work. These goals either reflected a social welfare or a commercial logic. 
But also in their relations to external stakeholders, MEX-FP faced some considerable challenges. 
Private health providers had benefitted from the vast prevalence of unmet health needs and the 
lack of high-quality health provision for low-income people in Mexico, as it allowed them to 
generate high profit margins. As one of MEX-FP’s founders explained, many commercial health 
providers had entered price fixing agreements in order to cream off maximum profits. They thus 
feared that MEX-FP’s low-price approach would disrupt the market in a way that would 
significantly minimize their profits. Being well-organized and well-connected in the health sector, 
incumbent health providers thus started to threaten the organization by restricting their access to 
critical resources. Using the argument that MEX-FP’s founders lacked a professional background 
in health care and thus had no right and no competence to enter the health sector in such an 
offensive way, competitors tried to damage MEX-FP’s reputation by portraying MEX-FP’s 
founders as business men that intended to make money on the back of low-income people. 
Founder 1 explained:    
“In [medical] reunions people say: “if you go and work with them you can no 
longer be part of the committee”. Because we’re not doctors and we’re offering a 
completely distinct model. That can be a problem, because if they lock the access 
to doctors, you’re in a bad position. They don’t have this power formally, but they 
can exert psychological pressure. For example, there is one doctor that we would 
like to hire and she is willing to come as well, but she told us that her brother 
wants to study in one of the three big hospitals here and he is afraid that if she 
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comes and work with us, he won’t get accepted at the hospital. Who knows 
whether they will do that, but people don’t want to take the risk.” [MEX-FP-3.1] 
In other words, MEX-FP struggled in gaining the acceptance of competitors for its 
innovative and disruptive hybrid business model. This manifested in a tension over means as 
the organization had to find ways how it could, on the one hand, continue to disrupt the 
inequitable health market, and, on the other hand, gain the acceptance of competitors who acted 
as quasi-gatekeepers for human resources. In this case, the institutional voids underlying the 
tension was not related to conflicts between the commercial and the social logics. It was clear 
that price-fixing agreements to maximize profits were legally prohibited in Mexico. Yet, the formal 
institutions that would have enforced the corresponding laws were weak. The institutional void 
underyling the tension can thus, instead, be related to discrepancies between formal and informal 
– or even illegal – strategic action fields. Further, the tension didn’t emerge as a consequence of 
conflicting demands but rather as a material tension that was inherently embedded in the 
organization’s business model. 
RC1: Emphasizing Systemic Flaws and the Organization’s Innovativeness to Attract Young 
Talent 
Regarding the tension that MEX-FP had experienced in its interaction with competitors, the 
organization emphasized the social welfare logic. Despite the difficulties that it caused, it was the 
explicit social goal of the organization to disrupt the Mexican health market. As the founders 
explained, institutions in the Mexican health sector weren’t strong enough to prevent illegal or 
unfair market behavior such as the above-mentioned price-fixing agreements. Particularly, private 
health providers could basically operate according to their own rules, attending only a well-off 
minority of the Mexican population and leaving off the poor. As a reaction, MEX-FP started to 
publicly emphasize these systemic flaws – or institutional voids between formal and 
informal strategic action fields – and relate them to the profit-maximization dictum of the 
commercial logic. The organization thus positioned itself as an organization with social 
objectives that explicitly sought to disrupt such illegal practices and emphasized its 
distinctiveness to existing health care organizations, which, as the founders argued, had failed to 
develop sustainable models that reached the low-income segments of the Mexican population. In 
other words, the founders sought to gain legitimacy by delegitimizing incumbent health 
players. However, instead of pursuing its goals as a nonprofit organization, MEX-FP argued that 
the organization had to defeat the systemic flaws by operating in the same arena, namely the 
commercial sector. As the founders argued, being largely independent from donor funding was 
the only possibility to establish an organization that would be able to survive in the long run and 
make a durable change in the Mexican health sector. Hence, MEX-FP emphasized its 
commercial face by stressing the need to establish a financially sustainable business model, 
which required rigorous cost efficiency. This strategy of inspirational leadership enabled MEX-FP 
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to gain the moral legitimacy and hence the acceptance of, predominantly young and 
idealistic, employees who shared the objective of changing the Mexican health market and 
agreed on accepting a lower wage when compared to what they would earn in other 
commercial health providing organizations. 
However, knowing that the fast-scaling approach that MEX-FP wanted to implement required 
many human resources, the organization was aware of the fact that it could not only rely on 
young and idealistic employees, but needed to increase its attractiveness for a larger share of the 
labor market. The organization thus started to more offensively stress the advantages to work at 
MEX-FP. An internal document provided by MEX-FP describes the measures taken: 
“In response to the higher than expected turnover, [MEX-FP] implemented a 
nursing training program, with hopes of eventually establishing training programs 
for [medical specialists] as well, in a partnership with (…) universities, and [an 
international NGO dedicated to improve access to health care globally]. Salaries 
that are lower than expected, even if they are above local market rates, may be 
offset by the incentives of high-level training and research opportunities.” [MEX-
FP-3.12] 
In other words, in order to confront the hesitance and rejection of present and future employees, 
MEX-FP decided to strategically employ its hybrid identity, by either emphasizing its social 
face or its commercial face, depending on the argument it wanted to stress – a strategy that 
has been labeled impression management by prior research and can be classified as a 
separation strategy given that it seeks to emphasize either one or the other side of the hybrid 
identity. Further, the delegitimization of extant players in the health markets, as well as the 
emphasis on systemic flaws, are part of the sensemaking efforts to which MEX-FP referred in 
order to position and gain acceptance for a new hybrid logic. These measures can thus both be 
classified as creative strategies.  
CTP2: Arbitrariness and Cultural Obstacles in the Mexican Health Sector 
The measures taken in RC1 enabled MEX-FP to gain the support of sufficient actors outside of 
the organization, and to attract enough employees to continue on its growth path. However, a 
new set of tensions emerged approximately one year after MEX-FP’s incorporation when the 
government unexpectedly decided to exclude MEX-FP’s main health service from the 
insurance plan covered by the Seguro Popular. As founder 1 claimed in an interview, the 
reasons for this decision were arbitrary. Instead of assessing the need for this health service 
among low-income people, one of the founders explained that the government had simply 
underestimated the costs, and now tried to find legitimate reasons to exclude the disease of the 
list of catastrophic diseases, which were covered by the Seguro Popular: 
“They cut [the health service] out of the insurance plan because they realized that 
[the disease] is too widespread. It simply exceeds their financial abilities. But 
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officially, what they say is that [the disease] doesn’t cause catastrophic 
expenditures and that’s why they’re taking it out. They want to focus on 
catastrophic health expenditures only. That’s what they say. But [the disease that 
we’re trying to cure] is one of the main reasons for poverty in Mexico. So they 
can’t tell me that it’s not catastrophic” [MEX-FP-3.13] 
The loss of this important revenue stream caused significant difficulties within MEX-FP. The 
Seguro Popular had been a crucial source of income to subsidize service provision for people 
who couldn’t afford to pay. MEX-FP was consequently thrown back in its scaling plans. The 
founders knew that finding a substitute for the public income stream was difficult and would 
require time. They were disappointed as they were convinced that working with the government 
would have been the best way to scale MEX-FP fast across the country. However, given the 
resource scarcity of the Mexican government, and the arbitrariness of public decision 
making, it seemed to factually conflict with the objective of establishing reliable revenue 
streams and thus a financially sustainable organization. The tension that MEX-FP 
experienced at that time was thus a tension over means, as the organization needed reliable 
income streams but was unable to establish them by serving the public sector. It was 
furthermore triggered by contradictions between the Western-style business mindset of 
the entrepreneurs and a local culture of short-term orientation within the Mexican Ministry of 
Health. Given the resource scarcity that the latter faced, decisions at times needed to be made in 
a spontaneous way. As a result, the public health insurance scheme failed to provide funds on 
which MEX-FP could rely upon. This tension didn’t emerge as a consequence of conflicting 
demands but rather as a material tension that was inherently embedded in the organization’s 
business model. 
Simultaneously to this, MEX-FP started to face another tension over means that also negatively 
affected the organization’s revenue generation. Revenue generation through the direct sale of 
services to customers who paid out of pocket was an important pillar of their business model. 
However, in contrast to what the entrepreneurs had expected based on their observations of 
unmet health needs in Mexico, unlocking customer demand proved to be very difficult. As the 
outreach manager of MEX-FP explained, the culture in Mexican low-income communities didn’t 
promote a preventive or responsible attitude toward health. Particularly, low-income people only 
sought health services when they already suffered from advanced symptoms:  
“There are information barriers. People are afraid of surgeries because they fear 
staying blind. Others think that you have to take out their eyes for the surgery, so 
they don’t want that. (…) We have to overcome economic barriers and logistical 
barriers, like who brings them here and back, who accompanies them. Then we 
also have to overcome their fear and mistrust, which are both huge. There are 
people that, although they would have the economical means to pay for a surgery 
and although they would have someone to bring them and accompany them, 
continue to be afraid and apathetic. Most of our patients are older and for that 
reason they say: “at my age for what would I get this surgery? It is normal that I 
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loose my sight, it’s gods will.” And then there is also the cultural aspect of not 
taking care of your health. In Mexico, the culture of seeking health services is 
practically non-existent. People only get treated when they have serious 
problems. There is no preventive culture to go and check your health regularly, go 
to the [medical specialist] when you have diabetes. They come when they are 
already [seriously ill], when it is already very difficult to treat them.” [MEX-FP-3.4] 
The need to adapt to specific local norms and consumption behavior, and to invest considerable 
efforts into health education thus additionally conflicted with MEX-FP’s ambitious efficiency 
maximization plans, which were essential for the success of the business plan. This tension 
could be traced back to the diverging understandings of health needs among low-income 
Mexicans and entrepreneurs who were imprinted by a Western culture, which gave more 
importance to disease prevention and individual responsibility in health care. However, it 
didn’t emerge as a consequence of conflicting demands but rather as a material tension that was 
inherently embedded in the organization’s business model. In addition, the tension can also be 
classified as a contradiction between the social welfare logic, which stresses the need for 
locally customized approaches and the commercial logic, which stresses standardization 
as a way to maximize efficiency. 
RC2: From Top-Down to Bottom-Up 
Being surprised by the withdrawal of the Seguro Popular, MEX-FP’s was forced to end its close 
collaboration with the Seguro Popular and to concentrate on revenues generated through 
the direct sale of health services to people in need and to third parties from the third 
sector. Finding a substitute for the revenues that were made through the Seguro Popular was 
crucial, but difficult – particularly finding a source of revenue with a similar potential of allowing 
MEX-FP to leverage the operations across the country. However, the organization had, since the 
beginning tried to avoid a singular dependence on one source of revenue. Cross-subsidization 
between customers who were able to pay and those who weren’t, for instance, had always been 
a key component of the business model and now needed to be intensified. Given that the cross-
subsidization strategy explicitly separated more commercially and more socially oriented 
activities within the organization, the researcher classified it as a cumulative strategy. 
However, given the second tension concerning the difficulties to unlock customer demand, MEX-
FP also intensified its collaboration with third sector and public organizations at the 
community level. Outreach campaigns with local NGOs and public health entities were crucial to 
educate low-income communities and thereby increase their demand for MEX-FP’s health 
services. In other words, MEX-FP needed to focus on bottom-up solutions to generate sufficient 
revenue in order to substitute the top-down income it had received from the national health 
insurance in the beginning. Hence, the organization had to emphasize its social face to find 
local partners with which these health education campaigns could be performed. 
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Still hoping for a change of mind among representatives of the Seguro Popular, MEX-FP’s 
founders, however, also continued to lobby for the reintegration of their major health service 
into the list of catastrophic diseases covered by the public health plan. 
Outcome: Accessing Long-Term Investment 
In sum, MEX-FP had succeeded in overcoming the tensions that it had experienced in CTP1 and 
CTP2. With regard to CTP1, the organization hat, at the time of data collection, succeeded in 
attracting enough human resources to continue with its short- to mid-term scaling plans although 
MEX-FP was still not accepted by competitors and they continued to search ways how to harm 
the organization. However, it was unclear at that time whether the approach would suffice in the 
long run, given that the organization had ambitious scaling plans to replicate the model across 
the country, and in the long run even to other Latin American countries. Further, in CTP2, 
additional tensions emerged and questioned the feasibility of the hybrid business model. Given 
the loss of the revenue stream from the Seguro Popular and the difficulties to unlock the demand 
of low-income customers, MEX-FP’s future revenue and thus ability to scale was quite unsecure 
at the time of data collection. Nevertheless, ultimately, the organization succeeded in receiving a 
grant from an international development bank with the purpose of further developping the 
business model until investment readiness. The plan of the bank was to then also provide the 
follow-up funding together with other investment partners in the form of loans and equity 
investments. Although MEX-FP had just experienced a substantial drawback with regard to its 
business model, the founders were able to suggest enough credibility to convince the 
development bank. With this, the organization could win the time and resources that were 
necessary to pursue the long-term scaling plans underlying the business model. After one year, 
MEX-FP could then also close its first investment round with financial involvement of the 
development bank, a Mexican foundation, as well as a Mexican social investment fund. Hence, 
MEX-FP received long-term investment from funders of diverse backgrounds without having 
proven the business model and without having had to enact major changes in its hybridization 
patterns.  
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Table 13:  Trajectory of Tensions, Strategies and Hybridization Patterns in MEX-FP 













Disrupt health market, 
systemic change, prove 
profitability of business 
model, scale (hybrid logic) 
     
Self-Definition / 
Communication 
Social Enterprise, Innovative 
hybrid organization with 
commercial emphasis 
(hybrid logic) 
     
Structure For-profit company 
(commercial logic) 
     
Financing Personal equity investment 
of founders (commercial) 
    Long-term investment 
of Mexican social 
investment fund and 
foundation as well as 




Balanced blend of revenue 
sources from public, private 
and third sector (hybrid logic) 
  Provide to public sector vs. 
establish financially sustainable 
organization 
(tension over means/institutional 
void between Western and local 
strategic action fields) 
Increase focus on cross-
subsidization between 





No proof of concept, 
but long-term 
perspective to break 
even through 
economies of scale 
and increased 
outreach / marketing 
campaigns 
Business model based on scale 
vs. need to adapt to local 
customer demand 
(tension over means/institutional 
void between Western and local 
strategic action fields) 
Search for bottom-up 
substitutes for loss of top-
down revenue stream 
Product and 
Service Delivery 
Emphasis on standardization 
and maximum efficiency 
(commercial logic) 
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Pay market rate 








model among staff 





 Emphasize hybrid approach 
with commercial face by 
stressing the need to establish 
a financially sustainable 
business model requiring 
rigorous cost efficiency 
(Impression management – 
Separation strategy - 
emphasis on commercial 
logic) 
 Inspirational leadership 
  Enough human 
resources for short- to 
mid-term scaling 
objectives, possibility to 













markets vs. gain and 
maintain legitimacy 
from gatekeepers 
(tension over means 
/institutional void 
between formal and 
informal strategic 
action fields) 
 Emphasize hybrid approach 
with social face by stressing 
goal to disrupt Mexican health 
market (Separation strategy - 
emphasis on social welfare 
logic) 
 Point out institutional voids 
and delegitimize existing 
health care providers to gain 
moral legitimacy of relevant 
stakeholders (sensemaking – 
creative strategy, hybrid logic) 
  Increase educational 
marketing campaigns in 
collaboration with actors 
from third and public 
sector to attract 
customers (Cumulative 
strategy – emphasis on 
social welfare logic) 
 Lobby for reintegration of 
health service in national 
health plan (no 
hybridization strategy) 




in labor market 
Summary of 
outcome 
     Virtuous cycle 
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6.1.2 KEN-FP: Just a “Normal” Business 
KEN-FP is a for-profit hybrid organization based in the surroundings of Nairobi and founded in 
2011 by three entrepreneurs with a professional background in international development – with 
two of the founders being native US American and one being Kenyan. The company seeks to 
provide affordable high-quality healthcare services for Kenyans of all income levels – including 
the poor income segments. Despite its incorporation as a for-profit, the motivation to provide 
affordable high-quality health care to the poor has been the main driver of the founders to set up 
KEN-FP. At the time of data collection, the organization generated its revenues mainly through 
the direct sales of services to its target population, and positioned itself as a competitor to extant 
health providers. In order to gather seed funding, the company launched a social crowdfunding 
campaign. Subsequently, it received convertible debt from a global social investment fund. During 
the period of data collection, KEN-FP has opened its second clinic, however, data collection only 
focused on the first clinic as this was more established and thus yielded more insights on the 
topics of interest for this study. In addition, interviews were conducted with the administrative 
workforce which was mainly located in the first clinic. Over a period of two years, KEN-FP 
experienced two CTPs, resulting in two response cycles (see table 14). 
Starting Point 
The creation of social impact was certainly a key driver for KEN-FP’s founders to start the 
business. The idea behind KEN-FP was to prove and rapidly scale a radically different type 
of business in the Kenyan health sector and subsequently replicate it in other African 
countries as to provide high-quality healthcare to Africa’s population. As this presented an 
innovative and thus risky endeavor the founders of KEN-FP knew that it would be difficult to 
convince profit-oriented funders to invest in them at this stage where the business model was not 
yet proven. Furthermore, they knew that they depended on socially oriented funding, as no 
investor with the objective to maximize its profits would take the risk to fund them. They thus 
knew that they would require support from socially oriented funders that were interested in 
supporting the improvement of the state of health in Kenya. The founders thus internally 
discussed the possibility of creating a nonprofit organization in order to access donations and 
grants. In an interview, one of the founders explained her perspective on raising funds from 
foundations and other “socially minded” funders: 
“To be honest, there has been a debate about creating a nonprofit. There is a 
bunch of foundations that are like: “We really love what you are doing, but we can 
only grant to nonprofits“. So there has been a debate, about opening some kind of 
nonprofit arm or something like that. (…) Fundraising in the foundation world is 
very similar to fundraising in venture capital word. It takes just as much time and 
effort and dedication. You have to get 501© through, you have to go through all 
the stuff. It takes six months before you get your first loan and everything else to 
get settled. So I think, we mostly feel like if it´s not gonna be our long term heart of 
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our business, it´s probably not worth the effort. Typically for us free money is time. 
(…) If we get free money and we don´t need to pay it back, that just gives us more 
leeway, without increased pressure to open up more clinics and stuff like that. And 
what we are doing is really hard. Nobody has done it successfully yet. There is a 
lot of things that we need to learn. A lot of mistakes we’re gonna make. So time is 
really important to us. So we do need to get some component of free money in the 
door. Obviously the more the better, obviously the less strings attached the better. 
Obviously the less effort put in the better, so we can actually focus on building a 
business. Right? Though we need more time to make mistakes and to learn stuff, 
so we do actually need to come up with a little bit of free money. [KEN-FP-5.3] 
But the founder also agreed that they wanted to focus on building a financially sustainable 
business model, which, as they felt, would conflict with the “non-profit thinking” as it neither fos-
tered downward accountability nor their ambitious scaling plans. One of the founders explained: 
“My biggest motivating factor is that we want our patients to be the decision 
makers, instead of donors and government. So I wanted our patients to define 
what the scope of our services were (…) and their dollars to be the voting dollars, 
instead of donors. So that was really my biggest motivation. And then, beyond 
that, we just have really ambitious goals for scale. And from what we have seen, 
and I have raised a lot of money for nonprofit in my life, and for what I have seen, 
they aren’t very for good for scaling quickly. Because it´s donor money. There is 
just a ton of reporting, structuring, you know. You have to make sure that these 
dollars go to this and that project. And they can´t just be used for general 
expansion and for paying market rate salaries. And there are just so many strings 
attached for nonprofits, that I think we were excited to working in a for-profit field.” 
[KEN-FP-5.1] 
The founders of KEN-FP thus decided to incorporate as a for-profit organization only and try 
to access free money as such. They started to approach social investment funds by 
presenting themselves as an innovative hybrid business model. Looking at their investment 
criteria raised the founders’ hopes. KEN-FP’s objective of setting up a scalable business model to 
provide affordable health care in Kenya – and later in other African countries – seemed to be 
strongly aligned with the objectives of several new investment funds.  
CTP1: Searching for Seed Funding 
However, KEN-FP soon realized that although there were funding organizations that had 
specialized in organizations like KEN-FP, access to funding still remained a challenge. One of the 
founders explained: 
“I went around and I have literally met with 35 different social investors, so 
everybody that you can think of – acumen, and Grameen, private investors and all 
those guys. And we were just addressing all of them. We were just too small and 
we were too early. Although some of them started to tell us that we were too late. 
That we were like past the idea stage, because we actually had a clinic opened. 
And so now we were too late and too developed. So it was a very, very frustrating 
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experience that really you need to deal with. Social investment sphere is a lot of 
smoke. There is not social investment for early stage companies. There is no 
element in their definition of early stage. It’s just that they are joking. What do you 
mean early stage? People are talking about two years, and over 1 million dollars 
of revenue or they won´t give money unless they can give at least half a million of 
dollars. But to flood an early stage startup, like ours, with half a million dollars, 
would just eat our equity. The evaluation that we would have to justify for that fund 
is crazy. That is a very, very, very frustrating experience.” [KEN-FP-5.4] 
Although a flourishing scene of social investing had emerged in the last years, KEN-FP realized 
that the organization seemed not to meet the criteria of funders that were dedicated to the 
support of blended value generating organizations. Investors explicitly expressed their desire to 
support innovative business models, however, at the same time, they factually seemed to be only 
willing to support organizations with a proof of concept of their business model. In other words, 
the social investment scene ultimately proved to be very similar to the commercial investment 
scene. In addition, KEN-FP’s concept also conflicted with prevailing conceptions in existing 
funding mechanisms from the third sector. In other words, KEN-FP realized that their 
approach simply didn’t fit in any existing funding mechanisms, be it commercial, 
philanthropic or new hybrid types of funding mechanisms and that they were basically 
operating in an institutional void. The tension was thus a tension over means that could 
be traced back to competing demands of potential funders from commercial and social 
welfare logics. 
RC1: Innovating Financing Through Social Capital and Building up Credibility 
Frustrated from their experiences, the founders of KEN-FP started to reflect upon their 
possibilities and to seek advice from their network. It soon became clear that they had to prove 
their credibility before becoming eligible for institutional funding. The founders thus invested all of 
their life savings to launch the first clinic: 
“So originally we decided that we were just gonna go out, trying to find like big 
donor money. And after about two months of trying and writing business plans, 
financials and putting a lot of information online, one of our buddies was just like, 
guys, open a clinic. Like, what are you doing? Like, just, how much money does it 
take? And we were all like, we think about 20,000 dollars. And he was like, oh 
please guys, how much money do you have (…)? Okay, we were like, okay, put 
your money in it and then we will see what we can do with other donors. So 
[Founder 1] and I put in a ton of our money, all of our life savings.” [KEN-FP-5.4] 
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In addition, they started to seek the financial support of people that trusted and believed in them 
and that were interested in promoting social change in Kenya. Emphasizing their social goals, 
KEN-FP’s founders thus started to mobilize their personal networks and proposed a new 
type of financial involvement that synthesized practices from the social welfare and from 
the commercial logic. The founder further elaborated: 
“And then, what we did, we actually created a structure called social shares. And 
so we allowed our family and friends to buy for 100 dollars a social share in our 
first clinic and to become one of our shareholders. And then with that, we would 
pay them back after two years, with the profit of the clinic. But if the clinic is not 
profitable in two years, then the individuals will not be paid back. But if it is 
profitable, they will be paid back and they have a certificate thing, that they helped 
that and our patients for a two-year period. So they sort of own a piece in the brick 
and water in the first clinic. We were really excited about that as a model that 
really helped us scale, going forward if we can have that kind of patient capital. 
Because we know all of those people are technically, you know, have some sort of 
investment in getting their money back. They are also incredibly generous. You 
know all of our friends and family and things like that, so you know we assume 
they are not gonna send the debt collectors after us, if we do end up as 
defaulters. But that was a pretty exciting innovation, that we were able to come up 
with. That really allowed us to get off the ground.” [KEN-FP-5.4] 
In sum, KEN-FP initially lacked the legitimacy that would have allowed the business to acquire 
funding. However, by suggesting a new type of hybrid funding (creative strategy) and 
referring to support from their closer network, the founders could set up a first clinic. In 
other words, the organization referred to resource bricolage, meaning that it “made do with 
whatever was at hand”. However, the organization remained in need of a long-term investment to 
implement its business model which was based on scale. 
CTP2: Facing Internal Discrepancies 
Having set up the first clinic and started to operate, KEN-FP experienced first tensions internally. 
The funders were aware of the fact that their business model was based on a central paradox. 
Establishing a financially sustainable business model vs. providing affordable high-quality health 
care to the Kenyan population was a trade-off in itself. Their plan was to resolve this latent 
tensions through scale, as suggested by the BoP proposition. However, it their daily routine, 
employees reported that they at times felt unsecure as to whether they should make 
decisions concerning the delivery of products and services based on a social rationale, or 
based on a commercial rationale. Just like most market-oriented health care providers, KEN-
FP regularly faced perverse incentives. However, in contrast to conventional for-profit or nonprofit 
health care providers, the organization lacked a clear prioritization of goals. One of the 
employees gave an example: 
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“The most profitable is the sale of drugs. We buy the drugs. The drugs, the price 
at which you buy them and the price at which you sell them, it gives you 
sometimes almost a 100% profit on the drugs. But at the same time, the downside 
of it is, we are focusing on giving quality healthcare so that you don't just walk into 
our clinic and come out with a sack of drugs, so that's the downside of it. And also 
consultation fee has also been giving us some money, but it is still low. [KEN-FP-
5.5]” 
The founders of KEN-FP thus soon experienced how the blended value creating approach, or, 
more specifically, conflicting demands of the social welfare and the commercial logic, could 
trigger tensions over goals among their employees.  
RC2: Positioning as a “Normal Business”  
In order to mitigate the normative controversies, the founders decided to avoid positioning 
KEN-FP as a socially oriented organization that aimed at providing health care to the poor 
(dismissing strategy). Instead, they emphasized that KEN-FP was a “normal business” in the 
health sector that sought to provide affordable – but not free – healthcare “to all Kenyans”. By 
doing so, the organization deliberately kept its objectives vague and avoided terms (e.g. 
“social enterprise” or “low-income people”) that would trigger cognitively and normatively 
institutionalized expectations of what a socially oriented organization should do, even if 
KEN-FP was factually more social than most private health care providers in Kenya.  
Typically, two types of health care providers could be distinguished in the Kenyan BoP setting, 
namely for-profit high-quality health care providers that were not affordable for the large majority 
of Kenyans, and for-profit low-quality health care providers that often didn’t comply with quality 
regulations. The above-mentioned decoupling of structure and institutional compliance allowed 
KEN-FP to gain cognitive legitimacy as the organization positioned itself as a “normal” 
for-profit organization. In fact, social value creation nevertheless factually remained a top 
priority for KEN-FP. Internally and externally, the organization emphasized the need to provide 
health care of highest quality no matter the income level of customers. While this value 
proposition wouldn’t surprise audiences in Western settings, the founders explained that low-
income Kenyans had practically no access to high-quality health care. One of the founders 
explained that patients reported to feel privileged that they could be treated in a “high-quality 
private clinic”, given that these were usually only accessible to higher income levels. In other 
words, KEN-FP benefitted from a legitimacy spill over effect from private, high-quality 
health care providers. 
Even if low-income people would receive treatment, they would rarely be attended by friendly and 
nonjudgmental staff – be it in organizations from the private, the public or the third sector – and 
generally had no possibility to raise a claim for high-quality services. On a webblog dedicated to 
blended value creating ventures, one of KEN-FP’s founders explained: 
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“At KEN-FP we’ve discovered a way to learn really quickly what women want. 
How? We sell our (…) services instead of giving them away for free (or highly 
subsidized prices). 
I find that if you give someone free services, they will often take them whether 
they like them or not. And they definitely won’t feel the right to complain. After all, 
it’s free. 
This changes fast when you ask patients to pay. Suddenly they are transformed 
into entitled, demanding and shrewd customers that ask questions and speak up 
(often loudly), when something isn’t going right. And well, they should. (…) Once 
you ask someone to pay for the services you start getting lots of firm feedback. 
How firm? They don’t show up. 
KEN-FP is a for-profit for this very reason. We like being dependent on our 
patients for our funding. It FORCES us to listen to them and offer the services 
exactly how they like them. If not, we go out of business.” [KEN-FP-5.23] 
KEN-FP thus emphasized the argument that an emphasis on the commercial logic in 
service provision was more “social” as it gave more importance to the direct “downward” 
accountability towards patients. 
With this argumentation, KEN-FP – while continuing to present itself as a normal business 
towards external audiences – already factually qualified as a socially oriented organization. In 
other words: Being a normal business was already social enough in the Kenyan context, 
particularly in the eyes of funders who sought to generate blended value. Whenever other 
stakeholders defined KEN-FP as a social enterprise, the founders thus didn’t actively disagree 
but rather benefitted from the vagueness of definitions in the field of blended value 
creation, as they were still seeking to get funded by a social investment fund. 
In addition, the strategy of lowering expectations allowed KEN-FP to constantly exceed 
expectations and thus gain moral legitimacy. Being defined as a conventional for-profit 
targetting all Kenyans, audiences couldn’t expect KEN-FP to perform in an extraordinary social 
way and were thus positively surprised by organizational behavior that fostered social change.  
In sum, KEN-FP had referred to the strategy of ceremonially dismissing the social welfare logic 
and decoupling the organizational structure from the factual behavior of the organization.  
  




In sum, it can be observed that, with regard to its hybridization patterns, KEN-FP had factually 
remained a hybrid. However, towards external audiences, it either emphasized its commercial or 
its social face. Changes in hybridization patterns were thus merely ceremonial. Further, the 
organization had taken advantage of the good reputation of commercial health providers in 
Kenya, which mainly targetted higher income segments of the population with good quality health 
care. With this approach, KEN-FP was able to resolve the tensions that it had experienced both 
CTPs. Only a few months later, although the establishment of the first clinic was not yet a proof of 
concept for KEN-FP’s business model, the founders had built up enough credibility to convince 
an investor. The organization closed its first investment round with funding from an international 
social investment fund that suited the blended value creating objectives of the organization.  
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Table 14: Trajectory of Tensions, Strategies and Hybridization Patterns in KEN-FP 













Establish radically new type 
of business providing 
affordable high-quality health 
care, scale across Kenya 
and Africa (hybrid logic) 
     
Self-Definition / 
communication 
Innovative hybrid business 
that seeks blended value 
creation with commercial 
emphasis (hybrid logic) 
 Emphasize social 
goal to mobilize 
financial support 
from personal 




– emphasis on 
social welfare logic) 
 
  Avoid positioning as  
social organization 
Position as “normal” 
business (Dismissing 
strategy – emphasis 
on commercial logic) 
 Take advantage of 
vague definitions in 
ecosystem of blended 
value creation and of 
positive reputation of 
commercial health 






Structure Incorporate as a for-profit 
company (commercial logic) 
     
Financing Approaching social 




model vs. depend on 
existing funding 
mechanisms for 
scale (tension over 
means/institutional 
voids between social 
welfare and 
commercial logic) 




(creative strategy - 
hybrid logic) 
 Invent new type of 
hybrid funding 
(creative strategy - 
hybrid logic) 
  KEN-FP received long-
term funding from social 
investment fund 
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Out of pocket payments only 
(commercial logic) 
    Tension resolved 
through investment that 
allows to achieve 




Provide high-quality health 
care at lower price than 
competitors (commercial 
logic) 
  Sell services / 
products based on 
social rationale vs. 




void between social 
welfare and 
commercial logic) 
 Tension resolved 





Pay market rate salaries 
(commercial logic) 
 
     
External 
relations 
Compete with all health 
providers (commercial logic) 
     
Summary of 
outcome 
     Virtuous cycle 
 Only ceremonial 
changes in 
hybridization patterns 
 Long-term investment 
from social investment 
fund helps to 
overcome tensions 
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6.1.3 COL-FP: Navigating Around Obstacles 
COL-FP is a for-profit hybrid organization that provides access to a network of high-quality private 
health providers, mainly general practitioners and small clinics, which are willing to offer their 
services at significantly discounted rates (up to 60%) for low-income people, and guarantees 
them maximum waiting times of less than 10 days. With this, COL-FP understands itself as an 
alternative to the largely publicly organized health system in Colombia, which in theory provides 
free access to health care for low-income people, however, at very low quality in terms of waiting 
times, equipping, and attention towards patients. 
People and their families can access COL-FP’s network by acquiring a membership card. 
Membership furthermore entails access to a social assistance service, which helps in scheduling 
appointments at health providers and provides advisory services for medical or health related 
issues. Being incorporated as a for-profit organization, COL-FP furthermore seeks to prove a 
new type of capitalism based on the mindset of Muhammad Yunus. A Colombian general 
practitioner and a Colombian business student (hereafter founder 1 and founder 2) founded COL-
FP in 2010 and received support from an incubator specialized in blended value creation in 
Colombia. The official incorporation of the for-profit legal entity took place in 2012.  
COL-FP has received a grant from a large Colombian company to get off the ground. Revenues 
are solely generated through direct sales of membership cards to the target population, which 
pays out-of-pocket. COL-FP started its operations in a Colombian city with almost 400,000 
inhabitants, located in one of the poorest departments of the country. This is also where data 
collection for this study has taken place. The case of COL-FP shows how the for-profit hybrid 
organization faced one CTP and responded to the tensions over a period of three years (see 
table 15).  
Starting Point 
After having started to operate in 2010, COL-FP’s founding team became part of an incubation 
program for social enterprises in Colombia. At that time, COL-FP was not yet registered as a 
legal entity. The founders agreed on the goal of creating a blended value generating 
organization, but were not yet decided whether they should incorporate as a for-profit or as a 
nonprofit organization. Based on discussions with members of the incubation program, the 
founders reflected upon the advantages and disadvantages of both options. Founder 1 explained: 
“There were two forms. First, we could use the form of a foundation, which is a 
nonprofit entity, being self-sustainable and doing commercial activities like a 
company. Or use the form of a SAS, which is a legal form for for-profit companies 
in Colombia (…). What are the advantages? The advantage of a foundation is that 
there are tax exemptions and also in terms of transparency and the possibility for 
international funders to invest in us. And for the SAS, the advantage is that it is a 
little easier to operate, there is less control.” [COL-FP-2.2]  
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Hence, the founders didn’t favor one of the two options from a moral perspective. They rather 
debated about their factual consequences. Having extensively discussed the advantages and 
disadvantages of the for-profit and the nonprofit legal form in order to set up a blended value 
creating organization, the founders of COL-FP decided to present themselves as a new type of 
hybrid organization – a social business according to the definition of Muhammad Yunus. As the 
founders explained, Yunus’ concept of social businesses is based on the argumentation that 
capitalism has been interpreted too narrowly, as it usually conceptualizes entrepreneurs as one-
dimensional beings who only seek to maximize their profit. However, it also emphasizes that the 
third and public sector have also failed in solving the world’s most pressing needs, as they are 
slow and bureaucratic, and depend on collective decision-making mechanisms, which are likely 
to be dysfunctional in the context of corruption, self-interest, chronical underfinancing and 
inconsistency. Social businesses that operate in the commercial market therefore aim at using 
the efficiency and effectiveness oriented practices of the commercial logic, but still account for the 
multidimensionality of human beings, particularly their selflessness, given that the priority of 
social businesses lies on the solution of societal problems.  
Following this argumentation, the founders of COL-FP incorporated their social business as a 
for-profit legal entity, but with an explicit prioritization of social objectives over financial 
objectives in the statutes of the organization. In order to demonstrate the clear social emphasis, 
COL-FP explicitly communicated its social objectives through various media channels, making 
sure that the organization’s social orientation was well understood.  
In addition, the founders of COL-FP also proposed a new concept with regard to the way a 
social business should be financed. Despite the organization’s incorporation as a for-profit 
entity, the founders sought to acquire interest free loans instead of donations. With this, they 
proposed an alternative for donors that wanted to maximize their social impact. As opposed to 
donations that could only be used for a social cause once, they argued that interest free loans 
could be used over and over again. After having received the initial investment, investors could 
chose to recycle their money and support a new social business. It was part of Yunus’ concept 
that social businesses shouldn’t operate in the “tax exempted sector” but rather “within the 
commercial market” in order to incentivize organizational leaders to find creative solutions to 
reach financial sustainability and thereby prove that the solution of social problems didn’t have to 
depend on the goodwill of donors. COL-FP thus also fixed in its statutes that any profit that would 
be generated could only be reinvested in the further pursuit of the social mission, and not be 
distributed to investors. A representative of the incubator who had been involved since COL-FP 
had started to operate explained: 
“When you invest in a social business like [COL-FP], you invest in an organization 
that will continue to exist as it seeks to be financially sustainable. So the 
organization will continue to create social impact with the dollar that you have 
invested. If you donate the dollar to a traditional nonprofit, the money is used to 
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realize a project that creates social impact one time only. And also, investors can 
get their money back and invest it in the next social business. The money is 
recycled.” [COL-FP-2.4] 
From a legal point of view, COL-FP thus made a clear decision for a for-profit incorporation. 
However, the founders publicly theorized about the constraints of the for-profit / nonprofit 
dichotomy to gain moral legitimacy for their new hybrid approach. This delegitimization of 
traditional health care provision – be it within the private, the public or the third sector – served 
as a basis to make sense of their new type of hybrid organization. In other words, they 
proactively made a normative case for their existence in order to gain the moral legitimacy 
of relevant stakeholders. 
CTP1: Experiencing the limits of philanthropic funding 
Many influential stakeholders, including potential funders, agreed with COL-FP’s argument that it 
needed a redefinition of capitalism. However, the organization experienced the limits of its 
innovative hybrid approach when it started to seek seed financing. Individual representatives of a 
large Colombian company (hereafter “the Colombian company”) were in theory willing to support 
the organization. Yet, these individuals were unable to convince their peers, who wanted to avoid 
potential criticism from audiences that wouldn’t understand why a socially oriented organization 
should take the form of a for-profit. The representative of the incubation program explained:  
“The thing is [the Colombian company] has a social welfare tradition when it 
comes to their social activities. So, they want to give social projects money without 
getting it back. That’s also how it is written in their internal guidelines. They only 
support nonprofits. [COL-FP-2.4]” 
The tension of being incorporated as a for-profit versus gaining support from nonprofit funders – 
or more generall, between establishing an innovative business model vs. depending on 
institutionalized financing mechanisms was thus a tension over means rooted in institutional 
voids between the social welfare and the commercial logic. 
RC1: Navigating Around the Tensions and Sensemaking of a New Approach to Social Impact 
Creation 
Sensing that the reasons why the Colombian company couldn’t support COL-FP were mainly 
related to cognitive barriers among a few of the company’s representatives who didn’t understand 
why a socially oriented organization would take the form of a for-profit, the founders continued to 
solicit the financial support fo the Colombian company. They felt that it was a matter of further 
increasing the moral acceptance within the Colombian company to persuade them and dealing 
with the internal guidelines at a later stage. The founders thus continued to emphasize the 
moral case of COL-FP by stressing the weaknesses of the Colombian health care system 
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and emphasizing the innovative commercial approach of COL-FP. This reasoning – or 
sensemaking (creative strategy) – emphasized the commercial face of the innovative hybrid 
identity in order to position the organization as an alternative to the dysfunctional publicly 
organized health system, where institutional voids between the formal and informal strategic 
action fields prevailed. The emphasis was thus on being different than any other health 
player and indedependent from public – that is – collective decision making, which was 
suceptible to corruption and other institutional weaknesses. By doing so, they succeeded in 
getting the buy in of an increasing amount of representatives within the Colombian company and 
overcoming the cognitive barriers that had led to the tension in the first instance. COL-FP’s 
founder explained: “After a while [the Colombian company] found it more and more interesting to 
give money that helps to create a sustainable model that can go on alone after a while. [COL-FP-
2.2]” 
However, due to internal guidelines, the company still wasn’t allowed to support a for-profit 
organization. COL-FP thus sought for ways how it could access the funding that the company 
was in theory willing to provide. The founders thus started to search for potential solutions to 
navigate around the internal guidelines. In discussions with the incubator and with supportive 
representatives of the Colombian company, the founders finally found a detour through which 
COL-FP could gain more acceptance and how funding could reach the organization without 
breaking the internal guidelines. An NGO that had worked with the Colombian company for 
several years agreed to enter a partnership with COL-FP and to act as an intermediary 
through which money could flow. In an interview, the manager of the incubation program 
explained: 
“So we proposed a solution, and the way we did it is as follows: [The incubator] 
has a contract with [the NGO] and [the company]. [The NGO] is a local 
organization and [the Colombian company] has the money that we need. [The 
Colombian company] already had a contract with the [NGO], so there will be no 
money that will flow in our incubation fund, it goes directly from [the company] to 
[the NGO]. And then [the NGO] contracts [COL-FP] to provide the services.” 
[COL-FP-2.4] 
In order to convince the NGO, COL-FP had to emphasize the social part of its hybrid identity by 
stressing that they were pursuing similar goals. COL-FP thus didn’t succeed in receiving interest 
free loans as initially proposed. COL-FP thus managed to resolve the cognitive barriers that 
had led to the tension by making a moral case with an emphasis on the commercial logic 
and to overcome the technical barriers of internal guidelines through collaboration with an 
NGO, that is, with an emphasis on the social welfare logic.  
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Outcome: A Preliminary Funding Solution 
In sum, it can be observed that with regard to the experienced tension concerning its financing, 
COL-FP succeeded in maintaining a fragile equilibrium. It received the necessary funding – and 
thus the legitimacy of resourceful actors – to be able to continue establishing its hybrid approach. 
Although the Colombian regulations lack a legal entity for a hybrid organization like COL-FP, and 
although donations aren’t usually granted to for-profit organizations, the founders discovered 
ways to overcome the tensions by making a moral case for their existence and navigating around 
the technical obstacles that inhibited them from accessing funding. The solution, however, is 
fragile in the sense that the organization wasn’t able to directly access funding, that it was thus 
not a long-term investment, and that it meant a major deviance from the original hybrid approach 
of the organization, given that the dependence on donations was one of the main arguments of 
Muhammad Yunus concerning the reasons why nonprofit organizations were inefficient and 
ineffective. It remained to be seen whether COL-FP would be able to access funding as a hybrid 
organization once it had further proven its model.  
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Table 15:  Trajectory of Tensions, Strategies and Hybridization Patterns in COL-FP 









Provide affordable health care to 
low-income people, prove new type 
of capitalism (hybrid) 
   
Self-Definition / 
communication 
Hybrid innovative business model 
(hybrid) 
 Emphasize innovativeness of new 
commercially oriented hybrid 
approach (Sensemaking - creative 
strategy – emphasis on commercial 
logic) 
 
Structure Incorporate as a for-profit business 
(commercial) 
   
Financing Suggest innovative form of 
financing (hybrid) 
Establish innovative business model 
vs. depend on institutionalized 
financing mechanisms (tension over 
means/institutional void between 
social welfare and commercial logic) 
Accept nonprofit funding (Dismissing 
strategy – emphasis on social welfare 
logic) 
Short-term funding solution, 
dependence on NGO 
Revenue 
generation 




Deliver products and services 
through existing private health 
providers (commercial logic) 
   
External 
relations 
Position as an alternative to the 
public health system (commercial) 
 Partner with NGO to channel through 
donations (Dismissing strategy – 




   Fragile equilibrium 
 substantial emphasis on social 
welfare logic 
 short-term funding in the form of 
donation 
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6.1.4 SA-FP: Leaving the Fast Lane 
SA-FP is a for-profit hybrid organization, initiated by the CEO of a South African company in 2011 
(hereafter the mother company). SA-FP aims at providing health care services at an affordable 
price to under-served communities and thus to establish an alternative to public and third sector 
health provision in South Africa. However, at the same time, it was also launched with the aim to 
establish a network of clinics that could be used as distribution channel for goods and services for 
low-income populations.  
Based on his observations of the domestic health sector, the founder of SA-FP developed the 
vision to establish a for-profit company that would operate at a large-scale and iron out the 
inefficiencies that prevailed in the South African health market. In an interview, he recalled 
his motivation: 
“One of the things that always amazed me was that you would have this 
completely inappropriate health seeking behavior through the lack of knowledge, 
the lack of confidence, the lack of advice or advisory ability and the lack of product 
availability. And so what would literally happen is, you would work in the casualty, 
get through the motor vehicle accidents etc, you get to there at 9 o'clock walk 
back at the waiting area and the place would be packed by the walk-ins. And the 
people in the room would be young well-dressed couples with a baby. And you 
bring them in and what you will find is a gastro, or a rhinitis or things that are really 
marginal. And what had happened to these people is that they had worked all day, 
they had gotten home, they got to the child minder and she would say: the baby is 
sick. And they only reaction pattern that they had available to them, was take a 
pile of money, take a taxi, ride to the nearest hospital, sit there for three hours 
waiting to see a doctor, to be told: the baby is good. Here is some paracetamol 
and off you go. The kind of stuff that your mother and my mother would have 
handled on their own because of societal knowledge, societal experience, 
because of support structures and confidence and because of availability of 
product.” [SA-FP-7.1] 
In addition, the founder was convinced that it was necessary to redesign the allocation of human 
resources in the South African health sector. Nurses were able to treat a large part of the 
diseases, however, the way the system was structured channeled all patients to highly skilled 
health personnel. The fee-based service model of SA-FP thus sought to enable the generation of 
financial surpluses and the empowerment of black women through the use of a franchised 
business model where the franchisor supports franchisees (nurses) for a period of five years. 
This support included providing seed and growth capital, establishing the infrastructure with the 
medical equipment and furnishings required to operate, and providing business skills training 
(specifically financial management and marketing training). SA-FP’s clinics were meant to be 
strongly standardized in an effort to allow for high efficiency and economies of scale.  
At the beginning of data collection, SA-FP (as a franchisor) was not yet incorporated as its own 
legal entity but rather operated as an intrapreneurial initiative. Despite its entrepreneurial 
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orientation, SA-FP was financed like a CSI (corporate social investment) initiative meaning that 
an annual budget was defined for the project. In addition, revenues were generated through the 
direct sales of health services, which were paid cash at the legally incorporated for-profit health 
facilities. In 2013, the franchisor SA-FP finally also incorporated as a separate legal entity.  
Data collection took place at the mother company’s headquarter, where the main administrative 
function were located as well as in three clinics around Johannesburg. As data collection and 
analysis for SA-FP revealed, the organization faced two major CTPs and reacted in two response 
cycles over a period of two years (see table 16). 
Starting Point 
The founder of the mother company knew that the kind of systemic change he wanted to make in 
the South African healthcare system was difficult to achieve and would require the collaboration 
with actors that had the resources and the capability to support this endeavor. Particularly in its 
early stages, SA-FP needed support from actors who shared the goal of improving the state of 
health in South Africa. Not only was their financial support crucial in order to scale the model, but 
also their expertise and network in the South African health market. Although determined to 
launch SA-FP as a for-profit business, the founder knew that supporters were mainly to be found 
in the public and third sector. Private health care providers in South Africa usually didn’t target 
low-income customers and were thus unlikely to be interested in SA-FP’s plans. SA-FP’s mother 
company therefore started to get in touch with relevant actors from the third and public sector. 
At the same time, the mother company started to develop the business model based on the 
principle of maximum efficiency and fast scaling. An ambitious scaling plan was developed, 
foreseeing the launch of 200 clinics within a period of two years. Processes were designed in a 
highly efficient and pragmatic way, as this was necessary to allow for fast scaling. In order to 
meet the shortage of human resources in the health market, for instance, the founder deeply 
believed in the need of “right-skilling medical staff”: 
“If we are going to wait until we got enough doctors in this country or in this 
continent, to deal with the health challenges that we have, we are going to see 
many dead people before we fix it. We have to task shift the services into other 
professions. Nurses need to do what doctors used to so. Assistant pharmacists 
need to do what a pharmacist used to do. Community workers need to do what 
nurse assistants used to do. We need to cascade responsibility down the 
qualification level in order to ensure that we get enough affordable resource in this 
space.” [SA-FP-7.1]  
SA-FP was thus built on a pragmatic reasoning that emphasized the societal benefits of 
redesigning the way health care was provided in South Africa. 
154 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
 
 
CTP1: Struggling to Find Investment Partners 
Intending to set up SA-FP as an initiative that involved all relevant parties, the founder and a 
designated management team started to reach out for potential partners. However, as an internal 
document provided by SA-FP describes, finding partners who believed in the business model and 
who were willing to collaborate was difficult: 
“[The founder] describes early attempts to get the project off the ground. He had 
the idea, supplies, relationships and network to get this going, but he wanted it to 
be an inclusive process with all the relevant parties (mainly other NGOs) involved 
in the project. This was a mistake. After a year of meetings, conferences and 
discussions back and forth, nothing happened. The entire project was at risk of 
becoming a political football, or getting lost in other organisations’ processes.” 
[SA-FP-7.20]  
The major bottleneck that SA-FP experienced at that time related to the challenge of mobilizing 
seed funding for the market-oriented business model. As the same document indicated, the 
tension between establishing an innovative business model and referring to conventional 
sources of funding was a tension over means that mainly related to conflicts between the 
social welfare and the commercial logic and could be traced back to the demands of 
potential financial partners: 
“Many NGOs/CSIs and governmental non-profit funding sources (…) have ethical 
concerns about allowing the recipients of their funding (…) operate in a for-profit 
manner.” [SA-FP-7.20] 
Given these experiences, the mother company internally discussed the possibility of incorporating 
SA-FP as a nonprofit. Several employees advocated for this solution, as it seemed to better 
corresponded to the way health care for low-income populations was organized in South Africa. 
Furthermore it better reflected the strongly institutionalized principle of free access to health care 
in South Africa and would thus facilitate access to the necessary resources, particularly funding 
and strategic partnerships with incumbent players in the health market. In contrast, the founder 
was convinced that SA-FP could only succeed if considerable scale was achieved and he 
believed this was only possible through a for-profit business model. He explained: 
“If it is going to fundamentally alter the secure access to quality health care 
services in communities across this country, you can't do it with five. You need 
2000, 5000, if we're going to move the needle. This is not a feel good project. It 
has never been. This was about trying to find out if we could come up with a 
model that you could then rapidly scale in order to fundamentally change the 
delivery of health products and services. We won’t achieve that with donations.” 
[SA-FP-7.1]  
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The internal dilemma between incorporating as a for-profit or as a nonprofit was thus again a 
tension over means emerging from institutional voids at the interstices of the social 
welfare and the commercial logic and related to conflicting claims of members of the 
management team. 
RC1: Piloting the Project as a Corporate Social Investment 
The founder was convinced that the venture had to primarily follow a commercial logic, even if 
many internal and external stakeholders disagreed with this approach. However, it was also clear 
for the founder that the initiative couldn’t attract any for-profit investor for the time being. The 
model first had to be proven and incorporating as a separate legal entity hence didn’t seem to 
make sense at that time. Instead, the mother company decided to avoid the exposure to 
conflicting external demands and first pilot a test version of SA-FP, which would operate as 
a Corporate Social Investment (CSI) initiative under its own organizational umbrella and be 
entirely financed by the mother company. With this strategy, SA-FP carried the entire financial 
burden, but it could at least write off the costs as social investment, even if it was clear for the 
founder that the aim of the venture was to become a for-profit company. The strategy can thus be 
classified as a separating strategy as SA-FP decoupled the structure from the actual objective of 
the initiative. 
Within this secured space, the mother company could further develop the business model, 
including the various measures that were believed to ensure the necessary efficiency. Once the 
business model was proven, the mother company could then spin-off SA-FP as its own company 
and seek the necessary resources to further scale the project. 
CTP2: A Disenchanting Pilot Phase 
Given the difficulties in finding suitable partners, the mother company had decided to act as the 
sole founder of SA-FP in order to avoid controversies that would inhibit the fast growth of the 
company. Nevertheless, the organization soon realized that collaborations with actors of the 
health sector were crucial and that even as the sole founder, the organization had to face 
controversial discussions.  
Distributing health products or services in low-income communities, for instance, was difficult if 
SA-FP appeared as a brand belonging to the mother company. Large companies in South Africa 
were typically in the hands of white business men and were therefore not very trustworthy in the 
eyes of low-income – mostly black – communities given the centuries of ethnic opression that 
they had suffered during colonialism and apartheid. After the end of apartheid, when the ANC – 
the political party advocating for the rights of black populations – took over the government, a 
range of programs had been started to promote the empowerment of black populations. 
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Economic liberalization had been a key pillar of ANC’s political strategy. The private health 
market in South Africa is therefore well developped. However, it mainly targets the higher income 
levels. For the low-income populations, the government had thus strongly advocated the principle 
of free access to health care in order to redress the high inequality between black and white 
populations.  
In order to tap into the market of low-income customers, the mother company had therefore at the 
beginning of the pilot phase approached informal traders – so-called spazas – and tried to 
convince them to partner and distribute their medical products. An internal document provided by 
SA-FP describes: 
“The original business model conceptualisation included informal traders (e.g. 
spazas). This association of micro-entrepreneurs from the informal sector is a 
major characteristic of almost any inclusive BoP business model and a key feature 
of the benefits for poor people. However, management had no direct experience 
with accessing this channel, so they elected to go into partnership with a company 
that was already supplying this informal network with other products like mobile 
pre-paid airtime. [The former manager] originally contracted this company to 
supply the spaza shops with [medical supply in a box]. (…) This component of the 
pilot was very successful with demand far exceeding supply. (…) However, the 
company raised an important point: What is the legality of supplying medication 
without the package insert? And spaza shops owners in [Site 1] and [Site 2] 
echoed similar sentiments: 
1) They were concerned with what impact this would have on their established 
logistics and distribution partners. Will involving themselves with [SA-FP] anger 
current supply chain partners? (…) 
2) Assuming they accept this box, they have a very limited understanding of 
health aliments. They would not know where to begin advising people on what to 
use and purchase. Therefore, they will need additional training.  
3) What if customers develop complications as a result of medicinal products that 
were sold to them (…)? How will the shop owner who sold the medication help? 
Will this type of event not lead to a negative backlash from the community on 
them and their stores? Did the box hold a potentially big risk to the store’s brand 
reputation in these stocking products?” [SA-FP-7.20] 
Reflecting the concerns of the black low-income population, spaza owners were thus very 
skeptical about the mother company’s proposal to collaborate. SA-FP therefore faced a tension 
between gaining the acceptance of extant market players at the BoP and establishing a 
market-oriented business model as a company with not only commercial but also “white” 
origins. The tension was thus a tension over goals rooted in contradictions between the 
social welfare and the commercial logic, which emerged due to the low legitimacy that SA-
FP had in low-income communities in South Africa.  
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In addition, SA-FP soon faced considerable challenges in implementing the fast-scaling, 
efficiency-maximizing business model that the founders and the management team had 
developed. First, for customers, getting treated by a nurse was not equivalent to getting 
treated by a doctor. As the first months of operation had shown, nurses were considered to be 
inferior to doctors, even if the disease that needed treatment didn’t require particularly specialized 
knowledge. However, employing doctors instead of nurses was not possible at the scale that SA-
FP sought to achieve, as this would have overthrown the basic financial projections on which the 
business model was built. Similarly, the management team of SA-FP realized that practices 
which functioned at one site could not necessarily be replicated at another site. As an internal 
document provided by SA-FP revealed, differences across South Africa forced the 
organization to adapt its practices, for instance, with regard to price setting: 
“The correct price that the market is willing to pay for [SA-FP]’s services is yet to 
be determined. The experiences at [Site 1] showed that pricing can vary 
significantly based on the competition and the degree of price sensitivity of the 
immediate community. (…) Diverging health outcomes are not only found between 
healthcare sectors, they are also geographical. This partly reflects differences in 
burden of disease, infrastructure and lifestyle. Significant differences exist 
between health outcomes in different regions of South Africa.” [SA-FP-7.20] 
The tension between increasing the efficiency of processes through standardization and 
scale vs. responding to local customer demand was thus a tension over means rooted in 
institutional voids between Western-style business approaches and local values and 
beliefs at the BoP – or, in other words, between Western-style and local strategic action 
fields. The tension, however, didn’t emerge as a consequence of conflicting demands, but 
rather as a material tension embedded in the business model of SA-FP. In addition, the 
tension can also be classified as a contradiction between the social welfare logic, which 
stresses the need for locally customized approaches and the commercial logic, which 
stresses standardization as a way to maximize efficiency. 
Second, SA-FP realized that customers were used to buying their medicine at informal retail 
channels where drugs were sold over the counter without any quality check or proper diagnosis. 
Such practices were clearly illegal in South Africa, however, the responsible authorities failed to 
enforce the regulatory institutions in the health market. One of the nurses explained:  
“The challenge is that, especially the black community, they feel more comfortable 
when they are given some medication. (…) And sometimes it is also the question: 
do I empower someone or do I just give the medication. I would like to empower 
people to take charge of their lives and of their health, but I am always caught 
between: when I give them medication, am I really empowering them? For 
example in the case of hypertension, it is more important that people live healthy, 
that would get their hypertension down. But if I don’t give them the medicine they 
just go somewhere else. And then I loose them as customers.” [SA-FP-7.7] 
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In this context, customer habits incentivized the franchisees to neglect the social rationale and 
directly meet customer demands for fast access to medication. Institutional voids between 
formal and informal strategic action fields therefore resulted in a tension over goals 
between educating people, that is, providing services based on a social rational vs. 
adapting to local customer demands, that is, providing services based on a commercial 
rationale.  
In addition, with regard to price setting, SA-FP also soon realized that the willingness and ability 
to pay for health services was much lower than expected. An internal document provided by SA-
FP described the situation as follows: 
“Community employment and willingness to pay is much lower than expected for 
most clinic locations: Except for the [SA-FP] Clinics in [site 1], most of the clinics 
were located in communities of huge unemployment and very low willingness to 
pay. Not only are people in these communities willing to wait in long public queues 
for healthcare, but they also survive on grants of R280 per month, so paying 150 
is out of the question.” [SA-FP-7.19] 
In sum, SA-FP faced a tension over goals among the nurses that run the clinics. They 
reported to feel constantly torn between identifying as a member of SA-FP and feeling as a 
member of the low-income communities themselves. The institutional void underlying the 
tension was thus a contradiction between Western-style market approaches and local values, 
beliefs and habits. Ultimately, this tension also manifested as a tension over goals between 
the social welfare and the commercial revenue as nurses were caught in the dilemma 
between setting prices that generated enough revenue and setting prices that were 
affordable. 
Given these tensions, the mother company realized that the scaling plans were impossible to 
achieve in the aspired time frame. In addition, the pilot project had absorbed much more money 
than initially envisaged and SA-FP started to reach its financial limits. An internal document 
described the situation:  
“After the initial pilot, funding still remains a challenge. According to [the project 
manager], internal funding still requires changing the mindset of the “hard-core 
(…)” executives who still perceive [SA-FP] as a CSI side project and not as a 
viable future business opportunity. Luckily, the core group of executives (and 
shareholders) do not share the same opinion. Unfortunately, scale is still required 
to make the project viable and attractive for external funding, but as external 
funding is required to make the project scalable, a vicious cycle has emerged. 
Many of the external partners who are willing to fund [SA-FP] towards scale 
require a minimum of ten self-sufficient clinics. (…). With only one self-sufficient 
clinic (…), funding remains the pre-eminent challenge for the entire endeavor.” 
[SA-FP-7.20] 
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Launching SA-FP as a CSI initiative had, on the one hand, allowed starting to operate with no 
further delay and without substantial controversies with other founders. On the other hand, it had 
concentrated the entire risk of the venture on the shoulders of the mother company. Getting other 
parties on board to share the costs and minimize the reputational risks was thus crucial. The 
need to seek funding from collaborators and consequently the tension between 
incorporating as a for-profit or nonprofit was thus on the table again: 
“Sharing the business risks with partners is another discussion point. Currently, 
[the mother company] is taking too much risk in expanding and developing [SA-
FP] on its own. Hence, [the mother company] urgently needs to diversify its risk 
pool via strategic funding or participating with partners to help develop and 
expand [SA-FP] into a national and regional value proposition that can make a 
meaningful difference to the lives of thousands of South Africans.“ [SA-FP-7.20]  
„We have to register it. And we are thinking about a PTY, or maybe also to have it 
as an NPO, cause it is not supposed to make profit. It is supposed to be a vehicle 
to assist to this.” [SA-FP-7.4] 
Once again, these tensions were rooted in institutional voids between the social welfare and the 
commercial logic as they related to the deeply institutionalized archetypes and routines in the 
third and private sector. 
RC2 – Setting up a Hybrid Structure and Slowing Down Scaling Plans 
Having learnt from the pilot phase, SA-FP decided to take measures to alleviate the tensions. 
The management team realized once more that reaching scale was crucial for the success of the 
endeavor. Operating under the organizational umbrella of the mother company didn’t allow 
reaching this scale, as it hindered any other investors to get involved and leverage the venture. 
The management team thus realized that it was time to create its own legal structure. Given the 
previously mentioned dilemma between incorporating as a for-profit or a nonprofit, SA-FP 
decided to establish a hybrid organizational structure – a for-profit and a nonprofit 
organization – at the franchisor level in order to enable the organization to access both 
philanthropic and investor funding. This strategy was a cumulative hybridization strategy in that it 
aimed at balancing the disparate demands of the social welfare and the commercial logics. On 
the one hand, the nonprofit organization allowed leveraging the incentives provided by the 
BBBEE framework, which was an influential regulatory framework that required South African 
companies to invest 3% of their annual profits into projects that empowered the Black South 
African population. The founder explained: 
“You’ve got the trust, then the operating company, then the franchisees. The trust 
is the nonprofit. The operating company is for-profit. The trust is the vehicle into 
which people put their money. That gives them their points for the BBBEE 
scorecard.” [SA-FP-7.1] 
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The program manager of SA-FP further added: 
So our plan to package this whole thing, so that other companies can invest, 
cause their is lots of companies that have to do BBBEE. Other companies can put 
forward their 3%. And with that, if we get our own clients, for example, putting their 
3%, then, it's a whole different thing. (…) So for us, the perfect opportunity for us 
would be to say (…) guys, put in all your money, cause we all have to comply, put 
all your money towards this project, so that we can actually have the 200 clinics in 
twelve months. We want to build this whole infrastructure. We would need a much 
bigger team to make sure we as a franchisor hold the standards consistently 
across the country. Then we would make a real impact out there and we would 
have our clients achieve their BBBEE. Some people struggle, they don't know 
what to do with their 3%. They don't get 15 out of 15 or 20 out of 20 for 
procurement.” [SA-FP-7.4] 
On the other hand, the for-profit organization also opened up the possibility to attract investors for 
the operating company in order to further scale SA-FP. The founder of SA-FP was convinced that 
this type of funding was necessary, as it was less restricted and could thus be deployed more 
freely as donations. However, the experiences from the pilot phase also showed that the scaling 
plan was too ambitious, given the challenging conditions that prevailed in the South African BoP 
context. Operational procedures such as price setting needed to be adapted to the local 
conditions. An internal document summarized the lesson that the organization had learnt: 
“Our initial hypothesis was to charge a uniform set of prices across all clinics in 
order to standardized prices to facilitate scalability. However, after visiting the 
clinics and communities, we have concluded each clinic should continue to charge 
different prices ranging from R100-R150 based on community unemployment and 
willingness to pay, availability and quality of local public clinics and private GPs, 
location and proximity to town centers, shopping centers, etc.” [SA-FP-7.19] 
With regard to the institutionally rooted tensions that SA-FP faced in its interaction with incumbent 
market players and with the public sector, SA-FP needed to invest significant efforts in gaining 
moral acceptance for its approach. This required the organization to prove the sincerity of its 
social goals by engaging in regular talks and showing presence on the ground. This was 
necessary to be able to enter collaborations with local actors that could spread the word for SA-
FP’s approach and thereby raise the demand of customers for its health care services. However, 
it also dramatically slowed down the operations of SA-FP and challenged the ambitious 
business plan. The scarcity of human resources, the low willingness and ability to pay for health 
services as well as the institutional circumstances in the South African health market forced SA-
FP to slow down its scaling ambitions. As a consequence, SA-FP needed to put a greater 
emphasis on the social welfare logic as initially planned. Having started the initiative with the 
plan to incorporate SA-FP as a for-profit company only, the founder ultimately decided to opt for a 
hybrid structure approach meaning that he founded both a for-profit and a nonprofit legal entity at 
the franchisor level. 
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In sum, the strong institutionalization of the principle of free access to health care, particularly 
among representatives of the public and third sector, was a greater obstacle for SA-FP than 
originally thought. It was, however, also clear that the current health system, which operated 
under this principle, hadn’t been able to manage the severe health issues in the country. The 
founder therefore also engaged in many discussions with key stakeholders to explain why South 
Africa was far from reaching free universal health care and that the country needed more 
pragmatic solutions to meet the urgent health needs of its population. An internal document 
described the situation: 
“Universal free access, (…) remains to some extent theoretical, since hidden 
costs are not taken into account: These include transport, which is one of the 
factors which the [SA-FP] model tries to address, as well as lost revenue caused 
by long waits as people queuing at a clinic are unable to be at work. The [SA-FP] 
model thus offers a wider range of options for people living in poverty, and the 
calculation is that people are often prepared to pay a fee in exchange for shorter 
waiting periods or shorter distances covered.” [SA-FP-7.9] 
He thus engaged in lobbying activities – which can be classified as part of an active strategy – 
in order to gain moral legitimacy for a pragmatic approach to health care. 
Outcome 
SA-FP faced considerable challenges in implementing the business model in the pace and with 
the efficiency that were initially envisaged. Before becoming a self-sustainable or even profitable 
business that could attract investors, SA-FP depended on the support of actors from the 
public and third sector to get off the ground and prove the concept. Although the founder 
had been aware of this since the beginning, he didn’t expect to face as much skepticism towards 
his commercially oriented approach.  
At the time of data collection, SA-FP was a fragile case in that several of the tensions that the 
organization had experienced in CTP1 and CTP2 remained substantial. SA-FP still carried the 
whole financial risk and knew it had to find financial partners for the initiative to survive. 
Employees and market participants further still remained skeptical. In the South African 
context, gaining legitimacy for a market-oriented approach to health care at the BoP had 
thus proven to be very challenging for SA-FP. It was therefore essential for the organization to 
gain the acceptance of actors from the public and third sector who could help SA-FP to become a 
legitimate player in low-income communities. Only with their support could SA-FP overcome the 
material trade-offs in the business model. 
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Table 16: Trajectory of Tensions, Strategies and Hybridization Patterns in SA-FP 













Implement a large and fast 
scaling, efficiency-
maximizing social franchise 
health care company for 
the BoP, establish 
distribution channel for 
goods and services for 
BoP market (hybrid logic) 
     
Self-Definition / 
communication 
For-profit BoP business 
model (commercial logic) 
   Emphasize sincerity of 
social goals (Dismissing 
strategy - social welfare 
logic) 
Greater emphasis on 
social welfare logic 
Structure Intrapreneurial initiative 
(commercial logic) 
Incorporate as a for-




voids between social 
welfare and 
commercial logic) 









Incorporate as a for-
profit vs. incorporate as 
a nonprofit organization 
(tension over 
means/institutional voids 
between social welfare 
and commercial logic) 
Incorporate a hybrid 
structure (nonprofit and 
for-profit organization) 





Financing Funding from mother 
company; seek co-
investment partners in 
private, public and third 
sector (commercial logic) 
Establish market-
oriented business 








business model vs. 
convince nonprofit 
funders (tension over 
means/institutional voids 
between social welfare 
and commercial logic) 
 Success of initiative 
dependent on whether 
organization can 
convince further partners 
Revenue 
generation 
Sale of health services to 
BoP customers 
(commercial logic) 
     
 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 163 
 
 

















product and service 
delivery (commercial 
logic) 
  Provide services based on social 
rationale vs. based on commercial 
rationale (tension over goals 
/institutional voids between formal 
and informal strategic action fields) 
Reduce level of standardization by 
adapting product and service delivery to 
local conditions (dismissing strategy - social 
welfare logic) 
Need to slow down scaling 
ambitions 
Set prices based on costs vs. set 
affordable prices (tension over 
goals/institutional void between 
social welfare and commercial logic) 
Increase the efficiency of processes 
vs. respond to customer demand 
(tension over means/institutional 
void between Western and local 
strategic action fields + between 









  Identify as member of low-income 
communities vs. identify as member 
of market-oriented health provider 
(tension over goals/institutional voids 
between Western and local strategic 
action fields) 




Position as an 
alternative to public 
and third sector and 
simultaneously seek 
collaboration with 









oriented business vs. Gain 
acceptance of incumbent health 
players in health markets (tension 
over goals/institutional voids 
between Western-style and local 
strategic action fields) 
 Slow down scaling plans and increase 
presence on the ground to prove sincerity 
of social goals (dismissing strategy, 
emphasis on social welfare logic) 
 Lobby for more pragmatic, market 
oriented approach to health care in South 
Africa (creative strategy – hybrid logic) 
Success of initiative 
dependent on acceptance 




     Fragile Equilibrium 
 Short term resolution of 
tensions 
 Unclear whether 
organization would be 
able to gain legitimacy in 
low-income settings and 
from other financiers 
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6.1.5 Comparative Reflections on Hybrid Organizations with Origins in the 
Commercial Logic 
Comparing the four hybrid organizations with origins in the commercial logic revealed that two 
organizations – MEX-FP and KEN-FP – could ultimately establish virtuous cycles, meaning 
that they were successful in sustainably overcoming the tensions that they faced through 
hybridization strategies – or, in other words, they were able to turn institutional voids into 
opportunity spaces. In contrast, COL-FP and SA-FP were only able to establish fragile 
equilibriums, meaning that they succeeded in resolving tensions in the short term through 
hybridization strategies, but remained likely to face the same or new substantial tensions soon. In 
order to understand the process of turning institutional voids into opportunity spaces, the 
following sections will summarize the tensions that have manifested, and the hybridization 
strategies that have been applied by hybrid organizations with a commercial origin. 
Subsequently, the focus will be laid on the factors that enabled and/or constrained the 
organizations in referring to hybridization strategies to manage the tensions. 
On the Process of Turning Institutional Voids into Opportunity Spaces 
Determining the Types of Tensions and Institutional Voids 
Taking a deeper look at the tensions in the virtuous and the fragile cases revealed that 
organizations faced tensions relating to conflicting demands of referent audiences from the 
commercial and the social welfare logic and to other institutional voids, namely voids between 
formal and informal strategic action fields (e.g. price-fixing agreements in Mexican health sector) 
as well as voids between Western and local strategic action fields (e.g. health seeking behavior 
of low-income populations). These institutional voids manifested in the form of tensions over 
goals and tensions over means (see table 17 for a detailed account of the tensions and 
hybridization strategies and appendix 5 and 6 for the corresponding empirical material). Further, 
they surfaced as a consequence of conflicting demands of adherents of conflicting logics or as 
material tensions that were embedded in the business models of the organizations and that 
became salient through external events or institutional voids. 
Identifying the Hybridization Strategies and Hybridization Patterns 
At first glance, both virtuous cases seemed to differ substantially with regard to their hybridization 
strategies. While MEX-FP kept positioning itself as a new type of hybrid organization, and thus 
explicitly emphasized its innovativeness in RC1 and RC2 (towards present and future employees 
asn well as external partners), KEN-FP decided to take a step back when a tension over goals 
between the social welfare and the commercial logic surfaced within the organization and risked 
to cause substantial uncertainty among employees. The founders ultimately decided to shift their 
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communication (towards employees and potential funders) and position KEN-FP as a normal 
commercial business instead of defining themselves as some kind of socially oriented 
organization.  
However, comparing the hybridization strategies of MEX-FP and KEN-FP in more detail revealed 
important similarities. Although overall, MEX-FP positioned itself as a new type of hybrid 
organization, it kept emphasizing that it was a for-profit when facing a tension that related to 
institutional voids between the social welfare and the commercial logic. This tension over goals 
emerged in MEX-FP’s interaction with employees, as the job profiles that strongly reflected the 
efficiency maximizing approach of MEX-FP conflicted with the imprinting of health personnel in 
particular. As a response, the organization pursued a strategy of inspirational leadership 
stressing the innovativeness of the organization as a for-profit – but not profit maximizing – 
organization operating in the market. MEX-FP emphasized that it was distinct from extant health 
players of the commercial sector, which sought profit maximization but also distinct from third 
sector organizations that were dependent on donations and thus restricted in their decision-
making and financial sustainability. In other words, the organization explicitly adopted an 
offensive approach of sensemaking in which it pointed to the prevalence of institutional voids 
between the social welfare and the commercial logic, namely that both “pure logics” failed to 
provide affordable high-quality health care to low-income people, in order to gain moral legitimacy 
for its innovative hybrid approach (creative strategy). However, as the organization explained, the 
hybrid approach needed to have a commercial emphasis given that it enabled the 
organization to change the system from within by defeating health providers with their own 
arguments, namely competition. Hence, the commercial emphasis was argued to be a means to 
a higher end. Aware of the tensions that this hybrid approach could engender, MEX-FP sought to 
be very transparent about its commercial orientation and the need to ensure rigorous cost 
efficiency in order to prove the model was feasible. By doing so, the organization could, on the 
one hand, anticipate criticism from stakeholders arguing that MEX-FP was not social enough. On 
the other hand, this approach allowed MEX-FP to attract – particularly young – employees who 
wanted to contribute to the idealistic objective of making a systemic change in the Mexican health 
market and were attracted by the intellectual challenge of proving a new type of business model. 
However, when MEX-FP faced tensions that related to other types of institutional voids, the 
organization proposed a hybrid approach with an emphasis on its social objectives and 
positioned the commercial logic as a means to a higher end. For instance, when facing a tension 
in its interaction with competitors (based on the institutional voids between formal vs. informal 
strategic action fields), MEX-FP emphasized its higher social goal and, again, positioned the 
founders as inspirational leaders that wanted to bring about systemic change in the Mexican 
health system. 
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Table 17:  Overview of Tensions and Hybridization Strategies in Hybrid Organizations with Commercial Origins 




















Nonprofit background of 
employees vs. gain and 
maintain acceptance of 
business oriented model 




Employees Social welfare / commercial logic 
Impression management and inspirational 
leadership: Emphasize hybrid approach 
with commercial face by stressing the 
need to establish a new type of financially 
sustainable business model requiring 






Sensemaking and inspirational leadership: 
 Point out institutional voids to gain moral 
legitimacy of (future) employees 
 Delegitimize existing health care / social 
welfare approaches 
 Position commercial logic as means to 
higher social end 
- Creative strategy 
Disrupt health markets 









Formal / informal 
strategic action 
fields 
Impression management: Emphasize 
hybrid approach with social face by 






Separation strategy  
Sensemaking 
 Point out institutional voids to gain moral 
legitimacy of relevant stakeholders  
 Delegitimize existing health care / social 
welfare approaches  
 Position commercial logic as means to 
higher social end 
- Creative strategy 
CTP2 / 
RC2 
Provide to public sector 









Western / local 
strategic action 
fields 
Increase focus on cross-subsidization 
between revenues from sale to higher-
income and lower-income populations  - Creative strategy 
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Business model based 
on scale vs. need to 









Western / local 
strategic action 
fields + social 
welfare / 
commercial logic 
Increase educational marketing campaigns 
in collaboration with actors from third and 











hybrid business model 
vs. depend on existing 







Social welfare / 
commercial logic 
Bricolage: 
 Personal equity investment of funders 
(hybrid logic) 
 Invent new type of hybrid funding (hybrid 
logic) 
-  Creative strategy 
Emphasize social goal to mobilize financial 









Sell services / products 
based on social rationale 





Employees Social welfare / commercial logic 
Emphasize goal of establishing financially 








hybrid business model 
vs. depend on existing 







Social welfare / 
commercial logic 
Reverse decoupling:  
 Position as a “normal” busines 
 Take advantage of positive reputation of 
commercial health providers and 
emphasize “direct” downward 




















Social welfare / 
commercial logic 
Sensemaking: Emphasize innovativeness 
of new commercially oriented hybrid 
approach and delegitimize extant health 






Accept nonprofit funding and partner with 






Dismissing strategy  






Incorporate as a for-profit 






Social welfare / 
commercial logic 
Decoupling: Pilot project as a Corporate 





Dismissing strategy  Establish innovative 















vs. Gain acceptance of 







Social welfare / 
commercial logic 
Sensemaking: Lobby for more pragmatic, 
market-oriented approach to health care in 
South Africa - Creative strategy 
Increase the efficiency of 







Western / local 
strategic action 
fields + Social 
welfare / 
commercial logic 
Prove sincerity of social goals by  
 showing more presence on the ground  
 reducing level of standardization 





Dismissing strategy  
Provide services based 
on social rationale vs. 
based on commercial 
rationale 
Tension 
over goals Employees 
Formal / informal 
strategic action 
fields 
Identify as member of 
low-income communities 







Western / local 
strategic action 
fields 
Set prices based on 






Social welfare / 
commercial logic 
Incorporate as a for-profit 







Social welfare / 
commercial logic 
Incorporate a hybrid structure (nonprofit 


















Social welfare / 
commercial logic 
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In addition, when facing a tension in the delivery of products to the public sector and to end 
consumers (based on institutional voids between Western vs. local strategic action fields and on 
institutional voids between the social welfare and the commercial logic), MEX-FP emphasized its 
adherence to the social welfare logic to gain acceptance and support from actors in the third and 
public sector, particularly local organizations that could help raise the demand of low-income 
people for MEX-FP’s products and services. Hence, MEX-FP repeatedly explained that it needed 
to overcome the institutional voids that it faced with a commercial emphasis but needed support 
of third and public sector actors to be able to do so. In other words, the orgainzation made 
sense of the institutional voids it had faced to gain moral legitimacy for its innovative 
hybrid approach.  
KEN-FP also actively made sense of the institutional voids between the social welfare and 
the commercial logic when facing the challenge of not being able to convince funders. By 
suggesting a new type of funding that blended sector logics and thus fit the goal of the 
organization to establish financially sustainable health care facilities, the organization was able to 
mobilize its personal network and access enough financial resources to build the first clinic and 
prove the business concept. Yet, when experiencing another tension between the social welfare 
and the commercial logic, KEN-FP decided to strongly side with the commercial logic by 
positioning the organization as a “normal business” in order to gain cognitive and moral 
legitimacy. In contrast to MEX-FP which decided to keep defeating extant players in the health 
system in Mexico and thus “building upon” the prevalence of institutional voids, KEN-FP 
ultimately decided to circumvent institutional voids and capitalize on cognitively established 
organizational categories. With this approach, KEN-FP succeeded in acquiring long-term 
investment and providing clear guidance for its employees. 
In sum, it can be noted that MEX-FP and KEN-FP both succeeded in turning institutional voids 
into opportunity spaces by referring to impession management, that is, the emphasis of their 
social or their commercial face depending on the audience from which they sought acceptance 
and the argument that they wanted to emphasize. However, the oscillation between logics only 
took place at a ceremonial level of impression management. In fact, neither MEX-FP nor KEN-FP 
made substantial changes in their hybridization patterns. Besides this impression management, 
the organizations pursued different strategies. While MEX-FP referred to more active 
resistance and continued to explicitly position the organization as a hybrid organization 
that challenged the inequitable health system, KEN-FP referred to a more defensive 
strategy of decoupling its structure and communication from its actual behavior. These 
strategies allowed both organizations to gain the legitimacy of essential stakeholders, in particular 
hybrid funders, and manage their expectations.  
The fragile cases revealed different hybridization strategies. COL-FP initially applied a similar 
strategy of decoupling its structure from its actual objectives. The organization incorporated as a 
for-profit although it clearly prioritized social objectives. However, when facing a tension between 
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the social welfare and the commercial logic, COL-FP ultimately had to depart from its initial hybrid 
approach in the area of financing towards a stronger emphasis on the social welfare logic. While 
the organization initially sought to convince funders to provide them with funding that suited their 
hybrid nature, it ultimately had to accept donations to be able to continue its operations. However, 
these donations were not long-term oriented and tied to restrictive accountability requirements.  
The analysis of the second fragile case, SA-FP, depicts similar patterns. After trying to avoid 
tensions between the social welfare and the commercial logic in RC1, SA-FP ultimately faced a 
series of tensions in CTP2 that were rooted in institutional voids between sector logics and other 
contradictions between Western and local strategic action fields. In contrast to the virtuous cases, 
and similarly to COL-FP, SA-FP had to substantially emphasize its adherence to the social 
welfare logic in order to avoid that the tensions intensified. This was particularly necessary to 
overcome the skepticism from external audiences, particularly in low-income communities as well 
as in the public and third sector, about the organization’s sincerity towards social goals.  
In sum, it can be noted that the virtuous cases mainly managed to limit the oscillation 
between logics at a ceremonial level (impression management), while the fragile cases had 
to refer to substantial changes in their hybridization patterns (accepting traditional nonprofit 
funding in COL-FP, creating nonprofit organization and slowing down scaling plans in SA-FP). 
On the Ability to Hybridize  
The present study seeks to understand how field-level factors influence organizations’ ability to 
maintain or implement hybridization strategies in an effort to turn institutional voids into 
opportunity spaces. The ability to hybridize is thus defined as an organization’s ability to freely 
select structures and practices from competing logics in an effort to create a new hybrid 
arrangement and overcome substantial tensions. As the last section has outlined, two cases with 
commercial origins showed the ability to do so and turn institutional voids into opportunity spaces 
through hybridization strategies. Prior research has suggested that the type of tension might 
determine an organizations’ ability to overcome tensions. In particular, tensions over goals have 
been argued to be more difficult to resolve than tensions over means. Looking at organizations 
with commercial origins revealed no significant relationship between the type of tensions that 
organizations faced and the type of hybridization strategies that they implemented. The different 
types of tensions (tensions over goals/tensions over means; tensions emerging from conflicting 
institutional demands/material tensions) as well as the different types of antecedents (institutional 
contradictions between the social welfare logics and the commercial logics; between formal and 
informal strategic action fields; between Western and local strategic action fields) could be found 
in both virtuous and fragile cases.  
However, as the comparative analysis suggests, the success of both virtuous cases is closely 
related to the support that they received and the time in which they were founded. Hybrid 
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organizations with commercial origins were all relatively young and could thus draw from 
experiences that other organizations with similar hybridization patterns had made. Further, they 
could benefit from the existence of new support mechanisms that embraced the idea of blended 
value creation. MEX-FP and KEN-FP had ultimately succeeded in gathering financial resources 
that fit their hybrid nature. MEX-FP started with a larger private investment of the founders and 
later succeeded in closing a first investment round with “hybrid funding”, meaning funding that 
was dedicated to the support of blended value creating organizations. This was also the case in 
KEN-FP. In addition to the private investments of founders, the organization had mobilized 
“hybrid funding” through their social network and ultimately succeeded in receiving an investment 
from an international social investment fund. COL-FP and SA-FP hadn’t been successful in 
raising such funds. Hence, they had to make a compromise and deviate from their initial hybrid 
approach by emphasizing the social welfare logic. This seemed to be the only option for them to 
continue their operations. However, they were still able to draw from the experience of previous 
hybrid approaches, and, in the case of COL-FP, of support from an incubator that focused on 
blended value creation and thus trained the paradoxical cognition of the organization.  
Reflecting on the reasons why MEX-FP and KEN-FP were able to mobilize hybrid funding while 
COL-FP and SA-FP weren’t, two observations appeared to be striking. First, although neither 
MEX-FP nor KEN-FP had proven the financial feasibility of their business model at the time of 
data collection, they both succeeded in convincing social investors. It can thus be assumed that 
the decision criteria of funders were not based on rationality, but rather on other factors that 
suggested investment worthiness. As insights from prior research, field observations and talks of 
the researcher with members of the BVC scene revealed during the field trips, social investment 
funds in developing and emerging economies seemed to emphasize values, practices, routines 
and hiring practices from Western commercial capital markets. It is thus assumed that the 
personal backgrounds of the entrepreneurs played a major role in enabling MEX-FP and KEN-FP 
to access hybrid funding. The founders all depicted a strong Western imprinting, either due to 
their nationality (KEN-FP) or due to their educational background (MEX-FP).  
Having said that, it is not believed that the personal background of COL-FP’s and SA-FP’s 
founders – who also had commercial backgrounds but were Colombians and, respectively, South 
African – was per se inhibiting. However, it also didn’t allow the organizations to compensate for 
their low investment worthiness at the time of data collection.   
Reflections on the influence of the institutional context on hybrid organizations’ ability to hybridize 
will be presented in 6.3 to include the analysis of hybrid organizations with social welfare origins.  
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6.2 Hybrid Organizations with Social Welfare Origins 
6.2.1 MEX-NP: Exiting the Nonprofit World 
MEX-NP is a nonprofit hybrid organization founded in 2005 by a Mexican philanthropist and 
managed by two Mexican managers with professional backgrounds in nonprofit management. 
The organization focuses on providing comprehensive high-quality health services, including not 
only the traditional care of the acutely or chronically ill patient, but also the prevention and early 
detection of disease and the rehabilitation of the disabled. At the time of data collection, MEX-NP 
sought to achieve financial sustainability by generating revenues through out-of-pocket 
payments. However, a large portion of funding came through private and institutional donations 
and later through a grant from a Mexican social investment fund, in which MEX-NP’s founder was 
also involved as a limited partner. Further, MEX-NP had received a significant grant from the 
Mexican government for building a health facility in 2005. 
With its focus on rural and marginalized populations, MEX-NP operated three hospitals at the 
time of data collection, all located in small towns or rural areas in Mexico. Data collection for this 
study took place at the main site from which key functions were effectuated. As the next sections 
show, the organization faced two CTPs over a period of eight years, leading to two response 
cycles (see table 18). 
Starting Point 
MEX-NP had, since the beginning, operated on a fee for service basis, with all products and 
services being provided at their own hospital facilities. However, the organization showed a 
stronger emphasis on the social welfare logic given that donations had always been necessary to 
compensate for the losses that MEX-NP was making. Further, the organization was mainly 
composed of health personnel and administration personnel with a nonprofit background. Finally, 
having chosen locations in which populations lacked nearby health provision, and having 
received a large grant from the Mexican government to build a hospital, MEX-NP had, since 
inception, understood itself as a complement to the public health system. 
However, a few years after MEX-NP had started its operations, the institutional context, and, 
more specifically, the resource environment started to change and began questioning the 
organization’s approach. 
CTP1: Loosing the Main Revenue Source 
When MEX-NP started its operations, the organization could still refer to private and institutional 
donations dedicated to improve the situation of the health sector in Mexico. The Seguro Popular 
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– the Mexican health insurance for people lacking a formal job – had just been introduced, but 
was still far from being rolled out. Consequently, demand for MEX-NP’s services was high since 
they were cheaper than services from other private health providers and, at that time, depicted a 
much higher quality than public health services. However, with the introduction and rapid 
expansion of the Seguro Popular, particularly after 2010, demand for MEX-NP’s products and 
services changed, and donors started to withdraw their support, given that the government had 
made substantial improvements in providing access to health care care for low-income people. 
The general manager of MEX-NP explained: 
“Initially, when this hospital started to operate, there was no Seguro Popular and 
health coverage was not at 100%. So obviously we served this population that 
had no access to any public health facility, so we attended these people, but 
today nearly all of them are covered, so they prefer to go to the next city instead of 
paying a fee. That’s their preference, and that has hit us in the sense that we are 
not experiencing the demand that we have planned for”. [MEX-NP-4.1] 
MEX-NP thus faced the material tension that the achievement of its social goal, namely the 
improvement of the health sector in Mexico, had just gotten much closer, but at the same 
time, this societal progress suddenly threatened the financial fundament of the 
organization. Many of the health services that MEX-NP provided at low rates were now covered 
by the Seguro Popular. People thus decided to go to the next larger city in order to get services 
for free rather than buying them in MEX-NP’s clinic. In addition, donations were decreasingly 
available. The organization thus faced a severe dilemma. While the social welfare logic, in theory, 
suggested that the organization had achieved its social goals and should therefore close, the 
commercial logic suggested endless organizational growth and exploitation of financial 
opportunities. The tension was thus a tension over goals rooted in institutional void 
between the social welfare and the commercial logic.  
Given these institutional changes and the stragic dilemma, MEX-NP had to rethink its social 
orientation and, as part of it, its relationship with the government. Internal discussions about the 
role of MEX-NP emerged. Through the implementation of the Seguro Popular, the need for MEX-
NP’s services had changed. Access to health care was now available at public health facilities 
almost free of charges. While the government had been a key supporter in the past, the 
introduction of the Seguro Popular suddenly had made him the main competitor. Consequently, 
following the original normative foundation of MEX-NP to act as a complement of the public 
health system, one part of the management team argued that the organization should now seek 
the affiliation of the Seguro Popular and become practically embedded in the public health 
system. However, others argued that an overly strong dependence on the public sector was 
dangerous for MEX-NP, as it would risk becoming the “political football” of a health system that 
was not yet well established. They therefore proposed to set MEX-NP up as a competitor to the 
public health system and to seek new forms of revenue, for example, in collaboration with private 
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companies. Positioning MEX-NP as a competitor to the government, however, meant a major 
strategic shift, particularly with regard to the original normative foundation of the organization. 
The tension between collaborating versus competing with the government was thus a 
tension over goals that was rooted in contradictions between the social welfare and the 
commercial logics and emerged among members of the management team.  
RC1: Making the Business Case 
In order to secure the organization’s raison d’être on both ends, the social and the financial, 
MEX-NP decided to seek affiliation with the Seguro Popular and, therefore, to stick with its 
original collaborative attitude towards the government. The public health insurance scheme 
presented an attractive possibility for generating revenues while continuing to serve the low-
income population in Mexico. MEX-NP’s general manager put it in simple words: 
“And that’s why we said: if you can’t cope with the enemy then go with the enemy, 
that’s why we try to work with the Seguro Popular now.” [MEX-NP-4.1] 
However, the management team knew that the Seguro Popular was newly implemented. 
Experiences concerning its reliability were thus lacking. In addition, the process of getting 
affiliated could last several months or even longer. Not only did it come along with significant 
bureaucratic efforts, it also most likely required modifications in the hospital facilities. However, 
MEX-NP was already in a difficult financial situation, particularly as donors increasingly started to 
withdraw their support for health care organizations in Mexico. The organization thus couldn’t 
afford to wait until the affiliation was granted without any other income streams. The 
management team thus simultaneously sought ways to generate other types of revenue 
through the direct sale of health services. In other words, simultaneous to emphasizing the 
collaborative attitude of the organization, MEX-NP also explored ways to establish the 
organization as a direct competitor to the government. This strategy can be classified as a 
cumulative strategy as it sought to balance disparate demands of the social welfare and 
the commercial logics. 
In addition, they had realized that with the perspective of affilliating to the Seguro Popular, MEX-
NP had the potential to become a lucrative organization in the future. The general manager and 
the founder of MEX-NP therefore started to reflect upon the possibility to apply for support from 
the social investment fund in which the founder was involved as a limited partner. Legally, MEX-
NP was currently unable to receive an investment that required profit distribution at some point. 
However, MEX-NP’s founder signaled his willingness to adapt the organizational structure in a 
way that made profit distribution possible in the future: “Who knows, maybe in the future we will 
be able to generate enough profits to scale this program significantly and to pay returns to 
investors who have supported us” [MEX-NP-4.1]. In other words, MEX-NP started to consider 
converting into a for-profit in order to access funding from a social investment fund and 
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respond to the new resource environment in which donations for health care organizations in 
Mexico were decreasingly availability. This strong emphasis on the commercial logic can be 
classified as a dismissing hybridization strategy. 
However, to become attractive for the social investment fund, MEX-NP knew that it had only a 
few months left to improve its financial performance and to minimize its costs. In addition, MEX-
NP’s organizational culture had been strongly influenced by the social welfare logic in the past. 
Transitioning to a for-profit, or even increasing the market-orientation of the organization, meant a 
substantial shift that needed to be performed cautiously. Employees had, for instance, accepted 
the low wages that MEX-NP paid them because of the social goals of the organization. However, 
with the improvements in the public health system, the organization’s raison d’être was 
challenged from a social point of view. And even if MEX-NP was now planning to convert into a 
for-profit, the organization was not able to raise the wages until it had moved out of the financial 
squeeze. Towards employees, the management team of MEX-NP thus needed to redefine its 
blended value creating goals in the new context of the Mexican health system in order to 
justify the low wages that they were only able to pay. In order to do so, the organization had 
to justify why it still needed an organization like MEX-NP from a social point of view. The founder 
and the management team therefore argued that although the Seguro Popular had been 
introduced and had thereby dramatically improved the Mexican health care system, a large 
portion of the Mexican population remained without access to affordable, high-quality health care. 
In an interview, one of the Program Managers explained: 
“It’s not like the Seguro Popular will drastically improve the situation in the health 
care market from one day to the other. I mean, it’s a huge improvement, really. 
But there are many issues left. It takes very long for people to become enrolled in 
the Seguro Popular. Sometimes several months of paperwork. And then there is 
also the problem of the public clinics’ capacities. They are overwhelmed by the 
high demand. So, quality is often bad. It’s going to take many more years until we 
can say that we have a well functioning public health system for the poor and rural 
population. And then, it’s also not for free. I know the government says that the 
Seguro Popular brings access to health care for low-income people free of 
charge. But the way to go to the public clinics and hospitals costs. Waiting time 
costs. For many of them, it is cheaper to go to a private health care provider and 
pay for getting treated soon instead of spending entire days to wait for a doctor’s 
appointment. [MEX-NP-4.2]” 
In sum, it can be noted that MEX-NP’s founder and management team chose to juggle the 
commercial and the social welfare logic at several levels to bridge the time until the organization 
had converted into a for-profit.  
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Outcome - Unstable Funding and Narrow Strategic Leeway 
At the time of data collection, it was still not sure whether MEX-NP would be able to establish 
itself as a sustainable hybrid organization in the long run. The measures that the organization had 
taken only provided short-term relief to the tensions that it had faced. The founders and the 
management team thus agreed that a stronger commercialization was necessary to secure the 
survival of the organization. Towards the social investment fund, MEX-NP therefore expressed 
the willingness to convert into a for-profit in order to increase MEX-NP’s attractiveness for 
a long-term investment. With this perspective, MEX-NP succeeded to negotiate a deal in which 
the social investment fund provided the organization with transitional funding. If the organization 
succeeded in getting the accreditation within one year, the social investment fund would support 
the organization in its conversion to a for-profit by covering its losses. However, it was also clear 
that MEX-NP had to meet the investment fund’s requirements in order to become eligible for 
follow-up funding. The general manager of MEX-NP explained: 
“Since we started the hospital it had to raise donations to compensate for the 
losses. But we are convinced that this can change with the Seguro Popular. That's 
why we have the relationship with [the social investor. All the deficits that we will 
have during the two thousand and twelve [the social investor] will donate. 
Logically this donation they're giving us this year is conditioned that eh in June we 
have to present the request to the direction of Seguro Popular for the 
accreditation. Then, in June we have to show that the federal government will 
come to accredit us, and then in September we already have to show the 
evidence that the hospital has accreditation or that they went to do the evaluation 
and have approved it. Only then we'll get the donations until December. If we don't 
deliver on that, [the social investor] is going to say: you know you're not fulfilling 
your part, this is an agreement. It was specified that we have to go to fulfill certain 
conditions or certain things they told us with the aim to get this accreditation and 
be able to offer the services to everyone who has the Seguro Popular.” [MEX-NP-
4.1] 
MEX-NP thus continued to face severe financial shortages that threatened its existence: 
“If the fund tells us that they’re not supporting us anymore and if we don’t succeed 
in acquiring other donations to compensate the losses that we have, then we can’t 
survive anymore. We would have to close the hospital, but we hope this is not 
going to happen.” [MEX-NP-4.1]  
Seeking to minimize MEX-NP’s expenses, the social investment fund therefore requested a 
close management relationship in which it could, for instance, make sure that operational costs in 
MEX-NP were kept as low as possible. Given the decrease in donor funding for health care 
organizations in Mexico, MEX-NP therefore became highly dependent on the social investment 
fund as the sole funding source and strongly restricted in its strategic latitude.  
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Table 18:  Trajectory of Tensions, Strategies and Hybridization Patterns in MEX-NP 









Improve access to health care 
for low-income Mexicans in a 
financially sustainable way 
(hybrid logic) 
Improve Mexican health system vs. 
secure financial and organizational 
survival (tension over goals /institutional 
void between social welfare and 
commercial logic) 
Redefine blended value creating goals 
in the new context of the Mexican health 
system in order to justify low wages 
(Sensemaking, creative strategy - hybrid 
logic) 
Organizational survival dependent on 
success in converting into for-profit 
Self-Definition / 
communication 
Position as a revenue 





Structure Incorporate as a nonprofit 
organization (social welfare 
logic) 
 Plan to convert into for-profit 
(commercial logic – dismissing strategy) 
 
Financing Fund organization with 
donations (social welfare 
logic) 
  Dependency on one funding source / 
High pressure to achieve public contract 




Generate revenue through out 
of pocket payments and 
donations (hybrid logic) 




Provide products and services 
at affordable prices, 
compensate for losses 
through donations (hybrid 
logic) 
 Increase cost efficiency (commercial 




Hire employees with social 
welfare and health care 
background (social welfare 
logic) 
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Position as a complement to 
the public sector (social 
welfare logic) 
Collaborate vs. compete (tension over 
goals/institutional void between social 
welfare and commercial logic) 
Impression management: Position as 
collaborator and competitor to the 
government: 
 Seek affiliation to public health 
insurance (social welfare) 
 Seek other revenue streams in 
parallel (commercial) 
 (Hybrid logic – separation strategy) 




   Fragile Equilibirum 
 Plan to overcome tensions through 
conversion into for-profit 
 Success of conversion dependent on 
one funding source 
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6.2.2 KEN-NP: Juggling with Logics 
KEN-NP is a nonprofit hybrid organization incorporated in Kenya and founded by a US American 
foundation in 1997. It has the objective to improve access to medicine and basic healthcare 
services for poor populations in developing and emerging economies. Since its inception, 
KEN-NP had been set up as a nonprofit organization. However, the founder of the foundation 
sought to implement a financially sustainable, business-oriented franchise approach with a social 
purpose. At the time of the study, KEN-NP was mainly financed through donations. At the 
franchisee level, revenues were generated by selling health services to the target population 
which paid out of pocket. KEN-NP outlets were run by nurses that had retired from their former 
jobs in the public health sector. They were located in three areas of Kenya: Central Kenya, 
Western Kenya, and the outskirts of Nairobi. For data collection, the researcher was mainly in 
touch with representatives of the Nairobi based nonprofit franchisor and a representative clinic in 
the peri-urban area of Nairobi. As data collection revealed, the tensions that KEN-NP 
experienced can be clustered in two CTPs and two response cycles. The sketched trajectory of 
tensions in KEN-NP stretched over a period of thirteen years (see table 19).  
Starting Point 
Given the dysfunctionalities in the Kenyan health system, particularly the prevalence of perverse 
incentives and the low quality of health care and medicine as the main reason of health issues, 
the founder of KEN-NP was convinced that a nonprofit organization with social ends but 
operating like a commercial franchise model could provide a promising solution. In the 
commercial sector, several examples had shown that maintaining quality standards at scale was 
possible through franchising. Standardization, in particular, would furthermore allow this to 
happen in a cost efficient way. He therefore decided to try and apply the franchising concept in 
the social sector to tackle the issue of access to high-quality health care in Kenya. As recorded in 
an internal document, one of the founders explained: 
“The intellectual thunderbolt that gave birth to the [KEN-NP] franchise model was 
the realization that the dysfunction of Africa’s healthcare delivery system resulted 
from perverse incentives that make delivering substandard care, or no care, more 
profitable than expanding access to care, and delivering at the quality standard 
necessary for effective treatment. Counterfeit drugs, for example, are more 
profitable to sell. This is partly because quality regulations are generally not 
enforced but also because positive incentives generally do not exist to reward the 
behaviors necessary to improved standards. I realized that in the same way 
incentives induce franchisees to open restaurants and hotels, and to comply with 
the brand standards necessary to maintain high quality, they can be used to 
induce health workers to open medical clinics and run them with high-quality 
standards. [KEN-NP-6.6]” 
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The organization had thus adapted the commercial franchising model to the problem of access to 
health care in remote communities and established a franchise network of for-profit clinics 
and drug shops. The umbrella organization, however, remained a nonprofit – a Kenya-
based foundation – which not only needed to secure the social orientation of the entire venture, 
but also fulfill various functions including recruiting, training, monitoring, and supporting 
franchisees financially if they were unable to cover their costs. Donations were thus often needed 
to subsidize unprofitable activities. 
KEN-NP furthermore worked closely with the government. This was not only important 
because the organization needed the government’s legitimization to operate, but also, because it 
occasionally provided subsidized products to KEN-NP and, more importantly, regularly referred 
patients to the organization’s clinics when public facilities didn’t have the resources or the 
capacity to treat them.  
CTP1: Experiencing the Challenges of Operating at the BoP 
Various tensions surfaced under CTP1, as the organization started to experience the 
consequences of operating in the Kenyan BoP setting. Rolling out a business plan based on 
linear calculations and financial projections proved to be difficult in the context of low-income 
markets. For instance, as part of its just-mentioned collaborative attitude towards the 
government, KEN-NP had entered an agreement with the government concerning its recruiting 
practices. In order not to skim off human resources that the public health system needed, KEN-
NP committed to only recruiting retired nurses. However, after the government had increased the 
retirement age for medical staff, scarcity in human resources resulted in a dilemma for KEN-NP. 
When confronted with the need to recruit appropriate and sufficient personnel in order to 
establish a financially sustainable business model, KEN-NP realized that the agreement with the 
government came along with considerable limitations. The Field Services Manager explained: 
“We use the local administration, churches, and other health providers within the 
area, we use many channels to vouch for the nurses and clinical officers. (…) But 
it’s a major challenge for us because since about 2-3 years ago the retirement 
age has been raised to about 60 so it means the nurses are in public service for 
longer. So the nurses who we would have got when they are a bit younger (…) 
now we are getting them when they are a bit older. And at times when we weigh 
the risks and benefits it’s a challenge. The majority of them at that age don’t want 
to go and start a business. At 55 a majority of them would think about doing that. 
That’s a major challenge and also because of the brain drain. A lot of nurses 
moving out of the country to go to the Western countries, Southern Africa and so 
on. That has really affected the country’s human resource in terms of healthcare.  
(…) In terms of say for example where we are and maintaining the network as it 
is, is a huge challenge. Because we are working with people who are a bit older 
so maybe within 5-10 years somebody wants to retire completely so you have to 
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try and find somebody to replace them or to take up the facilities they’ve been 
running. So if you have nobody you can imagine you have to close and move on.” 
[KEN-NP-6.4] 
Institutional change in the form of political reforms concerning the retirement age of nurses 
therefore engendered a major obstacle for KEN-NP. In order to reach the scale that KEN-NP 
needed to operate in a financially sustainable way, the organization needed human resources. 
The tension between collaborating and competing with the government was thus a tension 
over means among KEN-NP’s management team, triggered by institutional change but 
rooted in contradictions between the social welfare and the commercial logics. The Kenyan 
government effectively needed the scarce human resources and so did KEN-NP to scale and 
become the financially sustainable organization it intended to be. The organization thus needed 
to rethink its collaborative approach with the government. On the one hand, breaking the 
agreement to only recruit nurses would trouble the good relationship that KEN-NP had with the 
government. This was dangerous, as KEN-NP benefitted from this relationship in terms of patient 
referrals as well as general support in the form of subsidized supplies or word of mouth. On the 
other hand, KEN-NP needed appropriate and sufficient human resources if it wanted to reach the 
scale that was necessary to become financially sustainable.  
Regarding its relations with franchisees, the high level of unpredictability in BoP markets 
furthermore challenged KEN-NP’s approach based on maximum efficiency and scale. The 
founder explained: 
“One might assume, and we did assume, that if you own a clinic and you’re 
serving a community where people are literally dying for lack of these particular 
products like malaria medicine. And suddenly this clinic where you have assured 
supply of high-quality malaria medicine, you will keep your clinic in stock and be 
able to operate it profitably and you’ll succeed. Well sort of yes, many of our 
franchisees do that, but many don’t maintain adequate inventory. Things intervene 
in this picture to prevent adequate inventory from being in the outlet. So for 
example (…) some of our franchisees mingle their personal and business income, 
they’ll have school fees come up, some others just pay them from malaria 
medicine, instead of buying more malaria medicine, they take it out of the 
business, they pay school fees, suddenly they have less money than they need to 
restock, (…) there's no stock to sell, less money to restock, and it’s the sort of a 
downward spiral.” [KEN-NP-6.7] 
The tension between establishing an innovative business model based on scale and 
reacting to unpredictable events at the BoP was thus a material tension over means 
rooted in the contradictions between a Western business mindset that stressed efficiency 
and calculability and a local mindset that was more focused on living in the present. 
Although the franchisees theoretically wanted to maximize standardization and efficiency to 
conform with KEN-NP’s business model, they were rather used to the circumstances of the BoP, 
which factually forced them to deviate from the business plan. In addition, the tension can also 
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be classified as a contradiction between the social welfare logic, which stresses the need 
for locally customized approaches and the commercial logic, which stresses 
standardization as a way to maximize efficiency. 
Another tension furthermore relates to what the founder of KEN-NP referred to as an “apple to 
orange competition”. Although rules and laws to ensure high-quality healthcare existed, several of 
the players with which the organization competed in the Kenyan health market didn’t comply with 
them. The founder of KEN-NP gave an example how institutions failed to enforce the rules and 
laws regarding the sale of medical products and services: 
“It's worth pointing out that the prevailing price for a particular drug in a particular 
community reflects the price or the cost of distributing something of dubious 
quality and so you know someone like a franchise could say “well I could buy 
amoxicillin for two dollars less than you’ll sell it to me or than your approved 
vendor sells it to me” and we say “yeah and do you have any idea if it's actually 
amoxicillin, if it has the right amount of ingredients and all these other problems”. 
Again, scientific lab studies of drug quality over over over over over again show 
high percentages, different percentages, but high percentages of drugs as sub-
standard in these markets. (…)  
In an ideal situation there would be laws and you could depend on them and you 
know the people who are breaking laws have been forced and laws would make 
sense for rural areas and so on. The reality is that, for example, many chemists, 
drug sellers and others in Kenya operate laboratories illegally, uh... they operate 
laboratories that are themselves illegal and that are being operated illegally. So 
they're not configured legally and they are not registered. And they avoid lots of 
costs by doing that. If we set up a legal lab, we have to operate legally because 
we have this whole branded network. If we set up a legal lab next to one of these 
illegal labs, we have to more than double the cost of opening a clinic it's like 
seventy five hundred dollars worth of equipment for the lowest tier of lab in Kenya, 
then you need to pay lab tech, then you need to have a refrigerator, then you do 
have reagents and that complicates the whole inventory management problem 
that we just talked about so uh... in a sense who cares, but the reality is patients 
are used to, again back to patient perception, patients are used to walking up and 
getting a lab tests and so they say “well [KEN-NP] clinics, it’s a high-quality brand, 
you don't have a lab, that doesn't make sense to them.” [KEN-NP-6.7] 
In other words, the high quality standards that KEN-NP wanted to reach engendered costs that 
needed to be covered. However, institutional voids between formal and informal strategic 
action fields (operating and competing in settings where formal institutional don’t work 
effectively) as well as between Western and local strategic action fields (patients were used 
to sub-standard quality) engendered the material tension over means between setting prices 
that cover costs and setting competitive prices. In addition, this tension also evolved to a 
tension over goals based on a contradiction between the social welfare and the 
commercial logic among members of the management team. Covering its costs through the 
sales of products and services would have been possible if KEN-NP would have started to 
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increase its prices and thus its profit margins. However, this conflicted with the organization’s 
goal to provide health products and services that were affordable for the poor. The founder 
of KEN-NP explains: 
“I think there are parts of the value chain and the retail business with regard to 
drugs and medicines and health-related goods and services that can be run 
profitably. I think that the reality is… there are serious constraints in terms of road 
conditions and other things, so, just a simple example: if you're driving fifty km on 
a dirt road rather than one, you're gonna burn a lot more gas and if you have to 
drive that distance to deliver drugs or other things to a facility, then the question 
becomes “can people at the end of the chain afford to bear those full costs?” And 
the answer seems to be that although there's a market for private health care, 
people don't bear those costs very well.” [KEN-NP-6.8] 
In addition, the habits of local customers also engendered a tension over goals at the 
franchisee level. Given that customers didn’t necessarily value the quality standards that 
KEN-NP sought to maintain, franchisees were incentivized to adapt their product and 
service portfolio to the local customer demand and to increase their revenues. However, as 
the founder explained, this conflicted with the social rationale of KEN-NP: 
“Another thing is patient perceptions. It's one thing to say all these people are 
dying for lack of high-quality malaria medicine, why don’t they just get tested for 
malaria and then take these drugs. Well, yes many patients feel like that, but also 
patients are used to other things. They’re used to walking down the street to a 
chemist and buying a drug for say twenty-five us cents equivalent. Try to convince 
them to buy a drug for more expensive or to take a diagnostic test is difficult. As 
an example, these are some children looking at a malaria diagnostic test of the 
kind that we can legally use and promote in the global health community. They’re 
very accurate, so scientifically they're really great. We had some issues, for 
example, some patients when taking such a test – as it looks like an HIV test – 
they didn't want people know their HIV status. So things like that can certainly be 
worked through the web of trust that our clinicians and nurses have established in 
their communities. But nevertheless it's an example of the kind of obstacle that 
comes up with regards to patient perception. (…) 
And you see some of the things that would now make the clients go to a 
competitor are, we have standards that we keep. We follow the clinical protocol to 
the letter but I can’t say the same about the other providers, especially the private 
ones. If you walked into a [KEN-NP], nobody will give you anti-malarias over the 
counter. You have to be tested, have a consultation with the clinician; it has to be 
positive for you to get it. But you see, and we have complained about that to the 
Ministry of Health enough times, what other providers do, once a client comes in 
and asks for anti-malarial over the counter, they easily give them. We are trying to 
undo that but somebody else is also trying to undo our good work I would say that 
we are doing. So because of such things, some clients would prefer to go to a 
private practitioner where they can just get over the counter without being asked 
so many questions, they don’t have to pay consultation, they don’t have to pay for 
a test.” [KEN-NP-6.7] 
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RC1: A Series of Measures to Mitigate Tensions 
Facing the various above-mentioned tensions, KEN-NP took a range of actions to mitigate them. 
With regard to the challenges that the organization faced due to the new regulatory restrictions on 
employing nurses, the organization engaged in the cumulative strategy of trying to negotiate 
with the government and trying to convince it to relax the pertinent regulations. As the 
Field Services Manager explained, the efforts had some success: 
“We have now a few nurses who would still do another 20 years or so but they are 
not many because if you look at the public service, it normally absorbs the 
majority of those who are coming from training. Then there’s a huge private sector 
as well so the remaining are obviously taken by the private sector. Then we’ve 
been having sort of a to-and-fro with the regulatory bodies. They have advocated 
for nurses and clinical officers who have at least 5-10 years of experience. 
Actually now they have reduced to 5, but before they were saying 10 years of 
experience to run a facility like a [KEN-NP] clinic like Catherine is doing.” [KEN-
NP-6.4] 
In order to attenuate perverse incentives, KEN-NP increased the subsidies for their 
franchisees to make sure they were incentivized and able to provide high-quality products and 
services at prices that were affordable for KEN-NP’s social target group. Any losses that the 
franchisees made were compensated through donations. In addition, the organization invested in 
training for the franchisees to improve medical quality as well as their business skills and 
thus their ability to turn the franchises into financially sustainable entities.  
Overall, KEN-NP thus sought to iron out the many tensions that they faced mainly by 
substantially shifting towards an increased emphasis on the social welfare logic.  
CTP2 - Resistance from Stakeholders adhering to the Social Welfare Logic 
After some years of operations and interaction mainly with stakeholders that adopted a social 
welfare logic (particularly donors), KEN-NP’s management team started to gain the conviction 
that the nonprofit structure inhibited the organization in pursuing its hybrid goals. At that time, the 
organization continued to mainly rely on donations for its financial survival. Revenues were 
insufficient to allow for a rapid scaling and thus for the economies of scale that would have 
allowed for the necessary cost efficiency. The type of funding that KEN-NP had so far primarily 
received as a nonprofit, namely donations and grants, was perceived as a limiting factor for the 
establishment of a financially sustainable organization. This was, on the one hand, due to the 
inconsistency of donor funding and the related inability to plan business processes, expenses 
and investments. The financial manager explained:  
“Finally, and most importantly, even though some of the individual stores are 
profitable, they are only so because of the value added by [KEN-NP]. [KEN-NP], 
overall, is a nonprofit and its services are not profitable (…). [KEN-NP] is still 
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dependent on the NGO community for donor funding. [The founder] regrets 
having become so dependent on this inconsistent source of funding (…)”. [KEN-
NP-6.3] 
The tension between receiving donor funding and establishing a consistent income 
stream was thus a tension over means rooted in the contradiction between the social 
welfare and the commercial logic. Donations were per se more or less inconsistent, as donors 
usually provided financial support whenever they had money left over or whenever they became 
aware of a social problem and considered it appropriate to support its alleviation – that is, mostly 
on an irregular basis. The tension was thus based on the conflicting demands of the majority of 
funders that didn’t find it appropriate to provide continuous financial support and KEN-FP which 
required continuous revenue streams. 
On the other hand, the management team felt that donor funding also inhibited the 
establishment of the business discipline that they believed was necessary for the success of 
KEN-NP’s business model. This manifested, among others, in the organization’s relationships 
with franchisees. Initially, franchise agreements stipulated that franchisees had to pay fees and 
royalties on sales. In return, KEN-NP provided franchisees with access to cheap medical supply, 
training, a strong brand and other benefits. Although income through royalties was an important 
element of KEN-NP’s business plan, the organization realized that franchisees often defaulted on 
paying them while continuing to receive the support of the franchisees. The general manager of 
KEN-NP explained: 
“We found that many franchisees did not save enough cash from sales to pay 
royalties, so we added royalties to the wholesale price of drugs sold by [KEN-NP] 
to franchisees. After a while, royalties were dropped entirely. This was a mistake 
because royalties motivate franchisors to do their utmost to expand the network 
and maximize individual franchisee performance. Instead, the organization veered 
toward the standard NGO model depending upon top-down grants to fund [KEN-
NP]’s growth and franchisee support activities. (…) Because the original 
franchises were established to serve unserved communities mainly with 
humanitarian ends in mind, rural communities were selected and it was enough 
that a franchisee could generate enough profit to stay in business and comply with 
[KEN-NP] quality standards. Even a money losing franchise served the mission by 
sparing the poor from needless suffering and death.” [KEN-NP-6.6] 
The tension between being donation funded and establishing a business discipline was 
thus a tension over means rooted in contradictions between the social welfare and the 
commercial logic, as it touched upon the incentive structure of the social welfare logic that didn’t 
motivate both SA-NP’s employees and franchisees to seek maximum efficiency. This tension, 
however, was not based on conflicting demands, but rather on diverging incentive 
mechanisms and can thus be categorized as a material tension. 
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As a result, KEN-NP ultimately found itself constantly torn between expecting the 
franchisees to operate in a financially sustainable way, which was necessary for the 
franchisor’s financial success, and subsidizing the franchisees’ operations in order to enable 
them to survive in the Kenyan health market, which was one of KEN-NP’s key social goals. 
The organization thus realized that this tension over goals between the social welfare and the 
commercial logic was a result of having failed to align the objectives and incentives at the 
franchisee level with those at the franchisor level. An internal document summarized the 
assessment of an external consultant: 
“The greatest weakness identified was that the model did not build an inherent 
relationship between the financial success of the for-profit franchisees and the 
financial success of the non-profit franchisor [KEN-NP]. (…) Franchisor staff 
sought franchisee success as an aspirational goal instead of as a fundamental 
financial necessity of staying in business.” [KEN-NP-6.6] 
Overall, the founder of KEN-NP thus started to realize that there seemed to be a general 
mismatch between what KEN-NP intended to establish and the way the “nonprofit world” 
functioned. The founder of KEN-NP summarized the situation as follows:  
“Despite the increase in donations, much of the money we were able to raise was 
in the form of restricted grants from global health agencies, who were not 
interested in funding the expansion of the [KEN-NP] network or general overhead. 
So we were not always able to cover operating costs and expenses. (…) I now 
understand that problems associated with donor funding, the politics of NGOs, 
and the lack of accountability to investors result in organizational dynamics that 
are incompatible with [KEN-NP]’s mission and vision above the franchisee level.” 
[KEN-NP-6.6] 
The reporting and the milestones that donors expected from KEN-NP generally referred to 
concrete measures and social outcomes – such as the number of patients seen – and less to 
organizational progress.  
Diverging understandings about how social impact should be created furthermore manifested at 
the level of human resources. In the beginning of its operations, KEN-NP had mainly hired 
employees with a professional background in the third sector. As a consequence, the business 
oriented culture that the organization intended to implement conflicted with the normative 
imprinting of employees, as the business practices differed from what employees considered 
as morally legitimate. This tension over goals between the social welfare and the 
commercial logic organization experienced obstacles in implementing its business-oriented 
model, for instance, when hiring its first fundraiser. An internal document provided by KEN-NP 
stated: 
“The fundraiser (…) resigned as tensions over management, mission, and 
business methods surfaced. My failure to institutionalize the ideas and methods 
upon which I launched the organization, combined with a management style not 
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well suited to the needs of a charitable organization, led to conflicts in our 
leadership as new players entered the game.” [KEN-NP-6.6]  
Finally, a tension over means between the social welfare and the commercial logic also 
manifested in KEN-NP’s interaction with partner that provided them with medical supply. 
As a nonprofit organization, KEN-NP regularly received subsidized products from other socially 
oriented organizations, including from the third and public sector. Accessing these subsidized 
products, particularly medical equipment and drugs, was highly beneficial for KEN-NP’s social 
objective. However, as the founder explained, channeling these products through to the end 
consumer in a financially sustainable way was difficult: 
“There are products that are very beneficial that we want to distribute. And that 
are subject of intentional distortions by other agencies that we have to abide by 
and it’s difficult. So for example, [there is this large NGO] with half a billion dollar 
budget per year (…). So here's a simple example. Long-lasting insecticide 
mosquito nets are very important to prevent malaria. They can last five years, you 
don’t have to dip them in insecticide once in a while. (…) So the NGO has 
subsidized long-lasting nets that we can access. So in a sense this is wonderful. 
Again on behalf of all the franchisees we can set up this sort of vendor 
relationship with [the NGO]. So [the NGO] charges our franchisees forty five 
Kenya Shillings, they mandate that our franchisees sell the nets for fifty shillings 
because they want the subsidy that's been given by sort of a global community 
towards malaria efforts to be passed on to the patient. They don't want the 
franchisee to get the lower costs and just keep the profit. And yet we have 
calculated that for us in our particular locations, the cost of distributing one net is 
approximately thirteen shillings. It's an instant problem. The franchisees, are they 
going to consider this a loss leader, or are they just going to quit selling nets, or 
what?” [KEN-NP-6.7] 
NGOs that provided organizations like KEN-NP with those subsidized products were thus not 
used to foster and were also not willing to support the establishment of a financially sustainable 
organization.  
RC2: Preparing Structural Adaptations  
Based on these experiences, KEN-NP’s founder and the management team realized that the 
dependence on donations caused dynamics in the organization that inhibited its growth and 
pursuit of social and financial goals. They were aware of the fact that the organization would 
continue to depend on donations to a certain extent as long as KEN-NP would continue to target 
the poorest income levels. However, reflecting about strategic measures to improve the dynamics 
within the organization, the general manager came up with a creative strategy that could possibly 
improve those dynamics. By innovating the way financial subsidies were used, he argued, it 
was possible to establish and maintain a business discipline, while at the same time continuing to 
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pursue the social objective of providing affordable health care to BoP populations. However, he 
was also aware of the challenges that this would entail:  
“The average transaction, just in case you’re curious, is something like a dollar or 
a dollar and fifteen cents in our clinics, so it’s really inexpensive in some other 
clinics, in other areas like the average is three dollars. I mean some of our clinics 
in other areas depending on where they are what the services are about uh... 
there are some people that don't come in because of that and we don't know how 
many there are, this is one reason why we want to do this test of routing subsidies 
is sort of an easy and interesting, hopefully interesting theoretical topic. But the 
nuts-and-bolts of that require for some granular decisions about who is being 
subsidized, who they are, how do you make it, I mean you can't, it's not, even an 
asset survey is not expensive but you need to make the transaction costs of 
administering subsidies so low when the subsidies might be ten cents or fifty 
cents. You know you can't go, trying to scale down sort of stuff from the quote on 
quote insurance industry, usually operating way up high in the pyramid in a place 
like Kenya where there is virtually no insurance for anybody except for rich people 
or formally employed workers”. [KEN-NP-6.7] 
In other words, routing subsidies through the customers again engendered costs that KEN-NP 
would need to cover.  
Other representatives of the management team argued that it needed a stronger shift within KEN-
NP to change the internal dynamics and finally become more independent from donations, and, 
more importantly, from donors. They were convinced that the organization’s emphasis on the 
social welfare logic seemed to be the very reasons why KEN-NP couldn’t achieve its social and 
financial goals. Some of them thus started to deeply question the conduciveness of the 
nonprofit structure for the organization’s hybrid goals, and to reflect upon the possibility 
of converting into a for-profit organization (dismissing strategy). As an internal document 
provided by KEN-NP state, their financial projections showed that “with $2.5 million invested over 
a seven year period, the franchisor would break even and show profitability from there on” [KEN-
NP-6.6].  
The management team of KEN-NP therefore started an intensive process of anticipating the 
potential tensions that it could face if the restructuring plans were realized and working 
through those challenges in internal discussions (creative strategy). They were aware of 
the trade-offs that a stronger focus on profitability would imply. For instance, with regard to setting 
up new clinics that could improve KEN-NP’s financial performance, the Financial Manager 
explained how this affected the decision about where to locate clinics: 
“Locality is key. Franchises that are financially sustainable are in localities that are 
a bit more financially stable in terms of the economic activities around. (…) Even 
though it’s periodically, at least those people are empowered economically. So 
that means that the clinic around there, as much as they provide good services, 
they have good customer care, their customers are also able to pay, meaning that 
clinics will not do a lot of subsidies in terms of it does not have much of a 
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percentage of patients unable to pay. (…) For-profit, you can’t do it at the same 
level than nonprofit. You can’t go rural-rural and do for-profit. I don’t think so, very 
few instances. You have to position yourself a bit higher and offer a bit more 
services for you to make a bit more money.” [KEN-NP-6.4] 
KEN-NP was thus in a situation in which its hybrid approach was hitting walls. On the one hand, 
the adherence to the social welfare logic limited the organization’s possibilities to access 
adequate financing and establishing a business culture that emphasized accountability towards 
the customer and not the donor. On the other hand, the difficulties of operating in the Kenyan 
BoP setting seemed to make profitability without subsidies from the third or public sector nearly 
impossible.  
Outcome: External and Internal Discrepancies 
In sum, it can be noted that at the end of data collection, it was still not sure whether KEN-NP 
would be able to durably overcome the tensions that it faced. Discussions about the option to 
convert into a for-profit were initiated with key decision-makers and stakeholders (particularly 
funders). As an internal document provided by KEN-NP reveals, not all relevant parties believed 
in the optimistic financial projections of the managers who had proposed to convert into a for-
profit. The opposing view – mainly held by employees and managers who interacted with donors 
– was that the organization should remain a non-profit and seek a continuous flow of donations. 
An internal document provided by KEN-NP explained: 
“(...) the concept of the restructuring seemed to divide the handful of individual 
donors whose contributions had historically constituted a large percentage of 
KEN-NP revenue. Several major donors found the restructuring concept exciting, 
while several others conveyed significant unease. One key donor especially, was 
vehemently opposed to the idea, concerned that offering investors an opportunity 
to invest, while at the same time asking others to donate, would confuse regular 
fundraising efforts. (…) 
Although [KEN-NP] planned to have the for-profit organization operate with the 
same mission as the non-profit had, there was skepticism on the ground in Kenya 
as to why an organization focused on providing the poor access to medicines and 
health care would want to structure itself as a for-profit.” [KEN-NP-6.6] 
Critics of the restructuring concept particularly emphasized the need to keep a good relationship 
with the Kenyan government and remain eligible to funding from development agencies. They 
thus argued that this would require remaining a nonprofit. In sum, it can be observed that KEN-
NP was in a situation in which substantial discrepancies between stakeholders who 
advocated for a social welfare logic and those who supported the stronger emphasis on 
the commercial logic prevailed internally and externally. Instead of entirely converting into a 
for-profit, the organization decided to pilot a for-profit approach in parallel to its nonprofit entity. 
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This allowed mitigating the concerns of doubtful stakholders and to test the new approach without 
losing access to its main source of funding, namely the donations and grants that had held the 
organization alive in the past. In sum, KEN-NP had found a series of measures to mitigate the 
tensions in the short term. However, it was unclear at the time of data collection whether the 
organization would be able to overcome its donor dependency and incentivize franchisees to 
establish the business discipline that was necessary to make KEN-FP a viable blended value 
creating business model in the long run. In particular, it was unclear whether the current 
supporters of KEN-FP would support the transition towards increased market-orientation, or 
whether new supporters in the field of blended value creation would grant the organization the 
support that it needed.  
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Table 19:  Trajectory of Tensions, Strategies and Hybridization Patterns in KEN-NP 













Provide access to 
affordable health care  
for low-income people 
through scalable and 
financially sustainable 
social franchise model 
(hybrid logic) 
     
Self-Definition / 
communication 
Position as an 
innovative hybrid 
business model (hybrid 
logic) 
     





   Prepare transition to 
for-profit legal form 




approach for testing 
Financing Donations (social 
welfare logic) 
  Establish financially 
sustainable organization vs. 
mainly depend on inconsistent 
source of funding (grants & 
donations) (tension over 
means/institutional void 
between social welfare and 
commercial logic) 
 Organization still 
dependent on 
donations 
Receive donor funding vs. 
establish and maintain 
business discipline (tension 
over means/institutional void 
between social welfare and 
commercial logic) 
Innovate the way 
financial subsidies 
were used (creative 
strategy – hybrid logic) 
New routing of 
subsidies had just 
started at the end of 
data collection 
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donations (hybrid logic) 





emphasis on social 
welfare logic) 
Subsidize franchisees with 
donations vs. expect them to 
operate in a financially 
sustainable way (tension over 
goals/institutional void between 
social welfare and commercial 
logic) 
 Franchisees still 
financially dependent 











business model based on 




between Western and local 
strategic action fields + 
social welfare and 
commercial logic) 
   KEN-NP still hadn’t 
found a way to 
deliver products and 
services in a 
financially 
sustainable way 
Provide products and 
services based on social 
rationale vs. on commercial 
rationale (tension over 
goals / institutional void 
between social welfare and 
commercial logic) 
  
Set prices based on costs 
vs. set affordable prices 
(tension over 
goals/institutional void 
between social welfare and 
commercial logic) 
Receive subsidized products 
vs. ability to deliver them in 
financially sustainable way 
(tension over 
means/institutional void 
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RC2  Æ 
 
Outcome 
 Set prices based on costs 
vs. set competitive prices 
(tension over 
means/institutional void 
between formal and 
informal strategic action 
fields) 
   
Human 
resources 
Hire employees with 
social welfare 
background mainly, 
hire retired nurses only 
(social welfare logic) 
  Hire employees with social 
welfare background vs. gain 
acceptance for market-oriented 
approach (tension over 
goals/institutional void between 
social welfare and commercial 
logic) 








about plans to 
convert into for-profit 
but acceptance of 







 Train franchisees 
to improve 










with the Kenyan 
government (social 
welfare logic) 
Collaborate vs. compete 
(tension over 
means/institutional void 
between social welfare and 
commercial logic) 










  Concerns among key 
external stakeholders 
about plans to 
convert into for-profit 
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6.2.3 SA-NP: Cautiously Approaching Social Enterprise 
SA-NP is a nonprofit hybrid organization seeking to globally improve access to health care for 
low-income people. Founded in 1976 by a medical specialist, SA-NP provides health services to 
low-income people and trains people from low-income communities to become health workers. It 
furthermore supplies the public and third sector with affordable medical supply. The organization 
operates in several countries including South Africa, where the headquarter is located. In South 
Africa, SA-NP operates across several provinces. Since 2005, SA-NP follows a social enterprise 
strategy with two components. First, the organization has started to launch its own clinics that 
seek to operate in a financially sustainable way. Second, a social enterprise has been founded to 
source and distribute affordable medical supplies to purchasers of the public, the third and the 
private sector. In South Africa, only the medical supply social enterprise was successfully 
established at the time of data collection. SA-NP is thus financed through donations and 
revenues through the sales of medical supply. 
Most activities in South Africa take place in the province in which the South African headquarter 
is located. Data collection therefore focused on the administrative headquarter of the organization 
and a clinic close to the headquarter from which the organization provides services. Based on the 
data collection and analysis for SA-NP, two CTPs and two response cycles could be identified 
over a period of three years (see table 20).  
Starting Point 
SA-NP looks back to several decades of operations as a rather traditional nonprofit organization, 
which depended on donor funding and worked closely with the South African Ministry of Health. 
When possible, health services were provided through existing public health care facilities as the 
organization aims to create linkages to other health providers and ensure sustainable 
health systems that are available on an ongoing basis. The organization therefore rather 
understood itself as a complement to the public health system which sought to fill gaps in public 
health provision.  
In the last years before data collection, however, the organization started to experience a 
significant decrease in philanthropic funding. Although the situation in the South African health 
market hadn’t improved and the public health system had proven unable to resolve the problems 
in the last decades, donors had reduced their support for health care in South Africa. An internal 
document summarized the situation: 
“The global recession has impacted negatively on philanthropic giving in general. 
And donors also focus on other countries now, like Mozambique or Zimbabwe. 
South Africa is better off when compared to them. So they attract more sympathy. 
And donors feel like they get a larger social return on their investment there. So a 
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challenge has been meeting growth targets within the environment of decreased 
donor funding.” [SA-NP-8.8]  
Given the changes in the resource environment, SA-NP started to experience challenges in its 
collaboration with the public sector. As mentioned previously, SA-NP generally sought to 
collaborate with incumbent players in health markets, particularly with the government. 
This was based on SA-NP’s conviction that health services for the poor should be provided by the 
government. In addition, this collaborative strategy sought to secure the long-term existence of 
projects, as one of the programm managers explained: 
“It's more of a public private partnership, so we do invest some money into the 
department of health by supporting them with the training of the health personnel, 
and providing them with basic equipment for refraction, but we don't expect 
anything in return in terms of finances. (…) But when we say we have this much 
that we want to invest in this, then they also have to contribute. We don't do 
100%, because that is when you end up with the problem of a project that is solely 
NGO owned or run. So we always have had a partnership whereby the 
government contributes a substantial amount, and we also bring in a substantial 
amount. The ownership is theirs from the beginning, as opposed to when we go 
with our money and say this is what we want to do. We shall give you all the 
money. (…) Because it is their responsibility to deliver [health] care, so they 
should own this responsibility. We only come in to support and improve the 
services. (…) we help them to kickstart the process. (…) At the end of our support, 
the only thing that we want is that [health] services are being delivered, and the 
only way to make sure that happens is that the department of health takes 
ownership.” [SA-NP-8.5] 
However, the downside of this approach was that SA-NP always depended on the financial ability 
and willingness of the government before being able to implement a project – even if the need for 
health care was obvious or even urgent. One of SA-NP’s Program Managers explained: 
“The challenge is that if the government does not have a budget for that, they will 
call and say no, we can't, and the reason for that is that they are looking after the 
risk of after those three years, what is going to happen? Whereas if they know that 
they had some money, there is more confidence that they can continue when we 
go out. For example, right now, the problem right now, [the child health project] 
that we are planning in [the region], we had wanted to start 2 months ago, but it 
has delayed because the department of health was saying, they are not ready, is 
not in their budget, and they are worried that, what happens after 4 years? Instead 
of just receiving money from us. So they first want to secure that they will have the 
money for the future.” [SA-NP-8.5] 
Although SA-NP in principle shared the philosophy that projects needed to be designed in a way 
that allowed for long-term sustainability within the public health system, the founder started to 
perceive that the exclusive alliance with the public sector as a strategic partner was restricting. In 
particular, now that the organizations had to make sure it generated enough income to 
compensate the loss of donations, providing to the government seemed to be insufficient.  
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 197 
 
 
Having heard of social enterprise as a way to solve social issues in a financially sustainable way, 
he started to explore possibilities how SA-NP could increase its financial independence. By 
venturing into social enterprise, he had two hopes, namely “to lessen [SA-NP]’s dependence on 
donor funding and to attract new investments to diversify [SA-NP]’s investment base and income 
stream.” [SA-NP-8.8] 
Lacking personnel with the necessary background to implement the social enterprise strategy, 
SA-NP hired two social enterprise program managers with professional backgrounds in the 
private sector. Their concrete task was to develop, implement and promote social enterprise 
projects for SA-NP’s global activities. However, more generally, this task also entailed promoting 
a cultural change towards market-orientation within an organization that had operated as a rather 
typical nonprofit for many years.  
CTP1: Internal Skepticism 
The social progress as well as the global recession that had triggered the changes in South 
Africa resource environment for health organizations had exposed SA-NP to substantial financial 
challenges. Increasing the market orientation of the organization seemed to be a promising path 
to go. However, after the first internal meetings with its management team, the founder and the 
social enterprise managers realized that shifting towards market-orientation would mean a 
substantial strategic change within SA-NP. Further, employees – who mainly had a nonprofit 
background – feared that the new approach would upset existing partners. One of the social 
enterprise managers explained: 
“Social enterprise gets lots of criticism, because they are not profit driven, so you 
could go into a market where there are existing service providers, (…) and if you 
go in with a social enterprise and you cut down margins, you could actually kill 
those businesses. So you might resolve one social problem, but you may create 
another one with unemployment. (...) It's a very tricky situation. Because you don't 
want existing providers to see us as competition and then there is a resistance 
and criticism of you coming into the markets. For example in South Africa, this 
was before my time, in the early days, apparently, there was lots of criticism 
coming from the private sector, because they were saying we were stealing their 
customers.” [SA-NP-8.1] 
In other words, SA-NP faced the tension over goals between estalishing a market-oriented 
hybrid business model vs. gaining the acceptance of nonprofit employees. This tension can 
be traced back to institutional voids between the social welfare and the commercial logic. 
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RC1: Trying to Convince Partners 
Given these internal discrepancies, the founder realized that he couldn’t change the core identity 
of SA-NP from one day to the other. He felt that particularly the collaborative attitude towards 
incumbent health players should remain, as he otherwise feared to receive substantial criticism. 
SA-NP thus decided to refer to a cumulative strategy, namely to try and convince collaborators 
in South Africa to jointly implement social enterprise projects by emphasizing the benefits 
of a stronger market-orientation. Given the magnitude of health issues in South Africa and the 
decrease of donation, SA-NP argued that social enterprise projects that operated in a financially 
sustainable way could be a promising solution. After few discussions with representatives of the 
ministry of health, a social enterprise pilot project with a focus on eye care was launched in 
collaboration with a public hospital. Within this project, SA-NP committed to providing the medical 
equipment to diagnose and treat a range of visual impairments. The government was in charge of 
providing the human resources, which would receive a prior training by employees of SA-NP. 
Patients would receive the check-ups for free, but needed to pay a small price for glasses if 
needed. Revenues would be used to cover the costs and, if possible, to invest in the further 
expansion of the project.  
CTP2: Further Normative Controversies Regarding Social Enterprise 
However, after few weeks already, the project was cancelled when SA-NP realized that the social 
enterprise approach was incompatible with the way the public hospital worked. First, the 
employees of the hospital had no incentive to implement the project, as they only perceived it as 
an additional burden in their daily work for which they receive no additional compensation. 
Second, some of the administrative personnel of the department of health didn’t accept the 
market-oriented approach, as it conflicted with their values and beliefs. As the social enterprise 
manager explained in an interview, the principle of free access to health care was strongly 
institutionalized in South Africa: 
“The big problem with the pilot was that a public hospital simply doesn’t fit with a 
dynamic entrepreneurial initiative. That means for the nurse, when more urgent 
things popped up, she just stopped checking eyes. And also not enough patients 
came. That was the biggest challenge. And then many other smaller problems 
from the department of health like “there are people who are not employed by us 
and they sell glasses to make money” and these kind of thoughts.” [SA-NP-8.3] 
The tension between implementing an innovative, market-oriented approach and gaining 
acceptance of partners from the public sector was thus a tension over goals rooted in the 
contradiction between the social welfare and the commercial logic. In addition, depending 
on revenue from the public sector impeded the establishment of a financially sustainable 
organization for cash flow reasons: 
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“When the government has money, or when its budgets come close to the end of 
the financial year, they buy a huge amount and just keep it in stock, and so it's 
very erratic, so if you run it as a business dependent only on that, you could have 
some serious cash flow issues.” [SA-NP-8.1] 
SA-NP therefore also faced a tension over means between providing to the government 
and trying to establish a financially sustainable organization, which was rooted in the 
discrepancy between the Western style business mindset of establishing a business 
model based on calculability, and a local culture of short-term orientation resulting from 
resource scarcity in the South African Health Ministry.  
Given these tensions related to the collaboration of SA-NP with governmental entities, a general 
normative discussion about the organization’s right attitude about its relationship with the 
government emerged among members of the management team. SA-NP started to internally 
face a tension over goals between the social welfare and the commercial logic. The 
organization could either continue its close collaboration with the government, as this 
reflected its general approach to social impact creation, or it could seek other ways of 
implementing projects, which would require building structures that competed with the 
public health system.  
In addition, internal discrepancies arose concerning the way products and services should be 
delivered to the low-income South African population. While the majority of SA-NP’s employees 
argued that medical products should only be distributed with prescriptions, the social enterprise 
managers adopted a more liberal approach. Taking the example of the eye care project again, 
the social enterprise manager explained: 
“Here we will have to make an internal decision. Do we want that people who 
don’t have a health care background sell reading glasses, without making sure 
that the patient has been consulted by a medical professional or not? Currently 
we say: we don’t want to give anyone reading glasses who hasn’t been checked 
by a medical professional. But I mean, in Germany you can also just go and buy 
reading glasses. The problem with that is that… The glasses themselves can do 
no harm, but in the age in which you start to need glasses you also become more 
vulnerable for diseases like cataract and glaucoma. And the danger is that if 
someone simply buys reading glasses and thinks he is fine, but at the same time 
there is cataract or glaucoma emerging, that’s the danger.” [SA-NP-8.3] 
Another point of tension in this regard concerned the prices that SA-NP could charge for its 
health care products and services. Vulnerable populations had received those products and 
services free of charge for many years. Being aware of the fact that many low-income people 
wouldn’t be able to pay for services, the social enterprise strategy foresaw that new profitable 
activities would cross-subsidize the unprofitable. For instance, people that were able to pay 
should be charged while those that weren’t should continue to receive products and services for 
free. However, drawing a line between different income levels was a challenge and the amount of 
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people that were able to pay also seemed to be insufficient for SA-NP to reach financial 
sustainability. An internal document described the situation: 
 “The small profits made on the sale of [product 1] are used to cross-subsidize 
other aspects of care and the setting up of new clinics. Even so, most of the 
clinic’s costs are covered by donations. The organization is committed to providing 
care even to the destitute; children from low-income families generally receive free 
[products], as do adults who cannot afford to pay. The clinics’ mission is to provide 
[health services] to all who need it, regardless of income. While they do try to 
collect payment from all patients able to pay, providing free [products] on occasion 
makes financial sustainability a challenge.” [SA-NP-8.8] 
The tension between adopting a social rationale versus adopting a commercial rationale 
for the delivery of products and services was thus again a tension over goals rooted in 
contradictions between the social welfare and the commercial logics, as it referred to 
divergent values and beliefs or moral evaluations about the appropriate goal of SA-NP 
among the employees of SA-NP.  
The social welfare logic was thus strongly institutionalized in SA-NP, making the introduction of 
the social enterprise strategy a challenge. It conflicted with practices that employees of SA-NP 
considered as appropriate and to which they were used to. One of the social enterprise program 
managers expressed that he felt he constantly had to fight for acceptance within the organization: 
“So they think of me: you’re not an optometrist, you don’t understand that we need 
to check the eyes and things like that. Maybe they don’t say it explicitly, but that’s 
how it feels. The health care sector is tricky. It is different from other sectors. I 
mean we deal with people’s health and lives. So it’s not like giving microcredits or 
doing mobile phoning. But I am deeply convinced that there is a middle course. 
Nobody wants to turn doctors into machines. That’s not what this is about. (…)   
I think the biggest argument is that here decision are not made in an 
entrepreneurial way. Instead I think its more an NGO mindset that says: ok we 
have trained these people, we can’t just release them, even if they don’t perform. 
(…)There is a general internal conflict and we regularly have discussions about 
what the best way is at the end, and that’s also a challenge for me because I am 
always dependent on getting the buy-in of the country offices. For example, it is 
very difficult for me, in the South African projects, to do something entrepreneurial, 
cause there the project managers generally don’t really believe in entrepreneurial 
strategies. They generally only see the risks. I mean of course there is the risk 
that the profit making one day takes over the social mission, no doubt. But they 
emphasize it much more than the opportunities that also exist.” [SA-NP-8.3] 
Being a small minority of business professionals within the organization, the two social enterprise 
managers still struggled to gain legitimacy for the aspired cultural change towards market-
orientation. Launching social enterprise projects indeed required the organization to take certain 
risks, and risk-taking was not considered to be appropriate for a socially oriented organization 
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that operated with money it had raised from donors who wanted to make sure their financial 
support created maximum social impact. Ultimately, SA-NP again faced the tension between 
increasing the market-orientation of SA-NP and gaining the acceptance of employees. This 
tension was a tension over goals as it related to problems of identification with values and 
meanings adhering to the social welfare and the commercial logics. 
RC2: Adapting the Organization’s Structure to Avoid Tensions 
Expierencing how first attempts to implement social enterprise projects in collaboration with 
incumbent players in the South African health market triggered considerable controversies, the 
founder of SA-NP knew that he had to proceed with caution. However, given the changes in the 
availability of donor funding, he was still convinced that the shift towards market-orientation was 
necessary in order to secure SA-NP’s survival in the long-term. Together with the social 
enterprise program managers, he decided to choose the strategy that was considered to be the 
“safest”. SA-NP structurally separated the risk-taking social enterprise activities from SA-NP 
and created a new for-profit sister organization. The social enterprise program manager 
explained: 
“There are expansion plans for [social enterprise program 1] that are currently in 
the infancy stage. The team is currently conducting feasibility studies to launch the 
[social enterprise program 1] as a separate legal entity. All revenues from the 
separate legal entity will then be donated to [SA-NP] to create a new source of 
revenue for [SA-NP]. The objective of this approach is to allow [SA-NP] to target 
the private sector market as well, without the limitations imposed on it as an 
activity of a not for profit organization in South Africa. [SA-NP-8.1] 
However, SA-NP continued to involve other players in the South African health market for this 
purpose in order to share the financial and reputational risk, and acquire the necessary financial 
resources for the social enterprise strategy. In other words, it remained SA-NP’s official goal to 
be a complementary actor in the South African health sector. The organization continued to 
see its role in filling the gaps that existing public and private health provision left empty. For its 
activities in South Africa, the organization therefore decided to only implement parts of its 
social enterprise strategy for the time being – an approach that can be classified as a 
cumulative strategy. However, SA-NP also started to seek opportunities to collaborate with other 
players to allow for a full implementation of the social enterprise strategy. One of the Program 
Managers explained: 
 “That's why in South Africa we only implement certain parts of the social 
enterprise strategy. If a social enterprise program is not implementable in certain 
countries, because the government has this, then we will not implement it. Like in 
South Africa, we don't do social enterprise clinics, but we have this [social 
enterprise program] that we are doing. (…) So here in South Africa we asked 
ourselves: how can we implement social enterprise, given that we will be unable 
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technically to do the pure clinics. But, we can go into partnerships with different 
people and we can open up other channels. So for example the [medical] supply, 
(…) we are looking at producing the [products] locally, instead of sourcing them 
from China. [SA-NP-8.6] 
Similarly, her colleague added: 
(…) So when you ask what the future is, so it may not be entirely public sector, we 
are now also (…) getting partner together to set up a social enterprise clinic. (…) It 
could be individuals, just a [health worker] or a business person and set up a 
clinic. So, with the department of health, that's a different model, which we will 
see. (…) Social enterprise is the way to go, because [SA-NP] is a social enterprise 
organization and as I said, South Africa's economy is vibrant enough and they are 
encouraging a lot the growth of small and medium enterprises, so we see 
opportunities there. [SA-NP-8.5] 
In other words, SA-NP continued on its path toward increased market-orientation in a slow 
and cautious manner that avoided upsetting their strategic partners.  
The founder was moreover aware that he needed to further promote the shift toward market-
orientation internally. As the previous experience had shown, the two social enterprise managers 
were struggling to gain the acceptance of their colleagues for the social enterprise strategy. The 
social welfare logic was strongly institutionalized in the minds of the vast majority of SA-NP’s 
employees who had been serving the organization for many years. They were thus not only not 
used to pursuing commercial objectives, they also often considered it as inappropriate and 
incompatible with social objectives. The founder thus realized that he needed to change the 
culture of his workforce and decided to do so by exposing them to more people that were more 
open to mixing commercial and social objectives. Having two social enterprise advocates in the 
organization was simply not enough. Over time, SA-NP thus started to refer to a creative strategy 
geared towards embracing the hybrid goals of social and financial value creation in the long run, 
namely to increasingly hire younger employees with weaker preconceptions about how the 
organization should work and instead more flexibility to accept new – hybrid – approaches to 
tackling health issues. By doing so, he intended to change the cognitively institutionalized 
preconception about the role and workmode of a nonprofit organization. 
  




In sum, SA-NP continued on its path towards becoming a more market-oriented organization. 
However, it did so in a discrete way in order no to upset its partners and its workforce. Both 
strongly adhered to the social welfare logic and were normatively opposed to commercial 
approaches in health care. But in order to secure its long-term existence in the context of 
decreasing donor funding, SA-NP’s founder knew he had to tap into new revenue generating 
opportunities. As a result, SA-NP started to adopt a double identity. At the time of data collection, 
social enterprise activities still accounted for a small portion of SA-NP’s operations. However, 
more and more attention was dedicated to the future of SA-NP as a social enterprise 
organization. This shift continued to cause tensions within the organization, particularly among 
employees who had served the organization for many years and strongly believed in the principle 
of free access to health care. For the founder and the social enterprise programm managers it 
was a delicate task of innovating the organization without running into an internal fight about the 
fundamental role of SA-NP that could significantly destabilize the organization. Further, the 
question about the right attitude towards the government was still unanswered at the time of data 
collection, thereby remaining a substantial source of tensions. 
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Table 20:  Trajectory of Tensions, Strategies and Hybridization Patterns in SA-NP 
 T0 CTP1 Hybridization 
Stragies in RC1 
CTP2 Hybridization 




Fill gaps in health 
system; support public 
health system to 
improve (social welfare 
logic) 
    Slow and discrete 





Position as a nonprofit 
social enterprise 
(hybrid logic) 
     
Structure Incorporate as a 
nonprofit (social 
welfare logic) 
   Incorporate additional 
for-profit organization 
(separating strategy – 
hybrid logic) 
 
Financing Donations and grants 
(social welfare logic) 
     
Revenue 
generation 
Provide to public sector 
and private donors 
(social welfare logic) 




Provide in collaboration 
and, if possible, 
through existing health 
facilities 
  Provide services and products 
based on social rationale vs. 
based on revenue expectations 
(tension over goals/institutional 
void between social welfare 
and commercial logic) 
 No sustainable earned 
income strategy at time 
of data collection 
Establish financially 
sustainable organization vs. 
provide to government (tension 
over means/institutional void 
between Western and local 
strategic action fields) 
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 T0 CTP1 Hybridization 
Stragies in RC1 
CTP2 Hybridization 




Large majority of 
employees with social 
welfare background; 
two social enterprise 
managers with 
business background 
(social welfare logic) 
Establish a market-
oriented hybrid business 
model vs. gain 
acceptance of nonprofit 
employees and key 
partners (tension over 
goals/institutional void 
between social welfare 
and commercial logic) 
  Hire young employees 
with more openess to 
hybrid approaches 







with incumbent health 
care players (social 
welfare logic) 
 Try and convince 
collaborators in 










emphasis on social 
welfare logic) 
Collaborate vs. compete with 
government (tension over 
goals/institutional void between 
social welfare and commercial 
logic) 
Implement only parts 
of the social enterprise 
strategy to avoid 
upsetting partners 
(cumulative strategy – 
social welfare logic) 
No clear attitude towards 
government at time of 
data collection 
Implement innovative market-
oriented approach vs. gain 
acceptance of partners from 
public sector (tension over 
goals/institutional void between 





    -  Fragile equilibrium 
 skepticism among key 





 no clear earned 
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6.2.4 COL-NP: Pushed Towards Mission Shift 
COL-NP is a nonprofit hybrid organization providing medical services and education to the 
Colombian population through an own network of clinics. Founded in 1965 by a medical 
specialist, COL-NP’s mission has a clear social emphasis. As reported by the founder of COL-
NP, it was always the organization’s goal to support the establishment of a well functioning public 
health system, and to render itself superfluous: “Our goal is that we achieve what more 
developed countries have achieved. That an organization like ours is not needed anymore” [COL-
NP-1.4]. COL-NP has never stopped to depend on donations and grants. However, COL-NP has, 
since its inception, sought to operate in a business manner, meaning that the organization has 
always generated revenue by selling its services to the government and directly to patients. The 
case of COL-NP illustrates how the nonprofit hybrid organization faced two CTPs and responded 
to them over a period of almost fifty years (see table 21). 
Starting Point 
In 1965, COL-NP’s founder – a popular and well-established medical specialist in Bogotá – 
started to dedicate one afternoon per week to the treatment of low-income patients. During the 
remaining time he continued to operate as a medical specialist for higher income populations. 
This allowed him to subsidize the health services that he provided for people in need for symbolic 
costs. At that time, demand for his services was very high as the Colombian low-income 
population lacked access to affordable high-quality health care. In its first year of operation, the 
founder had already attended almost 7000 patients. He could thus soon attract the attention of 
domestic and foreign donors who started to support him with the creation of a formal organization 
that would expand the reach of his health services. The founder therefore decided to dedicate all 
his time to the creation and fast growth of COL-NP in order to meet the vast demand. In 1968, the 
organization already operated twenty clinics all over COL-NP and had become a highly 
recognized brand in the Colombian health care sector. COL-NP’s workforce was furthermore 
composed of a majority of employees with nonprofit or health background and a minority of 
employees with commercial background. 
CTP 1 – Hit by Social Progress  
The first critical tension in the case of COL-NP occurred when the Colombian government 
implemented the national health insurance based on the “law 100” in 1993. With this significant 
change in the regulations of the Colombian health sector, the government sought to reach 
universal health care (UHC) through a model of publicly managed competition of private health 
providers and insurers where the government buys health insurance for the poor.  
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COL-NP had worked closely with the government for many years in order to make sure that 
certain health products and services be included into the public health system. On the one hand, 
particularly employees who had fought for the improvement of the public health system thus 
interpreted the introduction of the national health insurance as a success for COL-NP. However, 
on the other hand, COL-NP had been financially independent from the government and operated 
as a hybrid organization that predominantly combined the social welfare and the commercial 
logic. Due to the extent of unmet health needs at that time, COL-NP had grown to a very large 
health provider that generated the biggest share of its revenues through the direct sales of health 
products and services to patients who paid out-of-pocket. The introduction of the NHI now 
fostered competition in the Colombian health market. Many new health providers emerged and 
created a financial threat for COL-NP, as described in an archival document provided to the 
researcher: 
“[In 1993], the Colombian health sector has experienced a radical transformation. 
With the “Law 100“ it transitioned to a system of free competition in health insuring 
and health provision. With this law [COL-NP] lost the monopolistic position it had 
at that time.” [COL-NP-1.10]  
In other words, the tension between maintaing the organization’s raison d’être and fostering 
social progress was a tension over goals rooted in a strategic paradox between the social 
welfare and the commercial logic. Through its activities, the organization fostered social change, 
but at the same time, incrementally destroyed its raison d’être. It was thus not a tension that 
manifested due to conflicting demands but a material tension embedded in the busines model of 
COL-NP. 
RC 1 – Adapting the Structure to the New Resource Environment: 
As a reaction to the institutional change that COL-NP had contributed to achieve, the organization 
entered into a process of deep restructuring and cultural change. It created the nonprofit 
organization “COL-NP IPS”, which became accredited to the public health system and was 
meant to operate in a financially sustainable way through payments from the publicly 
managed health system. In addition, a second nonprofit organization, “COL-NP Social”, was 
created to enable the organization to further realize social programs and attend people that were 
not affiliated to the NHI, particularly displaced people who form a large group in Colombia until 
today due to the lasting internal conflicts in the country. COL-NP Social was mainly funded 
through donations and grants. In addition, surpluses generated by COL-NP IPS cross-
subsidized the operations of COL-NP Social when possible and necessary. This dual structure 
was necessary as health providers who were affiliated to the public health system were legally 
required to operate in a financially sustainable way. The Public Relations Manager of COL-NP 
explained: 
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“Well, actually, [COL-NP IPS] does everything that the health system prescribes. 
So, it’s  for all the people who belong to the contributory or subsidized system, 
which would be the SISBEN. In [COL-NP Social] we provide to people what the 
system does not guarantee. For example, a more integral approach for youth, 
such as life projects, unwanted pregnancies, (…). Another thing that COL-NP 
Social does is to work with people who are in emergency situations. People that 
have been displaced, either by the armed conflict or by natural catastrophes. 
COL-NP searches these spaces that the system does not necessarily serve. Or 
that are needed because they are cyclical. So many times, clients of COL-NP 
Social are people who are displaced by the winter and who require health care but 
are currently only identified as displaced people.” [COL-NP-1.5] 
From that moment on, the largest share of COL-NP’s operations was funded through the public 
system. Services that were provided for low-income people who couldn’t afford to pay were 
reimbursed by the publich health insurance. Nevertheless, out-of-pocket payments remained an 
important share of COL-NP’s revenues (approximately 30%) as COL-NP IPS continued to 
privately offer services that were not covered by the public health insurance plan. These services 
thus had to be paid out-of-pocket and/or cross-subsidized with surpluses that COL-NP had 
generated by selling its services to the government. In addition, COL-NP Social also continued to 
rely on donations for projects that targetted people who were not covered by the public health 
insurance. In sum, COL-NP thus referred to the strategy of separating a more commercially and a 
more socially oriented organization and a cumulative strategy of creating synergies between the 
different activities and respective revenue streams. In comparison to COL-NP’s initial structure, 
this represented a shift towards the commercial logic although COL-NP IPS was incorporated as 
as a nonprofit. As the legal regulations in the Colombian law stated, IPS’s were legally required to 
be financially sustainable and thus couldn’t operate at a loss. 
CTP 2 – Experiencing the Instability of Public and Third Sector Funding: 
Having established the structure to receive funding from the publicly managed health system as 
well as donors and to sell private services, COL-NP achieved financial sustainability for many 
years and could dedicate profits as well as donations to the provision of health services for 
marginalized populations that were not affiliated to the public health system. In particular, large 
grant programs funded through USAID kept COL-NP Social in a financially comfortable situation. 
However, in 2009, USAID decided to end its engagement in the Colombian health sector, which 
hit COL-NP unexpectedly. The Financial Manager described the situation: 
“Being a nonprofit and having had large contracts with organizations from the US 
and elsewhere, [COL-NP] has never been a commercial company. It has never 
sought the best way to do business, to sell better, it has never asked itself: what is 
the highest efficiency that I can reach? This is one of the big problems that we 
had. This organization has always been social, and it has done many social 
things, but thanks to these large contracts, it has always had a good cash flow 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 209 
 
 
and good returns, but it never thought that these flows, these contracts could end. 
[COL-NP-1.1]” 
The rationale for USAID’s decision to exit Colombia’s health sector was based on the fact that the 
improvements in the Colombian health sector signaled that donor support was less needed, 
particularly in comparison to other developing and emerging economies. In 2009, a very high 
percentage of the Colombian population (approximately 93% according to COL-NP) was enrolled 
in the NHI. Furthermore, the country depicted a relatively high-ranking Human Development 
Index. 58  As the Public Relations Manager explained, these figures left a comparably good 
impression in the eyes of foreign aid organizations, which felt that they could now focus on other 
countries that needed their support more urgently: 
“It is precisely that Colombia isn’t part of the countries that are currently prioritized 
by international assistance. We are experiencing a change in focus towards 
countries like Ecuador, Bolivia, and Paraguay. That’s why we are being sidelined 
in the focus of these international organizations” [COL-NP-1.6]. 
However, as a program director of COL-NP Social explained, these macroeconomic figures failed 
to reflect the real situation of health care in the country. The high degree of inequality in 
Colombia, for instance, was not taken into account according to COL-NP’s Public Relations 
Manager:   
“Inequality is another variable that is not used in development cooperation, 
because they say that it depends on the determination of the government. That 
means that the distribution of wealth is a governmental decision. If you have few 
rich people and many poor people, you could, from a political perspective, apply 
fiscal or redistributive mechanisms to achieve a better distribution of wealth. So 
donors say that from that moment on they are not needed anymore, because the 
country can manage it alone.” [COL-NP-1.6] 
In addition, as the Financial Manager claimed, the Colombian health system was simultaneously 
struck by a large corruption scandal that started to surface and paralyzed the flow of funds from 
health insurers to health providers: 
“The Law 100 is one of the largest problems that this country has ever had. The 
corruption that has taken place with the law 100 can not even be analyzed, 
especially in the last 10 years. When the law 100 started to be implemented, so-
called EPS were created and they have evolved into the biggest corruption 
centers where billions of pesos have been misappropriated. We had contracts 
since the end of the 1990. But the EPS haven’t paid us consistently, they have 
huge debts with us. I don’t even know how many millions they owe us.” [COL-NP-
1.1] 
                                                   
58 http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/COL  
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Being exposed to these two external events, COL-NP started to face considerable financial 
challenges. For the first time since its inception, the organization experienced severe financial 
losses for several years. In addition, the situation also couldn’t be interpreted as a success from a 
social point of view given the substantial problems that prevailed in the public health system.  
In sum, data analysis revealed that COL-NP experienced three concrete tensions in CTP 2. First, 
relying on donor funding had deteriorated the business discipline that COL-NP sought to 
cultivate since its inception. This tension can be classified as a tension over means between 
the social welfare and the commercial logic, as it refers to the institutional rigidity that resulted 
from COL-NP’s long-term reliance on donor funding. As this tension related to the lack of 
incentives to increase efficiency in a situation where COL-NP was well funded through donations, 
it can be classified as a material tension.  
Second, COL-NP faced another tension over means between the social welfare and the 
commercial logic in that large contracts with donors had been a reliable source of funding 
for some years, but ultimately ended surprisingly as other countries became more 
attractive support targets compared to Colombia. Due to the general progress that Colombia 
made, particularly with regard to economic development, donors started to shift their focus away 
from the country. Less developed countries attracted their compassion more easily and were thus 
a better target for their social investments. Hence, COL-NP realized that it had neglected its goal 
of establishing a secure revenue base. Third, providing to the public sector also didn’t allow 
generating steady revenues due to the corruption scandal that occurred in the health 
system. This tension can be classified as a tension over means rooted in the contradictions 
between formal and informal strategic action fields in the Colombian health system. It was 
classified as a material tension as it didn’t relate to conflicting institutional demands but rather 
represented a material tension that surfaced as a consequence of the corruption scandal. 
RC2 – Increasing the Organization’s Market-Orientation: 
In order to overcome these tensions, COL-NP once again started to redefine its strategic 
orientation and to adapt its hybridization pattern. Facing severe financial shortages, the 
organization felt forced to intensify its market-orientation by putting a stronger emphasis on 
privately sold health services (dismissing strategy). The Financial Manager explained the 
new approach: 
“And we're trying to encourage cash income, which is income not through the 
EPS, but users who come here and want to have this or another procedure. (…) 
COL-NP has never been a commercial organization. And right now it is changing 
tremendously to being commercial. (...) So we're sketching for new products, 
giving them greater impetus so that we can really add products that are stable and 
will increase our product sales. (…) So, cash payments are what we want to 
increase. It is one of the great advantages of [COL-NP IPS], because we have this 
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part of cash generating activities. Users come here and pay cash. These users 
have always been a fairly high percentage of the revenue. When the EPS were 
still strong, our health care sales were 70% of EPS and 30% in cash. But with the 
EPS cutting services etc ... we're now at 50/50. It may be a little more cash than 
EPS. So we are trying to strengthen this part because besides the fact that we 
receive the cash directly, also the margins are higher than when it goes through 
the EPS.” [COL-NP-1.1] 
Part of the increased market-orientation was also a stronger focus on target groups with 
sufficient ability to pay: 
“As we are a social institution, we have always made the lobby for [health 
services] to be included in the POS.59 But with the current situation in which the 
system is, the EPS are in a very very very very difficult situation, so they are 
beginning to restrict our services. They fixed quotas, for example for the [product 
x], which is quite expensive, a little over 150 dollars. They fixed quotas, like this 
month you have 200 no more. And then they begin to restrict. Then a woman can 
wait 5 or 6 months for getting the approval for the [product x]. So we're offering 
the [product x] as a private service. Some people may afford it, others won't.” 
[COL-NP-1.1] 
Given the new situation with regard to available financial resources, COL-NP thus shifted towards 
a stronger emphasis on the commercial logic. At the same time, however, the organization also 
sought to continue delivering on its social mission, which required trying to raise funds from 
donors to implement complementary social programs and continuing to lobby for 
improvements in the public health system (cumulative strategy). In order to remain eligible for 
donor funding in the context of the above-mentioned changes in development agencies’ focus, 
however, COL-NP Social needed to adapt its programs in order to fit the new lines of action. In 
an interview, the Public Relations Manager explained: 
“USAID is currently defining their lines of action in Colombia. The information that 
I have is that they are going to focus on democracy and security. Our task and 
challenge will be to see how our social projects in reproductive health can fit in 
these lines of action.” [COL-NP-1.6] 
In other words, COL-NP had to take a series of measures to make sure it could survive in the 
new resource environment. However, this impacted negatively on the achievement of its mission. 
 
  
                                                   
59 The “Plan Obligatorio de Salud“ is the public health insurance plan in Colombia. 




Emphasizing the commercial logic and simultaneously maintaining adherence to the social 
welfare logic caused significant internal discrepancies within COL-NP. Employees and managers 
started to question the ultimate goal of the organization. On the one hand, some advocated for 
prioritizing the social mission, which was to provide affordable, or free, access to health care for 
people in need. On the other hand, several organizational members emphasized the need to first 
secure the survival of the organization as a prerequisite to be able to continue delivering on the 
social mission. Tensions thus manifested in discussions about price setting, for instance. While 
one part of the workforce advocated for raising prices and thereby increasing the profit margins, 
others made clear that this jeapordized COL-NP’s social mission. The organization’s initial target 
group was not able to afford higher prices. Hence, for COL-NP, the hybrid orientation had 
reached a level that led to significant internal confusion. A Program Manager explained her point 
of view:  
“There has always been a tension between the objectives of [COL-NP] as an 
enterprise and the social objectives. But the recent changes have intensified this 
tension. The social role of [COL-NP] can not be impaired. This is the founder’s 
argument and I agree with that. In the moment in which [COL-NP] impairs its 
social role, we will end up doing neither one thing nor the other.” [COL-NP-1.2] 
In the eyes of its organizational members, the organization was neither delivering on its social 
mission, nor was it operating in a financially sustainable way. The tensions that COL-NP had 
faced over the last years had thus turned into a vicious cycle at the end of data collection, as the 
organization faced substantial tensions, which paralyzed it to further implement its hybridization 
approach with an emphasis on the commercial logic. 
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Table 21:  Trajectory of Tensions, Strategies and Hybridization Patterns in COL-NP 
 T0 CTP1 Hybridization Strategies 
in RC1 







care to low-income 
people; fight for 
better public health 
system (social 
welfare logic) 
Foster social progress 
vs. maintain reason 
for existence (tension 





   Stronger focus on 
target groups with 
sufficient ability to pay 
(Dismissing strategy - 
emphasis on 
commercial logic) 
 Adapt strategic focus to 
fit new lines of action of 
donors (Cumulative 
strategy – social 
welfare logic) 
Trying to balance 
social welfare and 
commercial logic 











 Restructure organization 
to allow for affiliation to 
public health system and 
philanthropic activities 
(separating strategy - 
hybrid logic) 
   
Financing Donations and grants 
(social welfare logic) 
  Rely mainly on donor 
funding vs. establish secure 
funding base (tension over 
means/institutional void 






revenue from private 
health services to 
patients (hybrid logic) 
 Cross subsidize between 
profitable and unprofitable 
operations (cumulative 
strategy - hybrid logic) 
Sell to public sector mainly 
vs. establish reliable 
revenue stream (tension 
over means/institutional 
void between formal and 
informal strategic action 
fields) 
Put stronger emphasis on 
privately sold health 
services and target 
groups with sufficient 
ability to pay (dismissing 
strategy – emphasis on 
commercial logic) 
Tension remained 
substantial at end of 
data collection 
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 T0 CTP1 Hybridization Strategies 
in RC1 






Network of own 
clinics (commercial 
logic) 
     
Human 
resources 





  Rely mainly on donor 
funding vs. establish 
business discipline (tension 
over means/institutional 
void between social welfare 
and commercial origin) 
 Substantial internal 
controversies about 






with public sector 
(social welfare logic) 
     
Summary of  
outcome 
  -    Vicious cycles 
 Substantial internal 
controversies 
about ultimate goal 
of the organization 
 Internal resistance 
to further increase 
market orientation 
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6.2.5 Comparative Reflections on Hybrid Organizations with Origins in the Social 
Welfare Logic  
Comparing the four hybrid organizations with social welfare origins revealed that none of them 
could turn institutional voids into opportunity spaces as to establish virtuous cycles. However, 
three organizations (MEX-NP, KEN-NP, SA-NP) could establish fragile equilibriums by applying 
hybridization strategies that provided short-term relief. For one organization (COL-NP) tensions 
ultimately ended in a vicious cycle, meaning that it was paralyzed and thus unable to freely select 
structures or practices from the commercial and the social welfare logic and ultimately faced 
substantial tensions. In analogy to the approach taken in 6.1.5, the following sections will 
summarize the findings for those cases by concentrating on the types of tensions that hybrid 
organizations face as proxies for higher order institutional voids as well as the hybridization 
patterns and strategies to which the organizations referred in order to manage those tensions. 
Subsequently, the factors that enabled and/or constrained the organizations in referring to 
hybridization strategies to manage the tensions will be discussed. 
On the Process of Turning Institutional Voids into Opportunity Spaces 
Determining the Types of Tensions and Institutional Voids 
Just as for hybrid organizations with commercial origins, the analysis of hybrid organizations with 
social welfare origin revealed that they faced both tensions over goals and tensions over means. 
The sources of tensions referred to institutional voids between the social welfare and the 
commercial logic, between formal and informal strategic action fields, and between Western and 
local strategic action fields (see table 22 for a detailed account of the tensions and hybridization 
strategies and appendix 5 and 6 for the corresponding empirical material). Further, they surfaced 
as a consequence of conflicting demands of adherents of conflicting logics or as material 
tensions that became salient through external events or institutional voids. 
Identifying the Hybridization Strategies 
A major difference between the three organizations that could establish a fragile equilibrium and 
COL-NP relates to the type of strategic answers that they chose to react to the tensions. MEX-
NP, KEN-NP, and SA-NP all either coverted to a for-profit (MEX-NP) or created parrallel for-profit 
structures (KEN-NP, SA-NP). In other words, the organizations that could maintain a fragile 
equilibrium proved structural compliance with the commercial logic. When facing the 
massive reduction of customer demand after the introduction of the Seguro Popular, MEX-NP 
decided to transition to a for-profit in order to become eligible for funding from a social investment 
fund – particularly as donor money also decreased simultaneously. Similarly, SA-NP reacted to 
the decrease of donor money with the creation of an additional for-profit entity dedicated to the 
pursuit of a social enterprise strategy. 
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Table 22:  Overview of Tensions and Hybridization Strategies in Hybrid Organizations with Social Welfare Origins 










Strategic Reponse Changes in 
Hybridization Pattern 






Improve Mexican health 








in business model) 
Social welfare / 
commercial logic 
Consider conversion into for-
profit in order to access funding 
from social investment fund 
Substantial shift towards 
commercial logic Dismissing strategy 
Increase cost efficiency Substantial shift towards commercial logic Dismissing strategy 
Redefine blended value creating 
goals in the new context of the 
Mexican health system in order 
to justify low wages  
- Creative strategy 
Collaborate vs. compete 




Management team Social welfare / commercial logic 
Position as collaborator and 
competitor to the government: 
 Seek affiliation to public health 
insurance (social welfare) 
 Seek other revenue streams in 
parallel (commercial) 
Substantial shift towards 




Collaborate vs. compete 




Management team Social welfare / commercial logic 
Try to lobby for improvement of 
regulations in health market -  Cumulative strategy 
Establish innovative 
business model based 
on scale vs. need to 







in business model) 
Western / local 
strategic action 




 Compensate for losses with 
donations 
 Train franchisees to improve 
business skills and medical 
quality 
Substantial shift towards 
social welfare logic Cumulative strategy 
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Set prices based on 







in business model) 
Formal / Informal 
+ Western / local 
strategic action 
fields 
Set prices based on 





Management team Social welfare / commercial logic 
Provide products / 
services based on social 










vs. mainly depend on 
inconsistent source of 





Funders Social welfare / commercial logic 
Prepare transition to for-profit 
legal form 
Substantial shift towards 
commercial logic Dismissing strategy 
Receive donor funding 






None Social welfare / commercial logic 
Innovate the way financial 
subsidies were used to change 
incentive structure 




with donations vs. 
expect them to operate 





Management team Social welfare / commercial logic 
Hire employees with 
social welfare 






Employees Social welfare / commercial logic 
Try to gain acceptance of 
employees through internal 
discussions and anticipating 
tensions 
- Creative strategy 
Receive subsidized 
products vs. ability to 








Social welfare / 
commercial logic 
Prepare transition to for-profit 
legal form 
Substantial shift towards 
commercial logic Dismissing strategy 







oriented hybrid business 
model vs. gain 
acceptance of nonprofit 





Employees Social welfare / commercial logic 
Try and convince collaborators in 
South Africa to jointly implement 
social enterprise projects by 
emphasizing the benefits of a 
stronger market-orientation  





approach vs. gain 
acceptance of project 







Social welfare / 
commercial logic 
Incorporate additional for-profit 
organization 
Substantial shift towards 
commercial logic Separation strategy  
Establish financially 
sustainable organization 







Western / local 
strategic action 
fields 
Provide services and 
products based on 
social rationale vs. 





Employees Social welfare / commercial logic 





Management team Social welfare / commercial logic 
- Remain a complement to public 
health system  
- Implement only parts of the 
social enterprise strategy to 
avoid upsetting partners 
- Cumulative strategy  
Establish a market-
oriented hybrid business 
model vs. gain 





Employees Social welfare / commercial logic 
Hire young employees with more 
openess to hybrid approaches - Creative strategy 
  







Foster social progress 










Social welfare / 
commercial logic 
Process of restructuring and 
cultural change 
Substantial shift towards 
commercial logic Separating strategy 
Cross subsidize between 
profitable and unprofitable 
operations  
- Cumulative strategy 
CTP2 / 
RC2 
Rely mainly on donor 
funding vs. establish 




None Social welfare / commercial logic 
 Put stronger emphasis on 
privately sold health services 
to target groups with sufficient 
ability to pay (commercial 
logic) 
 Continue to seek funds from 
donors to implement 
complementary social 
programs and continue to 
lobby for improvements in the 
public health system (social 
welfare logic) 
Substantial shift towards 
commercial logic 
Dismissing / Cumulative 
strategy 
Rely mainly on donor 
funding vs. establish 




Funders Social welfare / commercial logic 
Sell to public sector 
mainly vs. establish 









Formal / informal 
strategic action fields 
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KEN-NP didn’t react to changes in the resource environment, but rather decided to create an 
additional for-profit organization as a response to the perceived incompatibility of the dynamics in 
the third sector and the organization’s goal to become financially sustainable. COL-NP, in 
contrast, remained a nonprofit entity and only increased its adherence to the commercial logic 
through internal changes. These differences suggest that structural compliance with the 
commercial logic could substantially improve the situation of hybrid organizations with a social 
welfare origin. 
Overall, hybrid organizations with origins in the social welfare logic all moved towards an increase 
of their market orientation over time, based on the need or the desire to improve access to 
(adequate) funding. For two hybrid organizations (MEX-NP, COL-NP) this increase of emphasis 
of the commercial logic was an answer to a central strategic paradox, namely the tension 
between achieving social progress and maintaining the organization’s raison d’être. For 
SA-NP, this paradox didn’t manifest as a tension that the organization experienced, however, it 
was reflected in the very reason why SA-NP had started to venture into social enterprise. In all 
three cases, the countries slowly moved out of the focus of donors due to the apparent 
improvements in their social development. While for MEX-NP and COL-NP these improvements 
related to the establishment of a public health system, for SA-NP they related to apparent 
improvements in the country’s health systems or economic development. All three organizations 
were thus pushed towards a major strategic redefinition due to substantial changes in their 
resource environment.  
The case of KEN-NP was an exception in this regard, as Kenya depicts a comparably weaker 
progress in its social development, meaning that donors still continued to focus on the support of 
Kenya’s health system. Here, the organization mainly increased its market orientation in order to 
improve its access to adequate, that is, organizational growth oriented funding, which was 
necessary to realize the business model based on maximum efficiency and scale. However, 
KEN-NP’s decision to move towards more market orientation was still based on the realization 
that the logic of the third sector (that is, ideal-typically the social welfare logic) inhibited the 
organization in achieving its financial, and therefore, also its social goals. In other words, 
referring to or increasing the emphasis on practices of the commercial logics was mainly 
an exit strategy for hybrid organizations with a social welfare origin.  
However, the increased implementation of practices and structures from the commercial 
logic led to tensions over goals for all organizations with a social welfare origin. These 
tensions either directly manifested or evolved to becoming tensions that questioned the 
core of the organization. For instance, for three of the cases, the tension between collaborating 
and competing with the government was a major tension over goals, as the support of the public 
health system was part of their key objectives (MEX-NP, SA-NP, COL-NP). For KEN-NP, 
collaborating with the government was rather a pragmatic measure as it provided the 
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organization with important benefits (referrals of patients, access to subsidized supply). It had 
never been a strategic objective to act as a complement to the Kenyan public health system. 
However, KEN-NP’s increased emphasis of the commercial logic still led to substantial normative 
discrepancies as key stakeholders disagreed with the organization’s plans.  
Hence, in sum, it can be noted that the strategies that could be identified in the analysis of 
hybrid organizations with social welfare origins were mainly aimed at avoiding tensions 
over goals at the core of the organization. Separating and cumulative strategies were 
particularly prevalent.  
On the Ability to Hybridize  
As the last section has outlined, none of the cases with social welfare origin have been able to 
turn the tensions that they faced into a virtuous cycle. Three cases have been able to establish 
fragile equilibriums. One organization ultimately faced a vicious cycle. Looking at the factors that 
enabled and constrained the studied organizations to freely draw from competing logics revealed 
no significant relationship between the type of tensions that organizations faced and the type of 
hybridization strategies that they implemented. The different types of tensions (tensions over 
goals / tensions over means; tensions emerging from conflicting institutional demands / material 
tensions) as well as the different types of sources (institutional contradictions between the social 
welfare logics and the commercial logics; between formal and informal strategic action fields; 
between Western and local strategic action fields) could be found in both fragile and vicious 
cases.  
Further, in analogy to the comparative reflections on hybrid organizations with commercial 
origins, it can be noted that none of the hybrid organizations with social welfare origins had 
succeeded in receiving long-term funding that embrace the idea of blended value creation. Only 
MEX-NP had received a conditional grant from a social investment fund. However, it is believed 
that this was not a consequence ot its compliance with the legitimacy criteria of the fund 
members, but rather a consequence of the involvement of MEX-NP’s founder in the social 
investment fund as a limited partner. 
6.3 Comparative Reflections on the Role of the Institutional Context 
As explained in the methodology section, governments of all four countries sought to implement 
the principle of universal access to health care. In Mexico and Colombia, the governments had 
implemented public health insurance schemes that covered large parts of the low-income 
population. In Kenya and South Africa, public health facilities provided free access to health care 
for low-income populations.  
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However, as the empirical investigation of the case studies in Colombia, Mexico and Kenya 
revealed, the ineffectiveness of public institutions to provide affordable high-quality health care 
seemed to destroy the ability of governments to ensure access to health care and thus seemed to 
destroy the field-level consensus that the public health system was the best option. In Mexico, the 
government was overwhelmed by the high demand for services that had to be covered by the 
Seguro Popular and was thus in a constant situation of financial scarcity. In Colombia, the health 
system had just experienced a large corruption scandal due to which the Ministry of Health was 
unable to settle the invoices of health providers affiliated to the public health insurance scheme. 
In Kenya, where low-income segments could, in theory, access free health care in public health 
facilities, the situation was similar. Public clinics and hospitals were often out of stock of medical 
supply. Furthermore, health workers were typically overwhelmed by the high demand and the bad 
conditions under which they had to treat patients. Hence, waiting times were long, causing high 
opportunity costs for patients that needed to wait for hours or even days to be attended, and the 
quality of services decreased. Further, interviews and field observations repeatedly confirmed 
that not only the public health systems but also the commercial and the third sector in all three 
countries failed to provide access to affordable high-quality health care for low-income people. 
These facts resulted in a general openness for any innovative type of organization that promised 
to provide high quality health care at affordable prices in Colombia, Mexico and Kenya. In other 
words, in Colombia, Mexico and Kenya, there was no effective dominant logic among players 
in health fields concerning the sector that should provide health care to low-income segments of 
the population. 
In South Africa, data collection revealed a different picture. Although the public health system 
also failed to provide affordable, high-quality health care to low-income segments, and although 
South Africa’s post-Apartheid regime clearly fostered liberal reforms – including in health care – 
there was a strong belief among many of SA-FP’s and SA-NP’s relevant stakeholders, in 
particular partners from the third and public sector, as well as employees, that providing health 
services to the poor should occur under the principle of free access to health care. In addition, 
interviews and, more importantly, field observations during data collection in South Africa 
revealed that the majority of large companies in South Africa – including SA-FP’s mother 
company – were in the hands of white South Africans. In the context of the post-Apartheid 
regime, these companies faced normatively rooted legitimacy disadvantages, particularly among 
actors from the public and the third sector, as they were skeptical about the organization’s 
sincerity concerning its social objectives. However, given that customers still demanded 
affordable high-quality health care, departing from the principle of free access to health care was 
still legitimate from a pragmatic point of view. In other words, in South Africa, there was a 
dominance of the social welfare logic among players in the health field, but it was weakly 
enforced. 
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As a consequence, hybrid organizations in all four countries ultimately faced conflicts over 
goals at the organizational level concerning the question of whether health care at the BoP 
should be provided based on a social welfare logic, or based on a commercial logic. 
However, in addition, hybrid organizations in South Africa had to deal with the low 
legitimacy of market-oriented approaches in the eyes of public and third sector actors. 
(Appendix 7 displays additional empirical material that reflects the situations in the health fields in 
all four sample countries) 
6.4 Summary and Discussion of Findings  
By analyzing eight hybrid organizations, the present study seeks to shed light on cross-sectoral 
hybridization as a strategy to turn institutional voids at the BoP into opportunity spaces. For this 
purpose, the focus of the empirical analysis outlined in the last chapter lied on the identification of 
tensions in hybrid organizations as proxies for higher order institutional voids, as well as 
hybridization strategies and hybridization patterns as responses to those tensions. In addition, 
field-level factors that enabled and constrained organizations to enact such hybridization 
strategies have been analyzed. Building on prior research and field observations, the logic of 
origin as well as the institutional context were assumed to be major determinants concerning the 
ability to hybridize.  
The study has therefore investigated four blended value creating hybrid organizations with social 
welfare origin, and four with commercial origin in four different developing and emerging 
economies. In those settings, it was assumed that institutional voids would be prevalent, thereby 
constraining and enabling organizations to apply successful hybridization strategies. In the 
following sections the specific tensions and hybridization strategies identified in the empirical 
material will be summarized and discussed as to further develop the emerging theory of hybrid 
organizations. Given the theory-building objective of this study, the findings will be formulated as 
propositions. As will be further elaborated in the next chapter, future research is needed to further 
test these propositions. 
6.4.1 Institutional Voids as Sources of Tensions in Cross-Sectoral Hybrid 
Organizations 
Identifying the Sources of Tensions in Hybrid Organizations at the BoP 
As posited in the conceptual framework, institutional voids, in this study, have been understood 
as contradictions at the interface of different institutional spheres (Mair, Martí, & Ventresca, 2012, 
p. 822). Given the different and perhaps conflicting sets of values, beliefs, and norms that 
constitute institutional spheres, organizations face tensions as they seek to operate at their 
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interstices. Tensions have thus been treated as proxies for higher level contradictions between 
institutional spheres. In total, three different types of institutional voids have been identified in 
the institutional contexts of the studied organizations. The empirical material showcasing these 
institutional contradictions is presented in appendix 5. 
Given the hybrid nature of the studied organizations, the first type of institutional voids 
unsurprisingly relates to contradictions between the commercial and the social welfare 
logic. (An overview of the elements that constitute both logics is displayed in appendix 4). 
Institutional voids between the social welfare and the commercial logic mainly emerged as a 
result of competing demands of external or internal constituencies adhering to one of the two 
logics and as organizational outcomes could be interpreted as successes and/or failures. 
Tensions emerging out of this first type of institutional void could be found in all studied 
organizations, with specific tensions being particularly frequent. One tension, for instance, that 
surfaced in three cases (KEN-FP, SA-FP, KEN-NP) is the moral dilemma between delivering 
products and services based on a social welfare rationale (e.g. meeting own high quality 
standards) versus delivering them based on revenue expectations (e.g. adapt quality standards 
to customer demand) as suggested by the commercial logic. Further, the tension between 
collaborating vs. competing with the government has also been identified in numerous cases 
(MEX-NP, KEN-NP, SA-NP). As the interviews in all four countries revealed, a social welfare 
logic stipulates a collaborative attitude towards governments, emphasizing the normative view 
that health care should ideally be provided by the government. The role of organizations adopting 
such a view is therefore limited to complementing the government and filling gaps in health 
service provision. In contrast, a commercial logic perspective rather emphasizes the power of 
competition as a mechanism to enhance quality and drive down costs in a market. The role of 
organizations adhering to the commercial logic therefore stresses their function as challengers of 
the government. Finally, institutional voids between the social welfare and the commercial logic 
also emerged as a consequence of inherent strategic paradoxes. Such paradoxes only 
manifested in social welfare cases that destroyed their own raison d’être by achieving their 
social goals (MEX-NP, SA-NP, COL-NP). While the commercial logic suggests an endless 
pursuit of organizational growth and financial surplus maximization, the social welfare logic ideal-
typically suggests organizational liquidation after achievement of an organization’s social goal. 
This source of tension could, for example, be observed in the case of MEX-NP. When the 
government introduced the Seguro Popular, it radically improved the Mexican health care sector, 
which had also been the goal of MEX-NP. However, being mainly funded through donations and 
revenues from the sale of services to people that had no health insurance, MEX-NP suddenly lost 
its two main sources of income. Donors started to concentrate on other topics or other countries 
that needed their support more urgently. And customers started to seek services from health 
facilities that were affiliated to the public health insurance, that is, MEX-NP’s competitors at that 
time. In contrast to contradictions that emerge as a consequence of competing institutional 
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demands, strategic paradoxes can not be traced back to claims from internal or external 
audience. Rather, they are inherent contradictions that lead to paradoxical and thus confusing 
situations in organizations.  
The second type of institutional voids that has been identified in the empirical data refers to 
contradictions between Western and local strategic action fields. In interactions with 
customers, such voids emerged as organizations built their Western-style business models on 
assumptions that neglected or underestimated 1) the ability and willingness to pay for health 
services (SA-FP), 2) the lack of customer knowledge about the need to get treatment as well as 
differences in health seeking behavior (MEX-FP), 3) diverging understandings or evaluations of 
appropriate quality requirements in health care and health products (KEN-NP), 4) the lack of a 
saving culture as well as saving opportunities at the BoP (KEN-NP), 5) the preferences of 
customers, for example, to be treated by doctors as opposed to nurses (SA-FP), as well as 6) the 
unpredictability of operating at the BoP and the prevailing culture of “living in the present” (KEN-
NP). Neglecting or underestimating these voids, led to various tensions in the studied hybrid 
organizations, in particular in those cases that had a strong emphasis on efficiency maximization 
and standardization as means to allow for fast scaling. These were two hybrid organizations with 
commercial origins (MEX-FP and SA-FP), and one organization with social welfare origin (KEN-
NP). It further has to be noted that for two of the organizations, SA-FP and KEN-NP, 
standardization and efficiency maximization were core propositions of their social franchise 
business model. In addition, in all those organizations, founders and key management team 
members depicted a stronger imprinting through Western style (business) mindsets, either 
because they were of Western origin, or because they had been imprinted by former involvement 
in Western educational institutions or employments. KEN-NP, for instance, faced several tensions 
as it failed to align its product and service delivery to the habits of Kenyan customers living in 
BoP settings. While the management of KEN-NP was largely influenced by Western beliefs about 
how health care should be provided to people, Kenyan low-income populations often proved to 
have a diverging understanding. For example, low-income customers in Kenya were used to 
walking into a health facility and buying drugs without previous tests or proper diagnosis. 
Convincing them of the need to change these health seeking habits was difficult, particularly if 
they had to pay for a consultation and if competitors continued to provide them with medicine 
without proper diagnosis. In addition, this type of institutional void could also be identified as 
organizations faced challenges in providing to public entities. Reimbursement schemes or 
partnership agreements with public entities in the sample countries proved to be inconsistent in 
two cases, either due to unpredictable decision-making (MEX-FP) or a lack of planning capability 
in the health ministry (SA-NP). Similarly as just described for customer behavior at the BoP, this 
type of behavior in public entities is a consequence of several factors that prevail in developing 
and emerging economies, including resource scarcity, dependence on volatile foreign aid, and 
ineffective formal institutions. As a result, short-term planning and spontaneity in decision-making 
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are more prevalent in public institutions in developing and emerging economies as in Western 
economies.  
The third type are institutional voids caused by contradictions between formal and informal 
strategic action fields. Such tensions emerged as organizations complied with legal norms but 
relied upon or had to compete with organizations that didn’t. A long-term contract with the 
government enabled COL-NP, for instance, to maintain financial sustainability for several years. 
However, a corruption scandal that surfaced in 2012 caused significant liquidity problems within 
COL-NP as the government suddenly stopped reimbursing the organization for services it had 
already provided to insurance holders. KEN-NP and SA-FP further faced the challenge of having 
to convince customers of referring to health services that complied with certain quality standards 
instead of seeking health services at health providers that operated illegally or referred to illegal 
practices. Finally, MEX-FP faced a similar tension as the organization depended on gaining the 
legitimacy of competitors that were at the same time gatekeepers for resources that the 
organization needed. In sum, it can be noted that this type of institutional void occurred in both 
hybrid organizations with commercial and with social welfare origins. In addition, it could be 
identified in all four countries, reflecting the ineffectiveness of public institutions to enforce legal 
norms about the appropriate behavior and goals of health care organizations. 
Based on these elaborations, the researcher suggests that: 
Proposition 1:  Tensions in hybrid organizations at the BoP not only reflect 
institutional voids between the social welfare and the commercial 
logic, but also other institutional voids 
The Nature of Tensions in Hybrid Organizations at the BoP 
As mentioned in the conceptual framework, the present study initially sought to focus on an 
investigation of hybrid organizations in fields where tensions over goals are not resolved at the 
field level. Building on Pache and Santos (2010), the assumption behind this focus was that, in 
such situations, both tensions over goals and tensions over means manifest at the organizational 
level and force organizations to find appropriate response strategies. The tensions that have 
been identified as proxies for the just presented institutional voids and strategic paradoxes have 
therefore been classified as tensions over goals and tensions over means. Overall, both types of 
tensions could be found in all cases.  
However, comparing the manifestation of tension across hybrid organizations revealed that the 
very same tensions could take the form of tensions over goals in some hybrid 
organizations and of tensions over means in others. In particular, as mentioned above, three 
organizations (MEX-NP, KEN-NP, SA-NP) reported having faced a tension between collaboration 
vs. competition. However, it is only for MEX-NP and SA-NP that this tension manifested as a 
tension over goals, given that both organizations had since the beginning adhered to a social 
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welfare logic with regard to their collaborative attitude towards the government. They had 
repeatedly emphasized their goal to support the government in establishing a well-functioning 
public health system. KEN-NP, in contrast, although closely collaborating with the government, 
hadn’t integrated the support of the government as a component of its organizational objectives. 
Collaboration with the Ministry of Health in Kenya was rather based on pragmatic reasoning. 
When KEN-NP had to rethink its collaborative attitude towards the government due to regulatory 
changes, the tension between collaborating vs. competing with the government therefore only 
represented a tension over means for the organization. Hence, the researcher suggests that 
hybrid organizations may influence the nature of tensions by framing it through either one or the 
other of their constitutive logics. In other words: 
Proposition 2:  Hybrid organization may manipulate the nature of tensions 
(tension over goals vs. tension over means) by altering the logic 
of reference 
Based on these findings and propositions on the tensions in hybrid organizations in general, the 
next sections will focus on cross-sectoral hybridization strategies in BoP settings. 
6.4.2 Determining Cross-Sectoral Hybridization Strategies and Hybridization 
Patterns at the BoP 
The second interest of the present study relates to the cross-sectoral hybridization strategies and 
hybridization patterns in BoP settings. Hybrid organizations referred to several strategies in order 
to manage the tensions that they faced. In accordance with Battilana and Lee’s (Battilana & Lee, 
2014, p. 41) typology, these strategies included dismissing, separating, cumulative and creative 
strategies. 
Dismissing strategies seek to eliminate contradictions between opposing poles. In the empirical 
analysis, three different types of dismissing strategies have been identified. First, COL-FP 
referred to a co-optation strategy defined as the importation of influential constituents (Oliver, 
1991, p. 152). COL-FP did so by partnering with a well-established and legitimate NGO – which 
is an ideal-typical organization of the social welfare logic – in order to access resources from a 
funder used to providing donations – which is ideal-typical funding of the social welfare logic. 
Second, a specific type of decoupling has been identified, which will be referred to as “reverse 
decoupling”. While decoupling generally refers to situations in which organizations show 
ceremonial conformity with institutional demands while effectively defaulting on those demands 
(Fiss & Zajac, 2006), reverse decoupling describes a strategy where an organization remained 
silent about its compliance with institutional demands in order to gain cognitive and moral 
legitimacy (Suchman, 1995). In particular, although seeking blended value creation, KEN-FP not 
only decided to incorporate as a for-profit, but also to avoid any explicit positioning as a socially 
oriented organization. Instead, KEN-FP positioned itself as a “normal business”. This strategy 
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allowed the organization to capitalize on well-established organizational forms (cognitive 
legitimacy) instead of trying to establish a new type of organization. Further, it allowed KEN-FP to 
manage expectations concerning its social impact creation, as internal and external audiences 
didn’t expect a “normal business” to perform in a particularly social way. With every social impact 
creating outcome of KEN-FP, the organization was thus able to exceed expectations and thus to 
improve its reputation (moral legitimacy). Finally, the third dismissing strategy that could be 
identified in the empirical material is avoidance. SA-FP sought to avoid the exposure to 
conflicting institutional demands by delaying the formalization of its BoP venture and trying to pilot 
the initiative without external partners of the third and public sector. It did so after first attempts to 
get partners on board and realizing that it required substantial efforts to convince them of the 
hybrid venture. 
Separation strategies aim at creating distance between opposing poles. Two types of separating 
strategies could be found. First, structural separation has been applied by three organizations 
(SA-FP, KEN-NP, SA-NP) as a reaction to skepticism from referent audiences from the social 
welfare logic in particular. Second, a specific type of structural separation, which could be found 
in all cases refers to the practice of selective coupling, defined as the selective combination of 
intact demands drawn from competing logics (Pache and Santos, 2012). All cases drew from 
intact practices from the social welfare and the commercial logic in different areas of the 
organization. For instance, already from a structural point of view, all organizations had to choose 
between incorporating as a for-profit or a nonprofit organization, given the lack of legal forms 
suited for their hybrid nature. Third, various instances of impression management, defined as 
organizational practice to present different faces to different audiences (Teasdale, 2010), could 
be found. Nearly all hybrid organizations (except KEN-NP and COL-NP) referred to this strategy 
and emphasized either their “social face” or their “business face” to gain access to resources 
(COL-FP, MEX-NP), to gain the legitimacy of employees (MEX-FP, KEN-FP, SA-NP or of 
external partners (SA-FP). A specific type of impression management has furthermore been 
identified in COL-FP. In contrast to showing its social face towards demands from the social 
welfare logic and its business face towards demands from the commercial logic, as could be 
expected, the organization disentangled a tension that it faced into its institutional 
subcomponents and adapted its impression management accordingly. In particular, when facing 
the challenge that a potential funder remained skeptical about the moral legitimacy of COL-FP, 
the organization emphasized its innovativeness as a commercially oriented hybrid organization. 
Having succeeded in convincing the funder from a moral point of view, COL-FP subsequently 
faced the challenge that the internal guidelines of the funder prohibited the support of a for-profit 
organization. In order to overcome this regulative barrier, COL-FP emphasized its social face in 
order to be able to enter a partnership with an NGO that agreed on channeling through donations 
from the funder to COL-FP. 
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Cumulative strategies seek to balance opposing poles by complying to several competing 
institutional demands and trying to forge synergies between the opposing poles. Such strategies 
have also been found in nearly all cases. For instance, at the level of funding, MEX-FP balanced 
different types of funders including an international development bank, a Mexican foundation 
and a Mexican Social Invest Fund. With regards to revenue generation, the strategy of cross-
subsidization between different customer target groups has been applied by MEX-FP and 
COL-NP. Further, in its interaction with franchisees, KEN-NP sought to find a balance between 
expecting the franchisees to become financially sustainable entrepreneurs and supporting them 
with donations and training when needed. In other words, the organization sought to balance 
paradoxical goals. Finally, several cases (SA-FP, COL-FP, SA-NP) tried to find a balance 
between reacting to the skepticism of key constituencies and continuing to increase the emphasis 
of the commercial logic. In order to do so, they accepted to slow down their increasing market 
orientation and invested in negotiation efforts geared towards convincing the skeptics.  
Creative strategies aim at merging opposing poles in a new hybrid whole. In particular, three 
types of creative strategies could be identified. First, several instances of sensemaking could be 
found, through which organizations iteratively and retrospectively provided interpretations that 
alleviated the tensions. In particular, several organizations positioned their new hybrid logic as 
superior to traditional approaches in providing health care to low-income people. Across multiple 
cases (MEX-FP, KEN-FP, COL-FP, SA-FP), institutions of the public or third sector proved to be 
ineffective and thus inhibiting for the establishment of financially sustainable health care 
organizations that could continue to exist and provide affordable health care in the long term. 
Sensemaking was thus strongly based on pointing to the prevalence of institutional voids – in 
particular voids between the social welfare logic and the commercial logic as well as voids 
between formal and informal insitutional speres – at the BoP, delegitimizing existing approaches 
of health provision and explicitly positioning the own hybrid organizations as “game changers” 
and “inspirational leaders”. A second type of creative strategy, refers to hiring practices that 
sought to minimize the former imprinting of employees. In an effort to facilitate an easier 
adoption of a new hybrid logic, MEX-NP and SA-NP started to focus on hiring young employees 
with little work experience and thus weak imprinting from employments that followed beliefs, 
practices and routines from traditional sector logics. Finally, a third type of creative strategy 
referred to adapting business practices to the solution of social issues. In particular, the 
social franchise concept that underlied KEN-NP and SA-FP can be seen as a perfect blend of the 
commercial and the social welfare logic.  
By applying those strategies, the studied organizations reflected different hybridization 
patterns, meaning that they combined and emphasized the social welfare and the commercial 
logic in different ways. As mentioned in the conceptual framework, it was one of the present 
study’s objectives to further shed light on differences in hybridization strategies and hybridization 
patterns. Prior research has suggested that the types of tensions – in particular tensions over 
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goals and tensions over means – may influence the types of strategies and thus the hybridization 
patterns. The comparative analysis of the present study, however, revealed that most of the 
studied organizations referred to a combination of the above-mentioned strategies in order to 
manage the diverse tensions that they faced. In the majority of organizations there was also no 
clear link between the nature or source of tensions and the hybridization patterns. Nevertheless, 
the studied organizations clearly adapted their hybridization patterns when facing different types 
of tensions.  
Given that the types of tensions didn’t determine the strategies that organizations applied, the 
next section will turn the focus on other factors that determined the way hybrid organizations 
dealt with institutional voids.   
6.4.3 The Role of the Institutional Context in Hybrid Organizations’ Ability to Turn 
Institutional Voids into Opportunity Spaces 
The empirical analysis in the last chapter has outlined how institutional voids can be both 
constraints and opportunity spaces for hybrid organizations. They are constraints as they trigger 
tensions over goals or tensions over means, and they are opportunitiy spaces as organizations 
make sense of them in order to gain legitimacy for their innovative behavior. In addition, it has 
shown that organizations were able to manage tensions differently. Of the eight hybrid 
organizations that have been analyzed, only two hybrid organizations – with commercial origins – 
were able to establish virtuous cycles, meaning that they applied hybridization strategies that 
enabled them to achieve a lasting resolution or acceptance of tensions and thus turn institutional 
voids into opportunity spaces and to establish sustainable hybrid arrangements. Five 
organizations that could establish fragile equilibriums, meaning that they were able to resolve 
tensions in the short-term, but remained likely to face new substantial tensions soon. Of these 
five organizations, two had commercial origins and three had social welfare origins. Finally, for 
one hybrid organization with a social welfare origin the tensions ultimately resulted in a vicious 
cycle, as tensions ultimately couldn’t be resolved and led to a substantially threatening situation 
for the organization, in which the survival of the organization was at risk.  
This finding already seems to support the initial assumption of the conceptual framework, namely 
that the logic of origin is an influential factor concerning hybrid organizations’ ability to refer to 
hybridization strategies that turn institutional voids into opportunity spaces. Similarly to evidence 
from prior research, the empirical analysis showed that logics of origin may equip hybrid 
organizations with legitimacy advantages or disadvantages. However, given that not all 
organizations with commercial origin could establish virtuous cycles and that not all organizations 
with social welfare origin ended up in vicious cycles, further factors had to be taken into account 
when trying to explain why certain hybrid organizations succeeded in turning institutional voids 
into opportunity spaces while others didn’t. 
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In particular, the empirical analysis revealed that the institutional environment of different 
country contexts had significant influence on the factors that equipped hybrid 
organizations with a legitimacy advantage or disadvantage. 
As mentioned in the comparative reflections on the role of the institutional context, the empirical 
analysis revealed that in Colombia, Mexico and Kenya, there was no effective dominant 
logic in health fields concerning the sector that should provide health care to low-income 
segments of the population. This fact resulted in a general openness towards any 
innovative type of organization that promised to fulfill this task.  
In South Africa, the situation was different. Although both the public and the third sector had so 
far failed to effectively provide health care to low-income populations, there was a strong belief 
among several of SA-NP’s and SA-FP’s stakeholders, in particular actors from the public 
and third sector, as well as employees, that providing health services to the poor should 
occur under the principle of free access to health care. In addition, interviews and, more 
importantly, field observations during data collection in South Africa revealed that the majority of 
large companies in South Africa – including SA-FP’s mother company – are in the hands of white 
South Africans. In the context of the post-Apartheid regime, these companies face considerable 
legitimacy disadvantages in low-income communities, which are primarily populated by black 
South Africans. Several actors that SA-FP approached – including local actors from the public 
and the third sector – were therefore skeptical about the organization’s sincerity concerning its 
social objectives. From a normative point of view, commercial organizations faced a legitimacy 
disadvantage towards local actors from the public and thitd sector in health fields at the BoP, 
even more when they were launched by white South Africans or Western founders. However, 
many low-income people ultimately proved willing to pay for high-quality health services, given 
the institutional ineffectiveness in providing affordable high-quality health care to low-income 
populations. Hence, in South Africa, there was a dominance of the social welfare logic, but 
it was weakly enforced. 
As a consequence, hybrid organizations in all four countries ultimately faced conflicts over goals 
at the organizational level. The researcher therefore suggests that: 
Proposition 3:  Cross-sectoral hybrid organizations face tensions over goals in 
social service provision fields with no enforced dominant logic as 
well as in social service provision fields where this dominant logic 
is only weakly enforced 
In sum, Colombia, Mexico and Kenya were classified as health fields with no enforced 
dominant logic in social service provision fields. South Africa, was classified as a field 
with a dominant, but weakly enforced logic.  
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Given the predominance of empirical material from Colombia, Mexico and Kenya, the next 
sections will mainly theorize on hybridization in fields with no enforced dominant logic. 
However, some reflections on hybrid organizations in fields with a weakly enforced dominant 
logic will be provided at the end of this chapter as to open up avenues for further research. 
6.4.4 Hybridization Strategies in Fields With no Enforced Dominant Field Logic  
As mentioned previously, prior research has suggested that hybrid organizations may benefit 
from legitimacy advantages when their logic of origin corresponds to the logic that is enforced by 
public or other institutions. Based on the empirical analysis in this study, the next sections argue 
that even in field where institutions don’t effectively enforce a dominant logic, hybrid 
organizations’ logic of origin remains a key factor that enables and constrains them to draw from 
competing institutional spheres and thus to turn institutional voids into opportunity spaces. In 
addition, the personal background of founders also seemed to play a role. However, the reasons 
why these factors were influential is related to a more complex set of reasons. By analyzing 
hybrid organizations in Colombia, Mexico and Kenya, three reasons could be identified to explain 
these legitimacy advantages and disadvantages, namely legitimacy spill over effects, 
specifications of logics of origin and dominant logics among powerful resource providers.  
Legitimacy Spill Over Effects 
As mentioned in the methods section, in all sample countries tradtional commercial health care 
organizations usually provided high-quality health care with a focus on high-income populations. 
Hence, “private health care” was often set equal to “high quality”. Yet, it was unaffordable and 
thus inaccessible for low-income populations. With the emergence of hybrid organizations that 
adopted the BoP proposition and were explicitly positioned as health providers of the private 
sector, this high-quality health care suddenly became accessible for low-income people. Further, 
as interviews with patients of the hybrid organizations with commercial origins revealed, in 
contrast to health provision from the public and third sector, which was affordable or even free of 
charge, patients felt they were more entitled to claim for high-quality health care when paying for 
health services. Hence, patients repeatedly reported feeling privileged and dignified to be 
able to refer to private health care (MEX-FP and KEN-FP). In other words, the positive 
reputation of the private health sector spilled over to hybrid organizations with a commercial 
origin. 
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Building on these differences the researcher suggests that: 
Proposition 4:  In social service provision fields with no enforced dominant logic, 
hybrid organizations’ logic of origin engenders legitimacy 
advantages or disadvantages due to legitimacy spill over effects 
from other market players  
The Conduciveness of Logic Specifications for Cross-Sectoral Hybridity 
In addition to legitimacy spill over effects, the empirical investigation further revealed that, in 
comparison to the social welfare logic, the commercial logic overall appeared to be less restrictive 
towards cross-sectoral hybridity from a normative point of view. This finding is based on 
observations in several areas.  
First, as part of their hybridization strategies, the studied organizations repeatedly referred to the 
commercial logic as a superior means to a higher end, namely effective and efficient health 
care delivery in the context of institutional voids. In particular, tensions between formal and 
informal institutional spheres in the public sector (e.g. establishing a financially sustainable 
organization vs. providing to the public sector) were repeatedly argued to be major obstacles that 
prevent organizations to effectively provide health care. Furthermore, tensions between the social 
welfare and the commercial logic (e.g. establishing a financially sustainable organization vs. 
depending on donations) were used as arguments to point to the third sector’s weaknesses in 
continuously delivering health care to the poor. In contrast, the commercial logic was argued to 
be less susceptible to such institutional voids, given that it’s source of agency is based on 
individual decision-making rather than collective decision-making as is ideal-typically the case in 
the public and third sector (COL-FP). In contexts of high prevalence of institutional voids between 
the formal and the informal institutional spheres, such collective action is severely impeded. In 
other words, hybrid organizations with a commercial origin thus referred to sensemaking in order 
to emphasize the procedural superiority of the commercial logic in comparison to other sector 
logics.  
Second, as mentioned previously, tensions over means frequently evolved to more 
substantial tensions over goals in hybrid organizations with a social welfare origin. In 
COL-NP, for instance, these tensions ultimately even reached a magnitude that threatened the 
organization’s social and financial performance. Furthermore, comparing the nature of tensions in 
hybrid organizations revealed that both hybrid organizations with commercial origins and hybrid 
organizations with social welfare origins faced tensions over goals and tensions over means. 
However, taking a deeper look at the tensions revealed that the very same tensions could 
manifest as tensions over goals in some hybrid organizations and as tensions over means 
in others. Specifically, MEX-NP adhered to a social welfare logic concerning their attitude 
towards the government. Supporting the establishment of a well functioning public health system 
was part of their organizational objectives. For KEN-NP, which adhered to a commercial logic in 
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this regard, collaborating with the government was the result of rational considerations, as it 
provided the organization with access to important human resources. In other words, from a 
social welfare perspective the tension was more substantial than from a commercial point 
of view. 
Third, hybrid organizations with commercial origins referred to the commercial logic in order to 
manage the expectations of internal and external constituencies. Demonstrating social behavior 
is not morally wrong from a commercial perspective. Socially oriented practices can even lead to 
comparative advantages and are thus, in the best case, beneficial for the commercial objective. 
KEN-FP’s strategy of reverse decoupling illustrates the difference in the normativity of both 
logics. The emphasis on the commercial logic enabled the organization to overcome or avoid 
scrutiny concerning the social orientation of the organization. Even more, positioning as a 
commercially oriented organization even allowed KEN-FP to exceed expectations and thus gain 
moral legitimacy. The research therefore suggests that: 
Proposition 5:  In social service provision fields with no enforced dominant logic, 
the specifications of hybrid organizations’ logic of origin engender 
legitimacy advantages or disadvantages 
The Role of Resource Dependence Structures  
The empirical analysis further revealed the importance of organizations’ resource dependence 
structure as a factor that influences hybrid organizations’ legitimacy advantages and 
disadvantages. 
As described in chapter 2, the international development regime, as well as many health sectors 
in developing and emerging economies, have in the last decades shifted towards increased 
market-orientation, contributing to an increasing blurring of sector boundaries in social service 
provision at the BoP. One of the trends reflecting this is the emergence of social investment. 
Referring to means of the commercial logic, social investors seek to support the establishment of 
organizations that solve social problems with business means. Hence, for-profit organizations 
have become a new legitimate player in poverty alleviation. Even more, social investors in 
developing and emerging economies appear to have a stronger focus on the financing of for-
profit organizations rather than nonprofit organizations.  
Having already been aware of this trend at the time of founding, MEX-FP and KEN-FP, for 
instance, deliberately chose to incorporate as for-profits, knowing that they would be better able 
to access funding from both commercial and philanthropic sources. In addition, the analysis 
showed that referent audiences from the commercial logic seemed to be more open to cross-
sector hybridity than those of the social welfare logic. As just described, the prescriptions of the 
commercial logic are normatively less restrictive than those of the social welfare logic. As 
exemplified by the case of KEN-NP, hybrid organizations with a social welfare origin mainly 
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received non-repayable funding, which is usually granted by philanthropic funders with the 
expectation that a pre-defined social impact (mainly measured by the number of beneficiaries) is 
created within a certain time frame. Both virtuous cases, in contrast, had commercial origins, 
which allowed them to receive private equity or debt capital from social investors with 
accountability requirements that mainly stressed operational milestones such as growth and 
financial performance.  
COL-FP applied similar strategies, in that the organization incorporated as a for-profit despite the 
clear prioritization of social objectives. However, the organization was not (yet) able to access 
hybrid funding, which, as the researcher argues, doesn’t necessarily reflect the general 
inattractiveness of COL-FP for social investors, but can be related to other reasons including that 
COL-FP was still in very early stages at the time of data collection and therefore couldn’t provide 
a proof of concept as desired by many social investment funds.  
In contrast, hybrid organizations with a social welfare origin were all older and founded at a time 
where hybrid funding was not yet existent and organizations thus had to rely on development 
funding which mainly adhered to a social welfare logic. Accordingly, the researcher argues that 
the reason why cases with social welfare origins had incorporated as nonprofits is closely linked 
to the prevalence of ideal-typical funding from actors adhering to the social welfare logic at the 
time of founding. Further, based on the observations of the study, it can be noted that all studied 
hybrid organizations with a social welfare origin increased their emphasis on the commercial logic 
over time, thereby reflecting a rather defensive motivation to hybridize in the sense that they tried 
to adapt their hybridization patterns depending on what type of resources they could access.  
These observations suggest that the way hybrid organizations oscillate between different sector 
logics is determined by field-level shifts in the availability of conducive resources. The researcher 
therefore proposes the following propositions: 
Proposition 6:  In social service provision fields with no enforced dominant logic, 
the logic of origin equips hybrid organizations with a legitimacy 
advantage if it reflects the dominant logic of funders 
In addition, the empirical analysis revealed that the individual background of founders or 
managers was an essential factor influencing whether hybrid organizations could benefit from a 
legitimacy advantage, in particular towards resource holders. Looking at the founders of the two 
virtuous cases revealed some differences, but also important similarities.  
MEX-FP’s founders both had formerly worked in the private sector in Europe and the US. They 
were thus mainly imprinted by the commercial logic and initially had little knowledge about the 
Mexican health sector. In contrast, KEN-FP’s founders had formerly worked in the development 
sector in Kenya. They were thus – in theory – rather imprinted by the social welfare logic from a 
former work experience perspective. However, having worked in the development sector had also 
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caused considerable frustration and led KEN-FP’s founders to developing the desire of doing it 
differently. In addition, just as in MEX-FP, KEN-FP’s founders had no personal experience of 
living in low-income settings. They were not entrepreneurs who had developed a solution to a 
problem that they had personally experienced. In addtion, two of KEN-FP’s founders were native 
US Americans. MEX-FP and KEN-FP’s founders were thus part of a (white) elite with high levels 
of education. 
Given that the social investment scene was still in its infancy, faced difficulties of finding 
investable blended value creating organizations and was rather infused with values, practices 
and routines from Western capital markets, it is hypothesized that the importance of founders’ or 
managers’ personal background increases with regard to hybrid organizations’ eligibility for hybrid 
funding. Given the many challenges and tensions that came along with investing in a blended 
value creating organization at the BoP, social investment funds seemed to value the resemblance 
between them and hybrid organizations’ founders and/or managers. The researcher therefore 
argues that 
Proposition 7:  In social service provision fields with no enforced dominant logic, 
the personal background of hybrid organizations’ founders and/or 
managers equips them with a legitimacy advantage if it reflects 
the dominant logic of funders 
In Colombia, Mexico and Kenya, the cases that depicted all factors leading to a legitimacy 
advantage were MEX-FP and KEN-FP. They could emphasize the commercial logic, which 
allowed them to take advantage of legitimacy spill overs, make sense of the specifications of the 
commercial logic and position it as superior to other sector logics, as well as convince social 
investors to provide them with hybrid funding. COL-FP, although also a for-profit organization, 
hadn’t yet succeeded in receiving social investment and therefore needed to refer to traditional 
philanthropic funding. MEX-NP, KEN-NP and COL-NP all faced the legitimacy disadvantage in 
those fields of being incorporated as nonprofit organizations. 
The Benefit of the Young and Small 
Finally, based on the observation that hybrid organizations with commercial origins were younger 
and overall more eligible to receive financial or technical support, the researcher further suggests 
that the time of founding is of significant importance in two regards. First, younger organizations 
could benefit from the existence of supporters that embrace a blended value creation approach 
and build upon learnings that previous organizations had made with similar hybridization patterns. 
For all four hybrid organizations with commercial origins, the choice of the for-profit legal form 
was deliberate and based on the conviction that it was more beneficial to be a for-profit, in 
particular, with regard to access to appropriate funding and human resources. They had 
developed this position based on observations of other organizations that tried to develop similar 
business models as well as by refering to literature or external consulting on success factors for 
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establishing blended value creating business models. COL-FP, for instance, having benefitted 
from being enrolled in an incubation program for blended value creating ventures, even chose the 
for-profit legal form, but explicitly stated that the social objectives had higher priority. MEX-FP’s 
founders thoroughly prepared the business model for several years before launching the 
company. Both founders trained their paradoxical cognition by exposing themselves to the 
additional knowledge that founder 2 had gathered in his public health curriculum. In addition, they 
referred to pertinent literature about hybrid ventures at the BoP as well as exchange with experts 
and entrepreneurs in BoP ventures. These efforts allowed MEX-FP’s founders to increase their 
paradoxical cognition and anticipate potential tensions before starting the business. Similarly, 
KEN-FP also deliberately chose an emphasis on the commercial logic, being convinced that it 
would be more suitable for their hybrid business models. In contrast, for hybrid organizations with 
a social welfare origin, the choice of the nonprofit legal form was largely based on taken-for-
granted decision-making. Incorporating as a for-profit had literally been unthinkable for most 
organizations with social objectives few decades ago. Hybrid organizations with a commercial 
origin had thus shown a better ability to embrace institutional complexity and anticipate tensions 
in an early stage of their venture.  
Second, commercial organizations providing affordable, high-quality health care for low-income 
people were an unusual type of actor in low-income settings of the four sample countries. They 
were thus not part of the actors that had already failed to adress the health needs of the 
population. Hence, these organization could refer to the strategy of delegitimizing extant actors in 
the field of health care in order to gain moral legitimacy. Based on this, the researcher proposes 
that: 
Proposition 8:  Younger hybrid organizations are better able to strategically 
establish legitimacy advantages, as they can build upon lessons 
and failures from previous organizations  
Third, the hybrid organizations with a commercial origin were not only younger but also smaller 
than the hybrid organizations with a social welfare origin. It can be assumed that they were 
therefore more flexible and open to adaop new practices, in contrast to larger organizations such 
as COL-NP, in which practices and routines were more institutionalized. The researcher therefore 
proposes that 
Proposition 9:  Smaller hybrid organizations are better able to strategically 
establish legitimacy advantages, as inner-organizational 
structures and practices are less institutionalized than in bigger 
hybrid organizations  
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The Influence of Legitimacy Advantages on Hybrid Organizations’ Ability to Turn Institutional 
Voids into Opportunity Spaces 
As mentioned in the conceptual framework, prior research has proposed that the types of 
strategies that hybrid organizations enact are a key factor influencing whether organizations can 
thrive and be able to turn the tensions that they face into opportunity spaces. In particular, based 
on evidence from paradox research, the researcher therefore assumed to find a prevalence of 
creative strategies in virtuous cases, and a prevalence of defensive strategies (dismissing, 
separating, cumulative strategies) in fragile and even more in vicious cases. However, the 
empirical analysis revealed a more complex picture. Virtuous, fragile and vicious organizations 
usually referred to a combination of creative and defensive strategies, which altogether spurred 
positive or negative consequences. Creative strategies that merged the commercial and the 
social welfare logic into a new hybrid logic could be found in all organizations that succeeded in 
establishing a virtuous cycle or a fragile equilibrium. At the same time, fragile and vicious cases 
showed a tendency to refer to defensive strategies. For hybrid organizations with social welfare 
origins, this defensive attitude was among others related to the strategic paradox between 
seeking social progress and maintaining the organization’s raison d’être. Many of them referred 
to hybridization as a strategy to overcome this paradox. However, defensive strategies per se 
didn’t necessarily lead to vicious cycles. For instance, KEN-FP succeeded in turning the 
tensions that it faced into a virtuous cycle by referring to a strategy of reverse decoupling, which 
can be classified as a dismissing, and thus, defensive strategy, givent that it doesn’t embrace the 
opposition but rather keeps it alive. Hence, the researcher proposes that  
Proposition 10:  Hybrid organizations with a legitimacy advantage may refer to 
creative and/or defensive strategies in order to turn institutional 
voids into opportunity spaces 
Furthermore, as mentioned previously, hybrid organizations with a social welfare origin proved to 
face more difficulties to turn institutional voids into opportunity spaces given that tensions over 
means tended to evolve towards tensions over goals. Consequently, the hybridization changes 
that organizations with a social welfare logics had to make were overall rather substantial. 
For instance, the three hybrid organizations that could establish fragile equilibriums structurally 
shifted towards the commercial logic, either by converting into a for-profit (MEX-NP) or creating a 
for-profit sister organization (KEN-NP). Only COL-NP didn’t change its structure. However, in 
order to compensate the financial losses it had experienced, the organization needed to redefine 
its strategy and dramatically increase its market-orientation by focusing on higher income target 
customer groups and increasing the sale of privately sold health services. For two of the hybrid 
organizations, the situation was similar. COL-FP had to accept traditional nonprofit funding 
after realizing that the organization was unable to convince funders of providing an innovative 
“hybrid” type of funding. In contrast, for the two virtuous cases which both benefitted from 
legitimacy advantages, the resolution of tensions didn’t require any or less substantial 
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changes in their hybridization patterns. MEX-FP could continue to emphasize its hybridity 
throughout both CTPs, and KEN-FP only ceremonially changed its hybridization patterns. Based 
on this, the researcher suggests that 
Proposition 11:  The intensity of adaptations in hybridization patterns is a function 
of legitimacy advantages and disadvantages in hybrid 
organizations 
Further, given that substantial changes in hybridization patterns are believed to be more 
challenging for organizations compared to ceremonial or less intensive changes in hybridization 
patterns, the researcher further generally suggests that: 
Proposition 12:  Hybrid organizations with a legitimacy advantage are better able 
to turn institutional voids into opportunity spaces than hybrid 
organizations with no legitimacy advantage or hybrid 
organizations with legitimacy disadvantages 
Compensating for Legitimacy Disadvantages through Structural Adaptations 
As the empirical analysis has shown, fragile equilibriums could be maintained by both hybrid 
organizations with commercial origins and hybrid organizations with social welfare origins. 
However, taking a deeper look showed that all the hybrid organizations with a social welfare 
origin that were able to maintain fragile equilibriums (MEX-NP, KEN-NP) significantly increased 
their market orientation by showing structural compliance with the commercial logic. They either 
transitioned to a for-profit, or created a parallel for-profit legal entity. As the only hybrid 
organization with social welfare origins that didn’t refer to structural compliance with the 
commercial logic, COL-NP was simultaneously also the only case that ultimately faced a vicious 
cycle. The present study therefore suggests that:  
Proposition 13:  Organizations with no legitimacy advantage can improve their 
situation by showing structural compliance with the dominant 
logic of the most adequate available funding  
In the next section, an overview of the propositions will be displayed and synthesized as to 
propose a process model of cross sectoral hybrid organizations at the BoP. 
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Theorizing – Antecedents and Consequences of Legitimacy Advantages in Cross-Sectoral 
Hybrid Organizations Operating in Fields with no Enforced Dominant Logic 
The focus of the present study lied on the tensions that hybrid organizations face as proxies for 
higher order institutional voids as well as the hybridization strategies that they applied to 
overcome these tensions. Moreover, the study sought to shed light on the reasons behind hybrid 
organizations’ ability to successfully refer to hybridization strategies. Building on prior research, 
the study has concentrated on the role of logics of origins in hybrid organizations as a source of 
legitimacy advantages or disadvantages, enabling or constraining organizations to draw from 
competing logics in an effort to turn institutional voids into opportunity spaces. Yet, given that 
prior research revealing the importance of logic of origins has mainly focused on Western settings 
that generally prescribe what the appropriate goals of social service providing organizations are, 
the present study sought to investigate institutional contexts in which tensions over goals are not, 
or not effectively, resolved at the field level. The study has thus analyzed eight cross-sectoral 
hybrid organizations seeking to provide affordable high-quality health care to low-income 
populations in four developing and emerging economies. 
The findings of the study overall suggest that organization’s ability to successfully manage 
tensions through cross-sectoral hybridization at the BoP is dependent on their logic of origin, as it 
equips them with legitimacy advantages or disadvantages. However, compared to fields that 
prescribe a dominant logic in social service provision, the study showed that the factors leading to 
those legitimacy advantages and disadvantages are more complex. In addition, the study outlined 
how hybrid organizations make use of legitimacy advantages in order to turn institutional voids 
into opportunity spaces. Table 23 summarizes the propositions that have been derived from the 
empirical analysis of cross sectoral hybrid organizations at the BoP. 
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Table 23:  Overview of Propositions Derived from Empirical Analysis of Hybrid Organizations at the 
BoP 
Section / Topic Proposition 
Identifying the Sources 
of Tensions in Hybrid 
Organization at the BoP 
Proposition 1: Tensions in hybrid organizations at the BoP not only reflect 
institutional voids between the social welfare and the commercial logic, but also 
other institutional voids 
The Nature of Tensions 
in Hybrid Organizations 
at the BoP 
Proposition 2: Hybrid organization at the BoP may manipulate the nature of 
tensions (tension over goals vs. tension over means) by altering the logic of 
reference 
The Role of the 
Institutional Context in 
Hybrid Organizations’ 
Ability to Turn 
Institutional Voids into 
Opportunity Spaces 
Proposition 3: Cross-sectoral hybrid organizations face tensions over goals in 
social service provision fields with no enforced dominant logic as well as in social 
service provision fields where this dominant logic is only weakly enforced 
Hybridization Strategies 
in Fields With no 






Proposition 4: In social service provision fields with no enforced dominant logic, 
hybrid organizations’ logic of origin engenders legitimacy advantages or 
disadvantages due to legitimacy spill over effects from other market players 
Proposition 5: In social service provision fields with no enforced dominant logic, 
the specifications of hybrid organizations’ logic of origin engender legitimacy 
advantages or disadvantages 
Proposition 6: In social service provision fields with no enforced dominant logic, 
the logic of origin equips hybrid organizations with a legitimacy advantage if it 
reflects the dominant logic of funders 
Proposition 7: In social service provision fields with no enforced dominant logic, 
the personal background of hybrid organizations’ founders and/or managers 
equips them with a legitimacy advantage if it reflects the dominant logic of 
funders 
Proposition 8: Younger hybrid organizations are better able to strategically 
establish legitimacy advantages, as they can build upon lessons and failures 
from previous organizations 
Proposition 9: Smaller hybrid organizations are better able to strategically 
establish legitimacy advantages, as inner-organizational structures and practices 
are less institutionalized than in bigger hybrid organizations 
Proposition 10: Hybrid organizations with a legitimacy advantage may refer to 
creative and/or defensive strategies in order to turn institutional voids into 
opportunity spaces 
Proposition 11: The intensity of required adaptations in hybridization patterns is a 
function of legitimacy advantages and disadvantages in hybrid organizations 
Proposition 12: Hybrid organizations with a legitimacy advantage are better able 
to turn institutional voids into opportunity spaces than hybrid organizations with 
no legitimacy advantage or hybrid organizations with legitimacy disadvantages 
Proposition 13: Organizations with no legitimacy advantage can improve their 
situation by showing structural compliance with the dominant logic of the most 
adequate available funding  
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Based on these propositions, figure 8 proposes a process model that traces the antecedents and 
consequences of legitimacy advantages and disadvantages in cross-sectoral hybrid 
organizations in BoP settings with no enforced dominant logic in social service provision.  
 
Figure 8: Antecedents and Consequences of Legitimacy Advantages in Cross-Sectoral Hybrid 
Organizations Operating in BoP settings with No Enforced Dominant Logic in Social 
Service Provision 
6.4.5 Reflections on Hybridization Strategies in Fields with a Weakly Enforced 
Dominant Logic  
As mentioned earlier, the empirical analysis has shown that hybrid organizations not only face 
tensions over goals when they operate in fields with no field-level consensus, but also when they 
operate in fields where this field-level consensus is weakly enforced. This was the case in both 
South African hybrid organizations and affected the way they could hybridize. 
In contrast to hybrid organizations in Colombia, Mexico and Kenya, both SA-FP and SA-NP faced 
substantial normative obstacles to implement market-oriented health care providing organizations 
in low-income settings. This was above all due to the strong belief in the principle of free access 
to health care in South Africa. Particularly local actors from the public and third sector – on which 
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both organizations depended in order to gain acceptance in low-income communities – had 
substantial concerns about the “rightness” of selling health care to low-income populations. In 
addition, SA-FP’s “white” commercial origin caused substantial legitimacy disadvantages. In post-
Apartheid South Africa, actors that represented and sought to empower black populations – 
which were by far the ethnic majority in low-income settings – were very skeptiv about the 
sincerity of SA-FP’s social goals.  
In other words, the study showed that, in South Africa, the social welfare logic was, in theory, the 
dominant logic for health care provision at the BoP in the eyes of local public and third sector 
actors. However, given the decrease of donor money for health purposes that SA-NP reported 
and SA-FP’s aim to establish a financially sustainable organization, both organizations sought 
ways to implement market-oriented health care providing organizations. This was possible given 
that there was a high demand for affordable high-quality health care in South African low-income 
communities. Similarly to the situation in Kenya, the extant health system in South Africa 
appeared to be overwhelmed with the task of providing affordable high-quality health care to low-
income populations. Public and third sector health facitlities were often out of stock and unable to 
attend patients within reasonable a time frame. Hence, many patients accepted to pay for prompt 
health services in order to reduce opportunity costs and receive higher quality health services. In 
other words, patients at least granted hybrid organizations pragmatic legitimacy. However, 
SA-FP and SA-NP had to be much more cautious in their endeavor to implement structures and 
practices of the commercial logic. 
Overall, the study suggests that the normatively rooted dominance of the social welfare logic in 
the South African health field outweighed or at least significantly reduced the legitimacy gains 
that SA-FP and SA-NP could have made by strategically employing the factors that led to 
legitimacy advantages in Colombia, Mexico and Kenya.  
For instance, as a franchisee of SA-FP explained, many patients seemed to feel priviledged to be 
treated in a high-end private clinic. SA-FP thus benefitted from the same legitimacy spill over 
effects than KEN-FP, for instance. However, it could not employ this fact as offensively as KEN-
FP did, by dismissing the social welfare logic and positioning as a “normal” business.  
Further, SA-FP also tried to lobby for a more pragmatic approach to health care in discussions 
with representatives of the public and third sector. The founder of SA-FP was convinced that it 
needed a fast-scaling approach to meet the health needs of the South African population and that 
this was only able with a for-profit approach. However, realizing that any potential co-financiers 
were hesitant to buy into the model, the organization ultimately decided to opt for a hybrid 
structure, that is, a for-profit and a nonprofit entity. 
In other words, the propositions about factors that spurred legitimacy advantages in hybrid 
organizations in Colombia, Mexico and Kenya and thus enabled them to select more freely from 
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competing logics and turn institutional voids into opportunity spaces didn’t seem to hold true in 
South Africa – or, at least, not in the same intensity. The ability to hybridize thus appeared to be 
lower in South Africa than in the three other sample countries.  
More generally, these observations suggest that: 
Proposition 14:  In social service provision fields in which one logic has low 
legitimacy, cross-sectoral hybrid organizations are more resticted 
in combining competing logics than in social service providing 
fields with no enforced dominant logic. 
In addition, given that SA-NP – which had a social welfare origin, and had long operated as a 
rather typical nonprofit organization – sought to increase its market-orientation despite the 
subtantial controversies that this engendered within and around the organization, it can be infered 
that: 
Proposition 15:  In social service provision fields with a weakly enforced dominant 
logic, the influence of hybrid organizations’ resource dependence 
structure on hybridization patterns is more important than the 
normative claims of actors in the field of social service provision 
However, further research is needed to refine these propositions and investigate the interplay 
between dynamics in fields with a dominant logic that is only weakly enforced and organizations’ 
ability to hybridize. As will be further discussed in the next chapter’s elaborations on the 
limitations of the present study and suggestions for further research, the investigation of the 
South African context points to the need of paying particular attention on the question of how 
hybrid organizations in fields with a weakly enforced dominant logic prioritize the different 





Hybrid organizations, defined as organizations that internalize competing logics under one 
organizational roof, have increasingly attracted the interest of scholars in the last years. While 
institutional theorists and paradox researchers have started to develop general theories of hybrid 
organizations, bodies of literature on specific types of hybrid organizations, including blended 
value creating organizations, such as social enterprises or BoP ventures, have been growing in 
the last decades. 
At the same time, the field of blended value creation has also grown in practice. Organizations 
that seek to generate social and financial return can increasingly be found in BoP settings. In 
developing and emerging economies, hybrid organizations combine the social welfare and the 
commercial logic in order to make sense of the high institutional complexity and the multiple 
institutional voids that prevail. Scholars have identified institutional complexity and institutional 
voids as major obstacles for organizations, as they cause tensions that inhibit organizational 
performance, and may even reach levels that threaten survival. However, hybrid organizations 
have repeatedly been put forth as effective and flexible players, which succeed in turning such 
voids into opportunity spaces, thereby building “inclusive markets” in developing and emerging 
economies (Mair, Martí, & Ventresca, 2012). In particular, hybrid organizations may view 
institutional voids as analytical spaces that occur at the interface of different institutional spheres 
and thus help them to diagnose contradictions (ibid, p. 843). Further, scholars have suggested 
that hybrid organizations may flexibly adapt their hybridization patterns in an effort to gain the 
legitimacy of actors adhering to different sector logics (Pache & Santos, 2012).  
In sum, prior research has emphasized that hybrid organizations are both constrained and 
enabled through institutional voids. This central contradiction suggested a range of questions 
that remained under researched and which motivated the researcher to conducting the present 
study. How does cross-sectoral hybridity enable organizations to turn institutional voids into 
opportunity spaces? Why do hybrid organizations draw on a particular sector logic to overcome 
the institutional voids that they face? Why are certain organizations better able to hybridize than 
others? How does the institutional environment influence hybrid organizations’ ability to freely 
draw from competing logics?  
Prior research has sugested that in fields that prescribe a dominant logic, tensions over goals are 
resolved at the field level. In such situations, hybrid organizations’ logics of origin, if 
corresponding to the dominant logic at the field level, spur legitimacy advantages that enable 
organizations to manipulate organizational templates and gain acceptance (Pache & Santos, 
2012, p. 974). Yet, in fields that don’t effectively prescribe a dominant logic, both the process of 
turning institutional voids into opportunity spaces, as well as the factors determining hybrid 




The present study contributes to filling this gap by investigating hybrid organizations with 
commercial and social welfare origins in four different developing and emerging economies. The 
field of health care has been chosen due to its relevance and suitability for the research interest. 
As a central human need, health is not only a human right but also a huge market that attracts 
both philanthropic and commercial actors, and where organizations with commercial and social 
welfare origins have started to experiment with new hybrid organizational models to provide 
affordable high-quality health care to low-income populations. Analyzing the health markets in 
four specific countries – Colombia, Mexico, Kenya and South Africa – has revealed that in those 
countries health markets depict high levels of institutional complexity. Partly as a consequence of 
the resource scarcity and the institutional weakness that prevail in those countries, the public, the 
private and the third sector co-exist, collaborate and compete in so-called mixed health markets 
(Evers, 2005; Marwell & McInerney, 2005). Nevertheless, access to affordable high-quality health 
care remains the exception for low-income people. As a result, health markets do not – or not 
effectively – prescribe a dominant logic with regard to the appropriate goals, means and forms of 
organizations providing health services to low-income populations. 
The aim of the present study was twofold. First, it sought to determine the tensions that hybrid 
organization at the BoP face and investigate the field-level reasons for these tensions. In this 
regard, the first overarching argument of the study has been that hybridization patterns not 
only reflect institutional voids between sector logics, but also between other strategic 
action fields. Second, the study sought to investigate the hybridization strategies in hybrid 
organizations at the BoP and investigate the field-level reasons why they may referred to certain 
strategies. Two different scenarios have been revealed.  
One scenario refers to fields in which no logic predominates concerning the legitimate type of 
actor that should provide social services to low-income populations. The present study has 
shown that in fields that don’t effectively prescribe a dominant logic in social service 
provision, the logic of origin as well as the personal background of founders are key 
factors that may spur legitimacy advantages in hybrid organizations, meaning that they 
enable certain organizations to select more freely from competing logics and ultimately overcome 
the tensions that they face by introducing a new hybrid logic. This resonates with previous 
research, which has suggested that in fields with a dominant logic, hybrid organizations may take 
advantage of legitimacy advantages if their logic of origin corresponds to the dominant logic at 
the field level (Pache and Santos, 2012). However, the present study suggests that the factors 
leading to legitimacy advantages are more complex in fields with no effective dominant 
logic in social service provision, giving more importance to dominant logics in the 
resource environment of hybrid organizations, to possible legitimacy spill over effects and 
to logic specifications. In addition, it suggests that organizations’ ability to perceive and 
strategically employ these factors as to establish legitimacy advantages is dependent on 




In addition to these findings that are limited to fields that don’t prescribe a dominant logic, the 
study has also provided few insights on hybridization in fields with a weakly enforced 
dominant logic. In particular, the study suggests that in such settings, hybrid organizations are 
more restricted to freely draw from competing logics given that they face effective normative 
imperatives about the goals that they should pursue. However, it has also suggested that 
organizations’ resource dependence structure is more influential than the normative claims 
of audiences in health fields at the BoP that they face. Further research is needed to refine 
these insights and explore cross-sectoral hybridization in social service provision fields with a 
weakly enforced dominant logic. 
With these findings, the study contributes to extant theories and bodies of literature. First, it adds 
to the currently growing theory of hybrid organizations, and thereby to institutional theory and 
paradox research. Second, it contributes to literature on blended value creating organizations, 
mainly social enterprise and BoP research. Third, it contains a few insights that add to 
development theory. The following sections will elaborate on the theoretical contributions of the 
study, and subsequently turn to its practical implications. It was a key purpose of the study to 
derive practical recommendations, mainly for the field of blended value creation, in order to 
promote the impact that hybrid organizations can have for social and economic development in 
BoP settings. 
7.1 Theoretical Implications 
7.1.1 Implications for Theory on Hybrid Organizations from an Institutional and 
Paradox Perspective 
The last years have seen a significant increase of publications aiming at developing a theory of 
hybrid organizations. Organizational scholars, mainly from institutional theory and paradox 
research, have identified hybrid organizations as a particularly interesting object of study, given 
their observed ability to deal with tensions. The findings of the present study contribute to this 
body of research in several regards. 
Broadening the Understanding of Tensions in Hybrid Organizations and Hybridization 
Strategies 
Analyzing the empirical material revealed that existing typologies of tensions in hybrid 
organizations failed to capture the entirety of the tensions that they faced. From an institutional 
point of view, hybrid organizations – often cross-sectoral hybrid organizations – have repeatedly 
been portrayed as organizations that combine competing institutional logics in an effort to find 




poverty (see e.g. Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Jay, 2013). Consequently, hybridization patterns and 
hybridization strategies have mainly been analyzed as a consequence of contradictions between 
different sector logics, which manifest through conflicting institutional demands (see e.g. Battilana 
& Lee, 2014; Ebrahim, Battilana, & Mair, 2014; A. Pache & Santos, 2012), and cause conflicts 
over goals, or conflicts over means (Pache & Santos, 2010). Paradox researchers provided a 
more detailed account of tensions by distinguishing between performing, organizing, belonging 
and learning tensions (Smith & Lewis, 2011), and therefore typologizing tensions based on the 
question of “what are tensions about and where do they manifest?”. Further, they reflected on the 
difference between material and socially constructed tensions and stressed the relevance of 
cognitive frames in perceiving and managing tensions (ibid). However, most studies in paradox 
research remain silent about the roots of tensions.  
The present study has argued that a more fine-grained understanding of tensions is necessary 
for organizations to be able to manage them in the long term or to even anticipate them. In 
particular, a deeper understanding of the sources of tensions has been argued to be decisive for 
organizations to derive strategies that resolve tensions at their roots. In accordance with Mair and 
colleagues (Mair, Martí, and Ventresca, 2012), the researcher therefore proposed to use an 
institutional voids perspective to diagnose field-level institutional contradictions that manifest as 
tensions in organizations. The study leaned on Mair et al, who interpret institutional voids not as a 
lack of effective (market) institutions, as suggested by previous researchers (see e.g. Castellacci, 
2015; Chakrabarty, 2009; Chakrabarty & Bass, 2013; Puffer, McCarthy, & Boisot, 2010), but 
rather as contradictions between different institutional spheres. In Mair et al’s study, such voids 
occurred as Western-style interpretations of necessary market institutions conflicted with local 
“bits and pieces” of the political, the religious, and the community sphere in rural Bangladesh. By 
adopting this sociologically oriented interpretation of institutional voids, which stresses the 
abundance of institutions, the present study identified three sources of – socially constructed and 
material – tensions in the sample organizations. Organizations not only refered to cross-sectoral 
hybridization strategies when they faced institutional voids between different sector logics, but 
also when they faced other types of institutional voids, such as contradictions between different 
strategic action fields. This finding has at least three theoretical implications. 
First, in contrast to Mair and colleagues who “treat voids as analytical spaces at the interface of 
several institutional spheres, each with its own animating logic of meanings and social practices“ 
(p. 822), the present study argues that the spheres that engender such contradictions may not 
necessarily follow common logics, but more flexible common understandings. The informal 
strategic action field that has been identified in this study, for instance, doesn’t rely on a shared 
sense of meaning as suggested by the concept of institutional logics. However, it can still be 
interpreted as an own institutional sphere with certain rules and sanction mechanisms that 




more dynamic type of meso level order such as strategic action fields (Fligstein & McAdam, 2011, 
2012) or social grids (Beckert, 2010) into organizational theory.  
Second, the study moves away from previous research that has drawn a picture of hybrid 
organizations that operate between well-established logics of economic sectors, face tensions 
between static claims of what is considered to be appropriate according to a specific logic and 
passively draw from intact practices of these logics to comply with the institutional demands that 
they face (Pache & Santos, 2012). Instead, the present study emphasized a more dynamic 
picture of hybrid organizations that adapt their hybridization patterns as a strategy to react to or 
anticipate various types of tensions by means of sensemaking. 
Third and relatedly, the study echoes Jay (2013) who emphasized the importance of 
sensemaking, defined as “an iterative cycle of action and retrospective interpretation to generate 
stable meaning and organized action” (ibid, p. 140), as a strategy to successfully embrace 
tensions in hybrid organizations. Jay described how hybrid organizations use different logics to 
reinterprete paradoxical outcomes as sucesses, thereby transforming the organizational logic 
over time. In the present study, a specific form of sensemaking has been identified, namely the 
hybridization strategy of positioning certain logics as particularly conducive to overcome 
institutional voids. Through sensemaking, they framed different types of institutional voids as a 
matter of contradictions between sector logics in order to justify and gain moral legitimacy for 
specific hybridization patterns. In other words, the study suggests that actors may link cross-
sectoral institutional contradictions to other field-level institutional contradictions through social 
construction.  
Furthering the Understanding on Organizations’ Ability to Hybridize and Overcome Tensions 
The current understanding of factors that enable or constrain hybridization, from an institutional 
perspective, is mainly based on evidence from Western settings where tensions over the 
appropriate goals of hybrid organizations are resolved at the field level. In such contexts, Pache 
and Santos (2012) showed that organizations entering a field with low legitimacy have more 
difficulties to freely combine elements from competing logics. They thus have to strategically 
incorporate a majority of elements from the predominant logic to gain legitimacy and acceptance 
– a strategy that Pache and Santos called the “Trojan Horse”. Investigating settings where 
conflicts over goals are not effectively resolved at the field level has revealed that the factors that 
spur legitimacy advantages and disadvantages in hybrid organizations are more complex. In 
particular, it has been argued that, in fields with no enforced dominant logic in social service 
provision, the role of hybrid organizations’ resource environment, possible legitimacy spill over 
effects and logic specifications increases. Further, not only the logic of origin has been shown to 
be a source of legitimacy advantages and disadvantages, but also the personal background of 
founders. Aware of these factors, particularly young hybrid organizations have shown that they 




legitimacy advantages. In contrast, in fields with a weakly enforced dominant logic, the study 
suggested that organizations’ ability to hybridize is more constrained. Normative institutional 
claims appeared to significantly inhibit hybrid organizations’ ability to freely combine the 
commercial and the social welfare logic. Nevertheless, the resource-dependence structure 
seemed to outweigh these constraints and incentivize hybrid organizations to increase their 
market orientation despite the normative obstacles that they faced.  
With this, the present study contributes to institutional research on hybrid organizations, or, more 
generally, on institutional complexity, in at least five ways.  
First, with reference to the previous section, it points to the fact that legitimacy advantages don’t 
only help to overcome tensions between sector logics, but also enable organizations to make 
sense of other types of tensions and frame them as matters of cross-sectoral contradictions. 
Previous research has largely neglected tensions in hybrid organizations that go beyond 
contradiction between conflicting logics.  
Second, it emphasized the role of logic specifications with regard to their conduciveness to 
embrace hybridity. In the context of the present study, the commercial logic has proven to be 
more open to cross-sector hybridity than the social welfare logic, as it appeared to be less 
restrictive from a normative point of view and more open to innovation and risk taking. With this, 
the study adds to research on the sources of logic incompatibility (for an overview see 
Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta, & Lounsbury, 2011, p. 333) and suggests that logic 
incompatibility is asymmetric. It varies depending on the logic of reference.  
Third, it shows how organizational strategies to deal with institutional contradictions are shaped 
by field-level dynamics, in particular, by preferences of powerful resource holders. With this, the 
study recalls arguments from the study on institutional entrepreneurship, which has repeatedly 
emphasized the importance of powerful allies and thus the limits of organizational agency (For an 
overview, see Battilana, Leca, & Boxenbaum, 2009, p. 81). As posited in chapter 3, reflexivity has 
been presented as a key asset for actors to be able to disembed themselves from institutional 
constrains and become agentic. The empirical analysis has shown that reflexivity, more 
specifically, the ability to anticipate institutional tensions, is essential. However, organizational 
agency to work institutional voids has shown to be dependent on the field-level support that 
organizations receive. 
Fourth, it questions the definition of hybrid organizations in institutional theory. While 
organizations may remain “illegitimate hybrids” in the eyes of certain constituencies, they may 
already belong to an institutionalized field that has embraced their hybridity. In particular, the 
antagonism between the social welfare and the commercial logic, which has repeatedly been 
described as a constitutive element of many cross-sectoral hybrid organizations (see e.g. 




valid in the eyes of loyal adherents of these ideal-typical logics. In the eyes of funders that 
embrace a blended value creating approach, they may no longer be classified as hybrids.  
Fifth, the study stresses the multifaced nature of legitimacy. As the study of hybrid organizations 
in South Africa has suggested, fields with a weakly enforced dominant logic force hybrid 
organizations to prioritize the competing institutional demands and the technical forces that they 
face. The study thus points to the need of distinguishing between different institutional claims, 
that is cognitive, normative and regulative claims, as well as technical forces that underlie 
tensions in hybrid organizations and influence their ability to hybridize. 
Sixth, by contextualizing the study in historical shifts towards increased market orientation in 
social service provision in developing and emerging economies, particularly fostered by logic 
preferences of international institutions of development finance, the study emphasizes the 
dynamic and constructed character of legitimacy. While nonprofit organizations were the more 
legitimate recipients of foreign aid in the 1980’s and 1990’s, the last two decades have seen a 
rapid shift towards increased legitimacy of market oriented development approaches, which now 
grants legitimacy advantages to organizations that reflect this trend. Overall, these contributions 
respond to Greenwood et al’s (Greenwood et al, 2011) call for further research on the link 
between organizational responses to institutional complexity and “institutional identities as 
embedded in field-level categorizations“, as well as between hybridity and “organizational 
outcomes such as endorsements or penalties from field-level actors“ (p. 354). However, it also 
shows that hybrid organizations, together with funders, shape field-level shifts concerning the 
legitimacy of social service provision at the BoP. 
By leaning on institutional perspectives, the study further provides to paradox research by 
interlinking the organizational and the field-level perspective. Most paradox research largely 
neglects field-level explanations. For instance, Smith and Lewis (2011) suggest a range of factors 
that enable organizations to manage tensions. These factors include cognitive and behavioral 
complexity as well as emotional equanimity at the individual level of managers, and 
organizational dynamic capabilities. Similarly, Jay (2013) suggests that success in implementing 
innovative hybrid ways of organizing depends on an organization’s ability to make sense of 
paradoxical outcomes, and, more specifically, on a manager’s ability to embrace complexity. This 
reflexivity, he argues, can be trained by referring to external perspectives. Further, Jarzabkowski, 
Lê and Van de Ven (2013) show how defensive strategies to manage tensions are likely to spur 
vicious cycles, while active strategies are likely to engender virtuous cycles. However, questions 
concerning the contexts in which individuals and organizations can acquire the necessary attitude 
and capabilities, or ability to apply active strategies remain largely disregarded.  
The present study suggests that factors that enable or constrain hybrid organizations to deal with 
tensions are linked to field-level dynamics, as they provide organizations with legitimacy 




into opportunity spaces in the present study have indeed depicted a better paradoxical cognition 
and, overall, a more proactive attitude towards tensions when compared to those that haven’t 
succeeded. However, these cases have only been able to do so because they were able to learn 
from previous organizations, strategically employed factors that equipped them with legitimacy 
advantages, and thus succeeded in receiving the right field-level support. Even more, 
organizations with legitimacy advantages could even refer to defensive strategies such as 
dismissing institutional contradictions in order to overcome tensions. A particular form of 
decoupling, labeled reverse decoupling, has been identified in this regard. Institutional scholars 
have usually described decoupling strategies as practices where organizations give ceremonial 
and symbolic commitment to institutional pressures (e.g. for social behavior) while preserving 
their original behavior and identity, for example, for financial or efficiency related reasons (see 
e.g. Fiss and Zajac, 2006). In the present study, organizations did the opposite. They 
ceremonially complied with the commercial logic, as it raises low expectations concerning social 
performance, but factually followed a social welfare logic of social value creation. By doing so 
they could exceed expectations and gain moral legitimacy more easily.  
Organizations that were unable to strategically employ legitimacy advantages indeed depicted a 
rather defensive attitude and could ultimately only establish fragile equilibriums, or even ended up 
in vicious cycles. However, these organizations did not only apply defensive strategies. Lacking 
legitimacy advantages, they couldn’t find long-term solutions to the tensions that they faced even 
if they referred to active strategies. Especially, they proved unable to convince funders of their 
hybrid approach and thus remained in situations that required constant oscillation between logics 
and adaptation to preferences of funders providing short-term resources. 
Finally, the present study supports arguments from paradox researchers (Jay, 2013; Smith, 
Besharov, Wessels, & Chertok, 2012; Smith & Lewis, 2011) by showing that managers’ ability to 
anticipate tensions is decisive in hybrid organizations’ ability to turn tensions into opportunity 
spaces. The findings of the present study, however, further links the ability of embracing 
complexity to the time of organizational founding. Organizations that were founded later could 
draw from experiences that other organizations with similar hybridization patterns had made, and 
from the existence of new support mechanisms that help to embrace complexity.  
In sum, with these arguments, the present study adds to paradox research in that it embeds 
individual or organizational factors spurring virtuous, fragile or vicious cycles in field-level 




7.1.2 Implications for Literature on Blended Value Creating Approaches (Social 
Enterprise and BoP research) 
With its focus on hybrid organizations that seek to provide affordable high-quality health care in a 
financially sustainable or profitable way, the study also adds to literature on blended value 
creating approaches, in particular social enterprise and BoP literature.  
Susceptibility to Mission Drift 
Much of the literature on social enterprises has discussed tensions between social and financial 
value creation and the possible risk of mission drift (for recent elaborations on this topic see e.g. 
Battilana & Lee, 2014; Doherty et al, 2014; Ebrahim et al, 2014; Smith, Gonin, & Besharov, 
2013). Viewing social enterprise as a phenomenon belonging to the third sector, many 
researchers have adopted arguments from nonprofit management research stressing that an 
increasing focus on market-oriented activities may have negative consequences on 
organizations’ social mission (Alexander, Nank, & Stivers, 1999; Eikenberry & Kluver, 2004; 
Weisbrod, 2004). At the same time, researchers emphasizing the possibility of social enterprises 
to take the form of for-profit organizations have described risks of mission shift when 
organizations expose themselves to profit oriented funders. The present study challenges these 
perspectives by emphasizing the practices of socially oriented organizations to deliberately 
incorporate as for-profits in order to protect their social orientation. First, it reflects arguments 
from previous researchers by showing that the for-profit form may be more conducive in gaining 
the acceptance of low-income populations in developing and emerging economies (Kistruck & 
Beamish, 2010) or funders. Second, it shows that nonprofit hybrid organizations in developing 
and emerging economies face larger difficulties to access both donations and social investment. 
Hence, they become susceptible to mission drift as they may be forced to increase profit 
generating activities, thereby losing sight of their social goals, or becoming unable to dedicate 
enough attention to the pursuit of their social goals. 
Elasticity of Definitions in BVC and The Role of High Status Actors 
With the comparative analysis of eight hybrid organizations seeking to create blended value 
creation in four different developing and emerging economies, the study has provided insights on 
the role that country contexts have on the definition of what can be considered as social. Further, 
it has shown how social investors take advantage of vague definitions in the field of blended 
value creation in order to include different types of organizations in their portfolio of investees. 
Given that in Kenya, for instance, a “normal” business providing affordable high-quality health 
care is already more social than any other private health provider, commercial health providers at 
the BoP may more easily become eligible to social investment than in other countries. However, it 




the eligibility of different types of organizations and sectors to receive social investment and the 
influence that social investing has on the landscape of social service provision in BoP settings. 
Introducing a Hybridity Lens in BoP Research 
The present study was based on the belief that a hybridity lens is particularly useful to broaden 
the current focus of BoP literature on strategy-making in private sector companies. As the present 
study has shown, the scaling proposition that has coined BoP literature so far, stands in stark 
contrast to the needs of organizations that operate in the context of multiple institutional voids. It 
is therefore no surprise that few successful large scale BoP ventures are known, and that it is, 
instead, more flexible types of actors that experiment with innovative business models at the 
BoP. These actors frequently refer to hybridization strategies in order to manage those 
institutional voids. Hence, the researcher emphasizes the need to integrate hybridization 
strategies in the set of strategies that are discussed in BoP research. Further, hybrid funding 
mechanisms seem to be essential for hybrid organizations to become able to create blended 
value at the BoP. Yet, only little research so far has been dedicated to the investigation of hybrid 
organizations and hybrid funding mechanisms in BoP settings. 
7.1.3 Implications for Development Literature 
The Limits of Endogeneous Bottom-Up Solutions to Poverty 
The last body of literature to which the present study contributes is development theory. While 
most development scholars have adopted macro economic perspectives to explain differences in 
the development of countries and deriving recommendations concerning appropriate poverty 
reduction strategies, recently scholars have emphasized the need to adopt a micro-level 
perspective to development. In particular, Banerjee and Duflo (2011) suggest to concentrate on 
informations about how low-income people live their lifes and make their choices in order to adapt 
efforts to fight poverty to local behavioral patterns, thereby making the fight against poverty less 
overwhelming. Similary, Easterly (2006) proposes to foster the emergence of searchers as 
opposed to planners to promote the development of more endogenous solutions to poverty 
eradication and establish more direct accountability mechanisms in development approaches. 
The present study has investigated organizations that try to develop such endogenous solutions 
by treating low-income populations as business customers – as opposed to beneficiaries of 
philanthropy – and thus having to meet local demands and needs in a cost-efficient and 
sustainable way. However, the study revealed the limits that such organizations face and 
highlighted their dependence on funders’ preferences. With this, the researcher questions the 
endogeneity of current so-called market-oriented, bottom-up solutions, and emphasizes the need 




7.2 Counterfactuals, Limitations and Further Research 
This dissertation investigates cross-sectoral hybrid organizations seeking to provide affordable 
health care in developing and emerging economies that lack an effective dominant logic 
concerning health care provision at the BoP. These organizations have been positioned as hybrid 
organizations that combine the social welfare and the commercial logic as they seek to create 
blended value. With this, the research setting has been argued to be particularly conducive with 
regard to the research interest, as tensions over goals are not effectively resolved at the field 
level, requiring hybrid organizations to find strategies that help them in managing those tensions. 
However, in order to further generalize, test or refine the propositions derived in this study and 
further develop the emerging theory of hybrid organizations, additional research is needed. 
Specific sources of alternative explanations and limits for the propositions shall be presented 
here in order to suggest interesting paths for further research.  
The Institutional Context of Colombia, Mexico, Kenya and South Africa  
As mentioned previously, the researcher argues that many developing and emerging economies 
may correspond to the above-mentioned classification, as fields that lack an effectively enforced 
dominant logic concerning social service provision at the BoP and are highly dependent on trends 
in international funding mechanisms. Hence, the propositions derived in this study are believed to 
be valid for many other developing and emerging economies that don’t effectively resolve 
tensions over goals at the field level. In developing and emerging countries that do effectively 
resolve tensions over goals at the field level, tensions and hybridization strategies may either look 
different, or not occur at all. However, further research is needed to test, refine and generalize the 
propositions generated in this study and explore developing and emerging markets with diverging 
characteristics. 
In particular, the researcher acknowledges the asymmetry in the country sample of the present 
study. Given that three countries were classified as fields with no enforced dominant logic and 
only one country with a weakly enforced dominant logic was investigated, theorizing mainly 
focused on the first type of settings. Further research is needed to extend the knowledge about 
the ability to hybridize in fields with weakly enforced dominant logics. Based on the investigation 
of two hybrid organizations in South Africa, the researcher particularly encourages researchers to 
investigate how hybrid organizations in fields with a weakly enforced dominant logic prioritize the 
different institutional claims from internal and external audiences depending on their resource 
dependence structure. 
Further, it has to be noted that the study reflects a snapshot of the institutional contexts of 




institutional change in developing and emerging economies, legitimacy advantages or 
disadvantages of sector logics are subject to continuous change.  
The Health Sector as a Particularly Antagonistic Setting? 
The health sector has been chosen as a field of study due to its conduciveness for the present 
investigation. In the last years, organizations that seek to create blended value by providing 
affordable health care to low-income people have emerged in numerous developing and 
emerging economies. Given that access to health care is a human right, it was argued that 
organizations adopting market-orientated practices in areas where health needs remain severe 
are likely to face substantial tensions at their core.  
However, it could be argued that in light of the increasing market-orientation in health markets, 
the combination of the social welfare logic and the commercial logic is not a matter of competing 
logics anymore, but rather its own logic of a social market economy. However, the researcher 
argues that in the settings of the present study, where regulatory authorities fail to enforce norms 
that protect a social orientation of market-oriented health providers, providing affordable high-
quality health care and generating revenues remains antagonistic. The studied organizations all 
faced tensions that could be traced back to conflicting demands of adherents of the social welfare 
and of the commercial logic. 
In light of these reflections, the researcher proposes three paths for further research. First, the 
propositions generated in this study should be tested in other areas. Although other sectors are 
likely to depict similar patterns and present similar conditions to hybrid organizations, it is 
possible that some of the propositions that have been discussed in this study are less 
accentuated, for instance, in the education or housing sector where the centrality of competing 
logics is less pronounced (Besharov & Smith, 2013).  
On the Definition of Hybrid Organizations 
Battilana and Lee (2014) argued that only organizations that persistently combine competing 
logics in their core should be classified as hybrid organizations. To illustrate, they suggested that 
“a mule is a hybrid, but a chameleon, due to the contingent nature of its multiple forms, is not” 
(p. 4). Given that some of the studied organizations have adapted their hybridization patterns 
towards an increase of the commercial origin as a reaction to shifts towards market-orientation in 
their resource environment, they might rather be chameleons and not mules. However, the 
researcher argues that hybridization patterns can not be seen independently from their 
institutional context and, more specifically, from their resource environment to which they adapt 
until they become a blend of different logics. In other words, they might start as chameleons and 




Similarly, if funders embrace a blended value creating approach and contribute to organization’s 
ability of successfully delivering on their social and financial value propositions, it remains 
debatable whether the studied organizations can still be classified as hybrid organizations. In fact, 
the empirical evidence of the present study suggests that organizations stepped out of hybridity in 
the moment that they received funding embracing the concept of blended value creation. 
Tensions between the social welfare and the commercial logic didn’t any longer pose substantial 
threats to the organization.  
Hence, the researcher points to the need of considering and exploring the subjectivity behind the 
definition of hybridity in future research. Scholars have so far largely portrayed hybrid 
organizations as entities that combine competing logics. However, they have neglected the fact 
that the assumed opposition of logics is a matter of subjective evaluation. For some audiences, 
organizations may already be a new type of institutionalized entity, while for others they may 
remain hybrids. Moreover, this view stresses the question of which audiences hybrid 
organizations should target first, or predominantly, when trying to institutionalize a new hybrid 
logic. Further research is needed to explore how organizations can actively step out of hybridity 
to become an own institutionalized form of organization. Institutional entrepreneurship scholars 
have elaborated on the process of creating new organizational forms – which entailed measures 
at the micro-, meso- and macro-level – and emphasized the importance of aligning with highly 
legitimate actors (Tracey, Phillips, & Jarvis, 2011). However, further research would be 
interesting to shed light on other examples of institutional entrepreneurs that have succeeded in 
institutionalizing a new organizational form out of two competing logics, and the type of actors 
from which they needed to gain acceptance. In particular, it is believed that a focus on the 
relationship between strategies to mobilize allies, organizations’ resource dependence structures 
and power structures in fields is an interesting path to go for further research in this regard.  
Integrating the State Logic 
The present study has investigated hybrid organizations that seek to create blended value and 
thus combine the social welfare and the commercial logic. Given that these organizations 
operated in the field of health care, which is in large part regulated and financed through entities 
of the public sector, one could argue that they also embody a state logic. In developing and 
emerging economies, where resources are scarce and institutions are weak or absent, actors 
from various sectors, as well as hybrid organizations, take essential roles in welfare delivery. 
However, most research on hybrid organizations – including the present study – locates the 
organizations at the interstices of the social welfare and the commercial logics (see e.g Pache & 
Santos, 2012; Smith et al, 2013). The state or public logic remains largely neglected. Pache and 
Chowdury (2012), for example, stress that social entrepreneurs operate at the interstices of three 
institutional logics: the social-welfare logic, the commercial logic and the public-sector logic. 




logics. As they argue, the public-sector logic, stressing the goals of transparency and fairness, 
bureaucratic principles and democratic governance, becomes important not only as social 
enterprises receive funding from governmental sources and as they are involved in and affected 
by macro-level policy making on the provision of social goods.  
For the present study, the researcher argues that the public logic was not an own central logic of 
the studied organizations, even if some of them relied on funding from the public sector. Instead, 
the “publicness” of hybrid organizations has been found to be an element integrated within the 
commercial and the social welfare logics. While adherents of the social welfare logic advocated 
for a collaborative attitude towards the government, constituencies of the commercial logic 
emphasized competition as a key mechanism to improve quality and price levels in health care.  
However, further research is needed to investigate hybrid organizations in which such an 
integration is not possible and where hybridity refers to the combination of more than two logics. 
For the study of cross-sector hybridity, the researcher suggests to account for the “publicness” of 
hybrid organizations, thereby bringing in a public adminitstration perspective. As Bozeman (1987) 
proposes, “an organization (…) is public to the extent that it exercises or is constrained by 
political authority” (p. 84). Based on this, Heres and Lasthuizen (2012) suggest that organizations 
can be located on a public–private continuum, depending on: “(1) the extent to which 
organizations are constrained by political control, (2) how organizations are funded and financed, 
and (3) the extent to which organizations perform public or private tasks in order to reach public 
or private goals” (p. 445). Accordingly, the degree of publicness must be seen as a function of the 
institutional fabric of countries. Depending, for instance, on the economic growth of countries or 
other proxies that are used to assess their stage of development (IMF & Nielsen, 2011), the 
landscape, the structure and the practices of institutions and organizations that finance and 
provide social services as well as the legitimacy of different actors and beliefs about who does 
what is expected to differ (Jansen, 2012). Further comparative research would be interesting to 
shed light on the the degrees of publicness in blended value creating organizations and the 
exposure of hybrid organizations to three competing institutional logics. 
The Opposition Between Western and Local Cultures 
Finally, one of the sources of tensions in hybrid organizations that has been identified in this 
study refers to contradictions emerging between Western and local cultures at the BoP. The 
researcher acknowledges the oversimplification implied in such an approach. Neither the 
Western culture nor the culture of populations living in low-income settings in developing and 
emerging economies can be seen as homogenuous and clearly separated institutional spheres. 
The so-called Western culture is also prevalent in developing and emerging economies and vice 
versa. However, the researcher argues that some of the tensions that were identified in the 




and pieces that are based on effective institutional conditions prevailing in Western settings. 
Many of the models and theories in business administration – including the BoP proposition – are 
built on the premise of calculability and long-term orientation, for instance. In contrast, the 
ineffectiveness of public or market institutions in developing and emerging economies can be 
related to cultural and thus institutional bits and pieces that prevail in BoP settings (Mair et al, 
2012). Given the institutional uncertainty under which actors in developing and emerging 
economies have to live and act, it is argued that adaptability and short-term orientation is a more 
accentuated cultural component when compared to Western settings.  
This argumentation resonates with findings from recent development research on decision 
making and consumption or market behavior of low-income people (Banerjee & Duflo, 2011). 
However, the researcher emphasizes the need for more localized research in order to 
disentangle specific sources of contradictions and derive appropriate, endogenous strategies.  
7.3 Practical Implications 
The present study argued that the concept of hybrid organizations is a useful and yet rarely 
applied lens to learn about innovative ways to organize and foster social and economic 
development in BoP settings. A range of practical recommendations have thus been derived from 
the study for two main audiences, namely organizations that seek to create blended value by 
providing social services at the BoP, and for funding organizations that seek to support social and 
economic development in developing and emerging economies. 
The findings of the present study emphasize the relevance of the logic of origin and the founders’ 
personal background as a major determinant for hybrid organizations’ ability to benefit from 
legitimacy advantages. Further, it identified factors that may spur such legitimacy advantages in 
fields that lack a dominant logic concerning social service provision to low-income people. In 
particular, hybrid organizations operating in such fields should consider possible legitimacy spill 
over effects, dominant logics among the most appropriate and accessible resource providers as 
well as logic specifications in order to determine their hybridization strategies and patterns. 
Given the positive reputation of private sector organizations in providing social services to higher 
income populations, recent shifts in the resource environment of blended value creating 
organizations in developing and emerging economies, as well as the comparably open 
specifications of the commercial logic, hybrid organizations are currently incentivized – or maybe 
forced – to emphasize the adoption of structures and practices of the commercial logic. In sum, 
based on the findings of the present study, the general recommendation given to a hybrid 
organization operating at the BoP could be to position itself as commercial organizations but to 





With this, the study is in line with arguments from actors advocating for a “finance first” approach. 
Starting with the establishment of a financially sustainable organization with moderate social 
impact and progressively increasing the social value creation part appears to be easier with 
regard to management expectations and thus with regard to access to resources. 
However, the empirical evidence of the study has also shown that the support of adherents of the 
social welfare logic is essential for BoP organizations to deliver on their social mission. Hybrid 
organizations embracing the BoP propositions should therefore carefully assess the degree to 
which they can adhere to a commercial logic without losing the acceptance of essential 
stakeholders with a social welfare emphasis. 
In South Africa, the researcher recommends cross-sectoral hybrid organizations to be careful 
when adopting structures or practices from the commercial logic given the low legitimacy that this 
logic has in the health market at the BoP – and potentially in other social service markets. 
Organizations thus need to thoroughly analyze the institutional claims that they face in order to 
gain – or not to lose – legitimacy in BoP markets, which are mainly populated by black South 
Africans. Particularly organizations with “white” commercial origins are likely to face substantial 
skepticism in these settings. 
Having realized the current shift towards market orientation in social service provision in 
developing and emerging economies, organizations have increasingly adopted their structures 
and practices to reflect this trend (for a larger scale study showing the increasing legitimacy of 
market oriented approaches in international development, see Hanley, Wachner, & Weiss, 2015). 
Given this observation the researcher cautions funding institutions not to neglect the importance 
of the social welfare logic. As McMullen (2011) posits, for development entrepreneurship – that is 
entrepreneurship that generates both social and financial value creation – to occur, it needs 
subsidization from charity. Only then will organizations consider second-best financial 
opportunities and engage in the necessary efforts to change or create new institutions that 
promote long-term social and economic development (p. 198).  
Moreover, nonprofit organizations have proven to be essential with regard to market building. For 
instance, before microfinance could become a profitable market attracting large institutional 
investors, nonprofit organizations had been working in the field and refining microfinance 
business models for several decades. The researcher thus urges funders and other institutions 
seeking to promote social and economic development in BoP markets not to underestimate the 
importance of nonprofit organizations. 
In addition, as the example of microfinance and the evidence of the present study has shown, the 
risk of mission drift in hybrid organizations prevails independently of their legal form. Resonating 




governance mechanisms need to be particularly aware of this risk if social value creation is not to 
be sacrificed for financial value creation. 
Finally, the present study has shown that hybrid organizations with a social welfare origin moved 
towards increased market orientation as donors withdrew their funding based on macro-level 
assessments of social development. In Colombia, for instance, donor support for health care 
providers decreased as the government introduced a public health insurance scheme covering 
large parts of the population. However, as the empirical evidence of this study suggests, access 
to affordable, high-quality health care still remains a severe challenge for low-income 
Colombians. Funders should thus adopt more finegrained criteria to assess the social needs of 
populations. This may inhibit or decelarate the endeavors of nonprofits to move towards 





Appendix 1: Extracts of Case Study Protocol Template 
I. Case Study Questions and source of evidence 
a. Level 1: Questions to be asked to specific interviewees 
Categories of questions 





Context knowledge: Embeddedness of Organization in Country context 
Legal context 
What are the most important legal regulations that affect the organization? (Healthcare 
laws / consumer laws / competition laws / employment laws )    
How well are these laws enforced?    
Political context 
How did the organization experience changing governments in the country?    
Is the political environment supportive of the organization’s activities?    
How does the organization perceive the healthcare market in the country? How is it 
working and what would need to be improved?    
Is the government highly intervening in the organization’s activities?    
Is there any governmental support for the organizations or any collaboration?    
Economic factors 
Colombia/Mexico/Kenya/South Africa is a growing economy. How does this affect the 
organizations?    
What are the most important sources for health financing in the country?    
Do they suffice and are they accessible?    
Social factors 
How easy or difficult is it for the organization to hire employees?    
Are there any other demographic trends that affect the organization?    
Technological factors Which technological advancements were important for the organization in the last two decades (in the administration as well as the product development and distribution)    
Normative context 
Are there any other standards that the organization has to meet?    
Is there any affiliation with an association?     




Categories of questions 





Did competitors exist since the beginning of operations or did they come later?    
What are competitive advantages, disadvantages of the organization?    
What would be an ideal labor division in the health market?    
Founding circumstances, justification for legal form and normative position of organization  
Reasons of existence 
When was the organization founded. What was the reason for founding?    
Did that change over time or is the problem remaining more or less the same?    
Self-definition 
How does the organization define its hybrid approach? (social enterprise? Social 
business? BoP?)    
In which way is the organization market oriented? In which way is it socially oriented?    
Do you think that your way of market-orientation is better than another? Or better than 
a non market-orientation? Why?    
Why did the organization choose to be a nonprofit/for-profit in the beginning? Is this an 
advantage/disadvantage?     
Social and financial strategies + Tensions over time 
Social strategy 
What are the organization’s social objectives for this and next year?    
What is the organization’s long-term social strategy?    
Financial strategy 
What are your financial objectives for this and next year?    
What is your long-term financial strategy?     
Compatibility of social and 
financial objectives 
Does the organization think that there are conflicts between its social and financial 
objectives?    
Has the the organization experienced such conflicts in the past?    
What were the strategies that the organization applied to overcome those conflicts?    
Changes in hybrid 
strategy 
Have there been any changes with regard to the organization’s emphasis on social or 
commercial activities?    
Business and financing model   
Service provision 
Who are the organization’s customers? How does the organization find and define 
them?    
Who are not the organization’s customers?    
How does the organization serve clients? Through which distribution channels?    
How does the organization set prices for its products and services?    




Categories of questions 





Are the organization’s products somehow subsidized by the state?     
In which case does the organization think it would be good to give the products to 
people in need for free?    
External financing 
How is the organization financed? How much of its financing needs does the current 
financing cover?    
For what kind of costs are these funds used (e.g. concrete social projects, 
investments)?    
Internal financing 
How does the organization generate revenue. How much of the costs does that cover?    
For what kind of costs are these funds used?     
General 
How happy are you with this funding structure? Is there any major inconvenient?     
Would it be an option for you to search for an investor? What kind of investor would 
the organization prefer?    
What are the main financial challenges?    
Financial accountability 
What kind of authority/stakeholder exists to which the organization has to be 
accountable to in terms of its financing? (state / donors / …)? What are their 
expectations? 
   
What kind of accountability mechanisms does the organization have to meet these 
expectations?    
What would happen if the organization would not meet the requirements of funders?    
How does the organization measure its financial performance?    
Social accountability 
What kind of stakeholders exist to which the organization has to be accountable to in 
terms of its social objectives?    
What kind of mechanisms does the organization have to meet these expectations?    
Does the organization have any kind of customer satisfaction mechanisms?    
What would happen if the organization would not meet the requirements of customers?    
How does the organization measure its social performance?    






b. Level 2: Questions to be answered through desktop research, document collection, etc. 
Categories of questions and 
subquestions Customization of question Sources of Evidence Status 
Founding circumstances, justification for legal form and normative position of organization 
Self-description How does the organization present its hybrid approach? Website / Brochures  
Description from outside How do others present the hybrid approach of the organization? Press / networks to which it is affiliated  
Social Objectives and Performance 
Mission, Vision 
What is the organization’s social mission? Website / internal document  
What is the organization’s long-term vision? Website / internal document  
Measurement of Social Performance 
How does the organization measure its social performance? Accountability reports  
How does the organization measure the satisfaction of clients? Description of Quality Management   
Financial Objectives and Performance 
Financial performance How has been the financial performance of the organization since inception (roughly)? Financial reports  
Financial strategy How is the organization planning to maintain / improve its financial performance? Internal document  
Organizational Structure 
Employees 
How many employees does the organization have? Document on organizational structure  
What are the different departments of the organization? Document on organizational structure  
How many employees are responsible for administrative tasks? How many are responsible for 
projects and social mission? 
Document on 
organizational structure  
Product and Service provision 
Product /service portfolio 
What is the product portfolio of the organization? Website / internal documents  
What are future products / services that the organization wants to develop? Internal documents  





Appendix 2: List of Case Study Interviews  
COL-NP 
 [COL-NP-1.1] Financial Manager 
 [COL-NP-1.2] Quality Manager 
 [COL-NP-1.3] Head of Medical Operations 
 [COL-NP-1.4] Founder 
 [COL-NP-1.5] Public Relations Manager (Part 1) 
 [COL-NP-1.6] Public Relations Manager (Part 2) 
 [COL-NP-1.7] Youth Program Manager 
 [COL-NP-1.8] Marketing Manager 
 [COL-NP-1.9] Impact Measurement Manager 
 
COL-FP 
 [COL-NP-2.1] Affiliated Health Provider 
 [COL-NP-2.3] Founders (Part 1) 
 [COL-NP-2.3] Founders (Part 2) 
 [COL-NP-2.4] Head of Incubation Program 
 [COL-NP-2.5] Patient 1 
 [COL-NP-2.6] Patient 2 
 [COL-NP-2.7] Patient 3 
 [COL-NP-2.8] Patient 4 
 
MEX-FP 
 [MEX-NP-3.1] Founder 1 
 [MEX-NP-3.2] Founder 2 
 [MEX-NP-3.3] Financial Manager 
 [MEX-NP-3.4] Outreach Campaigns Manager 
 [MEX-NP-3.5] Head of Medical Operations 
 
MEX-NP 
 [MEX-NP-4.1] General Manager 
 [MEX-NP-4.2] Program Manager (Part 1) 
 [MEX-NP-4.3] Program Manager (Part 2) 
 [MEX-NP-4.4] Portfolio Manager of Social 
Investment Fund 
 [MEX-NP-4.5] Patient 1 
 [MEX-NP-4.6] Patient 2 
 [MEX-NP-4.7] Patient 3 
 [MEX-NP-4.8] Patient 4 
 [MEX-NP-4.9] Patient 5 
 [MEX-NP-4.10] Patient 6 
 [MEX-NP-4.11] Patient 7 
 [MEX-NP-4.12] Patient 8 




 [KEN-FP-5.1] Founder 1 
 [KEN-FP-5.2] Chief of Financial Operations 
 [KEN-FP-5.3] Founder 2 
 [KEN-FP-5.4] Internal Processes Manager 
 [KEN-FP-5.5] Employee in Financial Department 
 [KEN-FP-5.6] Marketing Manager 
 
KEN-NP 
 [KEN-NP-6.1] General Manager Kenya 
 [KEN-NP-6.2] Franchisee 
 [KEN-NP-6.3] Financial Manager 
 [KEN-NP-6.4] Field Services Manager 
 
SA-FP 
 [SA-FP-7.1] Founder 
 [SA-FP-7.2] Program Manager 1 (Part 1) 
 [SA-FP-7.3] Program Manager 1 (Part 2) 
 [SA-FP-7.4] Program Manager 2 
 [SA-FP-7.5] Franchisee 1 
 [SA-FP-7.6] Patient 1 
 [SA-FP-7.7] Franchisee 2 
 [SA-FP-7.8] Franchisee 3 
 
SA-NP 
 [SA-NP-8.1] Social Enterprise Manager 1  
 [SA-NP-8.2] Social Enterprise Manager 2 (Part 1) 
 [SA-NP-8.3] Social Enterprise Manager 2 (Part 2) 
 [SA-NP-8.4] Financial Manager  
 [SA-NP-8.5] Program Manager Africa 














Appendix 3: Code Book for Deductive Data Analysis 
Concept of 
interest 





Tensions “influence organizations at the ideological 
level, prescribing which goals are legitimate to pursue” 
Pache and Santos 




Tensions “exert pressures at the functional level, 
requiring organizations to adopt appropriate means or 
courses of action” 
Pache and Santos 







Tensions manifest as a consequence of competing 
demands from internal or external audiences 
Own definition 
based on Smith 




Tensions manifest as a consequence of external events 
without being based on competing demands of 
audiences 
Own definition based 
on Smith and Lewis 
(2001, p. 385) 
Hybridization 
approaches 
 Dismissing In the context of multiple institutional logics, 
organizations may dismiss at least one of the multiple 
institutional pressures. Other types of strategies that 
have been described in institutional research can be 
subsumed under this approach, including defiance 
(“Explicit rejection of at least one of the institutional 
demands” (Oliver, 1991, p. 152)); avoidance (“Attempt at 
precluding the necessity to conform to institutional 
demands” (ibid)); deletion (“managers actually rid the 
organization of one or more of its multiple identities” 
(Pratt & Foreman, 2000, p. 29)) or denial (“deny the 
validity of various external claims that are placed upon it, 
attack the legitimacy of the entities making the claims, 
attempt to co-opt or control these entities, and/or try to 
escape their jurisdiction or influence altogether” (Kraatz 
& Block, 2008, p. 15). 
(Battilana & Lee, 
2014, p. 41) 
 Separating 
 
Hybrid organizations may attempt to separate multiple 
elements to make them co-exist. Separating includes 
compromising (“Attempt to achieve partial conformity in 
order to accommodate at least partly all institutional 
demands” (Oliver, 1991, p. 153); compartmentalization 
(“organization and its members choose to preserve all 
current identities but do not seek to achieve any 
synergies among them... multiple identities are 
maintained but are separated from each other”). 
(Battilana & Lee, 
2014, p. 41) 
 Cumulative 
 
Organizations can try to manage competing institutional 
forces in a cumulative and simultaneous way. This can 
involve acquiescence (“adoption of demands” (Oliver, 
1991, p. 152), Aggregation (“an organization attempts to 
retain all of its identities while forging links between 
them” (Pratt & Foreman, 2000, p. 32 or reining in (“try to 
balance disparate demands, play constituencies against 
each other, and/or attempt to find more deeply 
cooperative solutions to the political and cultural 
tensions which pluralism creates”) (Kraatz & Block, 
2008, p. 18). 
(Battilana & Lee, 
2014, p. 41) 
 Creative  
 
 
Organizations can also engage in creating new 
institutional orders. This can include manipulation 
(“Active attempt to alter the content of the institutional 
demands” (Oliver, 1991, p. 152)); integration (“managers 
attempt to fuse identities into a distinct new whole”) or 
forging durable identities of their own to create new 
“institutions in their own right” (Kraatz & Block, 2008, 
p. 8. 
Practices such as sensemaking (“an iterative cycle of 
action and retrospective interpretation to generate stable 
 Own definition 
based on Battilana 







Codes  Description of code  Theoretical basis 
meaning and organized action” (Jay, 2013, p. 140) or 
bricolage (“making do with pre-existing resources, and 
creating new products from the tools and materials at 









 Defensive “Defensive responses provide short- term relief. They 
may enable actors to temporarily overcome paradoxical 
tension but do not pro- vide a new way to work within or 
understand paradox. These responses include splitting 
(see also Poole and Van de Ven, 1989), regression, 
repression (see also Kraatz and Block, 2008), 
projection, reaction formation, and ambivalence. The 
splitting response is the least conflictual because it 
sepa- rates the two poles and prevents interaction that 
might occasion tension (Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2009). 
Splitting may be structural, with different poles 
compartmentalized into different organiza- tional units or 
hierarchical levels, or temporal, with different poles 
taking dominance at different times (Poole and Van de 
Ven, 1989). The reaction formation response is the most 
conflictual because it involves excessively aligning with 
one pole of the paradox, so generating opposition with 
the other pole (Lewis, 2000). Such polarized responses 
are evident when actors become unwilling to engage in 
compromise (Lüscher and Lewis, 2008; Smith and Berg, 
1987), potentially resulting in spiraling conflict and 
vicious circles (Bateson, 1972; Smith and Lewis, 2011; 
Werner and Baxter, 1994). While the extent of conflict 
arising from different defensive responses varies, 
critically, they are avoidance tactics, rather than longer 
term ways to reconceptualize actors’ expe- rience of 
paradox.” 
(Jarzabkowski, Lê, 
& Ven, 2013, 
p. 248f.) 
 Active “By contrast, active responses attempt to deal with 
paradox on a longer term basis. Active responses, which 
acknowledge paradox as a natural condition of work, 
include acceptance, con- frontation, and transcendence 
(Lewis, 2000; Smith and Lewis, 2011). Acceptance 
indicates will- ingness to find a way to balance the 
elements that cause tension (Poole and Van de Ven, 
1989; Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003). Confrontation 
involves directly addressing and working through the 
sources of tension; this may best be done using external 
facilitation to manage the emotional and partisan 
responses that arise (Engeström and Sannino, 2011; 
Lewis, 2000; Lindblom, 1965; Lüscher and Lewis, 2008; 
Poole and Van de Ven, 1989). Finally, transcendence 
involves moving to a higher plane of understanding in 
which paradoxical elements are understood as complex 
interde- pendencies rather than competing interests 
(Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2009; Lüscher and Lewis, 
2008; Smith and Lewis, 2011). This may be 
accomplished by reframing the paradox (Seo et al., 
2004; Werner and Baxter, 1994), affirming interests as 
equally valid (Kraatz and Block, 2008; Miron-Spektor et 
al., 2011), or via paradoxical leadership and thinking 
(Lewis, 2000; Smith and Lewis, 2011; Smith and 
Tushman, 2005; Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003). All 
active responses thus require partisan mutual 
adjustment between parties (Lindblom, 1965) in order to 
integrate paradoxes into the organization as a whole. 
However, Abdallah et al. (2011) caution that even active 
responses only offer partial relief as the fundamental 
paradox remains and continuously needs to be 
addressed.” 
(Jarzabkowski, Lê, 





Appendix 4: Elements of Social Welfare and Commercial Logics 
 Elements Source of 
conflict 
Demands from 
Social Welfare Logic 
Demands from 
Commercial Logic 

















(Serve the unserved: 
Make products and/or 
services available for 
people who have no 
access to affordable 
high-quality health 
care.) 
Client service, revenue, 
profit, financial value 
creation 
(Sell health care goods 
and/or services to 
generate economic 
surplus that can be 
legitimately appropriated 
by owners and capital 
providers) 
MEX-FP  
Mission: “Become the leading healthcare provider in Latin‐ America 
for the medium‐ lower income segment by offering superior and 
affordable specialized services“  
Double Benefit: “Creation of economic and social value through self 





















upon decisions that 
have been taken 
collectively and that 
receive support from a 
critical mass within 





Organizations act upon 
decisions that promise 
commercial success. The 
legitimacy of such 
decisions stems from 
salesmanship of business 
leaders and/or innovative 
service delivery that 
creates a competitive 
advantage.  
SA-NP 
“The challenge is that if the government does not have a budget for 
that, they will call and say no, we can't, and the reason for that is that 
they are looking after the risk of after those three years, what is 
going to happen? Whereas if they know that they had some money, 
there is more confidence that they can continue when we go out. For 
example, right now, the problem right now, [the child health project] 
that we are planning in [the region], we had wanted to start 2 months 
ago, but it has delayed because the department of health was 
saying, they are not ready, is not in their budget, and they are 
worried that, what happens after 4 years? Instead of just receiving 
money from us. So they first want to secure that they will have the 






Structure Ideal type 
organizati
on 








against mission drift) 
For-profit company 
(more effective for 
producing goods and 
services) 
COL-FP 
“There were two forms. First, we could use the form of a foundation, 
which is a nonprofit entity, being self-sustainable and doing 
commercial activities like a company. Or use the form of a SAS, 
which is a legal form for for-profit companies in Colombia (…). What 
are the advantages? The advantage of a foundation is that there are 
tax exemptions and also in terms of transparency and the possibility 
for international funders to invest in us. And for the SAS, the 











 Elements Source of 
conflict 
Demands from 
Social Welfare Logic 
Demands from 
Commercial Logic 
Empirical Material Illustrating Competing Demands Sources 
Financing External 
financing 







be financed through 
non-repayable funds 




Organizations should be 
financed through 
repayable financing 
products such as equity 
and debt 
MEX-FP 
“We are planning to seek social investment, but the limit that we face 
is that we want to make sure that the model is being safeguarded. 
We don’t want to grow in whatever way just to grow it. We want it to 
grow in the way we want it, in the sense that values are protected 
and the ethics are maintained, safeguarding the model we are 
interested in. Honestly, we are not doing this just for money. So it is 
important to find… If you let other investors come in, they have to be 
investors who share the vision. This I think is not so easy. There are 
many people with money. There will be many that want to invest. But 






























scrutinize whether the 
organization fulfills its 






financial key indicators 
and scrutinized through 
market forces (i.e. 
customer demand and 
attractiveness in capital 
market). 
KEN-NP 
“I now understand that problems associated with donor funding, the 
politics of NGOs, and the lack of accountability to investors result in 
organizational dynamics that are incompatible with HSF’s mission 
and vision above the franchisee level. To eventually attract 
investment capital the average revenue per clinic must increase 
significantly to drive a strong royalty stream to the for profit 
franchisor. To achieve this we’re targeting more densely populated 
communities with a beefed up clinic format and introducing a third- 


















parties or public 
contracts should pay 
for product and 
service delivery. 
Sales to patients, 
private health 
insurances and public 
contracts 
Patients, private health 
insurances and public 
contracts should pay for 
KEN-NP 
“Finally, and most importantly, even though some of the individual 
stores are profitable, they are only so because of the value added by 
[KEN-NP]. [KEN-NP], overall, is a nonprofit and its services are not 
profitable (…). [KEN-NP] is still dependent on the NGO community 
for donor funding. [The founder] regrets having become so 







 Elements Source of 
conflict 
Demands from 
Social Welfare Logic 
Demands from 
Commercial Logic 
Empirical Material Illustrating Competing Demands Sources 
sufficiency? Organizational 





product and service 
delivery. Financial self-
sufficiency or profitability 
is a necessary condition 













Actors with a 
professional 
background in social 
welfare or health care 
organizations should 
be involved in the 
leadership of health 
providing facilities as 




legitimacy is driven by 
contribution to the 
social mission) 
Business experts 
The leaders of an 
organization should have 
a background in the 
commercial sector 
(Professional legitimacy is 
driven by technical and 
managerial expertise.) 
MEX-FP 
“In [medical] reunions people say: “if you go and work with them you 
can no longer be part of the committee”. Because we’re not doctors 
and we’re offering a completely distinct model. That can be a 
problem, because if they lock the access to doctors, you’re in a bad 
position. They don’t have this power formally, but they can exert 
psychological pressure. For example, there is one doctor that we 
would like to hire and she is willing to come as well, but she told us 
that her brother wants to study in one of the three big hospitals here 
and he is afraid that if she comes and work with us, he won’t get 
accepted at the hospital. Who knows whether they will do that, but 
people don’t want to take the risk.” [MEX-FP-3.1] 
Battilana 
& Dorado, 












The work of 
employees should 
support the social 
mission of the 
organization. 
Employees are willing 





The work of employees 
should support the 
organization’s goal to 




“The majority of [health personnel] was trained in nonprofit clinics 
and brought preconceptions of their roles and responsibilities to 
[MEX-FP]. The discrepancy between clinical staff expectations and 
the initial [MEX-FP] experience led to higher than expected turnover 














Social and health 
care background 
The leaders and the 
employees of an 
Commercial and health 
care background 
The employees of an 
organization should have 
SA-NP 
“So they think of me: you’re not an optometrist, you don’t understand 
that we need to check the eyes and things like that. Maybe they 








 Elements Source of 
conflict 
Demands from 
Social Welfare Logic 
Demands from 
Commercial Logic 




have a background in 
the social or health 
sector. (Professional 
legitimacy is driven by 
contribution to the 
social mission.) 
a background in the 
commercial or health 
sector (Professional 
legitimacy is driven by 
technical and managerial 
expertise.) 
tricky. It is different from other sectors. I mean we deal with people’s 
health and lives. So it’s not like giving microcredits or doing mobile 
phoning. But I am deeply convinced that there is a middle course. 
Nobody wants to turn doctors into machines. That’s not what this is 
about. (…)   
I think the biggest argument is that here decision are not made in an 
entrepreneurial way. Instead I think its more an NGO mindset that 
says: ok we have trained these people, we can’t just release them, 
even if they don’t perform. (…)There is a general internal conflict and 
we regularly have discussions about what the best way is at the end, 
and that’s also a challenge for me because I am always dependent 
on getting the buy-in of the country offices. For example, it is very 
difficult for me, in the South African projects, to do something 
entrepreneurial, cause there the project managers generally don’t 
really believe in entrepreneurial strategies. They generally only see 
the risks. I mean of course there is the risk that the profit making one 
day takes over the social mission, no doubt. But they emphasize it 


























Procedures should be 
adapted at the local 
level to adapt to the 
specific needs and 




Procedures should be 
standardized because this 
is a source of consistency 
and efficiency gains 
SA-FP 
“Our initial hypothesis was to charge a uniform set of prices across 
all clinics in order to standardized prices to facilitate scalability. 
However, after visiting the clinics and communities, we have 
concluded each clinic should continue to charge different prices 
ranging from R100-R150 based on community unemployment and 
willingness to pay, availability and quality of local public clinics and 
private GPs, location and proximity to town centers, shopping 





















The portfolio of goods 
and services is based 
on a social rational of 
what donors and 
philanthropic 
community believes is 
needed by population 
Customer feedback 
The portfolio of goods and 
services is defined based 
on market research and 
customer feedback 
“It's worth pointing out that the prevailing price for a particular drug in 
a particular community reflects the price or the cost of distributing 
something of dubious quality and so you know someone like a 
franchise could say “well I could buy amoxicillin for two dollars less 
than you’ll sell it to me or than your approved vendor sells it to me” 
and we say “yeah and do you have any idea if it's actually 
amoxicillin, if it has the right amount of ingredients and all these 
other problems”. Again, scientific lab studies of drug quality over 
over over over over again show high percentages, different 
percentages, but high percentages of drugs as sub-standard in these 








 Elements Source of 
conflict 
Demands from 
Social Welfare Logic 
Demands from 
Commercial Logic 
Empirical Material Illustrating Competing Demands Sources 
In an ideal situation there would be laws and you could depend on 
them and you know the people who are breaking laws have been 
forced and laws would make sense for rural areas and so on. The 
reality is that, for example, many chemists, drug sellers and others in 
Kenya operate laboratories illegally, uh... they operate laboratories 
that are themselves illegal and that are being operated illegally. So 
they're not configured legally and they are not registered. And they 
avoid lots of costs by doing that. If we set up a legal lab, we have to 
operate legally because we have this whole branded network. If we 
set up a legal lab next to one of these illegal labs, we have to more 
than double the cost of opening a clinic it's like seventy five hundred 
dollars worth of equipment for the lowest tier of lab in Kenya, then 
you need to pay lab tech, then you need to have a refrigerator, then 
you do have reagents and that complicates the whole inventory 
management problem that we just talked about so uh... in a sense 
who cares, but the reality is patients are used to, again back to 
patient perception, patients are used to walking up and getting a lab 
tests and so they say “well [KEN-NP] clinics, it’s a high-quality brand, 










Free health care 
provision 
Health care for low-
income people should 




Prices should reflect 
ability to pay and at the 
same time allow for 
generation of profits 
COL-NP 
“As we are a social institution, we have always made the lobby for 
[health services] to be included in the POS.60 But with the current 
situation in which the system is, the EPS are in a very very very very 
difficult situation, so they are beginning to restrict our services. They 
fixed quotas, for example for the [product x], which is quite 
expensive, a little over 150 dollars. They fixed quotas, like this month 
you have 200 no more. And then they begin to restrict. Then a 
woman can wait 5 or 6 months for getting the approval for the 
[product x]. So we're offering the [product x] as a private service. 














Health care products 
Customers with ability 
and willingness to pay 
Health care products and 
services should be 
SA-NP 
“The small profits made on the sale of [product 1] are used to cross-
subsidize other aspects of care and the setting up of new clinics. 





                                                   




 Elements Source of 
conflict 
Demands from 
Social Welfare Logic 
Demands from 
Commercial Logic 
Empirical Material Illustrating Competing Demands Sources 
provision? and service should be 
delivered to people 
who have no access 
to affordable high-
quality health care. 
delivered to people who 
have the ability and the 
willingness to pay. 
organization is committed to providing care even to the destitute; 
children from low-income families generally receive free [products], 
as do adults who cannot afford to pay. The clinics’ mission is to 
provide [health services] to all who need it, regardless of income. 
While they do try to collect payment from all patients able to pay, 
providing free [products] on occasion makes financial sustainability a 
challenge.” [SA-NP-8.8] 





The legitimate location 
for sites are areas that 
lack access to 
affordable high-quality 
health care 
Areas with ability to pay 
The legitimate location for 
sites is where people are 
able and willing to pay for 
health products and 
services 
KEN-NP 
“Locality is key. Franchises that are financially sustainable are in 
localities that are a bit more financially stable in terms of the 
economic activities around. (…) Even though it’s periodically, at least 
those people are empowered economically. So that means that the 
clinic around there, as much as they provide good services, they 
have good customer care, their customers are also able to pay, 
meaning that clinics will not do a lot of subsidies in terms of it does 
not have much of a percentage of patients unable to pay. (…) For-
profit, you can’t do it at the same level than nonprofit. You can’t go 
rural-rural and do for-profit. I don’t think so, very few instances. You 
have to position yourself a bit higher and offer a bit more services for 













Free or subsidized 
supply 
Health products 
should be procured 
from suppliers who 
provide them for free 
or at subsidized prices 
as their delivery 
pursues a social 
mission. 
Cheapest supply 
Health products should be 
procured from cheapest 
suppliers in order to allow 
for maximum profit 
margin. 
KEN-NP 
“There are products that are very beneficial that we want to 
distribute. And that are subject of intentional distortions by other 
agencies that we have to abide by and it’s difficult. So for example, 
[there is this large NGO] with half a billion dollar budget per year 
(…). So here's a simple example. Long-lasting insecticide mosquito 
nets are very important to prevent malaria. They can last five years, 
you don’t have to dip them in insecticide once in a while. (…) So the 
NGO has subsidized long-lasting nets that we can access. So in a 
sense this is wonderful. Again on behalf of all the franchisees we can 
set up this sort of vendor relationship with [the NGO]. So [the NGO] 
charges our franchisees forty five Kenya Shillings, they mandate that 
our franchisees sell the nets for fifty shillings because they want the 
subsidy that's been given by sort of a global community towards 
malaria efforts to be passed on to the patient. They don't want the 
franchisee to get the lower costs and just keep the profit. And yet we 
have calculated that for us in our particular locations, the cost of 








 Elements Source of 
conflict 
Demands from 
Social Welfare Logic 
Demands from 
Commercial Logic 
Empirical Material Illustrating Competing Demands Sources 
problem. The franchisees, are they going to consider this a loss 






















Organizations that pursue 
the same objective are 
competitors. 
MEX-NP 
“And that’s why we said: if you can’t cope with the enemy then go 











Appendix 5: Empirical Material Illustrating Sources of Tensions 
Institutional Voids Between the Social Welfare and the Commercial Logic 
Tension Empirical Data Nature of Tension 
MEX-FP 
Nonprofit background of 
employees vs. gain and 
maintain acceptance of 
business oriented model 
among staff 
“The majority of [health personnel] was trained in nonprofit clinics and brought preconceptions of their roles and 
responsibilities to [MEX-FP]. The discrepancy between clinical staff expectations and the initial [MEX-FP] experience 
led to higher than expected turnover in the first year of operation.” [MEX-FP-1.12] 
Tension over goals 
KEN-FP 
Establish innovative hybrid 
business model vs. depend 
on existing funding 
mechanisms for scale 
“I went around and I have literally met with 35 different social investors, so everybody that you can think of – acumen, 
and Grameen, private investors and all those guys. And we were just addressing all of them. We were just too small 
and we were too early. Although some of them started to tell us that we were too late. That we were like past the idea 
stage, because we actually had a clinic opened. And so now we were too late and too developed. So it was a very, 
very frustrating experience that really you need to deal with. Social investment sphere is a lot of smoke. There is not 
social investment for early stage companies. There is no element in their definition of early stage. It’s just that they are 
joking. What do you mean early stage? People are talking about two years, and over 1 million dollars of revenue or 
they won´t give money unless they can give at least half a million of dollars. But to flood an early stage startup, like 
ours, with half a million dollars, would just eat our equity. The evaluation that we would have to justify for that fund is 
crazy. That is a very, very, very frustrating experience.” [KEN-FP-5.4] 
Tension over means 
Sell services / products 
based on social rationale 
vs. based on revenue 
expectations 
“The most profitable is the sale of drugs. We buy the drugs. The drugs, the price at which you buy them and the price 
at which you sell them, it gives you sometimes almost a 100% profit on the drugs. But at the same time, the downside 
of it is, we are focusing on giving quality healthcare so that you don't just walk into our clinic and come out with a sack 
of drugs, so that's the downside of it. And also consultation fee has also been giving us some money, but it is still low. 
[KEN-FP-5.5]” 
Tension over goals 
COL-FP 
Establish innovative 
business model vs. depend 
on institutionalized 
financing mechanisms 
“The thing is [the Colombian company] has a social welfare tradition when it comes to their social activities. So, they 
want to give social projects money without getting it back. That’s also how it is written in their internal guidelines. They 
only support nonprofits. [COL-FP-2.4]” 







business model vs. gain 
acceptance of conventional 
sources of funding 
 “[The founder] describes early attempts to get the project off the ground. He had the idea, supplies, relationships and network 
to get this going, but he wanted it to be an inclusive process with all the relevant parties (mainly other NGOs) involved in the 
project. This was a mistake. After a year of meetings, conferences and discussions back and forth, nothing happened. The 
entire project was at risk of becoming a political football, or getting lost in other organisations’ processes.” [SA-FP-7.20]  
“Many NGOs/CSIs and governmental non-profit funding sources (…) have ethical concerns about allowing the recipients of 
their funding (…) operate in a for-profit manner.” [SA-FP-7.20] 
Tension over 
means 
Incorporate as a for-profit 
vs. as a nonprofit 
“If it is going to fundamentally alter the secure access to quality health care services in communities across this country, you 
can't do it with five. You need 2000, 5000, if we're going to move the needle. This is not a feel good project. It has never been. 
This was about trying to find out if we could come up with a model that you could then rapidly scale in order to fundamentally 
change the deliver of health products and services. We won’t achieve that with donations.” [SA-FP-7.1]  
“Sharing the business risks with partners is another discussion point. Currently, [the mother company] is taking too much risk 
in expanding and developing [SA-FP] on its own. Hence, [the mother company] urgently needs to diversify its risk pool via 
strategic funding or participating with partners to help develop and expand [SA-FP] into a national and regional value 
proposition that can make a meaningful difference to the lives of thousands of South Africans. (..) We have to register it. And 
we are thinking about a PTY, or maybe also to have it as an NPO, cause it is not supposed to make profit. It is supposed to be 
a vehicle to assist to this.” [SA-FP-7.20] 
Tension over 
means 
Set prices based on costs 
vs. set affordable prices 
“Community employment and willingness to pay is much lower than expected for most clinic locations: Except for the [SA-FP] 
Clinics in [site 1], most of the clinics were located in communities of huge unemployment and very low willingness to pay. Not 
only are people in these communities willing to wait in long public queues for healthcare, but they also survive on grants of 




Improve Mexican health 
system vs. secure financial 
and organizational survival 
“Initially, when this hospital started to operate, there was no Seguro Popular and health coverage was not at 100%. So 
obviously we served this population that had no access to any public health facility, so we attended these people, but today 
that nearly all of them are covered, they prefer to go to the next city instead of paying a fee. That’s their preference, and that 
has hit us in the sense that we are not experiencing the demand that we have planned for”. [MEX-NP-4.1] 
Tension over 
goals 
Collaborate vs. compete 
with the government 
“And that’s why we said: if you can’t cope with the enemy then go with the enemy, that’s why we try to work with the Seguro 




Collaborate vs. compete 
with the government 
“We use the local administration, churches, and other health providers within the area, we use many channels to vouch for the 
nurses and clinical officers. (…) But it’s a major challenge for us because since about 2-3 years ago the retirement age has 
been raised to about 60 so it means the nurses are in public service for longer. So the nurses who we would have got when 
they are a bit younger (…) now we are getting them when they are a bit older. And at times when we weigh the risks and 
benefits it’s a challenge. The majority of them at that age don’t want to go and start a business. At 55 a majority of them would 
think about doing that. That’s a major challenge and also because of the brain drain. A lot of nurses moving out of the country 







(…) In terms of say for example where we are and maintaining the network as it is, is a huge challenge. Because we are 
working with people who are a bit older so maybe within 5-10 years somebody wants to retire completely so you have to try 
and find somebody to replace them or to take up the facilities they’ve been running. So if you have nobody you can imagine 
you have to close and move on.” [KEN-NP-6.4] 
Set prices based on costs 
vs. set affordable prices 
“I think there are parts of the value chain and the retail business with regard to drugs and medicines and health-related goods 
and services that can be run profitably. I think that the reality is… there are serious constraints in terms of road conditions and 
other things, so, just a simple example: if you're driving fifty km on a dirt road rather than one you're gonna burn a lot more gas 
and if you have to drive that distance to deliver drugs or other things to a facility, then the question becomes “can people at the 
end of the chain afford to bear those full costs?” And the answer seems to be that although there's a market for private heal th 
care, people don't bear those costs very well.” [KEN-NP-6.8] 
Tension over 
goals 
Subsidize franchisees with 
donations vs. expect them 
to operate in a financially 
sustainable way 
“Another thing is patient perceptions. It's one thing to say all these people are dying for lack of high-quality malaria medicine, 
why don’t they just get tested for malaria and then take these drugs. Well, yes many patients feel like that, but also patients 
are used to other things. They’re used to walking down the street to a chemist and buying a drug for say twenty-five us cents 
equivalent. Try to convince them to buy a drug for more expensive or to take a diagnostic test is difficult. As an example, these 
are some children looking at a malaria diagnostic test of the kind that we can legally use and promote in the global health 
community. They’re very accurate so scientifically they're really great. We had some issues for example some patients when 
taking such a test – as it looks like an HIV test – they didn't want people know their HIV status so things like that can certainly 
be worked through the web of trust that our clinicians and nurses have established in their communities. But nevertheless it's 
an example of the kind of obstacle that comes up with regards to patient perception. (…) 
And you see some of the things that would now make the clients go to a competitor are, we have standards that we keep. We 
follow the clinical protocol to the letter but I can’t say the same about the other providers especially the private ones. If  you 
walked into a [KEN-NP], nobody will give you anti-malarias over the counter. You have to be tested, have a consultation with 
the clinician; it has to be positive for you to get it. But you see, and we have complained about that to the Ministry of Health 
enough times, what other providers do, once a client comes in and asks for anti-malarial over the counter, they easily give 
them. We are trying to undo that but somebody else is also trying to undo our good work I would say that we are doing. So 
because of such things, some clients would prefer to go to a private practitioner where they can just get over the counter 
without being asked so many questions, they don’t have to pay consultation, they don’t have to pay for a test.” [KEN-NP-6.7] 
Tension over 
goals 
“The greatest weakness identified was that the model did not build an inherent relationship between the financial success of 
the for-profit franchisees and the financial success of the non-profit franchisor [KEN-NP]. (…) Franchisor staff sought 
franchisee success as an aspirational goal instead of as a fundamental financial necessity of staying in business.” [KEN-NP-
6.6] 
Establish financially 
sustainable organization vs. 
mainly depend on 
inconsistent source of 




“Finally and most importantly, even though the individual stores are profitable, they are only so because of the value added by 
[KEN-NP]. [KEN-NP], overall, is a nonprofit and its services are not profitable (…). [KEN-NP] is still dependent on the NGO 







Receive donor funding vs. 
establish and maintain 
business discipline 
“We found that many franchisees did not save enough cash from sales to pay royalties so we added royalties to the wholesale 
price of drugs sold by [KEN-NP] to franchisees. After a while royalties were dropped entirely. This was a mistake because 
royalties motivate franchisors to do their utmost to expand the network and maximize individual franchisee performance. 
Instead, the organization veered toward the standard NGO model depending upon top-down grants to fund [KEN-NP]’s growth 
and franchisee support activities. (…) Because the original franchises were established to serve unserved communities mainly 
with humanitarian ends in mind, rural communities were selected and it was enough that a franchisee could generate enough 
profit to stay in business and comply with [KEN-NP] quality standards. Even a money losing franchise served the mission by 





“Despite the increase in donations, much of the money we were able to raise were in the form of restricted grants from global 
health agencies, who were not interested in funding the expansion of the [KEN-NP] network or general overhead. So we were 
not always able to cover operating costs and expenses. (…) I now understand that problems associated with donor funding, 
the politics of NGOs, and the lack of accountability to investors result in organizational dynamics that are incompatible with 
[KEN-NP]’s mission and vision above the franchisee level.” [KEN-NP-6.6] 
Hire employees with social 
welfare background vs. gain 
acceptance for market-
oriented approach 
“After a period of 18 months, (…) the fundraiser (…) resigned as tensions over management, mission, and business methods 
surfaced. My failure to institutionalize the ideas and methods upon which I launched the organization, combined with a 
management style not well suited to the needs of a charitable organization, led to conflicts in our leadership as new players 




Establish a market-oriented 
hybrid business model vs. 
gain acceptance of 
nonprofit employees and 
key partners 
“Social enterprise gets lots of criticism, because they are not profit driven, so you could go into a market where there are 
existing service providers, (…) and if you go in with a social enterprise and you cut down margins, you could actually kill those 
businesses. So you might resolve one social problem, but you may create another one with unemployment. (...) It's a very 
tricky situation. Because you don't want existing providers to see us as competition and then there is a resistance and criticism 
of you coming into the markets. For example in South Africa, this was before my time, in the early days, apparently, there was 





vs. collaborate with 
government 
“The big problem with the pilot was that a public hospital simply doesn’t fit with a dynamic entrepreneurial initiative. That 
means for the nurse, when more urgent things popped up, she just stopped checking eyes. And also not enough patients 
came. That was the biggest challenge. And then many other smaller problems from the department of health like “there are 
people who are not employed by us and they sell glasses to make money” and these kind of thoughts.” [SA-NP-8.3] 
Tension over 
goals 
Collaborate vs. compete 
with government 
“You will go to certain places where you have huge communities that are run by chiefs and different cultural ways of living. 
There it made sense to have a social enterprise vision center. And of course, there are different ways you could look at social 
enterprise elements that we do, so I wouldn't comfortably say that it is a second choice. I think we have to, whenever we think 
about [our clinics], our collaboration with governments is important because of the human resource development. The nurses 
are in government and then the [medical specialists] are in government. But when we look at social enterprise, we always look 
at how our programs can fit and we make allowances for that, so that's not second choice, it's as important but we have to see 
how it fits in. (…)That's why in South Africa we only implement certain parts of the social enterprise strategy. If social 
enterprise (…) is not implementable in certain countries, because the government has this, then we will not implement it. Like 
in South AFrica, we don't do social enterprise (…), but we have this spectacle case that we are doing, we were also doing the 
other project that is now on hold, it was another social enterprise. So here in South AFrica we asked ourselves: how can we 






with different people and we can open up other channels. So for example the [medical] supply. In Pakistan we got a group of 
women, they sell cases and get income for that. Another thing is that we are looking at producing the [mecical equipment] 
locally, instead of sourcing them from china. [SA-NP-8.6] 
“It could be individuals, just an optometrist or a business person and set up a clinic, so, with the department of health, that's a 
different model, which we will see, South Africa a good thing is that we don't invest so much in the clinics compared to other 
countries, because in South Africa it may be that diagnostic equipment, but you know social enterprise is the way to go, 
because [SA-NP] is a social enterprise organization and as I said, South Africa's economy is vibrant enough and they are 
encouraging a lot the growth of small and medium enterprises, so we see opportunities there.” [SA-NP-8.5] 
Provide services and 
products based on social 
rationale vs. based on 
revenue expectations 
“Here we will have to make an internal decision. Do we want that people who don’t have a health care background sell reading 
glasses, without making sure that the patient has been attended from a medical professional or not? Currently we say: we 
don’t want to give anyone a reading glass who hasn’t been checked by a medical professional. But I mean, in Germany you 
can also just go and buy reading glasses. The problem with that is that… The glasses themselves can do no harm, but in the 
age in which you start to need glasses you also become more vulnerable for diseases like cataract and glaucoma. And the 
danger is that if someone simply buys reading glasses and thinks he is fine, but at the same time there is cataract or glaucoma 
emerging, that’s the danger.” [SA-NP-8.3] 
Tension over 
goals 
“The small profits made on the sale of [product 1] are used to cross-subsidize other aspects of care and the setting up of new 
clinics. Even so, most of the clinic’s costs are covered by donations. The organization is committed to providing care even to 
the destitute; children from low-income families generally receive free [products], as do adults who cannot afford to pay. The 
clinics’ mission is to provide [health services] to all who need it regardless of income. While they do try to collect payment from 
all patients able to pay, providing free [products] on occasion makes financial sustainability a challenge.” [SA-NP-8.8] 
Establish a market-oriented 
hybrid business model vs. 
gain acceptance of 
nonprofit employees 
“So they think of me: you’re not an optometrist, you don’t understand that we need to check the eyes and things like that. 
Maybe they don’t say it explicitly, but that’s how it feels. The health care sector is tricky. It is different from other sec tors. I 
mean we deal with people’s health and lives. So it’s not like giving microcredits or doing mobile phoning. But I am deeply 
convinced that there is a middle course. Nobody wants to turn doctors into machines. That’s not what this is about. (…)   
I think the biggest argument is that here decision are not made in an entrepreneurial way. Instead I think its more an NGO 
mindset that says: ok we have trained these people, we can’t just release them, even if they don’t perform. (…)There is a 
general internal conflict and we regularly have discussions about what the best way is at the end, and that’s also a challenge 
for me because I am always dependent on getting the buy-in of the country offices. For example, it is very difficult for me, in 
the South African projects, to do something entrepreneurial, cause there the project managers generally don’t really believe in 
entrepreneurial strategies. They generally only see the risks. I mean of course there is the risk that the profit making one day 








Foster social progress vs. 
maintain reason for 
existence 
“[In 1993], the Colombian health sector has experienced a radical transformation. With the “Law 100“ it transitioned to a 
system of free competition in health insuring and health provision. With this law [COL-NP] lost the monopolistic position it had 
at that time.” [COL-NP-1.10] 
Tension over 
goals 
Rely mainly on donor 
funding vs. establish 
business discipline 
“Being a nonprofit and having had large contracts with organizations from the US and elsewhere, [COL-NP] has never been a 
commercial company. It has never sought the best way to do business, to sell better, it has never asked itself: what is the 
highest efficiency that I can reach? This is one of the big problems that we had. This organization has always been social, and 
it has done many social things, but thanks to these large contracts, it has always had a good cash flow and good returns, but it 
never thought that these flows, these contracts could end. [COL-NP-1.1]” 
Tension over 
means 
Rely mainly on donor 
funding vs. establish secure 
funding base 
“It is precisely that Colombia isn’t part of the countries that are currently prioritized by international assistance. We are 
experiencing a change in focus towards countries like Ecuador, Bolivia, and Paraguay. That’s why we are being sidelined in 
the focus of these international organizations” [COL-NP-1.6]. 
Tension over 
means 
“Inequality is another variable that is not used in development cooperation, because they say that it depends on the 
determination of the government. That means that the distribution of wealth is a governmental decision. If you have few rich 
people and many poor people, you could from a political perspective apply fiscal or redistributive mechanisms to achieve a 
better distribution of wealth. So donors say that from that moment on they are not needed anymore, because the country can 






Institutional Voids Between Formal and Informal Strategic Actions Fields 
Tension Empirical Data Nature of Tension 
MEX-FP 
Disrupt health markets vs. 
gain and maintain 
legitimacy from gatekeepers 
“In [medical] reunions people say: “if you go and work with them you can no longer be part of the committee”. Because 
we’re not doctors and we’re offering a completely distinct model. That can be a problem, because if they lock the 
access to doctors, you’re in a bad position. They don’t have this power formally, but they can exert psychological 
pressure. For example, there is one doctor that we would like to hire and she is willing to come as well, but she told us 
that her brother wants to study in one of the three big hospitals here and he is afraid that if she comes and work with 
us, he won’t get accepted at the hospital. Who knows whether they will do that, but people don’t want to take the risk.” 
[MEX-FP-3.1] 
Tension over means 
SA-FP 
Provide services based on 
social rationale vs. based 
on commercial rationale 
“The challenge is that, especially the black community, they feel more comfortable when they are given some 
medication. (…) And sometimes it is also the question: do I empower someone or do I just give the medication. I would 
like to empower people to take charge of their lives and of their health, but I am always caught between: when I give 
them medication, am I really empowering them? For example in the case of hypertension, it is more important that 
people live healthy, that would get their hypertension down. But if I don’t give them the medicine they just go 
somewhere else. And then I loose them as customers.” [SA-FP-7.7] 
Tension over goals 
KEN-NP 
Set prices based on costs 
vs. set competitive prices 
“It's worth pointing out that the prevailing price for a particular drug in a particular community reflects the price or the 
cost of distributing something of dubious quality and so you know someone like a franchise could say “well I could buy 
amoxicillin for two dollars less than you’ll sell it to me or than your approved vendor sells it to me” and we say “yeah 
and do you have any idea if it's actually amoxicillin, if it has the right amount of ingredients and all these other 
problems”. Again scientific lab studies of drug quality over over over over over again show high percentages, different 
percentages, but high percentages of drugs as sub-standard in these markets. (…)  
In an ideal situation there would be laws and you could depend on them and you know the people who are breaking 
laws have been forced and laws would make sense for rural areas and so on. The reality is that for example many 
chemists, drug sellers and others in Kenya operate laboratories illegally, uh... they operate laboratories that are 
themselves illegal and that are being operated illegally. So they're not configured legally and they are not registered. 
And they avoid lots of costs by doing that. If we set up a legal lab, we have to operate legally because we have this 
whole branded network. If we set up a legal lab next to one of these illegal labs, we have to more than double the cost 
of opening a clinic it's like seventy five hundred dollars worth of equipment for the lowest tier of lab in Kenya, then you 
need to pay lab tech, then you need to have a refrigerator, then you do have reagents and that complicates the whole 
inventory management problem that we just talked about so uh... in a sense who cares but the reality is patients are 
used to, again back to patient perception, patients are used to walking up and getting a lab tests and so they say “well 
[KEN-NP] clinics, it’s a high-quality brand, you don't have a lab, that doesn't make sense to them.” [KEN-NP-6.7] 
 





products vs. ability to 
deliver them in financially 
sustainable way 
“There are products that are very beneficial that we want to distribute. And that are subject of intentional distortions by 
other agencies that we have to abide by and it’s difficult. So for example, [there is this large NGO] with half a billion 
dollar budget per year (…). So here's a simple example. Long-lasting insecticide mosquito nets are very important to 
prevent malaria. They can last five years, you don’t have to dip them in insecticide once in a while. (…) So the NGO 
has subsidized long-lasting nets that we can access. So in a sense this is wonderful. Again on behalf of all the 
franchisees we can set up this sort of vendor relationship with [the NGO]. So [the NGO] charges our franchisees forty 
five Kenya Shillings, they mandate that our franchisees sell the nets for fifty shillings because they want the subsidy 
that's been given by sort of a global community towards malaria efforts to be passed on to the patient. They don't want 
the franchisee to get the lower costs and just keep the profit. And yet we have calculated that for us in our particular 
locations, the cost of distributing one net is approximately thirteen shillings. It's an instant problem. The franchisees, 
are they going to consider this a loss leader, or are they just going to quit selling nets, or what?” [KEN-NP-6.7] 
Tension over means 
COL-NP 
Sell to public sector mainly vs. 
establish reliable revenue 
stream 
“The Law 100 is one of the largest problems that this country has ever had. The corruption that has taken place with 
the law 100 can not even be analyzed, especially in the last 10 years. When the law 100 started to be implemented, 
so-called EPS were created and they have evolved into the biggest corruption centers where billions of pesos have 
been misappropriated. We had contracts since the end of the 1990. But the EPS haven’t paid us consistently, they 
have huge debts with us. I don’t even know how many millions they owe us.” [COL-NP-1.1] 






Institutional Voids Between Western and Local Strategic Actions Fields 
Tension Empirical Data Nature of Tension 
MEX-FP 
Provide to public sector vs. 
establish financially 
sustainable organization 
“They cut [the health service] out of the insurance plan because they realized that [the disease] is too widespread. It 
simply exceeds their financial abilities. But officially, what they say is that [the disease] doesn’t cause catastrophic 
expenditures and that’s why they’re taking it out. They want to focus on catastrophic health expenditures only. That’s 
what they say. But [the disease that we’re trying to cure] is one of the main reasons for poverty in Mexico. So they can’t 
tell me that it’s not catastrophic” [MEX-FP-1.13] 
Tension over means 
Business model based on 
scale vs. need to adapt to 
local customer demand 
“There are information barriers. People are afraid of surgeries because they fear staying blind. Others think that you have 
to take out their eyes for the surgery, so they don’t want that. (…) We have to overcome economic barriers and logistical 
barriers, like who brings them here and back, who accompanies them. Then we also have to overcome their fear and 
mistrust, which are both huge. There are people that, although they would have the economical means to pay for a 
surgery and although they would have someone to bring them and accompany them, continue to be afraid and apathetic. 
Most of our patients are older and for that reason they say: “at my age for what would I get this surgery? It is normal that 
I loose my sight, it’s gods will.” And then there is also the cultural aspect of not taking care of your health. In Mexico, the 
culture of seeking health services is practically non-existent. People only get treated when they have serious problems. 
There is no preventive culture to go and check your health regularly, go to the [medical specialist] when you have 
diabetes. They come when they are already [seriously ill], when it is already very difficult to treat them.” [MEX-FP-3.4] 




vs. Gain acceptance of 
incumbent health players in 
health markets 
“The original business model conceptualisation included informal traders (e.g. spazas). This association of micro-
entrepreneurs from the informal sector is a major characteristic of almost any inclusive BoP business model and a key 
feature of the benefits for poor people. However, management had no direct experience with accessing this channel, so 
they elected to go into partnership with a company that was already supplying this informal network with other products 
like mobile pre-paid airtime. [The former manager] originally contracted this company to supply the spaza shops with 
[medical supply in a box]. (…) This component of the pilot was very successful with demand far exceeding supply. (…) 
However, the company raised an important point: What is the legality of supplying medication without the package 
insert? And spaza shops owners in [Site 1] and [Site 2] echoed similar sentiments: 
1) They were concerned with what impact this would have on their established logistics and distribution partners. Will 
involving themselves with [SA-FP] anger current supply chain partners? (…) 
2) Assuming they accept this box, they have a very limited understanding of health aliments. They would not know where 
to begin advising people on what to use and purchase. Therefore, they will need additional training.  
3) What if customers develop complications as a result of medicinal products that were sold to them (…)? How will the 
shop owner who sold the medication help? Will this type of event not lead to a negative backlash from the community on 
them and their stores? Did the box hold a potentially big risk to the store’s brand reputation in these stocking products?” 
[SA-FP-7.20] 
 




Increase the efficiency of 
processes vs. respond to 
customer demand 
“The correct price that the market is willing to pay for [SA-FP]’s services is yet to be determined. The experiences at [Site 
1] showed that pricing can vary significantly based on the competition and the degree of price sensitivity of the immediate 
community. (…) Diverging health outcomes are not only found between healthcare sectors, they are also geographica l. 
This partly reflects differences in burden of disease, infrastructure and lifestyle. Significant differences exist between 
health outcomes in different regions of South Africa.” [SA-FP-7.20] 
 
Tension over means 
Identify as member of low-
income communities vs. 
identify as member of 
market-oriented health 
provider 
“Community employment and willingness to pay is much lower than expected for most clinic locations: Except for the 
[SA-FP] Clinics in [site 1], most of the clinics were located in communities of huge unemployment and very low 
willingness to pay. Not only are people in these communities willing to wait in long public queues for healthcare, but they 
also survive on grants of R280 per month, so paying 150 is out of the question.” [SA-FP-7.19] 
Tension over goals 
KEN-NP 
Establish innovative 
business model based on 
scale vs. need to react to 
unpredictable events 
“One might assume and we did assume that if you own a clinic and you’re serving a community where people are literally 
dying for lack of these particular products like malaria medicine. And suddenly this clinic where you have assured supply 
of high-quality malaria medicine, you will keep your clinic in stock and be able to operate it profitably and you’ll succeed. 
Well sort of yes, many of our franchisees do that, but many don’t maintain adequate inventory. Things intervene in this 
picture to prevent adequate inventory from being in the outlet. So for example (…) some of our franchisees mingle their 
personal and business income, they’ll have school fees come up, some others just pay them from malaria medicine, 
instead of buying more malaria medicine, they take it out of the business, they pay school fees, suddenly they have less 
money than they need to restock, (…) there's no stock to sell, less money to restock, and it’s the sort of a downward 
spiral.” [KEN-NP-6.7] 
Tension over means 
SA-NP 
Establish financially 
sustainable organization vs. 
provide to government 
“When the government has money, or when its budgets come close to the end of the financial year, they buy a huge 
amount and just keep it in stock, and so it's very erratic, so if you run it as a business dependent only on that, you could 
have some serious cash flow issues.” [SA-NP-8.1] 
 






Appendix 6: Empirical Material Illustrating Hybridization Strategies 
Strategy Empirical Data Type of Strategy 
MEX-FP 
Impression management and 
inspirational leadership: Emphasize 
hybrid approach with commercial 
face by stressing the need to 
establish a new type of financially 
sustainable business model 
requiring rigorous cost efficiency 
“We are convinced that for Mexico, the for-profit form is not only better from an economical point of view, but also 
from an impact point of view. A for-profit can grow much faster because there are these incentives that require the 
organization to focus on foster its product and service delivery. (…) And there are enough people in Mexico with 
some disposable income for health services, so we can draw from these earnings to cross-subsidize service 
provision for people that can’t pay anything. And then investors can invest and we can use their money to create 
more clinics. (…) What we are doing right now is still a pilot. Once we have proven the concept and its scalability, we 
want to replicate this pilot in a different location. And that’s where investors might enter. Private investors, or if we 
don’t find private investors, it could also be an IPO. (…) I think as a for-profit you can also attract higher quality staff. 
If someone invested all his money to go to a good university, he will search to get a return on his investment, be it 
financially or in a different way like personal development and social impact. As a for-profit you can offer this return 
much easier than a nonprofit because resources are much more scarce and they come from donations. Donors don’t 
want you to spend all your money on salaries. But as a for-profit it is easier to attract talent.” [MEX-FP-3.2] 
“Charismatic leadership inspires staff and creates an organizational culture with a commitment to lean production, 
continuous process improvement, and patient-centered care.” [MEX-FP-3.12] 
Separation strategy 
Sensemaking and inspirational 
leadership: 
 Point out institutional voids to gain 
moral legitimacy of (future) 
employees 
 Delegitimize existing health care / 
social welfare approaches 
Position commercial logic as means 
to higher social end 
“Well, I think its part of the reason why we started here that the industry is quite bipolar. I mean, if you're in that top 
you have the resources to go to a doctor, you go to such a good doctor like in the US or in Germany or France or 
wherever you want, there are very good very good doctors and equipment. Hey but it is that only a minority have 
access to that, then it all depends on the public sector that has doctors, even some operating rooms and good 
facilities but it is completely inadequate. A person who has social security, in theory, has access to [product x] and 
the seguro popular covers the costs. But on the other hand you have to wait six, twelve or more months for [service 
x]. It takes a minute. I mean, you can change lives overnight, eh, and that's an example but there are a thousand, 
there are a thousand examples. Then I think there is much to be done on the public side but I think it is not 
reasonable to expect that to change soon, even with the Seguro Popular. I like it because it involves the private 
sector that I think needs to… then that is our concept, that the private sector is engaged to attend this part of the 
population that is largely neglected. (…) and we do it with economic sense. There is a need that is not being met. I 
think that this is happening more and more. [MEX-FP-3.2] 
Creative strategy 
Impression management: 
Emphasize hybrid approach with 
social face by stressing goal to 
disrupt Mexican health market 
 
“We are seeing not only us but many other eh people who are giving these services. There is of course a risk that 
many people enter this sector to serve that sector only with the intention of seeking a profit and sacrifice quality, 
taking advantage of the fact that in this segment, people do not have access to other options (...) and we, really, that 
is something that from the beginning we have condemned. We are not interested in cheap offer, it has to be 
good”.[MEX-FP-3.2] 
“Competitors hate us (…) Our model is very disruptive, the way we contract doctor, the way we pay them,its 
disruptive in terms of prices, the surgeries are disruptive. I mean, we have built this hospital like a fabric, right, 





Increase focus on cross-
subsidization between revenues 
from sale to higher-income and 
lower-income populations 
“And another important thing is that we work through cross-subsidies. The way that works is that people who pay full 
price are subsidizing people who can pay very little. Then, what do the people who pay full price they cover most of 
the fixed costs and then for people who pay only little, they cover the variable cost and surgery is very economical 
here” [MEX-FP-3.1] 
Creative strategy 
Increase educational marketing 
campaigns in collaboration with 
actors from third and public sector 
to attract customers 
“The goal is that roughly thirty percent of volume, should be coming through campaigns. For the campaigns we have 
created alliances with social partners in the different communities, with NGOs or religious groups, or the primary care 
clinics, any agent in society, in the community that naturally has the will to help bringing more attention to these 
people. This is what I do. I detect communities or groups who might be interested in making a social alliance with us 
through which we service directly to communities. We bring the doctors, give free consultations, we diagnose 





- Personal equity investment of 
funders (hybrid logic) 
- Invent new type of hybrid funding 
(hybrid logic) 
“So originally we decided that we were just gonna go out, trying to find like big donor money. And after about two 
months of trying and writing business plans, financials and putting a lot of information online, one of our buddies was 
just like, guys, open a clinic. Like, what are you doing? Like, just, how much money does it take? And we were all 
like, we think about 20,000 dollars. And he was like, oh please guys, how much money do you have (…)? Okay, we 
were like, okay, put your money in it and then we will see what we can do with other donors. So [Founder 1] and I put 
in a ton of our money, all of our life savings.” [KEN-FP-5.4] 
Creative strategy 
“And then, what we did, we actually created a structure called social shares. And so we allowed our family and 
friends to buy for 100 dollars a social share in our first clinic and to become one of our shareholders. And then with 
that, we would pay them back after two years, with the profit of the clinic. But if the clinic is not profitable in two years, 
then the individuals will not be paid back. But if it is profitable, they will be paid back and they have a certificate thing, 
that they helped that and our patients for a two-year period. So they sort of own a piece in the brick and water in the 
first clinic. We were really excited about that as a model that really helped us scale, going forward if we can have that 
kind of patient capital. Because we know all of those people are technically, you know, have some sort of investment 
in getting their money back. They are also incredibly generous. You know all of our friends and family and things like 
that, so you know we assume they are not gonna send the debt collectors after us, if we do end up as defaulters. But 
that was a pretty exciting innovation, that we were able to come up with. That really allowed us to get off the ground.” 
[KEN-FP-5.4] 
Emphasize social goal to mobilize 
financial support from personal 
networks of founders 
“Instead of seeking impact investors or angel investors to raise the $20,000 needed for one clinic, they crowdsourced 
investment from those who wanted to be a part of the clinics success. Individual investors, via PayPal, purchased 
“Social Shares” – essentially loans – of $100 each, in the individual clinic. If the clinic is successful, their investment 
will be returned plus a 5 percent interest rate in two years. If its not, “we can't promise anything,” they state clearly. 
While the company has also recently received investment from U.S. impact and Kenyan investors for overhead 
costs, they feel that this model of crowdsourcing for establishing individual clinics is the best way to engage a 
broader base of supporters with less cash. It’s like a Kiva model, but for growing social enterprises. They believe the 
best investors are those who believe in the mission of the clinic, and they will enjoy literally tracking their investment 






Emphasize goal of establishing 
financially sustainable organization 
with high quality standards 
“We believe that if we can prove profitability, we can convince the larger clinics that there is profit to be made by 
lowering prices and focusing on low-income patients. It is core to our concept of scaling not only our organization but 
getting the industry to step up their game.” [KEN-FP-5.24] 
“In the heart of one of the fastest-growing cities in East Africa, startup Penda Health opened the doors to its first clinic 
in February. By mid-July, the clinic had seen its 1,000th patient, and Penda Health’s co-founders had set a new goal:  
to open over fifty clinics in East Africa over the next five years aimed at improving access to high quality and 
affordable care for Kenyan women and their families.  
Founded on the premise of bringing affordable and high quality care to the market, Penda Health opened its first 
clinic in late February in Kitengela, a town of about 100,000 people just 35 km outside of Nairobi, and has made a 
number of impressive strides to meet the healthcare needs of Kenyans.   
“During the course of our market research, we were shocked at the severe lack of quality and affordable options for 
most Kenyans,” explains [KEN-FP’s founder 1]. “Too often, people have to see unqualified doctors who misdiagnose 
patients, have old equipment and drugs, and are sometimes rude to patients and make them wait for extended 
periods before treating them.” (…) the few high-quality options charge prices reserved for the upper classes. The 
only options available to most families are poorly staffed single-provider clinics, which are often unqualified and 
under stocked to serve the market. “Many Kenyans are treated extremely poorly and feel stigmatized by the system,” 
explains [founder2]. [KEN-FP’s] solution to this problem is to open a chain of high quality clinics, offering services 
that are affordable for all Kenyans. [KEN-FP] prices its services in-line with competing options” [KEN-FP-5.10]. 
Dismissing strategy 
Reverse decoupling:  
- Position as a “normal” busine 
- Take advantage of positive 
reputation of commercial health 
providers and emphasize “direct” 
downward accountability of 
commercial logic 
“At KEN-FP we’ve discovered a way to learn really quickly what women want. How? We sell our (…) services instead 
of giving them away for free (or highly subsidized prices). 
I find that if you give someone free services, they will often take them whether they like them or not. And they 
definitely won’t feel the right to complain. After all, it’s free. 
This changes fast when you ask patients to pay. Suddenly they are transformed into entitled, demanding and shrewd 
customers that ask questions and speak up (often loudly), when something isn’t going right. And well, they should. 
(…) Once you ask someone to pay for the services you start getting lots of firm feedback. How firm? They don’t show 
up. 
KEN-FP is a for-profit for this very reason. We like being dependent on our patients for our funding. It FORCES us to 
listen to them and offer the services exactly how they like them. If not, we go out of business.” [KEN-FP-5.23] 
“We are forprofit. We are a limited company. We have investors. We are completely for-profit. We are not to say we  
identify as a social enterprise, but... (…) You can call us that, if you want to. I think, that basically, every business in 
Kenya is a social enterprise. Except maybe for the cigarette company or beer company or something like that. We 
create employment in Kenya. You know, what I mean. (…) But, it´s a social enterprise debate. Even we are a social 








innovativeness of new commercially 
oriented hybrid approach and 
delegitimize extant health players to 
gain moral legitimacy 
“After a while [the Colombian company] found it more and more interesting to give money that helps to create a 
sustainable model that can go on alone after a while. [COL-FP-2.2]” 
“Health Care in Colombia is not for free. It costs a lot of money, if one is ill for some time and can not get an 
appointment, it will cost a lot of money if you have to got see the doctor three times,  including transportation costs, 
etc., before you find someone who one actually helps. The statistics in Colombia say that 80% of cases could actually 
be solved by generalists. But it is much less, because they earn so badly, the general doctors, that when people come 
and the doctor sees: oh you have a broken knee, then he sends you to the knee doctor. And then, you can wait 
another three months unti you get the next appointment with the knee doctor. But if you depend on your knees in order 
to make a living, then of course you have a huge problem. The costs are so enormous. [The founder of COL-FP] has 
shown a great caricature yesterday. There's a woman with her child, and there is a doctor who looks like a 
chimpanzee. And it says: Yes, but it's for free.” [COL-FP-2.4]  
Creative strategy 
Accept nonprofit funding and 
partner with NGO to channel 
through donations 
“So we proposed a solution, and the way we did it is as follows: [The incubator] has a contract with [the NGO] and [the 
company]. [The NGO] is a local organization and [the Colombian company] has the money that we need. [The 
Colombian company] already had a contract with the [NGO], so there will be no money that will flow in our incubation 





Decoupling: Pilot project as a 
Corporate Social Investment of 
mother company 
“[The mother company] launched a program to leverage its logistical expertise in the social enterprise sector by 
creating a (…) CSI initiative named [SA-FP]” [SA-FP-7.19] 
“[SA-FP] shall enable the achievement of the wider [mother company] corporate strategies and objectives through 
providing a logical network of community based delivery points for B-C (Business to Client) channel. [SA-FP] is a 
mechanism to create a healthcare channel to the BoP which no other logistics service provider is currently doing in 
South Africa. By making use of [the mother company’s] consolidated logistics model [SA-FP] can become a distribution 
centre for the greater base of the pyramid market thereby eliminating the poverty penalty which exponentially 
increases down the distribution chain. [The mother company’s] business opportunities also have the potential for [SA-
FP] to be a designated service provider and distribution point for public sector scripts.” [SA-FP-7.10] 
Dismissing 
strategy 
Sensemaking: Lobby for more 
pragmatic, market-oriented 
approach to health care in South 
Africa 
“Universal free access, (…) remains to some extent theoretical, since hidden costs are not taken into account: These 
include transport, which is one of the factors which the [SA-FP] model tries to address, as well as lost revenue caused 
by long waits as people queuing at a clinic are unable to be at work. The [SA-FP] model thus offers a wider range of 
options for people living in poverty, and the calculation is that people are often prepared to pay a fee in exchange for 
shorter waiting periods or shorter distances covered.” [SA-FP-7.9] 
“If we are going to wait until we got enough doctors in this country or in this continent, to deal with the health 
challenges that we have, we are going to see many dead people before we fix it. We have to task shift the services into 
other professions. Nurses need to do what doctors used to so. Assistant pharmacists need to do what a pharmacist 
used to do. Community workers need to do what nurse assistants used to do. We need to cascade responsibility down 





Prove sincerity of social goals by  
 showing more presence on the 
ground  
 reducing level of standardization 
 slowing down scaling plans 
“Our initial hypothesis was to charge a uniform set of prices across all clinics in order to standardized prices to facilitate 
scalability. However, after visiting the clinics and communities, we have concluded each clinic should continue to 
charge different prices ranging from R100-R150 based on community unemployment and willingness to pay, 
availability and quality of local public clinics and private GPs, location and proximity to town centers, shopping centers, 
etc.” [SA-FP-7.19] 
“And also what I have said, you need someone that goes and visits them. (…) Because again, it is this visibility 
emphasis”. [SA-FP-7.3] 
“Understand how to make existing model financially sustainable and successful before scaling 
- Allow pilot to complete to see if clinics can be successful without supporting working capital 




Incorporate a hybrid structure 
(nonprofit and for-profit 
organization) 
“You’ve got the trust, then the operating company, then the franchisees. The trust is the nonprofit. The operating 
company is for-profit. The trust is the vehicle into which people put their money. That gives them their points for the 
BBBEE scorecard.” [SA-FP-7.1] 
“So our plan to package this whole thing, so that other companies can invest, cause their is lots of companies that 
have to do BBBEE. Other companies can put forward their 3%. And with that, if we get our own clients, for example, 
putting their 3%, then, it's a whole different thing. (…) So for us, the perfect opportunity for us would be to say (…) 
guys, put in all your money, cause we all have to comply, put all your money towards this project, so that we can 
actually have the 200 clinics in twelve months. We want to build this whole infrastructure. We would need a much 
bigger team to make sure we as a franchisor hold the standards consistently across the country. Then we would make 
a real impact out there and we would have our clients achieve their BBBEE. Some people struggle, they don't know 




Consider conversion into for-profit in 
order to access funding from social 
investment fund 
“Who knows, maybe in the future we will be able to generate enough profits to scale this program significantly and to 
pay returns to investors who have supported us” [MEX-NP-4.1]. 
Dismissing 
strategy 
Increase cost efficiency “In fact, part of the strategy of this institution and is that we become a viable model and that our costs are low. 
That will allow us to be self-sufficient.” [MEX-NP-4.1]. 
Dismissing 
strategy 
Sensemaking: Redefine blended 
value creating goals in the new 
context of the Mexican health 
system in order to justify low wages 
“It’s not like the Seguro Popular will drastically improve the situation in the health care market from one day to the 
other. I mean, it’s a huge improvement, really. But there are many issues left. It takes very long for people to become 
enrolled in the Seguro Popular. Sometimes several months of paperwork. And then there is also the problem of the 
public clinics’ capacities. They are overwhelmed by the high demand. So, quality is often bad. It’s going to take many 
more years until we can say that we have a well functioning public health system for the poor and rural population. And 
then, it’s also not for free. I know the government says that the Seguro Popular brings access to health care for low-
income people free of charge. But the way to go to the public clinics and hospitals costs. Waiting time costs. For many 
of them, it is cheaper to go to a private health care provider and pay for getting treated soon instead of spending entire 





Position as collaborator and 
competitor to the government: 
 Seek affiliation to public health 
insurance (social welfare) 
 Seek other revenue streams in 
parallel (commercial) 
“And that’s why we said: if you can’t cope with the enemy then go with the enemy, that’s why we try to work with the 





Try to lobby for improvement of 
regulations in health market 
“We have now a few nurses who would still do another 20 years or so but they are not many because if you look at the 
public service, it normally absorbs the majority of those who are coming from training. Then there’s a huge private 
sector as well so the remaining are obviously taken by the private sector. Then we’ve been having sort of a to-and-fro 
with the regulatory bodies. They have advocated for nurses and clinical officers who have at least 5-10 years of 
experience. Actually now they have reduced to 5, but before they were saying 10 years of experience to run a facility 
like a [KEN-NP] clinic like Catherine is doing.” [KEN-NP-6.4] 
Cumulative 
strategy 
 Compensate for losses with 
donations 
 Train franchisees to improve 
business skills and medical 
quality 
“Finally, and most importantly, even though some of the individual stores are profitable, they are only so because of 
the value added by [KEN-NP]. [KEN-NP], overall, is a nonprofit and its services are not profitable (…). [KEN-NP] is still 
dependent on the NGO community for donor funding”. [KEN-NP-6.3] 
“I felt that I was still strong enough to work. I didn’t have a job and thought of what to do. That was to have my own 




Prepare transition to for-profit legal 
form 
“So, to start with, what we want to do is separate the two. We’ll have an NGO and for-profit at the end of the day. 
That’s what he is talking about, so we want to see how do we run this?  Of course there might be another organization 
here running for profit because you can’t run for-profit with an NGO registration, so there will be a new company 
registered in Kenya. How do we ensure who stays here, who  comes here from here, so there will be a bit of staff 
movement from NGO to this other one, then what will be the management agreement between this and this, who pays 
what and how much are we paying? So all that, the legal angle in terms of the restructuring, logistics, management 
agreement, there will be a lot of work, the staff movement, how do we manage our accounts? So this will be a lot of 
things to be done over here because at the end of the year we want to have a complete clear solid structure of this and 
this one as well, with clear terms if there is a lot of interchanges either from here to here and here to here there will be 
a bit of an agreement.” [KEN-NP-6.1] 
Dismissing 
strategy 
Innovate the way financial subsidies 
were used to change incentive 
structure 
“so we have some ideas about how to route subsidies better that will lead to better long-term results for us we have 
some exciting things going on right now in fact. We’ve designed along with two young economists, one at Yale on one 
at USC, we've designed some uh... mobile phone based uh... coupons that we're distributing, in fact the first ones are 
being distributed tomorrow. I wish it were yesterday so I can tell you if anyone had responded to the coupons yet… but 
We’ve collected information, mobile phone numbers and take an asset surveys of various people and communities 
near some of our clinics. So an asset surveys is like how many goats do you have, what is the roof your house made 
of, uh... things that can be indicators of wealth and poverty in places with no formal employment history or tax returns 
or credit history. So we have done that with 800 people, that we’re randomizing a bunch of coupons that give discounts 





distribute those to… via text message to all these 800 people and see who comes. Do people really respond to a 
seventy Shilling discount more than to the thirty-five Shilling discount, will they be incentivize too take sort of 
systemically beneficial and efficient prevention measures instead of just wait to get sick and they do that with this sort 
of pricing tests. (…) The average transaction, just in case you’re curious, is something like a dollar or a dollar and 
fifteen cents in our clinics, so it’s really inexpensive in some other clinics, in other areas like the average is three 
dollars. I mean some of our clinics in other areas depending on where they are what the services are about uh... there 
are some people that don't come in because of that and we don't know how many there are, this is one reason why we 
want to do this test of routing subsidies is sort of an easy and interesting, hopefully interesting theoretical topic. But the 
nuts-and-bolts of that require for some granular decisions about who is being subsidized, who they are, how do you 
make it, I mean you can't, it's not, even an asset survey is not expensive but you need to make the transaction costs of 
administering subsidies so low when the subsidies might be ten cents or fifty cents. You know you can't go, trying to 
scale down sort of stuff from the quote on quote insurance industry, usually operating way up high in the pyramid in a 
place like Kenya where there is virtually no insurance for anybody except for rich people or formally employed 
workers”. [KEN-NP-6.7] 
Try to anticipate tensions “Locality is key. Franchises that are financially sustainable are in localities that are a bit more financially stable in terms 
of the economic activities around. (…) Even though it’s periodically, at least those people are empowered 
economically. So that means that the clinic around there, as much as they provide good services, they have good 
customer care, their customers are also able to pay, meaning that clinics will not do a lot of subsidies in terms of it 
does not have much of a percentage of patients unable to pay. (…) For-profit, you can’t do it at the same level than 
nonprofit. You can’t go rural-rural and do for-profit. I don’t think so, very few instances. You have to position yourself a 
bit higher and offer a bit more services for you to make a bit more money.” [KEN-NP-6.4] 
“To protect the non-profit mission from influence by profit-motivated investors it is required by U.S. tax law that [KEN-
NP] have 100% operational control over the for-profit franchisor in Kenya, so decisions would continue to be made to 
serve [KEN-NP]’s charitable mission as they now are. And since [KEN-NP] may invest in the holding company the 
same as any other investor it can invest donations it receives so that those donations are spent in the same way they 
are now spent to provide working capital to the franchisor. Meanwhile, under U.S. tax rules, called “mission related 
investing,” tax-exempt foundations and trusts may not only donate to [KEN-NP] but they can also invest their assets in 
the holding company to the extent that the work of the for-profit franchisor serves their charitable missions of trusts and 
foundations. Finally, as the business in Kenya develops and prospers, ordinary private investors will find an opportunity 
to fulfill both their investment goals and their social missions.” [KEN-NP-6.6] 
Creative strategy 
SA-NP 
Try and convince collaborators in 
South Africa to jointly implement 
social enterprise projects by 
emphasizing the benefits of a 
stronger market-orientation 
“And we want now (…) within the Social Enterprise Strategy, is build clinics which are not in public hospital, but which 
are standalone and are profitable, and we want to do them as a joint venture with local partners.” [SA-NP-8.3] 
“It could be individuals, just an [medical specialist] or a business person and set up a clinic, so, with the department of 
health, that's a different model, which we will see, South Africa a good thing is that we don't invest so much in the 
clinics compared to other countries, because in South Africa it may be that diagnostic equipment, but you know social 
enterprise is the way to go, because [SA-NP] is a social enterprise organization and as I said, South Africa's economy 







Incorporate additional for-profit 
organization 
“There are expansion plans for [social enterprise program 1] that are currently in the infancy stage. The team is 
currently conducting feasibility studies to launch the [social enterprise program 1] as a separate legal entity. All 
revenues from the separate legal entity will then be donated to [SA-NP] to create a new source of revenue for [SA-NP]. 
The objective of this approach is to allow [SA-NP] to target the private sector market as well, without the limitations 
imposed on it as an activity of a not for profit organization in South Africa. [SA-NP-8.1] 
Separating 
strategy 
- Remain a complement to public 
health system  
- Implement only parts of the social 
enterprise strategy to avoid 
upsetting partners 
“It is [the government’s] inherent role [to provide free health care], but they don't. Most of what governments do, and 
not only in South Africa, when they do their budgets, they say the budget for health this year is that much, but they also 
have to identify where all that money has to come from. And some of that money they expect to come from partners.” 
[SA-FP-8.5] “That's why in South Africa we only implement certain parts of the social enterprise strategy. If a social 
enterprise program is not implementable in certain countries, because the government has this, then we will not 
implement it. Like in South Africa, we don't do social enterprise clinics, but we have this [social enterprise program] that 
we are doing. (…) So here in South Africa we asked ourselves: how can we implement social enterprise, given that we 
will be unable technically to do the pure clinics. But, we can go into partnerships with different people and we can open 
up other channels. So for example the [medical] supply, (…) we are looking at producing the [products] locally, instead 
of sourcing them from China. [SA-NP-8.6] 
“So when you ask what the future is, so it may not be entirely public sector, we are now also (…) getting partner 
together to set up a social enterprise clinic. (…) It could be individuals, just a [health worker] or a business person and 
set up a clinic. So, with the department of health, that's a different model, which we will see. (…) Social enterprise is 
the way to go, because [SA-NP] is a social enterprise organization and as I said, South Africa's economy is vibrant 




Hire young employees with more 
openess to hybrid approaches 
“But [the founder] will now recruit more young people who think entrepreneurially and socially” . [SA-NP-8.3] Creative strategy 
COL-NP 
Process of restructuring and cultural 
change 
“Because here , (…) , is where there was the split between [COL-NP] IPS and [COL-NP] Social.” [COL-NP-1.5] 
“In particular, (…) , this period of change influenced ]COL-NP] in at least five areas: increased competition , changes in 
the structure of costs and revenues, strengthening programs , administrative restructuring, and change in the job 
profiles”. [COL-NP-1.10] 
“When we went from being an institution that depended on international donations to be a income generating 
institution, we had to change many of the values in our management and service provision. At the level of services it 
happened that our workforce got accustomed in the organization’s thirty years of history that customers are grateful for 
receiving care- So they had to depart from that typical patronizing attitude in the health system before Law 100, of 
being omnipresent, of being the benefactor who was never wrong. With Law 100 we learned that the one you have to 




Cross subsidize between profitable 
and unprofitable operations  
“Well, actually, [COL-NP IPS] does everything that the health system prescribes. So, it’s  for all the people who belong 
to the contributory or subsidized system, which would be the SISBEN. In [COL-NP Social] we provide to people what 






pregnancies, (…). Another thing that COL-NP Social does is to work with people who are in emergency situations. 
People that have been displaced, either by the armed conflict or by natural catastrophes. COL-NP searches these 
spaces that the system does not necessarily serve. Or that are needed because they are cyclical. So many times, 
clients of COL-NP Social are people who are displaced by the winter and who require health care but are currently only 
identified as displaced people.” [COL-NP-1.5] 
- Put stronger emphasis on 
privately sold health services to 
target groups with sufficient ability 
to pay (commercial logic) 
- Continue to seek funds from 
donors to implement 
complementary social programs 
and continue to lobby for 
improvements in the public health 
system (social welfare logic) 
“And we're trying to encourage cash income, which is income not through the EPS, but users who come here and want 
to have this or another procedure. (…) COL-NP has never been a commercial organization. And right now it is 
changing tremendously to being commercial. (...) So we're sketching for new products, giving them greater impetus so 
that we can really add products that are stable and will increase our product sales. (…) So, cash payments are what 
we want to increase. It is one of the great advantages of [COL-NP IPS], because we have this part of cash generating 
activities. Users come here and pay cash. These users have always been a fairly high percentage of the revenue. 
When the EPS were still strong, our health care sales were 70% of EPS and 30% in cash. But with the EPS cutting 
services etc ... we're now at 50/50. It may be a little more cash than EPS. So we are trying to strengthen this part 
because besides the fact that we receive the cash directly, also the margins are higher than when it goes through the 
EPS.” [COL-NP-1.1] 
 “As we are a social institution, we have always made the lobby for [health services] to be included in the POS.61 But 
with the current situation in which the system is, the EPS are in a very very very very difficult situation, so they are 
beginning to restrict our services. They fixed quotas, for example for the [product x], which is quite expensive, a little 
over 150 dollars. They fixed quotas, like this month you have 200 no more. And then they begin to restrict. Then a 
woman can wait 5 or 6 months for getting the approval for the [product x]. So we're offering the [product x] as a private 
service. Some people may afford it, others won't.” [COL-NP-1.1] 
“USAID currently is identifying their lines of action in Colombia. The information I have is that they will focus on 





                                                   




Appendix 7: Empirical Material Reflecting Legitimacy of Sector Logics in 
Health Fields 
Colombia 
“Health Care in Colombia is not for free. It costs a lot of money, if one is ill for some time and can 
not get an appointment, it will cost a lot of money if you have to got see the doctor three times,  
including transportation costs, etc., before you find someone who one actually helps. The 
statistics in Colombia say that 80% of cases could actually be solved by generalists. But it is 
much less, because they earn so badly, the general doctors, that when people come and the 
doctor sees: oh you have a broken knee, then he sends you to the knee doctor. And then, you 
can wait another three months unti you get the next appointment with the knee doctor. But if you 
depend on your knees in order to make a living, then of course you have a huge problem. The 
costs are so enormous. [The founder of COL-FP] has shown a great caricature yesterday. 
There's a woman with her child, and there is a doctor who looks like a chimpanzee. And it says: 
Yes, but it's for free.” [COL-FP-2.4] 
“For example what happens is that, there is an EPS like Caprecom. Caprecom here owed to 
hospitals in [Colombian department] at least 2000 million pesos or 3000. But there are no powers 
of control in this department. They can not sanction anything. The public health system is based 
ona a free market logic where the free market supposedly regulates itself. But in a market where 
so much money is moving and there are so many differences between businesses with much 
power and others with very little, it doesn’t work. And the state should control, but he doesn’t. 
That is why we are in this crisis. For lack of control.” [COL-FP-2.2] 
“all programs of primary health care are trying to be realized through public hospitals because it is 
with state resources. If the state says, if I'm the father and I put the money to insure citizens, the 
ideal is that this money goes to the same state entities which are public hospitals.” [COL-FP-2.1] 
“In Colombia, access to health services for low-income people is a very big social problem. 
Despite the increase in insurance coverage there are several problems to be solved such as the 
significant differences in the quality of public health services and private services and between 
the subsidized and contributory scheme, high burden of administrative procedures and low 
opportunity and agility to access the services. Not only users but also health professionals face 
problems. Low wages, delays of more than 30 days on payments and frequent restrictions on the 
exercise of its work have generated dissatisfaction in the system.” [COL-FP-2.9] 
“Currently 9.4% of the population [in this department] does not have health insurance and 46.7 % 
are in the subsidized regime. Both situations often require users to spend more on private health 
services, however, usually the price of these services is unaffordable for low-income people, 
reducing the consumption of health services in emergency situations.” [COL-FP-2.9] 
“Our health sector is supposed to cover 100% of the population. Or that's the goal. But it is a 
coverage in which there is a manual which says things are covered. It does not cover 100%. 
However, the vast majority of things that are covered are provided in [COL-NP]. Why? Because, 
as a social institution, it has always made the lobby so that these things are included in the POS. 
(…) But with the system like this right now so critical, the EPS are in a very very very very difficult 
situation, so they are beginning to restrict our services. They placed quotas, for example [product 
x] that is quite expensive, are about 250,000, 300,000 pesos, a little more than 150 dollars. They 
place quotas, like this month you have 200 no more. And then they begin to restrict. Then a 
patient can expect 5 or 6 months to get [the product].”  [COL-FP-1.1] 
“then there is this serious problem, that there is a thing called user “ligas du usuario”, which is 
getting bigger and bigger right now. These are user associations, which all EPS must have by 
law. And the IPS have to settle for some users leagues for them to review, participate in hospital 
ethics committees, where complaints and claims, all part of patients' rights are handled. That they 




we are far away from that because people do not participate in those leagues, it is that it is very 
difficult for users to make calls that come form their leagues, but people do not understand that 
this is a very good tool if you know how to handle. I think that can be done at the community 
level. The idea is good for the community. But it doesn’t work very well. Here, it’s all against all 
and that is very inappropriate and inconsistent, very aggressive, it’s distrustful. I believe that here 
in Colombia there is a need to form communities, strong community groups to help.” [COL-FP-
1.2] 
“(…) the concept of health reform in Colombia in 93, the target for the year 2000 was universal 
health coverage in Colombia. In 2000 only 69% were covered. In 2010 we arrived at 88%. So 
there was a need of those people who are outside the coverage. We had to offer some type of 
service. In addition, the other major problem in the country, is that the system identifies the 
beneficiaries, in the SISBEN, it identifies them at home. Officials go home and see that people 
live on soil for example, then they make a rating and assign a score on the SISBEN. Stratum 0, 1, 
whatever. And that results in the economic segments in the SISBEN. People that can’t pay, 
people that can pay little, etc. But due to the internal conflict, people have to move. Colombia has 
the second highest amount of displacement. People move and thus are not even recognized by 
the system. So displaced people are just nothing in the SISBEN. Then someone has to begin 
addressing these displaced. But that has to be financed either by the social state or by 
international agencies (…).” [COL-FP-1.3] 
Mexico 
“The Seguro Popular is a new system of universal coverage of the government for people who 
have neither social security nor are workers in the state because state workers have security. 
There's another insurance called IMSS and the IMSS is for all employees working in a formal 
payroll. But almost 50 % of employees in Mexico are in the informal economy and lack access to 
health services. So through the Seguro Popular, there is a special fund called the "Fund for 
catastrophic expenditures" covering catastrophic illnesses such as breast cancer, abdominal 
cancer, etc. The Seguro Popular opened a system of outsourcing where you can become a 
supplier for the government in all these services.” [COL-FP-3.1] 
“Well, I think its part of the reason why we started here that the industry is quite bipolar. I mean, if 
you're in that top you have the resources to go to a doctor, you go to such a good doctor like in 
the US or in Germany or France or wherever you want, there are very good very good doctors 
and equipment. Hey but it is that only a minority have access to that, then it all depends on the 
public sector that has doctors, even some operating rooms and good facilities but it is completely 
inadequate. A person who has social security, in theory, has access to [product x] and the seguro 
popular covers the costs. But on the other hand you have to wait six, twelve or more months for 
[service x]. It takes a minute. I mean, you can change lives overnight, eh, and that's an example 
but there are a thousand, there are a thousand examples. Then I think there is much to be done 
on the public side but I think it is not reasonable to expect that to change soon, even with the 
Seguro Popular. I like it because it involves the private sector that I think needs to… then that is 
our concept, that the private sector is engaged to attend this part of the population that is largely 
neglected. (…) and we do it with economic sense. There is a need that is not being met. I think 
that this is happening more and more. [MEX-FP-3.2]  
“They cut [the health service] out of the insurance plan because they realized that [the disease] is 
too widespread. It simply exceeds their financial abilities. But officially, what they say is that [the 
disease] doesn’t cause catastrophic expenditures and that’s why they’re taking it out. They want 
to focus on catastrophic health expenditures only. That’s what they say. But [the disease that 
we’re trying to cure] is one of the main reasons for poverty in Mexico. So they can’t tell me that 
it’s not catastrophic”. [MEX-FP-3.13] 
“Here [in Mexico] it is a lot about who you know and who knows you. And although [the Seguro 
Popular] can be a super good opportunity for suppliers and it can be very good for patients, if 
there is no trust that (…) you will receive payment for services and will not jeopardize your entire 




verify that… I mean once you are accredited, they do not check whether or not you comply with 
certain standards, I mean you are not instructed. At least us…” [MEX-FP-3.2] 
“[Public] investment [in health] as a percentage of GDP is very low, it is like six point four percent 
and on average I think it's like ten. And out-of-pocket expenditure is like fifty percent, this I think is 
due to a lack of infrastructure, I mean, even though they are the government schemes, though 
there is an investment in percapita terms, I mean spending between percapita in the last fifteen 
years I think increased a hundred and thirty five percent. But not enough, I mean, still having too 
few doctors, still very few offices, there remains very little infrastructure, then people who have 
the resources resorts to private clinics because the service in the public sector is not so good, I 
mean the waiting time is very long, sometimes they charge, sometimes they are not in service, 
and I think that makes [MEX-FP] really a very good solution. Because if fifty percent of spending 
is out-of-pocket because you bring something that's a third of the price on average, really it is a 
radical change for people, because if anyway they have to pay, either here, either the more 
expensive hospital I think they have it at sixty five thousand pesos.” [MEX-FP-3.3] 
“[MEX-FP] has three main competitor types: private clinics, non-profit health providers, and public 
medical services. There are many private clinics in Mexico, but their price point is inaccessible to 
the general population, and they do not institute any community outreach programs. (…) Non-
profit health providers (social assistance centers and teaching hospitals) form the second source 
of competition. (…) The last category of competitors is the public health sector (all public general 
hospitals.) The public health infrastructure is insufficient to meet demand, resulting in delays and 
poor service. Although accessible, wait times are long (up to 8-months) and there is no 
community outreach. Most worrisome is that good service is not guaranteed.” [MEX-FP-3.17] 
“pues definitivamente hay barreras culturales, porqué? Porque aquí todo queremos gratis  
desafortunadamente”  [MEX-NP-3.1] 
Kenya 
“10% of Kenya is rich and they have insurance and they go to like Aga Khan. Really nice clinics, 
which is awesome. But the bottom 20% of Kenya is poor. (…) But even the poor people. You 
have to pay to go to the government. Free government clinics are not free. So then you either 
borrow money from somebody, or I guess, some of them just don´t go at all. Which does happen. 
And I guess, we don´t do anything about that. (…) We are targeting everybody. For in that bottom 
20%, some of them can´t pay for our services, so we don´t get them as patients. For some of our 
services, we are outrageously cheaper. Like we are cheaper than the government for Malaria... 
Free government clinics. We are cheaper than the free government clinics for Malaria. So like, we 
are very affordable. But there are some people, who can´t afford our services. That was a 
ramble.” [KEN-FP-5.1] 
“Everyone working in a formal sector, employees and factories are working in a formal sector, get 
NHF special health insurance fund. Which provides in-patient healthcare only and thinking about 
rolling out out-patient healthcare one day. But for right now it is only in-patient healthcare. What 
happens is that all of those peoples can go to the other shitty clinics and they can be like, I have 
this little tiny cup on my finger. And the doctor is like, pneumonia, hah? You gonna have to stay 
for two days. Which means that the hospital gets reimbursed from an NHF as if they had a 
person who slept for two days in that hospital. So they get paid a lot of money for that. But it also 
means that instead of paying 100 shillings for their band aid or whatever they needed, they don´t 
pay anything. They get it free. Because it´s now in-patient healthcare. Yeah. (…) I mean that's 
just fraud. Really it means that we are competing against free. All of our kind of target market that 
we are going after, all of them could get our services for free somewhere else. So that´s really 
hard to compete with free anywhere in the world, right?” [KEN-FP-5.1] 
“I guess, I am not sure, in Kenya, people don't care, as long as whatever I am getting is of quality, 
is worth the value of what I pay. I think in Kenya, the problem we have, is the government is 




eventually they give poor services. If there are services that are affordable and and very low cost, 
in most cases, people tend to go for private providers.” [KEN-FP-5.4] 
“In terms of the players in healthcare, of course public is a bit bigger than private, however, the 
difference isn’t that big because, although I’m not very sure of the figure but I would think it’s 
about 55% of all health services are provided by the public and then 45% by the private sector. 
But I’m not very sure about the percentage that you’d have to look through. Looking at what the 
public service provides, maybe it could be the reason why also there’s the presence of the private 
sector taking a big chunk in terms of health service delivery. Because you find that especially 
where it comes to service delivery, the public sector is unable to handle everything. They also 
don’t have all the resources that are required. You’ll find that especially the lower level of care, 
health centers, dispensaries and sub-district, they run out of stock on quite a number of products 
and that’s necessitated for the private sector to thrive actually. And in terms of [KEN-NP’s] 
presence in the country, I think what has made us successful at that level is that also there are 
very many gap areas that the government is also not able to reach especially now when you 
come to the rural facilities. There might be the infrastructure there, there might be that clinic there 
but no staff to work in those areas. I would give a very good example of a place I have visited 
although we are not there as [KEN-NP], in the coastal region. The facility is there, the dispensary 
is there, the health center is there but they don’t have anybody there because from the 
community they don’t have anybody who’s been trained as a nurse, clinical officer or doctor who 
can go back and give services to the community. In such cases you find that [KEN-NP] comes in 
handy if they are able to bridge that gap for the population.” [KEN-NP-6.4] 
“Or the very small clinics you get in the shopping centers and all that. But the biggest problem 
with those small clinics is you don’t know where the drug they bought came from. You don’t know 
whether it’s genuine. You don’t know whether the items being used are sterilized. There are a lot 
of questions in terms of the quality of healthcare. But if you are looking for something you can rely 
on it’s either the government or the faith-based institutions.” [KEN-NP-6.2] 
“I would say in Kenya it has just been limited to the government hospitals and NHIF. I would say 
that is the 2 areas that I’ve seen the government play. And when it comes to government-run 
hospitals, you literally don’t want to go to a government-run hospital.(…) because, the place is 
overloaded. I was being told in Kenyatta National Hospital (KNH) which is the biggest hospital in 
East and Central Africa; it’s a government-run hospital, a tertiary hospital, referral centre, a 
medical school and all that. To get diagnosis, say you want a CT scan, you can wait up to 2 
weeks. Assuming you have a growth in your head, and it keeps growing, do you know what 2 
weeks does to you? Everybody goes to these hospitals. Most of them very low-income don’t have 
any other alternative, so it’s either that or nothing. And then their health workers run their 
separate private practices so they really don’t give these government hospitals their 100%. 
They’ll just show up for maybe 1 or 2 hours in a day. After that you have to wait for the next 
doctor or whoever will be available” [KEN-NP-6.2] 
“In the constitution, yes it is there in black and white, but when it comes to the implementation 
how do you do it. It is all by the government. (…)And then there’s also a lot of corruption going on 
in the government. Like I think 3 months ago they were trying to roll out this National Social 
Insurance Fund (NSIF). So normally it only covers the in-patient but they were trying to roll out for 
the out-patient and they selected a few of these health clinics. And we realized at the end of the 
day there was a lot of kickbacks being paid out. Huge sums of money were being paid out to 
specific health facilities. And what these facilities were doing was paying back the government 
officials. Say it was supposed to be 1 M, they quote 3M out of which they pay 2M back to these 
people and then they get 1M back. So it’s really murky, lots of corruption going on. And that’s 
creating a big inefficiency in delivering quality healthcare especially to the low-income. Because 
the high-income people just go to Alexander-Forbes, Jubilee insurance, all these international 
insurance. Get a good cover. When you are sick you go to 4 star, 5 star hospitals, the Nairobi 
hospitals, the Aga Khan hospitals. You get very good treatment or go abroad, get treatment and 
you are covered and then you come back and you are okay. The low-income what do they do? 
And a place like UG doesn’t have the NHIF, nothing even for the people on white collar jobs, 
nothing even for the civil servants. But Rwanda, you should read about Rwanda. Rwanda has an 




adoption rate is really high. I can’t remember it at the top of my head but it’s something close to 
80 or something. 80% of the population is under the NSIF. That is where we would want us to go. 
[KEN-NP-6.2] 
“it's not just drug quality that is bad, it’s in everything quality is bad, diagnostic quality is bad, 
quality of equipment is bad, quality of roads is bad and so on right so uh... let's take malaria so 
we might say “well don't people know they're buying counterfeit and sub-standard malaria 
medicine” and on one hand the answer is yes they feel.. like if you talk to our patients and say 
why do you come and pay a dollar to our clinic instead of going down the street to a place that's 
substantially free, they very rarily will answer, and the answer is they say are “when i come here 
much out my child gets better” “uh... when i come here, I don’t have to wait a long time i get 
served quickly” and “these people here are nice instead of being rude to me” this is some 
anecdotal things that people you know that that we've heard uh...  
But but on the other hand if you think so there's some awareness of drug quality, but think 
about…. about half the drugs are sub-standard right and about half the time we found when 
people think that they have malaria that they don’t. So people get a fever especially cyclical fever 
they think it's malaria, and so they go buy drug so you might say “how can they do that don’t 
they.. isn’t it so obvious to them the most the time there'll be a better” but say that's a that's 
roughly half half and half like, so i got a fever, half the time I actually have malaria, half the time I 
don’t. but i always get malaria medicine say. And half the time i get malaria medicine and and i do 
have malaria it's good, So half the time I didn’t have malaria i get better, half the time i did have 
malaria I get good drugs, seventy five percent of the time i get better from the supposed malaria, 
twenty five percent of the time maybe I don’t. So the problem is not zero to a hundred like you 
don't get better all with bad drugs, it's that in the whole ecosystem with diagnosis and everything 
most of the time you do get better in a case like that. And so you really going from like seventy 
five two hundred in that case again the percentages you know uh... but the demands that is 
absolutely where the rubber meets the road on these  things that there's a huge gap between any 
policy whether from the who or national policy whatever that says “these are the drugs are should 
be used, these are a should use them this is how you should store them, this is how it should be 
price” or any of these things get lost along the way of the value chain where every link of the 
chain is very compromised. 
And by the end of the chain you have patients who don’t want to take malaria test for whatever 
reason, you know, other drugs are used to taking, if you have a blister pack of drugs where there 
is two drugs they have to take, they don't take the partner drug 'cause that has side effects they 
don’t want, i mean it's it's just chaos, so very difficult to uh...” [KEN-NP-6.7] 
South Africa 
“In South Africa, access to health care is, like so many other aspects of life, characterized by 
significant inequalities: While 17% of the population can afford to pay for private health care 
(usually of high quality), more than 8 out of 10 South Africans have no health insurance, and rely 
on an overburdened public sector to meet their health care needs.” [SA-FP-7.9] 
“While the state has begun the process of implementing ambitious plans to introduce a national 
health insurance scheme (NHI) for all South Africans, it lacks sufficient resources to provide 
quality, effective and affordable health care to all. As a result, there is a wide gap between the 
primary health care and medication needs of millions of poor South Africans and the available 
services. Market surveys indicate that a significant number of people in poor communities are 
able and willing to spend modest amounts for easier access to primary health care and 
medicines. This suggests that inclusive business models that combine commercial models with a 
strong social impact can help fill the gap that currently exists in access to primary health care and 
medicines for low-income communities, while at the same time alleviating the financial and 
logistical burden on over- burdened public health care facilities.” [SA-FP-7.9] 
“The inequalities that permeate South African society are equally present when it comes to 




funded public health care system and the private health care sector in terms of cost, spend per 
patient, and quality of care. While a minority of affluent South Africans is able to afford high 
quality private health care, 83 per cent of the population, a total of 41.7 million people out of 
South Africa’s total population of 50 million, rely on public health care services, which are often 
understaffed and under-resourced. 
The gap between the state and the private sector is perhaps most obvious when measured in 
average spending per patient: At R 8,250 per head (approximately US $ 1,090), it is 6 times 
higher in the private sector than in the public sector, where the average annual spend is R 1,372 
(approximately US $ 181). This level of discrepancy feeds on itself, as the resource gap between 
public and private health care sectors tends to drive qualified medical staff, especially specialized 
staff (pharmacists, dentists, optometrists, qualified nurses) away from the public sector. 
Poor South Africans rely mainly on the public health care network because of its relative 
affordability: Access to the public health care network is nominally free for children under the age 
of 6 and breastfeeding mothers, and available at very low fees (usually around R 20, the 
equivalent of US $2.60) for outpatients. Since April 2006, primary health care is free for all in 
South Africa, one of the biggest achievements in public health care since the advent of 
democracy. This achievement does not, however, take into account the indirect costs for patients, 
such as transport to get to a public health facility (especially in remote rural areas), or lost income 
as a result of many hours and sometimes days waiting in queues. 
One important factor that contributes to the reliance on the public health care network is that with 
generally low levels of education, many people in low-income communities are reluctant to self-
medicate, and seek treatment from already overburdened public health care facilities, at a very 
high cost to the public health care system. 
There remains, therefore, significant demand for primary health care at the base of the economic 
pyramid in South Africa, most significantly the 41% of the South African population earning or 
spending less than R 20 or the equivalent of US $ 3 per day, as well as the “middle of the 
pyramid”, i.e. those citizens who are on an income of between R 20 and R 140 per day (see Box 
II). 
Against this background, and given the unmet demand for primary health care and medicines, the 
gap in the market tends to be filled by private alternatives. There is some evidence, for instance, 
suggesting that illegal health clinics often operate in townships, and that people are prepared to 
pay for such services despite the obvious risks: One recent report put a standard medical 
consultation in an illegal health clinic at R 190 (approximately US $ 25). The fact that illegal 
health care services exist at all is a strong indication that people are willing to pay for alternatives 
to public health facilities if the perceived benefits outstrip the visible and invisible costs. Legal 
private clinics in the same areas can cost up to R 250. 
While it is difficult to estimate the size of this market with any real precision, national household 
surveys provide useful rough estimates. According to Statistics South Africa (the country’s main 
national statistical institute), the average annual consumption expenditure of poor Black African 
households is R 30,509 (approximately US $ 4,060 per year per household, with an average of 4 
people per household). An estimated 1.5% of that annual expenditure goes to health care, 
amounting to R 458 per annum per household. (…) 
Based on approximately 8 million households, it is estimated that the total underserved market at 
the base of the pyramid represents a monetary value of R 3.2 billion per year (approximately US 
$ 430 million at March 2012 exchange rates). This figure is most likely an underestimate: A global 
study of the BoP market in 2007 estimated that measured in purchasing power parity terms, the 
overall health care market at the Base of the Pyramid in Africa alone represented US $ 18 billion 
at purchasing power parity rates.” [SA-FP-7.9] 
“In summary, healthcare is distributed via three major sectors: private, public and NGO. These 
sectors, through various different factors, distribute health unequally and in a manner that is 
unsustainable. The numbers show that SA is behind peer countries and backs up the 




significant current pandemic of HIV/Aids coupled with a growing yet understated chronic non- 
communicable disease burden for the long term.” [SA-FP-7.20] 
“The original business model conceptualisation included informal traders (e.g. spazas). This 
association of micro-entrepreneurs from the informal sector is a major characteristic of 
almost any inclusive BoP business model and a key feature of the benefits for poor people. 
However, management had no direct experience with accessing this channel, so they 
elected to go into partnership with a company that was already supplying this informal 
network with other products like mobile pre-paid airtime. [The former manager] originally 
contracted this company to supply the spaza shops with [medical supply in a box]. (…) This 
component of the pilot was very successful with demand far exceeding supply. (…) However, 
the company raised an important point: What is the legality of supplying medication without 
the package insert? And spaza shops owners in [Site 1] and [Site 2] echoed similar 
sentiments: 
1) They were concerned with what impact this would have on their established logistics and 
distribution partners. Will involving themselves with [SA-FP] anger current supply chain 
partners? (…) 
2) Assuming they accept this box, they have a very limited understanding of health aliments. 
They would not know where to begin advising people on what to use and purchase. 
Therefore, they will need additional training.  
3) What if customers develop complications as a result of medicinal products that were sold 
to them (…)? How will the shop owner who sold the medication help? Will this type of event 
not lead to a negative backlash from the community on them and their stores? Did the box 
hold a potentially big risk to the store’s brand reputation in these stocking products?” [SA-FP-
7.20] 
“It is [the government’s] inherent role [to provide free health care], but they don't. Most of what 
governments do, and not only in South Africa, when they do their budgets, they say the budget 
for health this year is that much, but they also have to identify where all that money has to come 
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